WarSclerotic

New Middle East.

Amir Rapaport

23/11/2012

Operation Pillar of Defense, which ended on Wednesday evening, reshaped the Middle East, or is an expression of the harsh limitations imposed on Israel’s use of force in the post Arab Spring era. It depends on the onlooker’s perspective.

In order to understand the complexity of the operation, we need to start in January 2009 with operation Cast Lead. The operation that preceded the previous elections was treading in its last week, and ignited a perpetual fire between Prime Minister Olmert, Foreign Affairs Minister Livni, Minister of Defense Barak, IDF Chief of Staff Ashkenazi and Head of Southern Command Galant. It was, all in all, pretty successful. The operation achieved reasonable deterrence against Hamas, and created a 300 meter area “perimeter” to the west of the border fence surrounding the Gaza Strip. Despite occasional fire, the operation brought about two years and two months of near-total calm in the Gaza Strip region, until the terrorist attack in which an antitank missile was fired at a school bus in March 2011.

Since then, the timeframes between the rounds of combat have gotten shorter. Hamas and the other organizations had an interest in changing two things: easing the economic blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip, and bring about the cancellation of the ‘perimeter’. What is important is that since Cast Lead, the regional situation has drastically changed. Ehud Barak is more or less the only thing to remain from those days. Even the current US president, Barack Obama, is not George W. Bush, who wasn’t really interested in what Barak and Olmert were doing in Gaza. Of course, the greatest change is the ascent of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the international criticism directed at Israel after operation Cast Lead over the deaths of uninvolved civilians. Does anyone remember the Goldstone report?

Two other things: In the time that has passed since 2009, Iran has come closer to its nuclear bomb, and 2013 is now being defined as a decisive year with regards to the Iranian issue (this does not mean that the “decisiveness” won’t be postponed again for 2014 and onwards). On the other hand, the Iron Dome system became operational.

On Thursday, November 20, the General Staff was in the midst of a daily situation assessment discussion. Attending the meeting were the IDF Chief of Staff, Benny Gantz, and the head of the Operations Branch, Brig. Gen Yoav Har-Even, with more and more generals appeared around them and onboard the video conference screens (including the candidates for the position of next deputy chief of staff, Major Generals Gadi Eizenkot and Avi Mizrahi, as well as current deputy Yair Naveh).
The situation assessment dealt with the issue of seriousness of the DF’s plan for a ground effort in Gaza, and the possibility that the political echelon will instruct a ceasefire that evening. Reports came in from the field of commanders speaking of how their forces are being prepared daily for an operation, but the green light is not coming, while they are exposed to fire from the direction of the Gaza Strip. It was then that an initial report came in of a Fajr rocket that hit a building in Rishon LeZion.

The discussion carried on as usual, and the updates of the great miracle (or rather the proper implementation of the Homefront Command’s instructions, which prevented the loss of life) made their way to Gantz in notes. The reflex of all of those attending was to loosen the spring and take over the Gaza Strip, at least in part, and to teach Hamas a lesson. However, that didn’t happen.

Why not? Both because operation Pillar of Defense was greatly in the image of Lt. Gen. Gantz – temperate and not impassioned – and also because of the complexity of the situation. What is astounding is that throughout the operation. No pressure came from the military to the political echelon to approve an action that had not been approved. All shared the same concern that a strategic disaster could occur if the peace agreement with Egypt were to collapse.

The messages coming from Egypt and from the US were that a ground operation in the depths of the Gaza Strip was out of the question. The IDF was aware of the fact that operation Pillar of Defense was the first significant military operation in the post- Arab Spring era. The revolutions in the Arab world are not yet over, and they are still underway. Under the surface, a war is transpiring over the hegemony of the Arab world between the Shiites (Iran and Hezbollah) and their ally, Bashar al-Assad, and between the Sunni camp which includes Hamas, the Syrian rebels and Turkey, and the Islamic movements are rising in this camp.

Another scene from the war: on the evening of the second day of the operation, two suspicious figures appeared on the screen of the IAF’s command center, approaching near a house at the outskirts of Khan Yunis. There was grave concern that it was where weapons were being concealed. In normal times, the aircraft hovering above the two would have launched a missile without hesitation – but not this time. Those at the command center waited for the two people to be at a distance from the area and only then attacked. The tremendous subsequent blasts left no doubt that weapons were in fact concealed near the house. In this case, the Hamas operatives remained well because there was a small doubt among the fire operators that they might be innocent civilians rather than terrorists. The decision not to attack them indicates that the desire to avoid hurting uninvolved civilians at almost any cost was one of the cornerstones of the operation. In the end, only about a third of 200 casualties in the Gaza Strip were “innocent” according to military criteria, a figure which “passed” in international public opinion.

The desire to heavily pressure Hamas without causing anger among the international community, or the streets of Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority, was also at the hear of a dilemma. Even the minor decision to attack the fuel lines in the Rafiah tunnels was nearly spontaneous, and did not appear as a significant event in the early plans, but rather as “another option” in the general target list.

Throughout the week, Hamas operated firepower that exceeded what the IDF had anticipated – 150-250 rockets per day, including the fire to Tel Aviv, compared to 70-100 rockets foreseen from early predictions. One thing is certain: were it not for the Iron Dome system, which resulted in only 40 rockets actually landed in settled areas, the pressure on the political echelon to initiate a ground maneuver would have been much more significant – more than it would probably have been able to handle.

Weak in the knees
At the end of the operation, Israel’s Minister of Defense Ehud Barak is genuinely satisfied with the results of Pillar of Defense. True, he must put on the satisfied pose due to election and deterrence considerations, but he genuinely believes that Israel’s situation has actually improved. The big problem is that in complex reality in which the IDF operated, in which its force was limited, the operation was somewhat weak. After the death of Ahmed al-Jabri, the leaders of Hamas did not have to deal with a genuine sense of threat, while negotiating with Israel through Egyptian mediation.

Most of the IAF’s bombs were aimed for the sands of Gaza, where the weapon caches were hidden. It is best hot to have the heads in the sand: Hamas leaves operation Pillar of Defense with tremendous accomplishments. Its rule received international legitimacy. This was noted more than once this week, but more importantly, it reached political accomplishments through the use of military force. Its most significant achievements are the Israeli commitment not to operate any more in the “perimeter” and to ease the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip. Israel has not formally signed such a commitment, but it is certainly in the memorandum of understandings formed by Egypt, which will now be an address for the enforcement of the agreement, in cooperation with other countries that have not been decided upon.

Imagery has tremendous importance in the Middle East. From the Arab peninsula and all the way to Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, Hamas is perceived as the winner in this round. On our side, the feeling is much more acidulous. It is impossible to detach what happened this week from the Iranian connection. It may not be direct, but the handling of Gaza’s long-ranged weapons will do away with one headache for the IDF, in the event that a decision be made to attack in Iran in the next spring. In such a scenario, the IDF will primarily be forced to deal with long-range missiles from Iran and from Lebanon, even though according to a report in the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar, the attempts to renew Gaza’s weapon supplies through Iranian supplies already started during the operation. Even the most naïve among the senior IDF officials and those from the political echelon do not believe that the paper promising Israeli-Egyptian-US handling of the smuggling of weapons is worth something.

IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz quoted Brig. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot this week from when Eizenkot assessed that “Hamas is the one that would have liked to return to last Wednesday, half an hour before the operation.” Perhaps.

Iran accuses US of violating its airspace, complains to UN | The Times of Israel.

US cancels Middle East nuclear nonproliferation conference over regional turmoil and the Islamic Republic’s defiance

A US Naval vessel in the Persian Gulf (photo credit: US Department of Defense)the US Navy of carrying out “illegal and provocative acts” in the Persian Gulf and Sea of Oman.

In identical letters to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and the Security Council, Iran’s UN Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee said the Navy repeatedly violated the country’s airspace.

He cited flights over the coastal areas of Bushehr on seven occasions in October and most recently a US drone flight on Nov. 1 which disregarded all radio warnings and penetrated Iranian airspace.

The letters, circulated Friday, urged Ban to warn the US “against the continuation of acts in violation of international law and of the adverse consequences of any provocative and dangerous acts for which the United States government would be held responsible.”

The White House had no comment Friday night.

In related news, the US says a proposed conference on banning nuclear weapons in the Middle East cannot be convened at this point because of current conditions in the region.

State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said in a statement released Friday that the US will continue to work to create conditions that could result in a successful conference. But she cited political turmoil in the region and Iran’s defiant stance on nonproliferation.

Nuland says the US supports the goal of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. But she said such a conference should discuss a broad agenda of regional security.

“We would not support a conference in which any regional state would be subject to pressure or isolation,” Nuland added, alluding to Israel.

Iran and Arab nations have long criticized the West for supporting Israel and its widely suspected nuclear weapons program. Washington and its allies say Iran, North Korea and Syria are the greatest proliferation threats, even though Tehran and Damascus deny allegations of secret nuclear activities linked to weapons.

Nasrallah to Israel: You lost in Gaza, so who can you defeat? – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Hezbollah leader says Israel’s goal of ‘destroying Palestinian resistance’s leadership’ during Operation Pillar of Defense was not achieved; compares conflict to Second Lebanon War

Ynet

Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah congratulated the Palestinians in Gaza on their “first victory” over Israel’s armed forces.

In a televised address on Friday, the ninth day of the Shiite Muslim festival of Ashura, Nasrallah said, “The first victory of the resistance was that it prevented the enemy from achieving his goals, the greater victory was that it did not let the enemy impose his conditions, and the greatest victory was that it imposed its own conditions.

“The resistance, which lost a martyr, was able to fight efficiently (…) resistance movements in the region no longer depend on individuals,” Nasrallah said according to the Hezbollah-affiliated Al-Manar website.

“It is enough to look at the faces of the tripartite, Netanyahu, Obama, and Liebermanto see their defeat, they were similar to the faces of Livni, Peres, and Olmert after the July war (Second Lebanon War),” he said.

‘Psychological war.’ Nasrallah (Photo: EPA)

Nasrallah claimed that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “did not put high goals for this war. He rather put low goals so that he would achieve them and announce his victory, but even these he failed to achieve.

“The first goal was to destroy the Palestinian resistance’s leadership. He failed in that. The second goal was to destroy the resistance’s missile system. He also failed in that. The third goal was to reinforce Israel’s deterrence power. This war rather weakened this power,” he added.

The Hezbollah leader said Operation Pillar of Defense proved that the Israeli air force “is not capable of putting an end to the battle with Gaza,” and claimed that “it was clear that when the Israelis called the reserve soldiers, it was for imposing a psychological war, because they were scared of engaging in a ground war.”

Nasrallah continued to mock Israel, saying “if you failed to win a war against Gaza which has been under siege, what would be the case if you engage yourself in a war with someone else?”

Defense as defense – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

We now have a multilayered national defense; a main component is the IDF’s offensive and deterrent capabilities. We must now improve our rocket-defense systems, better protect vital infrastructure and strengthen our civil defense.

By Meir Elran Nov.23, 2012 | 3:34 AM

Operation Pillar of Defense will be remembered as a historic turning point in Israel’s defense concept. For the first time, after years of deep debates, Israel has proved that defensive capabilities play a decisive role in confronting its enemies. This is the case in the asymmetrical surroundings we have been living in for a generation.

That’s not a negligible statement. The Israel Defense Forces, as the key factor in shaping the security concept, still claims – for the most part – that victory and deterrence depend on its offensive capabilities. That was the reason for the army’s opposition since the 1980s to all plans for developing active defensive systems. It’s also what lay behind the insufficient investment in the Home Front Command and its marginalization. Calls for a revision of this outdated concept, which relies on the glorification of the IDF’s offensive ethos and combat units, constantly met reservations.

The change necessary for creating a balance between deterrence and victory on the one hand and defense on the other by developing combined military and civilian capabilities was late in coming. Awareness of defense’s role, which emerged after the Second Lebanon War and its effects on the civilian front, came gradually in the internal IDF debate.

We are not referring only to the dramatic successes of the Iron Dome rocket-defense system. It’s a good thing its impressive accomplishments, which saved lives and changed the strategic picture, have led the defense minister to request a special budget for more batteries – though still not enough for future needs. It’s an open question whether we will have the sense to realize that our achievements in the defensive campaign, alongside the offensive one, depend on building a combined national defense concept and implementing it over the long term.

The current campaign proved that this is possible. We now have a multilayered national defense; a main component is the IDF’s offensive and deterrent capabilities. In addition, we should keep building another three strong layers.

The first layer is active defense based on the Iron Dome, the Magic Wand and the Arrow rocket-defense systems. There is much to be done in this area.

The second layer is passive defense, which has been neglected relative to our needs. It includes the expansion of shelters and better protection of vital infrastructure.

The third layer is the strengthening of civil defense capabilities. The picture we saw over the week of fighting is encouraging. The people responsible for rescue, led by the Home Front Command, are doing very good work. The information to the public has been effective, there is evidence of combined military-civilian leadership, and overall cooperation reflects a proper amount of investment.

The successes of recent days point to an important change. We still face many obstacles, but it’s clear Israel is on the right track to ensure national fortitude based on its ability to absorb and contain serious attacks. Society must react responsibly, in accordance with the attacks’ intensity, and quickly continue functioning.

If we properly maintain the national defense system while preserving our offensive capabilities, we will achieve an important step in facing future challenges.

The writer, a retired brigadier general, heads the program for the study of the home front at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies.

Keeping America interested – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

An American presence in the region is an Israeli interest of the first degree, and we must do everything in our power to maintain it.

Despite the dramatic developments in the Middle East, from the civil war in Syria to the latest flare-up between Israel and Hamas, President Barack Obama’s first visit outside the United States, after his re-election, took place this week in East Asia. This trip served to inject content into the “shift eastward” the American administration announced last year, which is taking the form of a series of military, economic, commercial and diplomatic initiatives aimed at contending with the rising power of China. At the same time, the global energy map is changing because of the swell in oil and natural gas production in the United States, which is no longer dependent on imports of either of those fossil fuels. Just last week, the International Energy Agency announced that the U.S. is expected to surpass Saudi Arabia as the world’s largest oil producer by the middle of the next decade.

These developments could have a substantial impact on the Middle East, where America’s standing is being tested. Continued Iranian progress toward a nuclear weapon, erosion of American influence in Iraq, the difficulty of influencing the events in Syria, doubts among the monarchical regimes concerning American credibility, questions over the future of its relations with Cairo, as well as the chillier relationship with Jerusalem — all signify a growing difficulty to advance American policy goals in the region, and may be marks of a superpower in regression.

Directing its gaze away from the Middle East would represent a significant deviation from American policy throughout the years. Some maintain that this process has already begun. The Obama administration reduced its efforts to advance the peace process in the Middle East; it is having difficulty stopping Iran’s march to nuclear capability; Iraq is establishing itself increasingly outside the American sphere of influence; and in Afghanistan, where local security forces are not yet standing on their own feet, the administration is seeking an expedited exit.

Furthermore, the Obama administration “led from behind” in Libya, and has hesitated to push more actively for the ouster of Syria’s Bashar Assad, something that may have contributed to the extension of civil war there. The upshot: Allies and enemies alike are preparing, maybe already behaving, as though it were a post-American Middle East.

Between placing more emphasis than in the past on the Pacific basin and “disengaging” from the Middle East, however, there is still a great distance. This need not be a zero-sum game – the United States can be involved in both these arenas at once. It still has a number of central interests throughout the Middle East as a whole, each of which affects American considerations and requires constant monitoring and American willingness to intervene when necessary. Moreover, as this visit also attested, long-term considerations are frequently put off in practice, when short-term crises erupt in regions such as ours. Indeed, Obama had to dispatch Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the region from Cambodia, in order to press the sides to come up with an agreement to end violence.

Therefore it seems that, at least as far as the short term goes, the administration’s policy of pivoting toward East Asia will not necessarily take the form of reduced American military involvement in the Middle East. The need to stabilize weak countries and contend with radical Islam and global terror – and first and foremost the need to prevent regional nuclear proliferation – remain essential interests that require constant attention, if not continuous American presence.

Even though this is not necessarily America’s intention, there is no doubt that its enemies and friends in the Middle East will interpret the strategic change of focus that President Obama announced as another withdrawal from U.S. centers of influence in the region, and specifically, a devaluing of the military option against Iran and lack of support for the pro-Western regimes that remain in place.

We are talking about a highly dramatic change that could have long-term implications also for Israel, for which the United States is a mainstay. A genuine decline of American interest in maintaining significant involvement in the least stable region in the world will certainly will not help to make that region more stable.

On the other hand, though it is still far from clear to what extent it will have the attention span, energy and political power to invest in an attempt to bring the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table, there is a possibility that the new administration, freed of electoral considerations, will direct more effort toward a Middle East peace process. And that is something that need not bode ill for Israel. On the contrary: Israel, which emerges from the operation in Gaza with not insubstantial achievements, must act to repair its image, and despite the gaps that exist with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, prove that it remains a partner for peace. For this alone, American presence in the region is an Israeli interest of the first degree and we must do everything in our power to maintain it.

Relations with the United States constitute a central pillar of Israeli national security, and they will continue to do so. There is no substitute for these relations and Israel must toil to preserve and nurture them, despite the differences of opinion, some of these on matters cardinal to Israel’s security.

Yoel Guzansky is a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.