Archive for August 9, 2013

White House lobbies Israel to stop lobbying Congress on Iran policy

August 9, 2013

White House lobbies Israel to stop lobbying Congress on Iran policy | World Tribune.

Special to WorldTribune.com

WASHINGTON — The United States is stepping up efforts to dissuade Israel’s government from criticizing the policy of President Barack Obama toward Iran, officials said.

The Obama administration has decided to again send the chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to Israel. Officials said Gen. Martin Dempsey was
scheduled to leave Washington for Israel and Jordan on Aug. 10 in an attempt
to end Israel’s lobbying of Congress to oppose any U.S. reconciliation with
Iran.

Gen. Martin Dempsey.  /APT

The Dempsey visit was announced as Israel warned of the prospect of a U.S. reconciliation with a nuclear Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other officials have been briefing a delegation of 36 House members on Iran’s nuclear program, said to have accelerated in 2013.

“Iran’s work and quest towards the achievement of atomic weapons not only continues, it continues unabated,” Netanyahu said on Aug. 7.”It’s actually accelerated.”

“Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, will be departing this weekend for visits in Israel and Jordan,” the Defense Department said. “The focus of the chairman’s visits will be discussing issues of mutual interest with his counterparts and continuing to build on these important defense relationships.”

This was reported to be the second time Dempsey was sent to Israel in a
week. On Aug. 4, Dempsey, deemed the friendliest senior U.S. defense
official to Israel, was said to have held meetings with Netanyahu and the military command on Iran and Syria. Officials said Dempsey informed the Israeli leadership that Washington would not attack Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure and warned against any Israeli strike.

In a statement on Aug. 7, the Pentagon did not state that Dempsey arrived in
Israel several days earlier. The statement said the chairman’s last visit
was in October 2012.

“In Israel, the chairman expects to discuss the United States’
unwavering commitment to Israel’s security, including potential threats from
Iran, the ongoing civil war in Syria, and uncertainty in the Sinai
[Peninsula in Egypt],” the Pentagon said. “While in Jordan, he plans to
visit U.S. troops and to gain a richer understanding of the impact on how
the conflict in Syria is impacting Jordan and the region.”

History News Network – Nuclear Terror in the Middle East

August 9, 2013

History News Network.


Credit: Wiki Commons.

In those first minutes, they’ll be stunned. Eyes fixed in a thousand-yard stare, nerve endings numbed. They’ll just stand there. Soon, you’ll notice that they are holding their arms out at a 45-degree angle. Your eyes will be drawn to their hands and you’ll think you mind is playing tricks. But it won’t be. Their fingers will start to resemble stalactites, seeming to melt toward the ground. And it won’t be long until the screaming begins. Shrieking. Moaning. Tens of thousands of victims at once. They’ll be standing amid a sea of shattered concrete and glass, a wasteland punctuated by the shells of buildings, orphaned walls, stairways leading nowhere.

This could be Tehran, or what’s left of it, just after an Israeli nuclear strike.

Iranian cities — owing to geography, climate, building construction, and population densities — are particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to a new study, “Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale,” published in the journal Conflict & Health by researchers from the University of Georgia and Harvard University. It is the first publicly released scientific assessment of what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean for people in the region.

Its scenarios are staggering. An Israeli attack on the Iranian capital of Tehran using five 500-kiloton weapons would, the study estimates, kill seven million people — 86 percent of the population — and leave close to 800,000 wounded. A strike with five 250-kiloton weapons would kill an estimated 5.6 million and injure 1.6 million, according to predictions made using an advanced software package designed to calculate mass casualties from a nuclear detonation.

Estimates of the civilian toll in other Iranian cities are even more horrendous. A nuclear assault on the city of Arak, the site of a heavy water plant central to Iran’s nuclear program, would potentially kill 93 percent of its 424,000 residents. Three 100-kiloton nuclear weapons hitting the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas would slaughter an estimated 94 percent of its 468,000 citizens, leaving just 1 percent of the population uninjured. A multi-weapon strike on Kermanshah, a Kurdish city with a population of 752,000, would result in an almost unfathomable 99.9 percent casualty rate.

Cham Dallas, the director of the Institute for Health Management and Mass Destruction Defense at the University of Georgia and lead author of the study, says that the projections are the most catastrophic he’s seen in more than thirty years analyzing weapons of mass destructionand their potential effects. “The fatality rates are the highest of any nuke simulation I’ve ever done,” he told me by phone from the nuclear disaster zone in Fukushima, Japan, where he was doing research. “It’s the perfect storm for high fatality rates.”

Israel has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons, but is widely known to have up to several hundred nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Iran has no nuclear weapons and its leaders claim that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes only. Published reports suggest that American intelligence agencies and Israel’s intelligence service are in agreement: Iran suspended its nuclear weapons development program in 2003.

Dallas and his colleagues nonetheless ran simulations for potential Iranian nuclear strikes on the Israeli cities of Beer Sheva, Haifa, and Tel Aviv using much smaller 15-kiloton weapons, similar in strength to those dropped by the United States on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Their analyses suggest that, in Beer Shiva, half of the population of 209,000 would be killed and one-sixth injured. Haifa would see similar casualty ratios, including 40,000 trauma victims. A strike on Tel Aviv with two 15-kiloton weapons would potentially slaughter 17 percent of the population — nearly 230,000 people. Close to 150,000 residents would likely be injured.

These forecasts, like those for Iranian cities, are difficult even for experts to assess. “Obviously, accurate predictions of casualty and fatality estimates are next to impossible to obtain,” says Dr. Glen Reeves, a longtime consultant on the medical effects of radiation for the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, who was not involved in the research. “I think their estimates are probably high but not impossibly so.”

According to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund, a San Francisco-based foundation that advocates for nuclear disarmament, “the results would be catastrophic” if major Iranian cities were attacked with modern nuclear weapons. “I don’t see 75 percent [fatality rates as] being out of the question,” says Carroll, after factoring in the longer-term effects of radiation sickness, burns, and a devastated medical infrastructure.

According to Dallas and his colleagues, the marked disparity between estimated fatalities in Israel and Iran can be explained by a number of factors. As a start, Israel is presumed to have extremely powerful nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery capabilities including long-range Jericho missiles, land-based cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and advanced aircraft with precision targeting technology.

The nature of Iranian cities also makes them exceptionally vulnerable to nuclear attack, according to the Conflict & Health study. Tehran, for instance, is home to 50 percent of Iran’s industry, 30 percent of its public sector workers, and 50 colleges and universities. As a result, 12 million people live in or near the capital, most of them clustered in its core. Like most Iranian cities, Tehran has little urban sprawl, meaning residents tend to live and work in areas that would be subject to maximum devastation and would suffer high percentages of fatalities due to trauma as well as thermal burns caused by the flash of heat from an explosion.

Iran’s topography, specifically mountains around cities, would obstruct the dissipation of the blast and heat from a nuclear explosion, intensifying the effects. Climatic conditions, especially high concentrations of airborne dust, would likely exacerbate thermal and radiation casualties as well as wound infections.

Nuclear Horror: Then and Now

The first nuclear attack on a civilian population center, the U.S. strike on Hiroshima, left that city “uniformly and extensively devastated,” according to a study carried out in the wake of the attacks by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey. “Practically the entire densely or moderately built-up portion of the city was leveled by blast and swept by fire… The surprise, the collapse of many buildings, and the conflagration contributed to an unprecedented casualty rate.” At the time, local health authorities reported that 60 percent of immediate deaths were due to flash or flame burns and medical investigators estimated that 15 to 20 percent of the deaths were caused by radiation.

Witnesses “stated that people who were in the open directly under the explosion of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin was charred dark brown or black and that they died within a few minutes or hours,” according to the 1946 report.  “Among the survivors, the burned areas of the skin showed evidence of burns almost immediately after the explosion. At first there was marked redness, and other evidence of thermal burns appeared within the next few minutes or hours.”

Many victims kept their arms outstretched because it was too painful to allow them to hang at their sides and rub against their bodies. One survivor recalled seeing victims “with both arms so severely burned that all the skin was hanging from their arms down to their nails, and others having faces swollen like bread, losing their eyesight. It was like ghosts walking in procession… Some jumped into a river because of their serious burns. The river was filled with the wounded and blood.”

The number of fatalities at Hiroshima has been estimated at 140,000. A nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later is thought to have killed 70,000.  Today, according to Dallas, 15-kiloton nuclear weapons of the type used on Japan are referred to by experts as “firecracker nukes” due to their relative weakness.

In addition to killing more than 5.5 million people, a strike on Tehran involving five 250-kiloton weapons — each of them sixteen times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima — would result in an estimated 803,000 third-degree burn victims, with close to 300,000 others suffering second degree burns, and 750,000 to 880,000 people severely exposed to radiation. “Those people with thermal burns over most of their bodies we can’t help,” says Dallas. “Most of these people are not going to survive… there is no saving them. They’ll be in intense agony.” As you move out further from the site of the blast, he says, “it actually gets worse. As the damage decreases, the pain increases, because you’re not numb.”

In a best case scenario, there would be 1,000 critically injured victims for every surviving doctor but “it will probably be worse,” according to Dallas. Whatever remains of Tehran’s healthcare system will be inundated with an estimated 1.5 million trauma sufferers. In a feat of understatement, the researchers report that survivors “presenting with combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are unlikely to have favorable outcomes.”

Iranian government officials did not respond to a request for information about how Tehran would cope in the event of a nuclear attack. When asked if the U.S. military could provide humanitarian aid to Iran after such a strike, a spokesman for Central Command, whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East, was circumspect. “U.S. Central Command plans for a wide range of contingencies to be prepared to provide options to the Secretary of Defense and the President,” he told this reporter.  But Frederick Burkle, a senior fellow at the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Harvard University’s School of Public Health, as well as a coauthor of the just-published article, is emphatic that the U.S. military could not cope with the scale of the problem. “I must also say that no country or international body is prepared to offer the assistance that would be needed,” he told me.

Dallas and his team spent five years working on their study. Their predictions were generated using a declassified version of a software package developed for the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as other complementary software applications. According to Glen Reeves, the software used fails to account for many of the vagaries and irregularities of an urban environment. These, he says, would mitigate some of the harmful effects. Examples would be buildings or cars providing protection from flash burns. He notes, however, that built-up areas can also exacerbate the number of deaths and injuries. Blast effects far weaker than what would be necessary to injure the lungs can, for instance, topple a house. “Your office building can collapse… before your eardrums pop!” notes Reeves.

The new study provides the only available scientific predictions to date about what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean. Dallas, who was previously the director of the Center for Mass Destruction Defense at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is quick to point out that the study received no U.S. government funding or oversight. “No one wanted this research to happen,” he adds.

Rattling Sabers and Nuclear Denial

Frederick Burkle points out that, today, discussions about nuclear weapons in the Middle East almost exclusively center on whether or not Iran will produce an atomic bomb instead of “focusing on ensuring that there are options for them to embrace an alternate sense of security.” He warns that the repercussions may be grave. “The longer this goes on the more we empower that singular thinking both within Iran and Israel.”

Even if Iran were someday to build several small nuclear weapons, their utility would be limited. After all, analysts note that Israel would be capable of launching a post-attack response which would simply devastate Iran. Right now, Israel is the only nuclear-armed state in the Middle East. Yet a preemptive Israeli nuclear strike against Iran also seems an unlikely prospect to most experts.

“Currently, there is little chance of a true nuclear war between the two nations,” according to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund. Israel, he points out, would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless its very survival were at stake. “However, Israel’s rhetoric about red lines and the threat of a nuclear Iran are something we need to worry about,” he told me recently by email. “A military strike to defeat Iran’s nuclear capacity would A) not work B) ensure that Iran WOULD then pursue a bomb (something they have not clearly decided to do yet) and C) risk a regional war.”

Cham Dallas sees the threat in even starker terms.  “The Iranians and the Israelis are both committed to conflict,” he told me. He isn’t alone in voicing concern. “What will we do if Israel threatens Tehran with nuclear obliteration?… A nuclear battle in the Middle East, one-sided or not, would be the most destabilizing military event since Pearl Harbor,” wrote Pulitzer Prize-winning national security reporter Tim Weiner in a recent op-ed for Bloomberg News. “Our military commanders know a thousand ways in which a war could start between Israel and Iran… No one has ever fought a nuclear war, however. No one knows how to end one.”

The Middle East is hardly the only site of potential nuclear catastrophe. Today, according to the Ploughshares Fund, there are an estimated 17,300 nuclear weapons in the world. Russia reportedly has the most with 8,500; North Korea, the fewest with less than 10. Donald Cook, the administrator for defense programs at the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, recently confirmed that the United States possesses around 4,700 nuclear warheads. Other nuclear powers include rivals India and Pakistan, which stood on the brink of nuclear war in 2002. (Just this year, Indian government officials warned residents of Kashmir, the divided territory claimed by both nations, to prepare for a possible nuclear war.) Recently, India and nuclear-armed neighbor China, which went to war with each other in the 1960s, again found themselves on the verge of a crisis due to a border dispute in a remote area of the Himalayas.

In a world awash in nuclear weapons, saber-rattling, brinkmanship, erratic behavior, miscalculations, technological errors, or errors in judgment could lead to a nuclear detonation and suffering on an almost unimaginable scale, perhaps nowhere more so than in Iran. “Not only would the immediate impacts be devastating, but the lingering effects and our ability to deal with them would be far more difficult than a 9/11 or earthquake/tsunami event,” notes Paul Carroll. Radiation could turn areas of a country into no-go zones; healthcare infrastructure would be crippled or totally destroyed; and depending on climatic conditions and the prevailing winds, whole regions might have their agriculture poisoned. “One large bomb could do this, let alone a handful, say, in a South Asian conflict,” he told me.

“I do believe that the longer we have these weapons and the more there are, the greater the chances that we will experience either an intentional attack (state-based or terrorist) or an accident,” Carroll wrote in his email. “In many ways, we’ve been lucky since 1945. There have been some very close calls.  But our luck won’t hold forever.”

Cham Dallas says there is an urgent need to grapple with the prospect of nuclear attacks, not later, but now. “There are going to be other big public health issues in the twenty-first century, but in the first third, this is it. It’s a freight train coming down the tracks,” he told me. “People don’t want to face this. They’re in denial.”

Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch.com and a fellow at the Nation Institute.  An award-winning journalist, his work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch. He is the author most recently of the New York Times bestseller “Kill Anything that Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam” (The American Empire Project, Metropolitan Books). You can catch his conversation with Bill Moyers about that book by clicking here. His website is NickTurse.com. You can follow him on Tumblr and on Facebook.

Netanyahu concerned as ever about Iran, but world powers will not allow strike in coming year

August 9, 2013

Netanyahu concerned as ever about Iran, but world powers will not allow strike in coming year – Weekend – Israel News | Haaretz.

The atmosphere created after the election of Hassan Rohani leaves zero tolerance in the international community for an Israeli attack on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear sites, at least until the conclusion of talks between Tehran and major world powers.

By | Aug. 9, 2013 | 10:09 AM
Iranian president Hassan Rohani

Iranian president Hassan Rohani at his first official press conference, this week. Sweet talk and moderate declarations. Photo by AFP

This Wednesday was Iran day on the prime minister’s schedule. In the morning, Benjamin Netanyahu received a report about the incident in which four soldiers from the Golani infantry brigade were wounded in the detonation of an explosive device near the fence separating Israel and Lebanon. He then toured the “training-base city” under construction in the Negev, met with a delegation of Republican congressmen from the American Midwest and was an hour late for a meeting with a senior official from the British Foreign Office. But everywhere he went, he spoke mainly about the Iranian nuclear threat.
The prime minister warned that, despite the victory by Hassan Rohani in the Iranian presidential election in June, Tehran is accelerating progress toward nuclear weapons capability. According to Netanyahu, Rohani − who is considered a relative moderate in the West − wants to exploit a resumption of Tehran’s talks with the big powers to gain time, even as his country continues with the nuclear project. Only an explicit military threat will stop the Iranians, said Netanyahu, whose remarks coincided with a series of recent leaks about that project.

New centrifuges, which enrich uranium quickly, were installed at the Fordow site and could allow the Iranians to take the world by surprise by producing the quantity of high-grade uranium needed for a bomb, without foreign intelligence agencies noticing this development in time. ‏(Netanyahu himself referred to this explicitly for the first time this week.‏) At the same time, Tehran is stepping up work on an alternative option − plutonium production − which, according to The Wall Street Journal, could allow the country to achieve full military nuclear capability by next summer.

Netanyahu’s concern is obvious. He believes that Iran’s spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, is using the new president to set a honey trap for the West. Rohani’s sweet talk and moderate declarations will convince the Europeans and Americans that he is amenable to a compromise.

In practice, however, it is likely that the talks between the sides will drag on, while Iran continues to move ahead, and at the end of the process Tehran will present the world with a fait accompli: either the achievement of nuclear capability and a declaration to that effect, or being so close to that threshold that no one will dare threaten the country. However, in contrast to the past three autumns, this time it is probably wrong to interpret Netanyahu’s statements as an explicit military threat per se.

The atmosphere that was created after Rohani’s victory leaves zero tolerance in the international community for an Israeli attack, at least until the conclusion of the planned year-end talks between Tehran and the big powers. The timetable for an attack would thus be deferred until next spring, when the weather in the skies over Iran’s nuclear facilities improves. That target date also coincides with the nine-month deadline set by the Obama administration for a full-status agreement following the recent resumption of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks.

By next spring, it will be clear whether anything fundamental has changed in either one or both of these channels.

That, more or less, is also the opinion of Graham Allison, a leading American analyst of nuclear policy. In an article he published in The Atlantic on August 1, Allison predicted that 2013 will pass without an Iranian bomb, but also without an Israeli attack. Some had said that this would be the year for the Islamic Republic to “get the bomb or be bombed.” More likely, though, resolution of the dilemma will be put off again until next year.

The fact that the periodic rise of tension over Iran is not reflected in the behavior of the Israel Defense Forces also reinforces the assessment that an Israeli military strike against Iran is unlikely this year. The IDF remains skeptical. In a briefing with correspondents last month about the army’s new multiyear plan, senior officers explained that the structural reform in the IDF − involving the dismantling of units, a reduction in air force squadrons and a cutback in the number of tanks − can be implemented now, thanks to the emergence of a window of opportunity in the region. In other words, the IDF does not think there is a high probability of a large-scale war in the years ahead.

The plot thickens

This week, a battalion-level exercise was conducted in one of the territorial commands. The main topic of conversation among the officers who were present was neither the Iranian threat nor the tense situation along the Sinai border. It was something else entirely: the affair of the “Harpaz document.”

This past Tuesday marked the third anniversary of the eruption of the so-called Harpaz affair. It’s unlikely that the producers of the Israel Radio midday newsmagazine that day were aware of the date when they decided to interview Maj. Gen. ‏(res.‏) Yoav Galant. But Galant, who was originally thought to have played a major role in the affair, apparently remembered. The long interview dealt mainly with strategic issues, such as the unrest in Egypt and the civil war in Syria. At its conclusion, the anchorwoman, Esti Perez, slipped in a short question about the Harpaz case. Last week, Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein instructed the police to reopen their investigation of the document forged by Lt. Col. ‏(res.‏) Boaz Harpaz as part of an effort to block Galant’s appointment as chief of staff. This time, the investigation will center on suspicions against former Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi. Perez asked Galant for his opinion.

The man who was almost chief of staff made do with a brief reply. Seemingly, he only repeated what was already known ‏(that a criminal investigation has been launched‏) and explained why he would rather not delve deeply into the subject ‏(the investigation has just begun‏). However, after urging that the law enforcement authorities should be allowed to do their job, he added, “This is an extremely grave matter … A criminal investigation against a former chief of staff is unprecedented, certainly an investigation dealing with subversion against the elected government, including the prime minister and the defense minister, and at the same time similar activity against subordinates − whether major generals or brigadier generals.”

In two sentences, Galant wove together all the strands of the plot, which at this stage remain hidden from the public’s eyes. Galant noted not only the widely reported friction between Ashkenazi and the defense minister at the time, Ehud Barak, and not only the dispute over Ashkenazi’s objections to Barak’s intention to appoint Galant chief of staff: He also added new allegations, concerning subversion by the former chief of staff’s bureau against the elected political leadership under Netanyahu, and also reservations about the way two senior officers who were close to Galant, Moshe Tamir and Imad Fares, were booted out of the army after being found guilty of offenses unrelated to the Galant affair.

The new investigation, like its predecessor, will be conducted under gag orders. What is already clear is that it will revolve around the same source materials that the state comptroller’s report about the affair relied upon: extracts from 40,000 hours of recordings of conversations made in the chief of staff’s bureau. The recording system was installed at some point toward the end of the term of Moshe Ya’alon as chief of staff, or the start of Dan Halutz’s term in 2005, but its use was significantly expanded during Ashkenazi’s term. If the new investigation ends up blocking Ashkenazi’s lofty political ambitions − as his rivals hope it will − it will be because of the tapes. One thing already certain is that the directive to tape-record all their conversations will be on every future list of bizarre decisions made by ranking public officials in Israel. It will occupy a place of honor alongside such select developments as “Ehud Olmert befriends Moshe Talansky,” or “Ehud Barak decides to employ the services of promising adviser Eldad Yaniv.”

This week, Ashkenazi’s friend, Ilker Basbug, the former chief of staff of Turkey’s armed forces, was sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiring to topple the Islamic government in Ankara. Foreign observers viewed the proceedings as a political trial whose results were a foregone conclusion. Ashkenazi is, of course, in a completely different place: So far, no criminal allegation against him has been proved. Throughout, his line of defense has been that even if he occasionally tripped up slightly, he did nothing that many chiefs of staff before him did not do. There were no crimes, he will say, but at most ethical misdemeanors, committed in response to an annoying campaign waged against him by the responsible minister, Ehud Barak. Nor can we ignore the fact that the investigation, which will focus on the chief of staff’s tapes, misses half the picture: namely what went on at the same time across the corridor, in the defense minister’s bureau.

The five chiefs of staff who preceded Ashkenazi ‏(Barak, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, Shaul Mofaz, Ya’alon, Halutz‏) all entered politics shortly after their retirement from the IDF. It’s unlikely that all of them were chastely virginal in terms of their contacts with politicians and journalists while still in uniform. The difference, of course, is that in Ashkenazi’s case, there are prima facie findings hidden among the thousands of hours of recordings, which will now be examined meticulously by a team of police and state-prosecution investigators.

Square one, almost

The new team will be led by Chief Superintendent Yoram Naaman, head of investigations in the National Fraud Unit of the Israel Police, who was in charge of the investigation against former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Attorney General Weinstein decided to proceed with the investigation three years too late and with pronounced unwillingness. It is hard to shake the impression that in the previous round, in which the police focused on finding the forger of the document ‏(Ashkenazi’s confidant Boaz Harpaz admitted to playing that role, in the investigation‏), the police went about their work superficially and sloppily. Now, we are almost back to square one.

The State Prosecutor’s Office and the fraud unit investigators will continue to be in close touch with the military advocate general, Maj. Gen. Dan Efroni, and with the army team that dealt with the affair, prosecutor Lt. Col. Sharon Zagagi-Pinhas and Lt. Col. Gil Mamon, the commander of the special investigations unit in the Military Police. The head of that force, Brig. Gen. Meir Ohana, is quoted this week in the IDF weekly Bamahane as saying that the Military Police conducted “a professional investigation that dug deep.” He praised the investigators for their “serious work in one of the most sensitive cases we have dealt with in recent years,” adding, “I have no doubt that excellent work was done.”

In contrast to their counterparts in the Military Police, the Israel Police investigators will enter the highly volatile political and media arena. A thin and not easily detectable line exists between semi-legitimate political intervention by senior bureaus and allegations of subversion. Many possible questions arise from material published in the press alone. For example, how was the close alliance between Ashkenazi and President Shimon Peres forged? Is Histadrut labor federation head Ofer Eini, who in November 2010 savaged Barak at the height of Barak’s clash with Ashkenazi, part of that alliance? ‏(In a television interview, Eini called Barak a “dumbbell” after it was revealed that a foreign worker was employed illegally in the defense minister’s home.‏) In that period, did someone activate MKs from the leading opposition party, Kadima, against Barak? And why, in one of the peculiar developments in the case, did even the Western Wall rabbi, Shmuel Rabinovitch, take time out from his jihad against the Women of the Wall to contribute his share in the pro-Ashkenazi lobbying effort? It’s no wonder the political arena is in turmoil.

The tapes, then, are at the center of the investigation, but not only with regard to relations between Barak and Ashkenazi. Brig. Gen. Moshe “Chico” Tamir was forced to conclude his army career after being convicted in connection with an accident involving his underage son, when the latter was illegally driving an army all-terrain vehicle. Was Tamir recorded in connection with other allegations against him, and was there an additional reason for Ashkenazi to dismiss him?

Brig. Gen. Imad Fares was the first to reveal the existence of the tape-recording system in the chief of staff’s bureau, in the course of appealing his own dismissal from the army following an accident his wife had while driving a military vehicle. ‏(Fares was originally charged with lying and ended up getting a disciplinary reprimand for filling out a form incorrectly.‏) When Fares asked to listen to the recordings of the discussions involving his case, he was told that some of them could not be found. It will be interesting to see if they turn up now.

And there is also the procedure by which “background” meetings between the chief of staff and journalists are recorded by the IDF Spokesman. In one case, at least, it was alleged that a recording that might have proved problematic had disappeared. The IDF Spokesman’s Unit, which in the period in question was under the command of Brig. Gen. Avi Benayahu, will now be dragged deep into the heart of the affair. Those who thought that the bottom of the barrel in army-media relations had been reached when Miri Regev ‏(now a Likud MK‏) headed that unit might have to think again.

At present, with the recordings being examined meticulously, senior attorneys of the state prosecution who are reading the transcripts are finding it difficult to hide their astonishment at the vulgarity and aggressiveness contained in some of the conversations. It will be very hard to stuff the genie back into the bottle. Naturally, not every impolite occurrence, and not even every ethical infraction, is a matter for a police investigation. Weinstein will have to demarcate the boundaries of the game for the investigators. Still, at the conclusion of the investigation − which could take a year or more − we might get a better picture of what really went on in the battle of the two bureaus. And we must not forget that this ugly campaign was conducted while soldiers continued to be sent off on dangerous missions.

US-sponsored Israel-Palestinian interim peace talks near moment of decision

August 9, 2013

US-sponsored Israel-Palestinian interim peace talks near moment of decision.

DEBKAfile Special Report August 9, 2013, 1:13 PM (IDT)
Their secret peace track nears its climax

Their secret peace track nears its climax
The formal Israeli-Palestinian meeting announced by the US State Department as scheduled for next Wednesday, Aug. 14 is but the outer shell of the secret hard-core negotiations bouncing back and forth for weeks between US Secretary of State John Kerry, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas, debkafile reports.
The real talks are approaching a climax on the fundamental issues of borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements. Every afternoon in past weeks, Kerry has called the Israeli prime minister and Palestinian leader on secure phone lines and taken the talks a step further. Any incoming calls from the two leaders are switched directly through to the Secretary of State, an unheard of procedure in his department.
Ten days later, our sources reported dramatic progress, to the point that Kerry was asking Netanyahu for specific information on the Jewish settlements he was willing to remove in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), and Abbas was chipping in with additions to the list. Netanyahu countered with questions about the Palestinian concessions on offer for the evacuations.
The process has been reduced to straight haggling, Middle East bazaar style – except that the wares laid out for sale are Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, security, international security forces and the borders that will separate Israel from a future Palestinian state.
Although Secretary Kerry has stated publicly that his objective is a final resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, his expectations are more realistic when he handles the behind-the scenes, real-life horse trading. All three parties appreciate that the most they can achieve are interim accords. Items bound to remain at issue will have to be set aside for a future round of negotiations at a time which none of the parties is inclined to pin down.For now, the officials assigned with conducting the formal negotiations are not privy to the progress made secretly by their principals. US special envoy Ambassador Martin Indyk, Justice Minister and senior negotiator Tzipi Livni and Palestinian negotiator Saab Erekat are therefore still in the dark.Progress is substantial enough by now to have prompted Kerry to convene a meeting of Jewish American leaders for a briefing Thursday evening, Aug. 8, at the White House.
We told them there was a “strategic imperative” to arrive at a deal soon, and said he understood the difficulties Netanyahu faced in dealing with a coalition that included hard right parties and figures. He was described as appearing “bullish” about the talks, but also “nervous” about the Israeli prime minister’s ability to overcome the resistance in his own Likud party and government coalition to sweeping concessions on settlements.
As well as Ambassador Indyk, Kerrry invited National Security Adviser Susan Rice to join him at the meeting, which lasted 90 minutes, to signal President Barack Obama’s approval.
Kerry criticized the European Union’s policy of excluding Israeli enterprises on the West Bank from grants and prizes as likely to “nudge Netanyahu away” from a deal with the Palestinians, and therefore counter-productive to the peace effort he launched last February.
According to the information reaching debkafile, Kerry’s motive in summoning American Jewish leaders to the White House was his belief that progress in the negotiations has brought the Israeli prime minister close to a crossroads. He will soon face a decision to reshuffle his cabinet and replace ministers who would oppose the terms of the interim accord shaping up with Palestinians. For this step, he would find the support of American Jewry helpful.
Netanyahu will soon need to present the leaders of the pro-settlement Israel Beteinu and Bayit Yehudi parties with the choice of backing him up all the way to the accord with the Palestinians to which the US Secretary is steering at speed, or quitting the government coalition. The same question will be put to Netanyahu’s own Likud party members.

Israel and the Gulf states: It’s complicated

August 9, 2013

Israel and the Gulf states: It’s complicated | The Times of Israel.

They have many common interests, but now more than ever, any rapprochement needs to remain secret, some officials say. So why did Jerusalem open a ‘virtual embassy’ in the Gulf?

August 9, 2013, 10:40 am
Then-prime minister Shimon Peres presents a sculpture of the dove of peace to Omani Sultan Qaboos bin Said El Said in the palace in Salala, April 1, 1996. (photo credit: Avi Ohayun/GPO)

In February 2009, a few days after Israel concluded its Operation Cast Lead against Gaza terrorists, the chief of protocol at Qatar’s Foreign Ministry invited Roi Rosenblit, who at the time headed Israel’s interest office in Doha, for a meeting in his office. Rosenblit knew exactly what awaited him: a few days earlier he had seen how then-Qatari prime minister Hamad bin Jassim, angry over Palestinian casualties, announced live on al-Jazeera that the period of normalization with Israel needed to end.

The Qatari diplomat welcomed Rosenblit, friendly as always, served him tea with za’atar, and then handed him an envelope. In the letter, the government of Qatar politely yet determinedly informed the Israeli that he had one week to close down the Israeli mission on 15 al-Buhturi Street, and leave the country.

Since then, Israel no longer officially maintains diplomatic relations with any of the Arab states in the Gulf — or does it?

It is widely believed that Jerusalem still maintains some sort of engagement with various states in the Persian Gulf region. Yet the government is extremely careful not to publicly admit such ties — in order not to jeopardize them. One thing is certain: Jerusalem is vocally advocating for stronger ties with the overwhelmingly Sunni Gulf states in the Gulf, hoping both for commercial opportunities and geo-strategic advantages. On July 18, the Israeli Foreign Ministry opened a Twitter channel exclusively “dedicated to promoting dialogue with the people of the GCC region.” The GCC, short for Cooperation Council of Arab States in the Gulf, includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait. (Never mind that Israel still officially considers Saudi Arabia an enemy state and prohibits its citizens from entering the country.)

Within less than a month, the “official channel of the virtual Israeli Embassy to GCC countries” picked up more than 1,100 followers. On Tuesday, on the occasion of the Eid al-Fitr holiday (which marks the end of Ramadan), the channel hosted a live chat with Foreign Ministry director-general Rafi Barak. The top diplomat mostly stuck to slogans, saying that Israel is interested in peace and neighborly relations with all its neighbors. One Kuwaiti wanted to know how he could visit Israel in the absence of an Israeli embassy; “You can apply for a visa in any Israeli mission abroad,” Barak responded, suggesting citizens of Arab states turn to the Israeli embassy in Amman.

Benoit Chapas, a EU official dealing with the Gulf states, wondered whether Israel had any “plans to reopen” its offices in the area. “We will be happy to,” Barak replied.

He might as well have said: “we already did,” because, since earlier this year, Israelis know that the Foreign Ministry has recently taken a symbolically meaningful and potentially significant step indicating that ties between Israel and the Gulf are warming up again. A carelessly edited version of the 2013 state budget revealed that Israel opened a diplomatic office somewhere in the Persian Gulf. On page 213 of the document, readers learn that between 2010 and 2012, Israel opened 11 new representative offices across the globe, including one in the Gulf. Foreign Ministry sources in the know said they asked the Finance Ministry to remove the sensitive clause from the budget, but it is still there for anyone to see.

The exact nature of that mission — where it is, how many diplomats are or were stationed there, and whether it is still open — remains unclear. Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Ministry is unwilling to comment any further on the issue. “Others in the Foreign Ministry disagree with me, but as I see it, talking about it publicly would serve absolutely no purpose, other than risking whatever cooperation we have,” an Israeli diplomat well-versed in Jerusalem’s relationship with the Arab world said.

Indeed, the secrecy surrounding Israel’s mysterious office in the Gulf goes so far that even senior diplomats, including those dealing on a daily basis with the GCC, gave The Times of Israel conflicting information about it. Some asserted that “we have absolutely nothing” in the Gulf and that the line in the budget must have been an error. Others admitted that there is — or was — something but declined to detail.

“This ‘virtual activity’ will put our tangible activity at risk,” one diplomat opined

Not everyone in the Foreign Ministry is happy with the idea of establishing a “virtual embassy” to openly engage with the residents of the Gulf states via social networks. “This ‘virtual activity’ will put our tangible activity at risk,” one diplomat opined.

Israel and the Arab world have been engaging for decades, in various, mostly clandestine ways. In the 1990s, in the wake of the Oslo Accords, trade and political ties grew stronger, so much so that the Israeli chamber of commerce published a guide in Hebrew on how to do business in the Gulf. In 1994, then-prime minister Yitzhak Rabin visited Oman, where he was greeted by Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said (who is still reigning in Muscat). In 1995, a few days after Rabin was assassinated, then-acting prime minister Shimon Peres hosted Omani foreign minister Yusuf Ibn Alawi in Jerusalem.

In January 1996, Israel and Oman — which has always been Jerusalem’s best friend in the GCC — signed an agreement on the reciprocal opening of trade representative offices. “Oman believes that the current step will lead to continued progress in the peace process, and increased stability in the region,” the Israel Foreign Ministry declared at the time, adding that the office’s main role will be “to develop reciprocal economic and trade relations with Oman, as well as cooperation in the spheres of water, agriculture, medicine, and communications.”

Four months later, Peres visited Oman and Qatar to officially open “Israel Trade Representation Offices” in both capitals.

At the airport in Doha, the Israeli prime minister reviewed an honor guard before heading to the Royal Palace for a meeting with Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (who ruled until last month, when he abdicated the throne in favor of his son).

Shimon Peres and a Qatari official review an honor guard during a reception ceremony at the Doha airport, April 2, 1996 (photo credit: Avi Ohayon/GPO)

Shimon Peres and a Qatari official review an honor guard during a reception ceremony at the Doha airport, April 2, 1996 (photo credit: Avi Ohayon/GPO)

Headed by a small team of three Israeli diplomats, the offices in Muscat and Doha functioned “basically like a regular embassy — just without the Israeli flag,” an official stationed in both missions recalled.

The overt ties with Oman didn’t last for even half a decade. In October 2000, in the wake of the Second Intifada, Omani rulers felt the public opinion turned against Israel, suspended relations and closed the mission. The Israeli Foreign Ministry expressed regret at the decision, emphasizing that the cessation of contact and dialogue does nothing to advance the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians. “In days of crisis, it is especially important that lines of communication between countries be kept open,” the ministry declared.

However, despite shutting down the Israeli representative office, located on Muscat’s Al-Adhiba Street, the government of Oman quietly encouraged Israeli diplomats to stick around, as long as the ongoing engagement between the two countries stayed secret.

Official diplomatic relations with Qatar survived for nine more years, until Emir Hamad’s rage (or perhaps that of his subjects) led him to ask the Israelis to close up shop. But just like the ruler of Oman, the Qatari leader also hinted that, while the official channel needed to be closed, he would not mind if Israeli diplomats in his country continued their work, as long as they do it under the radar.

A few months after Qatar had expelled the Israeli mission, the country’s rulers twice offered to reestablish ties — including a reopening of the office in Doha. In return, the Qataris demanded that Israel allow the small Gulf state to take a leading role in the rebuilding of Gaza. They also demanded Jerusalem publicly express appreciation for the state’s role and acknowledge its standing in the region.

According to Haaretz, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was initially inclined to accept the offer but eventually declined, mainly because the Qataris also demanded to be allowed to bring large amounts of cement and other construction material into Gaza, which Israeli officials said ran counter to the state’s security interest. The Qataris cannot hope “to restore cooperative relations with Israel without agreeing to reopen the trade office,” a senior Israeli official said at the time, according to a secret diplomatic cable published by the whistleblower website WikiLeaks.

So far, Oman and Qatar are the only GCC states that agreed to openly maintaining diplomatic contacts with Israel. Yet it is well-known that Jerusalem had (and might still have) contacts to probably most other states in the region. These clandestine ties are mostly the domain of the Mossad. On its website, the spy agency openly states that one of its key goals is “Developing and maintaining special diplomatic and other covert relations” and one can safely assume that Israeli agents are in touch with officials from at least a handful of Arab states in the region that would never admit to having any contacts with Israel.

Take Bahrain for example. Jerusalem and Manama never maintained diplomatic relations, but, in 2005, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa boasted to an American official that his state has contacts with Israel “at the intelligence/security level (i.e., with Mossad),” according to a different secret US diplomatic cable published by WikiLeaks. The king also indicated willingness “to move forward in other areas, although it will be difficult for Bahrain to be the first.” The development of “trade contacts,” though, would have to wait for the implementation of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the king told the ambassador.

Other WikiLeaks documents show that senior officials from both countries have spoken in recent years, such as a 2007 meeting between then-foreign minister Tzipi Livni and Bahraini foreign minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ahmed Al Khalifa in New York. The Bahraini foreign minister in 2009 also signaled that he was willing to meet Netanyahu to try to advance the peace process, but ultimately decided not to go ahead with the plan.

It is not difficult to figure out why the Gulf states would be interested in closer cooperation with Israel. Most importantly, the Jewish state is a regional superpower, widely assumed to possess an impressive nuclear arsenal, and has openly vowed to prevent Iran from acquiring such weapons. The Gulf states, some of which have decades-old territorial disputes with Tehran, are just as scared as Israel is of a nuclear-armed Iran.

“In the Gulf, there is a particular concern over Iran and what appears to be the lackluster performance in Obama’s administration in stopping them from getting nuclear weapons,” said Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum, senior research associate at Bar-Ilan University’s Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. “This will lead, if it hasn’t already, to closer cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states.”

Indeed, Arabs in the Gulf believe in Jerusalem’s role in fighting Iran “because of their perception of Israel’s close relationship with the US, but also due to their sense that they can count on Israel against Iran,” then-Foreign Ministry deputy director-general (and current ambassador to Germany) Yacov Hadas-Handelsman said during a briefing with senior US officials in 2009. ”They believe Israel can work magic.”

But it’s more than just Iran. Israel and the Gulf states also have in common their fear of extremist political Islamism, such as practiced by Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, or Hezbollah. While it is true that Qatar has good ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas — last year, the emir became the first head of state to visit Gaza since it was taken over by the Palestinian terrorist group in 2007 — the GCC states in general are afraid of political and religious extremists that threaten their rule, especially from Shiite elements. (Qatar is unique in the sense that it manages good relations to all players in the region and even the US).

Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, left, and Gaza's Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, right, arrive for a cornerstone laying ceremony for Hamad, a new residential neighborhood in Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, October 23 (photo credit: AP/Mohammed Salem)

Qatari Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, left, and Gaza’s Hamas prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, arrive for a cornerstone laying ceremony in southern Gaza, October 23, 2012 (photo credit: AP/Mohammed Salem)

According to experts, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, are more worried about the Muslim Brotherhood than about Iran. “Israel and Gulf states seek stability and they work together to further this stability. This leaves lots of room for common tasks, as long as they keep it secret,” said Teitelbaum, whose research focuses on political and social development in the Arab world and the Persian Gulf in particular.

If the GCC and Jerusalem are in the same camp, geo-strategically speaking, why the need to sweep any sort of cooperation under the rug? “Why should they cause problems when there are none?” Teitelbaum said. “They have so many other issues to deal with, the last thing they need to is to publicly call for cooperation with Israel.”

Public opinion in the Arab world was always against Israel, and Qatar and Oman could only allow themselves to open up to Israel after Rabin’s peace process had come into gear. As soon as Israeli-Palestinians violence flared up, they cut all official ties.

‘The Gulf States couldn’t care less about the 1967 borders. It is the conflict that bothers them, because it strengthens the radical forces in the region’

Perhaps ironically, the Arab Spring does not make easier for the Gulf states’ autocratic leaders to get closer to Israel again, experts say. For the first time in history, public opinion has become a determining factor of the Arab world’s political system, and the rulers in the Gulf will think twice before admitting any sort of engagement with the Zionist entity.

It’s not so much about the Gulf nations’ love for the Palestinians. “The leaders of the GCC states couldn’t care less about the 1967 borders,” said a Jerusalem source intimately familiar with GCC politics. “For all that matters to them, the Green Line could be somewhere between Ohio and Maryland. It is the conflict that bothers them, because it strengthens the radical forces in the region.”

The recent resumption of Israeli-Palestinians peace negotiations, unlikely as they are to yield any results, will not be enough to allow the Gulf states to openly reengage with Israel. There are ways, however, in which Israel could make it easier for them to work towards an détente, Teitelbaum suggested. For example by speaking positively about the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative – in which the entire Arab world offered normal diplomatic relations with Israel in return for a comprehensive agreement with the Palestinians – or making a similar proposal to reach regional peace.

In the mean time, the GCC states will just stand on the sidelines and go on with business as usual — covert cooperation in the economic and intelligence fields but no official rapprochement. “Unless there is an official treaty with the Palestinians, I don’t think we can expect anything like formal relations,” Teitelbaum said. “That’s just how they are. From their perspective, it just doesn’t much sense…they have everything to gain from keeping it the way it is currently.”

Sinai jihadists have Eilat in sights

August 9, 2013

Sinai jihadists have Eilat in sights – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Analysis: Temporary closure of southernmost city’s airport most likely linked to smuggling of shoulder-launched missiles into Sinai

Published: 08.08.13, 23:54 / Israel Opinion

The temporary closure of Eilat’s airport on Thursday apparently stemmed from a terror threat emanating from Egypt’s Sinai peninsula.

It is safe to assume that the warning related to the possibility that terrorists belonging to one of the Islamist groups operating in Sinai will fire shoulder-launched missiles at airplanes. Some of these terrorists are directly linked to al-Qaeda , but most belong to Bedouin Salafist groups whose members are Egyptian citizens who live in Sinai.

These groups have received large amounts of weapons from Iran and Libya over the past two years, mainly with the purpose of transferring the arms to Gaza through the Philadelphi Route’s underground tunnels. Some of the weapons remained in Sinai, hidden, and are used by Islamist groups, mainly Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes (Supporters of Jerusalem), to carry out terror attacks against the Egyptian authorities and military, as well as against Israel.

Passengers stuck at Eilat airport (Photo: Meir Ohayon)
Passengers stuck at Eilat airport (Photo: Meir Ohayon)

 

Flights delayed, canceled (Photo: Meir Ohayon)
Flights delayed, canceled (Photo: Meir Ohayon)

Among the weapons smuggled from Libya into Sinai are old Russian-made SA7 “Strela” anti-aircraft missiles. Most likely, the Islamists in Sinai also received more advanced models of the missiles – SA18 and SA16. One of these more advanced missiles was fired two years ago at an Israeli helicopter during the terror attack in the Ein Netafim area – carried out by a Salafist group based in Sinai.

Planes en route to Eilat’s airport arrive from the south and are in the range of shoulder-launched missiles, if they are fired from Sinai. The mountainous terrain would make it very difficult to detect anyone trying to fire missiles at Eilat-bound aircraft.

Iron Dome battery in Eilat (Photo: Meir Ohayon)
Iron Dome battery in Eilat (Photo: Meir Ohayon)

 

It is very possible that Israeli intelligence agencies obtained information regarding a plan to open fire on Eilat-bound civilian aircraft and therefore ordered the temporary closure of the southernmost city’s airport. It is safe to assume that such an attack, if it was in fact in the works, would not be directly linked to the warning that led to the closure of American embassies in the Middle East.

The jihadist and Salafist Bedouins in Sinai are currently engaged in a violent confrontation with Egyptian security forces trying to rein in the terrorists. The Egyptian forces have caused heavy casualties among these groups, which are looking to further deteriorate the relations between Cairo and Jerusalem, this in addition to their continued attempts to kill Israelis and disrupt daily life and the economy in Israel. In this case, they are trying to hurt tourism in Eilat. In light of this, Israel plans to have all Eilat-bound planes land at the airport in Ovda, located dozens of kilometers to the north. Plans for the long term include closing the airport in Eilat and building a new one north of the city, in the Arava. The order to shut down the airport in Eilat was most likely based on credible intelligence.