WarSclerotic

Members of the Israeli Left were disappointed with the results of the 85th Academy Awards last month. Two home-grown documentaries depicting Israel in a terrible light were passed over for the Oscars.

Yes, it was a sad day for all those Israeli and Palestinian activists who had been rooting for “Five Broken Cameras” and “The Gatekeepers” to bring home the gold from Hollywood.

It was equally irritating for the rest of us, but not because the films lost; we were actually happy about that. But we were sorry that even a fraction of our tax shekels contributed to such slimy endeavors in the first place. Freedom of expression is one thing; public funding for projects geared at biting the hand that feeds them is quite another.

So I regret to say that a different Israeli work of “art” providing a pro-Palestinian perspective did win an international award this week — two, if you count the award it garnered for its musical score, written by singer/song writer Assaf Amdursky. The movie, “Rock the Casbah,” won the Special Prize of the Jury for Best Picture at a film festival in Aubagne, France.

I also have to admit to the less-than-dignified guffaw I let loose in response to what happened to director Yariv Horowitz immediately following the screening of the film: He was physically assaulted by a gang of Arab youths.

This was not due to the content of the film, mind you, which was nothing if not sympathetic to the plight of “poor Palestinians” at the hands of their “corrupt occupiers.” Nor was it due to Horowitz’s behavior or beliefs. Indeed, had the angry bullies cared about such things, they would have hailed Horowitz as a kindred spirit.

But Horowitz as an ally was of no interest to the anti-Semitic thugs. What they knew was that he was a Jew and an Israeli. This was sufficient cause to knock him unconscious.

After being treated at the scene, Horowitz was well enough to return to the festival, just in time to win his award.

This is not the only example of Israelis with impeccable left-wing credentials being shunned by their like-minded counterparts abroad. Academic boycotts of Israeli professors also point to this pathetic phenomenon. Like the art world, academia is a sector that can be relied upon to side with its country’s detractors. Yet, this does not guarantee immunity for even the most pro-Palestinian Israeli lecturers.

Another Israeli group that has experienced similar “injustice” is the lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgender community. Though its affiliates tend to lean far to the left — and rally around Palestinian society, in spite of its blatant abuse of LGBTs — it was banned from participating in the 2010 Gay Pride parade in Madrid. Some participants in an LGBT gathering in the U.S. walked out in protest when they discovered that the Israeli contingent had received some of its funding for the trip from the Foreign Ministry. Gasp! The “occupation” paid for fellow gays to come to our conference? Nothing doing, Nelly.

What this goes to show, for the millionth time, is that ill will and stupidity are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, the Israeli radicals are foolish for assuming that their ideology makes them any less Jewish in the eyes of the enemy.

The blanket boycotters are equally idiotic. The clever anti-Zionists are those who grasp the great benefits of having Israeli leftists leading the campaign to delegitimize the Jewish state. Hostile elements with any brains know that putting the likes of Horowitz in the spotlight by giving him a prize is much more useful than punching his lights out.

Ruthie Blum is the author of “To Hell in a Handbasket: Carter, Obama, and the ‘Arab Spring.'”

The violence in Syria claimed more victims on Thursday. The struggle in recent days has not only been between President Bashar Assad’s forces and the rebels, but also among the rebels themselves.

TIME Magazine reported this week on fighting between jihadist and secular rebel groups for control of the city of Tel Abyad near the Turkish border. This is just a preview of what is to come in Syria.

Moaz al-Khatib, the outgoing head of the Syrian National Coalition (he announced his resignation due to internal conflicts among the rebels), represented Syria at the Arab League summit in Doha this week. Al-Khatib complained that the world, especially the U.S., is not doing enough for the rebels. But the world is divided over Syria.

The Syrian opposition’s lack of unity is a result of the divisions in the international community. Everyone knows that the West supports the rebels, while Russia and China, along with Iran and Algeria, support the Assad regime. But the problem is that the support for the rebels is split. The religious rebels are supported by Qatar and Turkey, while the secular rebels are supported by Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

One can already see the Syrian opposition battling within itself over what will happen the day after Assad falls. Earlier this month, Turkey and Qatar promoted the candidacy of former businessman Ghassan Hitto to become prime minister of an interim rebel government to rule over “liberated areas.” Saudi Arabia opposed “Qatar’s candidate,” which led the Free Syrian Army to announce it would not recognize Hitto’s authority. Is this how you build a country?

The bitter rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is not only making the current situation in Syria more difficult, but also raises concerns about Syria’s post-Assad future. Qatar and Turkey are helping the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia is helping defectors from the Syrian military. Qatar and Saudi Arabia each have their own television channels. It is no wonder that commentators on Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya paint different pictures of the situation in Syria. Given the state of the opposition and the international community, it is not surprising that Assad is still surviving.

We are in the midst of an unusual Passover. We intensely studied the Obama administration as if this were Shavuot before asking forgiveness from Turkey as if this were Yom Kippur. Still, the calendar says we are in the middle of Passover. Isn’t this a time when we are supposed to ask why is this time different from all the other times?

Indeed, this year, instead of us Israelis traveling to Turkey for holiday, Turkey is coming to us. In every living room in the country during this holiday, the major topic of conversation was the rapprochement with Turkey, a nation whose presence is felt here on many levels, from pistachio nuts to the air force. The problem with this reconciliation is Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In the future, there’s a very good chance that Erdogan will serve up some of that bitter herb that we are commanded to eat at the Passover Seder. This time, however, it will be when the two governments are officially friends. It may be a cold friendship, but it’s a friendship nonetheless.

Still, even if the vacation packages to Turkey once again beckon and Antalya just can’t wait to welcome us back to its resorts and beaches, there are those who view Jerusalem’s apology to Ankara as an error. From the critics’ point of view, this was a blow to national pride and honor, an affront to morality, and, most importantly, an insult to the fighters of the elite Shayetet 13 commando unit, those who carried out their mission aboard the Mavi Marmara on the night of May 31, 2010. It was this operation that ended with the deaths of nine Turkish civilians.

Avigdor Lieberman, the former and future foreign minister, did not conceal his true feelings about the move, but he was one of the few figures in the Israeli political establishment who overtly objected to the re-establishment of ties. Others preferred to take a more pragmatic stance. They spoke more about the advantages of renewed relations, the army’s desire to turn a new page, how this would positively impact the needs of the intelligence community, the economic benefits, and, of course, the resumption of tourism.

Despite these factors, Lieberman is not alone in his thinking. Others, and not just those who were on board the ship, came out with remarks against the deal and how it was crafted. This isn’t the first time that a decision of major, national consequence has made with our heads and hearts clearly divided. Yet, after the Obamafest we witnessed last week, was it possible to say “no” to America?

In August 2011, Israel submitted a formal apology to a country with which it has diplomatic ties — albeit chilly ones — namely, Egypt. This was prompted by the killing of Egyptian police officers during a terrorist attack that took place along the highway that abuts the Israeli-Sinai border. When it comes to Turkey, however, the story is somewhat different. Since the Davos conference of 2009, when Erdogan angrily confronted President Shimon Peres after Operation Cast Lead, Ankara deliberately cooled relations to the point where it recalled its ambassador and severed ties completely.

Israeli officials were quite open about their desire to renew contacts with Turkey. Despite the lack of communication on the official level, informal ties and friendships with Turkish Foreign and Defense Ministry staff were maintained. The Turkish street also yearned for the return of the Israeli tourist. Still, Erdogan was on his high horse. He turned the confrontation with Israel and the overt embrace of the Palestinian cause into cornerstones of Turkish foreign policy.

There were a number of indicators that signaled to Erdogan that he was doing the right thing, including the European Union’s cold attitude toward his government as well as the Obama administration’s antipathy toward the Israeli government. Then came the unsightly developments that began to unfold in Syria, which compelled a change in plans. Ankara is no less anxious than Israel to see what happens after the dust settles on the Syrian civil war. It is particularly apprehensive about the possibility that chemical weapons will wind up in the hands of extremists.

Not only does Washington need stable allies, it also needs allies that communicate with one another so that it will have an easier time acting on the day after. All of a sudden, Erdogan discovered a commonality of interests with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He also realized that they both have a common friend — the Obama administration. Still, common friends don’t make Erdogan a friend. The Jewish community in Turkey can attest to that.

The Kurdish connection

Much has been said and written about the dramatic diplomatic news and the reasons it came about, but it’s worth noting that this reconciliation was one that was forged with Turkey’s head, not its heart. It would be foolish to think that after years of nonstop verbal onslaughts Erdogan has suddenly transformed into a lover of Zion. He has simply decided to direct all his hostility toward Bashar Assad’s regime, hoping that this avenue will give him what he has always desired — a way to boost Turkey’s influence and power in the region. He wants to be the lord of the manor.

Since his ascension to the premiership in 2003, Erdogan has done a lousy job of concealing his yen for a return to the days of the Ottoman Empire, both diplomatically and economically. It is safe to say that he has unquestionably succeeded. Look at where Turkey is today compared to Greece. Everything went according to Ankara’s plan. The Turkish government maintained good relations with Assad and former Libyan ruler Moammar Gadhafi — that is, until the Arab Spring erupted and people across the region reshuffled the deck.

The opportunistic Erdogan (a trait that is not necessarily a negative one when it comes to the Middle East) understood that he needed to get Turkey adjusted to the new reality. Instead of courting leaders, he was now courting peoples and nations. Meanwhile, however, the nations have been replaced by Islamist regimes that are not too enamored with the Turkish brand of Islamist democracy. In light of these circumstances, Erdogan needs to steer his country toward old (albeit unwanted) alliances, like with Israel.

Before patching things up with Jerusalem, Ankara’s other major diplomatic move was the historically significant truce that was forged with the Kurds. The price his government paid was steep. Or, as Erdogan put it, “It’s like swallowing poison.” Still, the interests justify the means.

An amazing thing happened this month, when the leader of the Kurdish underground movement PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, called for a cease-fire with Ankara from his jail cell (in which he has been incarcerated since 1999). This was the culmination of publicly held contacts between the Turkish government and the Kurdish underground.

To grasp the enormity of this development, one needs to understand that in Ankara’s eyes, the PKK is a bitter enemy, perhaps more so than Hamas is for Israel. Ocalan’s calls to his men to lay down their arms — something akin to “no more terrorism” — is a very significant strategic shift. In 1984, six years after the PKK was founded, it decided to adopt a policy of armed struggle which has thus far claimed 45,000 victims. This makes the Kurdish-Turkish truce much more significant than the Israeli-Turkish rapprochement.

What lies at the heart of Erdogan’s new Kurdish policy? An understanding of the changing regional calculus. The prime minister sees the increasing autonomy with which the Kurds of Iraq are handling their affairs. He is also cognizant of the large amounts of oil in Iraqi Kurdistan. Erdogan is also aware of the greater degree of independence being demonstrated by the Kurdish minority in Syria ever since the beginning of the gradual disintegration of the Assad regime. With all these factors in mind, the need for a detente with the Kurdish population has become more acute.

Everyone is agreed that the cease-fire reached earlier this month is the most significant of the five truces that have already been signed since the 1990s. By virtue of the cease-fire, Turkey wishes to take on the role of unifier of the Kurds. It wants to provide backing for the Kurds in northern Iran (who have enjoyed autonomy since 1991), the Kurds who are active in Syria and who have close ties with the Turkish PKK, and the Kurds in Turkey.

Officials in Ankara believe that if the government grants the Kurds a political and geographic base, a conduit to the West, and the backing of a democratic regime, then it will benefit from the support of its local Kurdish population, which numbers 25-30 million. Erdogan can effectively accomplish the goal long held by Turkey’s eighth President, Turgut Ozal, who during his term in the 1990s proposed the establishment of a Turkish-Kurdish confederation.

In order to succeed, however, the Turkish government first needs to solve its problems with the local Kurdish population. Only afterward could it then woo the Kurds in Iraq and Syria, thus boosting its regional profile. This is an old dream, one that seems more real today than ever before. Of course Erdogan would get the credit if it came to fruition, and this would give him power.

The timing of the cease-fire with the Kurds — shortly before Obama’s trip to the region — only helped Turkey, contributing to the overall atmosphere of reconciliation which came to encompass Israel as well. Media outlets across the globe were all too eager to report on the Israeli apology. The French daily Le Monde reported on Israel’s success in damage control after the long diplomatic chill.

Another factor that contributed to bringing Israel and Turkey together are the large quantities of natural gas that were discovered off of Israel’s coast. With the need to secure sources of energy to service its population of 70 million, Turkey unquestionably became more motivated to enter discussions with Israel.

Mediation

While Israel and the Kurds grabbed headlines in news stories related to Turkey, the chaos in unraveling Syria remains the most important story in the region. As we’ve mentioned, Turkey is well aware of the potential dangers inherent in a post-Assad order. As a result, Ankara is looking ahead. Moving closer to Israel may not expedite the fall of Assad or clean up the regional mess. But it is certainly in the interest of both countries and could go a long way toward solving numerous problems for Turkey, Israel, and the Americans.

Still, officials in Jerusalem are aware that as long as Erdogan remains in the picture (he’ll be prime minister at least until 2014, after which he may seek to institute constitutional changes and assume a presidency charged with greater powers) Israel needs to be on high diplomatic alert. Israel’s friends in Turkey privately acknowledge that Erdogan is far from a friend to Jerusalem.

Domestically, Erdogan is spinning Israel’s apology as a crowning achievement for Turkey. He told his parliament that he refused to compromise on anything. Erdogan demanded three concessions from Israel: an apology, financial compensation, and the removal of the blockade over Gaza. In the meantime, he has received two-thirds of what he demanded from Israel. It’s pretty clear that more disputes await us. The Turkish premier’s planned visit to Gaza will certainly not contribute to our warm feelings toward him.

One should expect more militant, bombastic statements from the Turkish prime minister, particularly when he is standing alongside militant Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. It should be noted that Erdogan has long sought to visit Gaza, but was denied access by Islamist Egypt. Neither Mohammed Morsi nor Benjamin Netanyahu holds the keys to the gates of Gaza today. Hence it will be interesting to see what kind of impact Erdogan’s visit has on the Palestinian Authority, beyond the expected anti-Israel rhetoric.

Erdogan, who took great pride in his ability to mediate between Israel and Syria, is likely to return to his role as mediator, this time in the dispute between Israel and the Palestinians. In light of the negotiations that are likely to get started once again, it is obvious that he will have some input to offer.

There is a significant dimension that has not been examined closely enough when it comes to the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement, and that is Turkey’s competition with Iran, a country that Ankara cozied up to three years ago. These are the two non-Arab powers of the region. Together, they have the wherewithal to completely change the strategic calculus. Nonetheless, officials in Ankara are cognizant of the Iranian threat, which casts a pall over their country as well. That explains the distance the Turks placed between themselves and Tehran, and the re-engagement with Israel. This way, Ankara is strengthened while Tehran is weakened.

Cold peace

As things stand now, diplomats in Jerusalem and Ankara are hard at work re-establishing a positive dialogue between the capitals. Netanyahu tapped former Foreign Ministry director-general Joseph Ciechanover to coordinate Israel’s position on the Turks regarding the amount of compensation to be paid to the families of those who died on the Marmara.

At the same time, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu spoke with Justice Minister Tzipi Livni over the formation of a joint Israeli-Turkish team that would be in charge of implementing the compensation payment. The only disagreements left to be ironed out are the amount of compensation and the manner in which the funds are to be transferred. While Israel wishes to make do with a few hundred thousand dollars, the Turks are speaking in terms of millions.

While negotiations are ongoing, it was still unpleasant for Israelis to read and hear the voices emanating from Turkish media outlets this past week. Although Davutoglu and Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc sounded conciliatory notes, Erdogan preferred to brazenly proclaim victory and flex his muscles. He even exploited the Israeli apology to demand that his opposition offer him an apology during a parliamentary debate. Did somebody say “power trip”?

Erdogan has also been feted by the Ankara municipality, which has hung signs around the capital bearing the prime minister’s image under the heading “We offer you gratitude, Erdogan.” The picture also depicts a shrunken version of Netanyahu, who is shown cowering in fear before the Turkish conqueror. Riding a wave of popularity, Erdogan boasted that during his upcoming trip to Gaza, he will examine the Israeli blockade. Officials in Jerusalem and Washington are beginning to realize that it will be difficult to rein him in.

The Turkish leader also sought to cool Israel’s enthusiasm over the renewal of ties. He said it was too soon for a reinstatement of ambassadors. He also said he was uncertain as to whether he could (even if he wanted to) cancel the legal proceedings planned against Israeli officers, who face maximum sentences of tens of thousands of years in Turkish jails. To make matters worse, Erdogan said that it was too soon to nullify the legal processes against the Shayetet commandos and officers who were on board the Marmara.

When examining the story up close, it certainly befits Passover. There’s a sense of freedom and vacation (as in all-inclusive vacation packages), but there are also some bitter herbs to swallow. Perhaps too many bitter herbs.

Within the government, there are — and were — three different conclusions drawn after Israel apologized to Turkey over the 2010 IDF raid on a Turkish ship that resulted in the deaths of nine Turkish activists.

Some people believed that Israel could have apologized to Turkey and ended the row two years ago. These officials included former ministers Ehud Barak, Dan Meridor and Benny Begin, and Israel’s representative to the U.N. investigation into the raid, Dr. Yossi Ciechanover. A second group believed that Israel should never have apologized, and that the very apology itself was wrong. This group included officials such as former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and former National Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau. And a third group, which includes Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon, believed that Israel waited until the right time came to apologize.

It’s likely that the debate over the Israeli apology will carry on for some time, but, alas, what’s done is done.

Israeli history has had no shortage of such divisive debates. Just in the last decade, two other important issues demanded incisive deliberation: former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s agreement with Hezbollah to free captive Elhanan Tennenbaum, and Netanyahu’s deal with Hamas to free Gilad Schalit. These situations were not identical. Though each deal set the bar for the next kidnapping, the debates surrounding them lost their significance the moment the captive prisoner emerged from his cell and was greeted by sunlight.

In the case of the Mavi Marmara incident, the conclusion is very much the same.

In each of these resolutions — especially in Israel’s apology to Turkey — the preceding debate raised important political and security-related questions: What is the limit to Israeli actions and, more importantly, how bold is Israel’s initiative?

Two opposing approaches to rapprochement with Turkey were developed in the last government. Netanyahu believes that his way will reap the most benefits for Israel.

According to Netanyahu, the party that initiates the apology will be forced to pay a high price; the initiating party is naked in front of the enemy, capitulating just by making the first move, and will be forced to make more concessions throughout negotiations. In addition, critics will slam the government because it didn’t wait for the enemy to initiate reconciliation. However, in Netanyahu’s scenario, the government would score political points and electoral support from its constituents if it could prove that it was forced to make concessions by an external party, proving that the government had “no choice.” The government’s status would remain unchanged and undiminished in the eyes of its supporters if Israel was to be strong-armed into dividing Hebron, halting settlement construction for a year, or declaring support for “two states for two peoples.”

Barak and Meridor — and sometimes other officials — proposed a different idea. In their opinion, despite the advantages of waiting for a “no-choice” scenario to arise, there are many disadvantage that accompany procrastination. Taking the initiative in issues of grave, national concern is an integral part of Zionism, they argue. Israel would do better to look interested in — and not be coerced into — a compromise that comes at such a high price.

For those who back this approach, the recent Israeli apology showed the world — and many young Israelis — that Israel does not pursue its own objectives. Rather, Israel responds only to force, or when it is backed into a corner — bad scenarios for everyone.

Still, when Israel does takes the initiative, greater concessions are often demanded of it; Israel capitulates through force. David Ben-Gurion took the initiative all his life (except when he was forced to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in 1957). Menachem Begin initiated three major events: the peace treaty with Egypt, the bombing of Iraq’s nuclear reactor and the First Lebanon War.

So, as the dust settles following Israel’s apology to Turkey, which approach triumphs? In my opinion, the second school of thought: taking the initiative. Many say it’s a draw. Actually, it hasn’t been decided.