Archive for March 31, 2013

The Obama visit: Did anything change?

March 31, 2013

Israel Hayom | The Obama visit: Did anything change?.

Richard Baehr

U.S. President Barack Obama has completed his most publicized foreign trip since he became president in 2009. His three-day swing through Israel, the Palestinian territories and Jordan has been routinely described in the American media as having gone perfectly from start to finish. The short summary, invariably repeated by reporters and pundits, is that Obama accomplished all of his objectives for the trip:

  1. The president delivered the message Israelis wanted to hear: that Jews had ties to the land and that international guilt over the Holocaust was not a sufficient explanation for Israel’s creation. The president spoke specifically of a Jewish state as part of a two-state solution.
  2. Israeli students heard the message that they should work the political system to ensure that their leaders fought for the two-state solution and to relieve the burdens of “the occupation” on Palestinians in the West Bank.
  3. Palestinians heard the message delivered to the Israeli students, that their grievances were real.
  4. The Palestinian Authority was told they should stop throwing roadblocks in the way of restarting peace talks, and that they needed to drop preconditions demanding another settlement freeze. The president also indicated the administration’s interest in revived talks, and the message to Israeli students suggested agreement with some of the PA’s positions.
  5. The president facilitated an agreement between Israel and Turkey related to the violence on the Mavi Marmara in 2010, which included an Israeli apology to Turkey and an offer of restitution to the families of the nine civilians killed in the raid on the ship.
  6. The president signaled the strength of U.S.-Jordan ties with his warm embrace of King Abdullah II, demonstrating continued support for the only stable pro-Western Arab country (for now) bordering Israel.

Most of Obama’s messages communicated during the trip reflected what could be discerned from the public events on the president’s trip. Exactly what transpired in the talks between Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or between Obama and PA President Mahmoud Abbas, or between Obama and Abdullah, is unknown. These discussions were, of course, off the record and journalists’ interpretation of what occurred at these meetings was based on the public comments made by the leaders at joint press conferences or appearances, or the off the record comments by Israelis, Palestinians or Jordanians who may have been privy to the private discussions among the leaders at each stop. In other words, what we know about the private meetings is only what the parties want anyone to know about them, which is exactly the same as the messaging about the public events.

Obama has proven to be generally skillful at messaging, even if his track record on governance and policy in his first term has often been deficient. Prohibiting students from Ariel University from attending his Jerusalem address to university students was undoubtedly not accidental. There was probably some concern about participation by students who might not be sympathetic to the president’s talking points about the West Bank, perhaps spoiling the visuals (enthusiastic applause at many points in the president’s speech). But the administration had to know that the exclusion would become news, and that too was a message to Palestinians and Israeli leaders.

The choice of venue for a talk to Israelis university students, rather than a public address to Knesset members, was also not accidental, since the expectation of a friendlier audience factored in here as well, as did the message that the president wanted to talk directly to Israelis, and not through their elected leaders.

Lost among the themes of the trip, was whether Obama and Netanyahu moved any closer on coordinating policy on Iran’s nuclear program. Israelis have become highly skeptical about progress in the peace process with the Palestinians, but are very focused on the Iranians’ progress towards joining the nuclear club.

While columnists like Tom Friedman of The New York Times always see some final window of opportunity closing on the two-state solution (inevitably because of alleged Israel settlement expansion in the West Bank), Israelis seem to have become accustomed to the no war, no peace stalemate with the Palestinians. Terrorism from the West Bank has subsided, and most Israelis see no reason to offer concessions that could endanger the security of Israelis, as many think occurred after the withdrawals from southern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The Israelis also see the behavior of the PA in real time, not as Americans do when attention is focused by a presidential visit to the region. They do not see a partner for peace in the PA, but a movement still much more fixated on discrediting Israel internationally than on negotiating either an interim or a more substantive agreement.

They also understand that Hamas, which controls Gaza, where 40 percent of the Palestinians live, has not reconciled to the permanence of Israel in any sense, but is committed to continued violence and the destruction of the Jewish state. Many Israelis think the PA is closer in philosophy to Hamas than is acknowledged abroad, or too weak to differentiate itself, since radicalism, and anti-Israeli hysteria still govern the political thinking of a large number of Palestinians.

Iran’s nuclear program, however, is not a situation where inaction is tolerable to Israel. As more uranium is enriched, Iran moves closer to securing its place among the nuclear nations. Obama seems committed to a final effort at diplomatic engagement with Iran, but what will follow when this effort fails, as have all the prior ones? Based on the record of the last decade, there will be one more “final” opportunity to settle the issue diplomatically, and then another.

The administration’s cautiousness about events abroad seems to have inspired misbehavior by rogue nations, or at least encouraged these nations to believe that there is no price to pay for it. Syria and North Korea seem to fit the pattern here, as does Iran. The unwillingness to really lead as opposed to leading from behind has hampered efforts at creating a resistance in Syria that might have promised something better if the Assad regime falls.

It is not only Syria that exemplifies the changes in Israel’s neighborhood. The Muslim Brotherhood runs Egypt. U.S. forces, after stabilizing Iraq, have departed, leaving a vacuum that has produced more violence, and increased influence for Iran. Hezbollah has greatly enhanced its weaponry, and range of firepower in Lebanon. The perception that America is tired of the fight and wants to withdraw from the region has allowed a new collection of despots to replace the previous collection, who tended to be less hostile to Israel and the United States, or at least more predicable and stable. American help for Iron Dome is appreciated, but as Middle East expert Barry Rubin has written, if American inaction or missteps have led to a far more dangerous and belligerent set of forces on Israel’s borders, then there has been real security deterioration, rather than enhancements due to improved weaponry.

After his failed strong-arming of Israel in the first two years of his first term in office, the president seems chastened by his experience and is reluctant to go all in on another peace process likely to lead nowhere. He is still no fan of Israeli settlements, and his instinct and ideology to always favor the underdog make him a natural backer of the Palestinian cause. But Obama may see no upside to taking the pressure-Israel route in his second term, since he appears to be more aware of the true intransigent party to peace talks — namely, the side that does not want them to even start. Obama has obtained the public relations boost and images he wanted from his trip to Israel. He has tried to make peace with his pro-Israel critics, especially after the confirmation battle over U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel.

But none of this means that American policy on Iran has shifted. On this front, caution, delay, and leading from behind only helps the mullahs.

Troubling Times for Once Mighty Hizballah

March 31, 2013

Troubling Times for Once Mighty Hizballah | Jewish & Israel News Algemeiner.com.

 

Haifa, Israel –Hizballah’s continuing alliance with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has the notorious Shia political and military movement navigating choppier waters than at any other time in recent memory.

Led by Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah – the Iranian-backed preacher rarely seen in public these days for fear he might be assassinated – Hizballah had been the unquestioned Shia force in Lebanon. But cracks have begun to appear as both internal dissent and external pressures have been brought to bear and reveal a vulnerability that had rarely, if ever, been seen before.

President Obama – angry at Hizballah’s continued support of the Assad regime – didn’t mince his words in Jerusalem March 21: “Every country that values justice should call Hizballah what it truly is – a terrorist organization.”

That’s a much more direct statement than administration officials previously were willing to make. In 2010, then-National Security Advisor and current CIA Director John Brennan spoke of trying “to build up the more moderate elements” of the organization.

It’s a fast fall from Hizballah’s previous high-point of influence, Mordechai Kedar, an Israeli scholar of Arabic specializing in Islamic movements and ideology, told the Investigative Project on Terrorism. “Hizballah was the most popular organisation in the Arab world after the 2006 Lebanon War [against Israel], but now their image is as bad as it could be because Hizballah is considered as a collaborator with the most vicious of regimes [Syria]. They have lost much of the image they gained after the 2006 war.”

In a December report, the United Nations confirmed that Hizballah was fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria.

“From the outside point of view, they [Hizballah] are supporting Assad by sending hundreds of combatants to Syria in order to preserve the regime, because they know that if they are not loyal to their friend, no-one will be their friend in the future,” Kedar explained. “Secondly, they need the Syrian regime as the bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It would be very hard for them to function without Syrian mediation between Lebanon and Iran when it comes to supplies, logistics, missiles and all the weapons that they need.”

Having been supported by both Syria and Iran for many years, Hizballah determined that it must stand by the Syrian regime even though it appears to be fighting a losing battle. Failure to do so could cost it financial support from Iran, leaving Hizballah – once Assad has gone – with no significant nation state supporting their cause.

But according to Kedar – who specialized in Syria during his 25 years in Israeli military intelligence – Hizballah faces no lesser difficulties from within Lebanon, and is gradually coming under more pressure from within its own ranks.

Shia leader Mohammed Ali al-Husseini accuses Nasrallah of “dragging Lebanon into the abyss and that the Shiites in Lebanon, and Lebanon itself, will pay a high price for this behavior,” Kedar said. “But also from inside Hizballah there are voices today – not out loud, but behind the scenes – which claim that gambling on the Syrian horse is gambling on the wrong horse, and Hizballah will be associated forever with Assad’s regime, especially its last brutal stages of life. This will hurt Hizballah and could even persuade Europe to place them on its list of terror organizations.”

Iran’s support makes Nasrallah “immune, because not only does he have their political support, he has the money and the control over the resources of Hizballah, and most importantly of all, the backing of Ayatollah Khamenei [Iran’s Supreme Leader].”

Al-Husseini is the leader of the Arabic Islamic Congress (AIC) and one of a growing number of high-profile Lebanese Shia who believe that Hizballah is wrong for their community and wrong for Lebanon. The U.S. has allegedly reached out to al-Husseini as a potential partner in undermining Hizballah. Al Husseini’s reputation has suffered a number of setbacks however, including being tried and later acquitted of being an Israeli spy, while U.S diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks in December 2011 cast doubt on just how genuine his rift with Hizballah really is.

“AIC headquarters are located on the Beirut airport highway, a Hizballah-dominated area,” the cable noted. “Contacts in the Beirut southern suburbs observed that Hizballah has neither harassed nor interfered with AIC.”

The long-standing Amal movement (another allegedly courted by the U.S.), is also seen as a more moderate Shia force and gained 13 seats to Hizballah’s 12 in the 2009 Lebanese general election. But Amal, led by Nabih Berri, has endured years of in-fighting while claims of nepotism and corruption have so far negated its political effectiveness. Despite opportunities to increase their influence amongst the Shia population those groups opposed to Hizballah have failed so far to make any real impression in gaining ground on the “Party of God.”

If Hizballah’s influence wanes it will be due to blindly supporting Assad in Syria, its reduced ability to function and provide the social support to its community that has come through its financial alliance with Syria and Iran, and possibly because of the emergence of a new political Shia force in South Lebanon.

On March 20 Israel’s Ynet.com reported that “a new political movement is gathering followers right in the Hizballah stronghold of Beirut’s southern suburb… Hizballah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah, once the undisputed stars of the Arab world, are rattled by surprise opposition from within their own ranks.”

The recently formed Movement for the Lebanese Citizen (MLC) is led by Imad Kamiche, a former Hizballah “operative.” Ynet.com – the online version of Israel’s highly regarded daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot – suggests MLC is “attempting to present an alternative to the rigidly Shiite framework represented by Hezbollah and Amal, and place the Lebanese citizen at the forefront, regardless of ethnicity.”

Hizballah suddenly appears keen to portray itself as tolerant of dissenting voices. “The fact that opposition elements are still residing in Beirut’s southern suburb is a testimony to the group’s tolerance,” a spokesman said. The article cited sources who added that “Hizballah actually wishes to absorb the opposition and their criticism, even contacting them for that purpose.” MLC founder Kamiche, however, hinted that he had been given clear “advice” to stay out of the political arena, a thinly veiled hint that Hizballah will only tolerate his opposing voice to a certain point.

This is supposed to be an election year in Lebanon. Sheikh Nasrallah and the Hizballah leadership will surely be aware that their intervention in the Syrian Civil War could cause a backlash at the ballot box and significantly reduce their share of the vote. Matt Levitt, director of The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, suggested recently that Hizballah still has to nail its colors to the Iranian mast to the exclusion of almost all other political and military considerations.

“What we see now is that Hezbollah is going to do things today that are in Iran’s interest even if they expressly run counter to the interests of Lebanon and Hezbollah’s own interest there,” Levitt argued. “People tend to misunderstand the relationship between Hezbollah and Iran, which has changed over time but is now extremely close. The U.S. intelligence community has publicly described this as a ‘strategic partnership.’ But people don’t fully appreciate Hezbollah’s ideological commitment to the concept of ‘velayat-e faqih,’ or guardianship of the jurists, which holds that a Shiite Islamic cleric should also serve as supreme head of government. For Hezbollah, this means the Iranian leadership is also their leader – not for every foot soldier, but for Hezbollah’s senior leaders, absolutely.”

Hizballah’s reputation had already been seriously damaged in the eyes of many EU states by its role in Syria, but the EU has thus far proved reluctant to officially designate it a terrorist organization. The recent confirmation by the Bulgarian government investigation that Hizballah was responsible for the bombing of a bus of Israeli tourists at Burgas last year was another blow to the Shia force’s credibility and may finally persuade the EU to act.

The EU’s argument that such a designation might destabilize the fragile Lebanese political status quo was left null and void on Friday evening when the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati – which included Hizballah – resigned, citing irreconcilable positions between the various factions over scheduling elections. Mikati’s spokesman, Fares Gemayyel, simply said, “The prime minister cannot work in such conditions. He needs to respect the constitution.”

A day earlier in Cyprus came the first conviction of a Hizballah member by an EU state as a court in Limassol found Hossam Taleb Yaacoub guilty of “being a member of a criminal organization.” Because the EU has not yet designated Hizballah a terror organization, the original charges of “being a member of a terrorist organisation” had to be amended to obtain a successful conviction under current Cypriot and EU law. Yaacoub was found guilty on five out of eight charges before the court.

“The United States applauds the government of Cyprus for its professional investigation and successful conviction in court today of Hezbollah operative Hossam Taleb Yaacoub on a range of charges involving his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets,” said State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland. “Today’s verdict underscores the need for our European allies – and other governments around the world – to crack down on this deadly group and to send a strong message that Hezbollah can no longer operate with impunity, at home or abroad.”

Writing on February 6 for the Washington Institute, Matt Levitt, taking into account the EU position and Hizballah’s support of the Syrian regime, came to the following conclusion:

“The ‘Party of God’ has turned its ‘weapons of resistance’ not on Israel, but on fellow Muslims. This, more so than the UN indictment of four of its members for the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, and more so than the exposure of Hizballah operations in places like Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Thailand, and Turkey, is what now threatens Hizballah’s standing as a Lebanese political party and social movement.”

Paul Alster is an Israel-based journalist who blogs at paulalster.com and can be followed on Twitter @paul_alster

Netanyahu hails ‘historic day’ as Israel starts pumping gas from major offshore find

March 31, 2013

Netanyahu hails ‘historic day’ as Israel starts pumping gas from major offshore find | The Times of Israel.

Four years after discovery, flow from Tamar field marks start of Israel’s transformation to ‘energy independence’ and eventual natural gas exporter

March 30, 2013, 5:38 pm
Undated file photo of the Tamar Lease natural gas rig, located 90 kilometers west of the city of Haifa, northern Israel (photo credit: AP/Albatross Aerial Perspective)

Undated file photo of the Tamar Lease natural gas rig, located 90 kilometers west of the city of Haifa, northern Israel (photo credit: AP/Albatross Aerial Perspective)

Natural gas from the offshore Tamar field was pumped to Israeli shores for the first time Saturday, four years after its discovery, in preparation for its first use in the Israeli energy market — a move that could transform the Israeli economy.

The Tamar deposit, discovered in 2009 some 90 kilometers west of Haifa, holds an estimated 8.5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

On Saturday, hailed an “important day for the Israeli economy” by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, natural gas from the field was being pumped to a newly erected facility on the coast of Ashdod, connected to the gas field via pipelines laid out on the ocean floor, 150 kilometers long and 16 inches wide.

Commenting on the historic development, Netanyahu drew a link between the event and the holiday of Passover.

“On the festival of freedom, we are taking an important step toward energy independence. We have advanced the natural gas sector in Israel over the last decade, which will be good for the Israeli economy and for all Israelis,” Netanyahu said.

The gas is to be transferred Sunday from the facility to a processing plant in Ashdod. From there, it will flow into the Israeli market. These newly harnessed resources promise to be a major boon to both the country’s public and private energy needs.

The controlling Tamar shareholder, Yitzhak Tshuva, said Saturday’s start of pumping came “months ahead of schedule.” He said the gas flow “will make Israel energy independent.”

The gas from Tamar is expected to help meet Israel’s energy needs for the next 20 years, Channel 2 said, and will save the economy some NIS 13 billion (some $35 billion) per year. Its ahead-of-schedule use will also save Israeli citizens some cash — lowering a planned rise in electricity costs to 6 percent, less than originally planned.

“This is an ‘energy independence day’ for Israel,” said Energy and Water Minister Silvan Shalom. “This breakthrough is the harbinger of the foray of additional private companies” into the Israeli energy market, he added.

Energy and Water Minister Silvan Shalom visits a special processing plant off the coast of Ashdod, set to receive gas from the Tamar deposit for the first time in four years. (photo credit: Moshe Binyamin/Energy and Water Ministry)

Energy and Water Minister Silvan Shalom visits a special processing plant off the coast of Ashdod, set to receive gas from the Tamar deposit for the first time in four years. (photo credit: Moshe Binyamin/Energy and Water Ministry)

The Tamar deposit, and especially the heftier Leviathan, which was discovered in 2010, are expected to provide Israel with enough natural gas for decades and transform the country, famously empty of natural resources, into an energy exporter.

Leviathan, which boasts an estimated 16 to 18 trillion cubic feet of gas, is expected to go online in 2016, the approximate time when exports are expected to begin.

Selling this gas overseas will require Israel to navigate a geopolitical quagmire that risks angering allies and enemies alike, however. Amid this uncertainty, Israel still has not formulated an export policy.

“Instead of being an ingredient which serves to calm the tensions of the eastern Mediterranean, (the discoveries) provide instead another impetus for rivalry,” said Simon Henderson, a fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “There is a reason this is often called diplomatically trapped gas.”

The discoveries are just a portion of the huge reserves in the Levant Basin, which the United States Geological Survey estimated in 2010 holds some 122 trillion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas.

While Israel’s finds are minimal compared to gas giants Russia, Iran or Qatar, they are more than enough for the country’s domestic needs and would enable the country to reduce its reliance on costlier and dirtier oil and coal. Nearby Cyprus has also become newly resource-rich, and Israel’s other neighbors, including enemies, may discover their own deposits.

In all, Israel has just the world’s 46th largest supply of proven natural gas reserves, according to the CIA Factbook. But the country’s proximity to Middle Eastern and European markets could make it an important regional player. For oil companies hoping to profit from the new wealth, the biggest hurdle remains the lack of an export policy.