WarSclerotic

A Robotic Forward Guard.

( Truly breathtaking… – JW )

Amir Rapaport

3/11/2012

“I believe that 2013 will be the year in which a decade’s worth of processes will come to a conclusion,” declares Col. Nir Halamish in a special interview for IsraelDefense. As Head of the Weapons Department for the IDF’s Ground Forces, Halamish describes the direction in which the branch’s force buildup will focus, and notes the areas where major breakthroughs are expected to occur – including more efficient energy utilization by infantry and special forces and operating in distant locations across the battlefield.

Col. Halamish grew up in the Armored Corps, and has manned several positions in the Weapons Department for more than a decade. The interview with him took place near the time when the IDF General Staff approved a new multi-year plan (“Oz” – to be initiated in 2013-2017). The plan, which defines the strengthening directions of all the branches (including the Ground Forces), will be replacing the Tefen Multi-Year Plan which began in 2007 after the Second Lebanon War and was completed by the end of 2011.

The year 2012 was defined by the IDF as a “singular year”, The new plan was postponed by a year due to the dramatic changes in the Middle East, and after arguments between the Defense and Treasury Ministries concerning the parameters of the defense budget.

“The Tefen Multi-Year Plan is unique in two regards,” says Col. Halamish. “Firstly, it is one of the few plans in the history of the IDF that used all of its five years, and it was a very good and healthy process for the military. Secondly, it came immediately after the Second Lebanon War, and its planning stemmed from the lessons of that war. It essentially implemented all of the things that were understood from the war and was intended to allow for significant increases in crucial capabilities, as we understood were necessary in 2007.

“The plan itself brought some very significant capabilities, such as connectivity between all of the force elements on the ground, via the Digital Army Program (DAP), which has already become operational in half of the layout. In the coming years, we will expand it to the entire military, including reserves, and we will advance the ground connectivity to entities such as the Directorate of Military Intelligence, the IAF, and branches in the General Staff.”

Maneuver and Regional Defense

“One of the most significant lessons learned from the Second Lebanon War was the decision to renew the campaign’s maneuvering capabilities – in other words, carrying out a ‘quick and lethal maneuver’ as defined by the Commander of the Ground Forces, Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman. The IDF decided to acquire hundreds of Merkava Mark IV tanks and Merkava Namer APCs produced on U.S. soil for the sake of improving maneuvering capabilities, as well as acquiring active defense systems against antitank missiles.”

Will the IDF continue to invest in tanks, APCs and active defense systems during the years of the Oz plan? The IDF General Staff recently discussed its intent to reduce the number of tanks and APCs.

“There were many discussions, but there’s already the Merkava Mark IV, which we are continuing to develop and to manufacture, as well as the Namer APC. The Namer started out as a heavy APC in 2007, with the global direction being that of less protected vehicles, as dictated by the US – speed at the expense of survivability. We decided towards a heavy maneuvering vehicle which prioritizes the team’s survivability at the expense of less weight. It has good maneuverability, yet it will not reach high speeds such as a light AFV. We presently have an entire operational Golani brigade with Merkava APCs, and we have transferred production to General Dynamics in the US to fund the rest of the acquisition with aid funds. We are advancing at full speed. The fact is, there are debates in the multi-year plan whether or not to continue producing Namers and how it has no effect on the things transpiring in the coming two to three years. Eventually there’s General Dynamics, which has a contract for the production of a considerable amount of Namers, and it is about to transfer several models of the new APC for testing.

“Upon the arrival of the APCs from the US, we will also renew the production line of the Namers in Israel (Israeli systems will be assembled onboard the hulls arriving from the US). There are thoughts about a second regular Namer brigade afterwards. We are examining the matter. On the one hand, it is important that the regular ORBAT be with the most advanced systems. On the other hand, these platforms have significant maintenance costs, and now there is the need to find the balance between the desire to be strong at the sharp tip and between the capability of carrying out this endeavor. This has not yet been decided – there are important considerations on how to expand the capabilities of the Namer, and also of the Merkava Mark IV, for a regular brigade. The issue will reach the branch commander within a few months, and it will then be brought up for General Staff approval.”
What about the active defense systems? Thus far, Trophy systems (by Rafael) were installed onboard only some Merkava Mark IV tanks. Will you continue installing Trophy on tanks, and will you equip the new Namers with this system?

“In general, we think we have reached a situation where this vehicle provides an excellent response to the existing challenges – both traditional challenges such as tanks that are operating in the environment, as well as the developing ones of antitank squadrons, of a small and low-signature enemy who is very difficult to locate.
“Today, the Merkava IV tank has a comprehensive capability for defending against antitank threats, as well as dealing with the enemy and closing the fire cycle at an impressive speed of a few seconds, on the same vehicle. I believe that in the next confrontation that takes place, we will have to test these capabilities in war, or in a more significant conflict than the one taking place today in Gaza. The more we succeed in operating these systems in a better manner, we will reach a situation where an antitank squad firing an RPG-29 or other antitank weapons will find itself in clear, immediate danger in a matter of seconds. We’ve done a very thorough effort with the tanks – the result of considerable development, but testing these capabilities was carried out after the Second Lebanon War.”

You mean that there are also soft-kill systems?

“What I can say is that other technologies are being examined beyond Trophy. Additional systems are being developed, and I think that in the operational field of dealing with the antitank threat, we have set a goal for ourselves under a program called ‘Green Page’, to improve the capabilities of the combat battalion team. We are not discussing more about the single instrument level or how any tank or Namer deals with the antitank threat. Rather it is about the integrated battalion – with infantry, tanks, engineering and collection – and how its fire handles a threat that we understand from the Second Lebanon War, which the enemy views as an endeavor he should invest in from his perspective. On our side, we invest in order to prepare the forces – force buildup for improved confrontation. I am discussing the field of weapons and strengthening, but there are, of course, other directions, such as training and doctrines. “

Does this mean that it is possible for one instrument to defend another?

“It means that I’ve said all that I can say. One of the significant things that we’ve tasked ourselves with is the issue of dealing with the capability of a force’s critical mass to handle the antitank threat. No more “boutique capabilities” of lone forces, but rather significant capabilities for a significant ORBAT, so that we will have the ability to deal with a significant challenge in times of war or large conflict, and defeat it. Regarding the tank itself, besides having the Trophy System, which greatly increases survivability, we also provided it with an antitank shell named Kalanit, which is unique and the first of its kind in the world, produced by Israel Military Industries (IMI).

Tactical UAV
Col. Halamish explains, “Six to seven years ago, we made a strategic decision – in IDF terms – to develop autonomous tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) layouts to work alongside the maneuvering force, battalion or brigade. All the decisions regarding them are accepted at the regiment or brigade commander level. Their availability is very high, their conditions are very low – take off and land in the field. Most importantly, they maintain performance, in day and night in a manner that approaches the IDF’s largest micro-remotely powered vehicles (MRPVs).

“The first is called Skylark 1 (according to the commercial name of the manufacturer, Elbit Systems). This is a layout which we are more or less in the middle of implementing, and there are already several dozens of teams using it. The system works in an intensive manner, deepening across all the current security sectors – Gaza, Egypt, the Lebanon border, Judea and Samaria, as well as in all the unit trainings. Every regiment commander who received the system and the team said that the first thing they want is to keep it.”

According to Halamish, the Ground Forces branch recently decided on a new UAV project for the brigade echelon, termed Sky Galloper. This UAV will be 1.5 times larger than the Skylark and will also be manufactured by Elbit Systems.

Precision Mortars
According to Col. Halamish, another significant and developing field within the ground forces in the coming five years involves mortars. After the IDF acquired the Soltam-produced “Keshet” (a rapid mortar fired from an APC), a decision was made to begin a new project for developing mortar shells with a precision of up to a few meters. The shells will be directed towards the target via a laser marker or other guidance measures. The IDF is presently considering a revolutionary step: providing precision shell fire capabilities to armored battalions as well, to offer them another means of quickly and efficiently dealing with antitank squads ambushing them in the maneuver areas. “This is something that is being examined,” says Halamish.

“My assessment is that we will introduce the mortars to the armored battalions at one stage, out of an understanding that the Keshet is truly a force multiplier, and we wish to add everything we define as a precision shell upon it. The Keshet does things automatically, reducing human error to a minimum. All that is left for us today is to take the mortar shell and make it precise.

“Today, the mortar is still ‘dumb’, statistically one that falls within a range of 100 meters. We want to take this range and make it more precise, at least to ten meters. The precision will turn this instrument into an ultimate asset – quick, precise, with a minimal amount of errors. This is the central step that we are working on.”

Precision Rockets

Beyond mortars, the Ground Forces also intend to establish battalions that world fire precise rockets to ranges of nearly 40 kilometers (as revealed by the head of the Ground Forces during the International Fire Conference organized by IsraelDefense and the Artillery Corps Association in May 2012). The precise rockets will be based on the Accular developed by IMI, which took old rockets and added guidance and navigation systems to them.

Have you already started to establish the first precision rocket battalion?

“Yes, we are working on it now. The layout has not yet been constructed, but is undergoing advanced approvals. The Ground Forces commander is outlining the direction for us. Today, the air force is needed in order to precisely hit a structure or another target. We want to reach a situation where the rocket or mortar will reach all targets in every scenario, during the day or at night, and in all weather conditions. This is a significant challenge in that we see ourselves fighting 24/7, in the winter and summer.”

Halamish adds that in addition to the rocket battalion, the IDF will start the conversion of its mobile gun layout to a new gun in the coming five-year period – an effort that will take nearly three decades, meaning four multi-year plans.

Easier, More Concealed

Regarding infantry forces, Halamish says, “If you take an infantry battalion from 2006 and compare it to today, you’ll see that we have made at least one, sometimes two jumps in every parameter – command and control, collection, lethality, ability to hit soft/hard targets, camouflage and personal gear. Since this is a very large layout, this was one of the most significant efforts in the Tefen Plan, and it provided improved, upgraded capabilities to every infantry battalion, in terms of both quality and quantity, compared to five years ago.

What is happening with the project that was referred to in the past decade as the “Future Infantry Soldier”?

“In the framework of the project, some of the things that made its way to the ground force battalions are the result of initiatives that were in the previous incarnation of the future infantry project (in 2003-2004). The mechanism says that you try numerous ideas – several of them will mature, while several of them slowly die. The best of them progress to the full development and acquisition stage, from which the gathering systems came. We were using systems such as Yuval – an expensive and heavy system weighing 11-12 kilograms.

“One of the things that came about during 2003 to 2005 was the capability to take the thermal world and pack it in two and a half kilograms while maintaining the same ranges. This was something that we thought about before then, but we did not see how we could turn it into a project. Now it’s a standard.

“In general, we took everything that the infantry soldiers were carrying, which was in the area of 40-50 kilograms, and reduced it to less than ten kilograms. Let’s say that an artillery cooperation officer had to carry observation systems and batteries for 48 hours. This is a weight that he could not carry on his own, alongside two soldiers who were carrying it as well. This was the operation – three persons walking with heavy gear. We took all of the artillery cooperation officer’s gear, and specified the equipment used to produce even better operational outputs (i.e. allows for seeing during day and night, and produces coordinates) – all of this in only ten kilograms. Today, an infantry artillery cooperation officer does not need a hauler.”

What breakthroughs are there in the energy field?

“I believe that the next head of the Weapons Development Division, in about five years, will have several issues that he will turn into projects, and one of them will be the energy issue. Looking ahead, you see there is more equipment that requires energy, including for command and control and gathering measures. We are approaching a situation where the different types and amount of energy requires many soldiers. We are presently examining several significant directions with MAFAT for more energy at less weight. The aspiration is to reach a ratio of 1:2 with portable infantry forces systems, meaning twice the energy for the same weight. There are several directions, starting with solar panels and up to composite materials whose energy is twice as high.

“MAFAT operates projects in several universities, as well as with the US. We are investing many resources in this field in order to reach a situation where a battery’s activation time will be 16 hours instead of eight. The goal is 1:3 with combat collection units, which collect materials and don’t have to be in motion all the time, and there are other directions, such as a small generator that could operate for days, while allowing for operating systems. We are working in this field with Ricor from Ein Harod. Sizable budgets need to be invested in this.”

So we are discussing energy generators in the field?

“For example, a liter of a certain type of benzene can allow for the production of 72 hours of energy. There is, of course, a trade-off – the generator weighs ten kilograms, not including the extra liter, but it’s worth it if it provides you with energy for a week.”

What about liquid energy?

“There is the whole world of fuel cells. We are also examining this in UAVs, which are electric and have an endurance of two to three hours. We want this to stand at six hours – the longer the UAV can stay in the air, the better. This is a field that has great potential. Breakthroughs will happen in some of the things and not in others.

What other things are on the verge of breakthroughs?

“The cellular field. Our cellphones consume energy so much that they can’t finish a day’s work without being recharged several times. Considerable amounts of money are being invested in this – whoever comes up with a solution will be a millionaire. We are riding on the backs of the civilian sector, and it is from there that things will be reached.

“Another issue is “friend-or-foe” identification, a subject that that comes up in every war or operation. The IDF enters built-up areas where everything is crowded and improvised, with tanks and infantry inside – everyone is mixed up with everything. We are now investing towards finding a solution to prevent friendly-fire. The attacker is less interested, so far as knowing if I am in a tank and signaling to an infantry force, whether it is one of our own, without requiring the infantry soldier’s cooperation. A breakthrough will happen here and while it will not provide 100% of what we need, it could improve decision-making. I am not assuming that a decision may or may not happen according to this, but it may allow for decisions to be made. You want to reach a situation where batteries are not needed for such a form of identification.

“Last year, we called on several companies to work on this. I believe that we will ultimately reach our goal. Today, you have systems that require cooperation with the force, such as a thermal flag. However, many times, someone could shoot you from behind because he can’t see the flag.

“There are all sorts of areas being developed regarding the future infantry soldier, such as better uniforms. Some of the officers examine potential uniforms that might aid the infantry fighter during combat.

“Another issue is to take what the infantry soldier carries, including uniform, measures, and protection – and turn it into a single system. For example, having energy be part of the protection layer. Energy is central, and it will provide you with the command and control. I presume that the combat configuration of the infantry – such as traversing on foot and reaching certain destinations – will be preserved, even in one or two decades from now. It will need assistance and organization for it to carry out such missions in a good manner.

“One of the other things is to transfer the world of autonomous vehicles from the air to the ground – this is the world we call UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles). There are two main directions in this field, one of which is to take this capability and integrate it in ongoing security settings, as is done in Gaza. The only missionoperational UGV system in the world that is the one we operate in Gaza – the G-NIUS Guardium UGV. It still carries out missions today. There were initially problems with it, primarily in communications and the capability of operating near the fence. It has been carrying out activities nicely in the past year.

“One example is that there are complex situations near the fences, where instead of operating manned forces and becoming entangled in a dangerous situation, the forces can be allowed to close a wider circle and introduce the UGV, which transmits the image back. If there’s a charge, it will explode, and if there is an incursion, then it transmits the information and allows us to get organized accordingly.

There is also a plan known as “Forward Guard” – what does it refer to?

“Forward guard refers to an unmanned force that will operate ahead of the main force, one which will track the enemy and another to encounter it in place of the main force.

Thus far, we have yet to solve the communication problem. I want to give this instrument commands, not just data, and this is where there is still a problem. Furthermore, you want to reach a situation where this instrument can make decisions independently in the field – what is called artificial intelligence (AI). This might be pretentious, but this is the appropriate word. If it reaches a place where there is an obstacle, and it needs to be overcome, then the robot will know how to figure it out, just like any sixyear old child. For the time being, this is something that they cannot do. If we solve this, we could provide unmanned forward guard capabilities with a manned force. This is something that we are advancing along with MAFAT.

Is there a goal to see to it that the robots could talk amongst themselves?

“Yes, but our current ambition is primarily that they will be able to operated on their own. The dream of taking a robotic force and having it fight behind enemy lines instead of soldiers exists in the movies, but we are not yet close to that. In any case, I say that we are the most advanced military in this field, and quite a few militaries come here to see what we are developing. Afghanistan, for example, presented very significant challenges to the various allied forces, similar to what he had in the security strip, such as the logistic convoys and movement to outposts. They eventually reached the same solutions that we did, such as supplies from the air and more, and then they also examined the UGV trucks.

I am a big believer in the notion that technological breakthroughs are accomplished step by step: isolate a problem, focus on what is desired, and thus reach a solution. It is very difficult to take a large step. Many times you do not have 10-15 years for a project to yield results. It is always easy is to say that the operational need is extensive and does not allow for compromise, and that the system is not needed without all of it. One of my challenges is to quantify the operational need so that it may be accomplished within a range of three to five years, and not to develop systems over many lengthy years that will not be needed by the time it is completed.”

London, Paris, Jerusalem line up for post-US vote action on Syria, Iran.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report November 3, 2012, 11:14 AM (GMT+02:00)

First talks between Binyamin Netanyahu and President Francois Hollande

The UK , France and Israel showed signs this week of lining up for military action with regard to Syria and Iran as soon as America’s presidential election was out of the way Tuesday, Nov. 6, debkafile’s military sources report.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu spent two days (Oct. 31-Nov. 1) talking to President Francois Holland. As the Defense Minister Ehud Barak landed in London the next day, Prime Minister David Cameron was reported on standby for the dispatch of RAF fighter-bombers to the Persian Gulf.

Barak flew to London after US Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had spent several days in Israel, no doubt tying up the last ends of US-Israeli cooperation for potential action.

Although America’s top military chief can’t tell who will be his next commander-in-chief – Barack Obama for another four years or the Republican Mitt Romney – he is duty-bound to have US forces in the Middle East ready for any contingency.
Although none has admitted as much, all the parties to these consultations did their best this week to chart alternative scenarios applicable to either winner. The consensus was that whether it is Obama or Romney, the two flaming Middle East crises can no longer remain subject to the policy immobility dictated by the presidential campaign – certainly not the Syrian bloodbath.

But the presence of thousands of Iranian and Hizballah combatants fighting for Bashar Assad on the battlefields of Syria oblige Western policy architects to reckon with reactions from Tehran and its Lebanese surrogate, HIzballah, as well as their Palestinian allies in the Gaza Strip.
debkafile’s military and intelligence sources report that all the US, British and French forces that might be needed for military action are already in place in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, while Israel’s Defense Forces are on standby. They are awaiting orders to go forward after first being told which way to jump – Syria or Iran.
US strength – air, naval and strike ground units – are concentrated on the Red Sea Socotra Island and Oman’s Masirah Island in the Persian Gulf. Since mid-October, Washington has maintained supplementary special operations and anti-air units in Turkey, Jordan and Israel.
Britain and France have massed naval, air and special operations forces in the big naval base of Port Zayed and the Al Dhafra air facility – both in the United Arab Emirates. A French fighter-bomber squadron is also parked at the Tabuk air base in Saudi Arabia.
Military strategists regard the initial phases of the Iran-Israeli confrontation as already being in motion, manifested by an Iranian stealth drone which overflew Israel on Oct. 6 and Israel’s raid on Oct. 24 of the Sudanese factory manufacturing and storing Iranian missiles. They are predicting that such shadow-sparring exercises between Tehran and Jerusalem may evolve next month into more direct clashes between Israel, Iran and Hizballah – more probably isolated incidents related to Iran’s Middle East deployments, especially in Syria and Lebanon, rather than a full-blown eruption of hostilities all at once.
Meanwhile, after both Obama and Romney voiced disapproval of direct US military involvement in Syria, Washington embarked on quiet moves for a diplomatic accomodation.
During a recent round table in Ankara, Admiral James Winnfeld, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that Washington would reveal its intentions toward Syria once the 6 November presidential elections were over. But he then announced to his Turkish counterparts that a peace plan had already been negotiated with Moscow for keeping Assad in power and that the UN Security Council would not authorize the creation of buffer zones on which Ankara had pinned its plans for Syria. Instead, Herve Ladsous, the UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, announced that he was studying the possible deployment of peacekeepers (“blue helmets”) in Syria.

This new situation comes at the expense of Saudi Arabia, France, Qatar and Turkey – all of whom back the Syrian revolt and demand regime change in Damascus. This anti-Assad coalition is now split between those demanding a compromise solution and those trying to sabotage the process underway between Washington and Moscow.
But no one has meanwhile heard from Assad or Tehran.
It is important to remember that Assad does not sit in Vladimir Putin’s pocket and may veto the project; so too might Tehran.

Just How Committed Is Obama to Stopping Iran? – Jeffrey Goldberg – The Atlantic.

( A very intelligent discussion.  RECOMMENDED. – JW )

Here is an interesting (to me, at least) exchange (originally published in The New York Jewish Week)  I had with my friend and sparring partner Yossi Klein Halevi, of the Shalom Hartman Institute, on the subject of President Obama’s Iran policy. Yossi is one of those Israelis who is, to my mind, irrationally fearful of Obama, and Yossi wanted to test my sangfroid.

Dear Jeff,

Like many Israelis, I don’t trust President Obama’s resolve on Iran. When he says that all options are on the table, I remain deeply skeptical about this President’s willingness to order a military strike if all other options fail.

More than any journalist I know, you’ve been at once clear-eyed on the Islamist threat and also a strong advocate of trusting Obama on Iran. So, as someone who takes the Iranian nuclear threat as seriously as we do here, tell me what we Israelis are missing about Obama.
Yossi

Dear Yossi,

I think Obama takes the threat very seriously. I think he takes it just as seriously as Netanyahu takes it. More, maybe. It seems to me sometimes that Netanyahu, if he truly believed his rhetoric, would have acted already against the Iranian bomb threat. I know there are people in Washington who think he’s not actually serious about striking Iran, should all else fail. And these are people who six months ago thought he would do it.

What you and other Israeli skeptics don’t get about Obama is this: He is deadly serious about stopping nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. It is a core belief of his. He has enunciated on many occasions compelling reasons why he believes it to be unacceptable for Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. He also knows that the reputation of his presidency is riding on this question. If Iran goes nuclear against his wishes, he looks like Jimmy Carter. He doesn’t want to go down in history looking like Jimmy Carter.

He also knows that he has time before having to act, because of America’s greater capabilities. He doesn’t show Israel much love, it is true. He doesn’t show any nation much love. That’s not who he is. But if you read the interview I did with him on this subject, you’ll see a clear path, a clear set of parameters and a clear intent to keep a bomb away from Iran. The flipside of this, of course, is that I believe Mitt Romney would be less likely to act, especially in 2013, which may be the year of decision. He’d be a new president, one with an inexperienced national security team. And he won’t want to begin his presidency by plunging the U.S. into another Middle Eastern war. It is so much harder for a Republican to confront Iran than it would be for a Democrat, for so many reasons. Obama’s drone war is a good example; he gets away with things George W. Bush couldn’t even imagine doing. Such is the nature of politics in America. Here, by the way, is a compendium of Obama’s statements on the subject. Identify for me, please, the wiggle room in these statements. I haven’t found any.
Jeff

Dear Jeff,

You make an important point about the advantage of a Democratic president over a Republican president in waging war. A similar dynamic has been at work in Israel. Former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert fought two wars – against Hezbollah in 2006 and then against Hamas in 2009 – and yet is still widely considered a dove, while Netanyahu, who has never led a military campaign in either of his two terms in office, is widely regarded as belligerent. Only the Likud, the old adage goes, can make peace, because it can deliver the moderate right for an agreement. By the same measure, perhaps only the Israeli left (or a national unity government) can effectively wage war and for the same reason: It can bring consensus.

But the question regarding Obama and Iran, of course, is whether this Democratic president is capable – temperamentally, ideologically – of ordering a military strike against Iran. At issue isn’t whether Obama wants to stop Iran but whether he has the determination to match his rhetoric.

Do you believe that the current level of sanctions, however economically painful, are enough to deter Iran? Do you believe the Iranians will agree to a negotiated solution? From reading you carefully over the last few years, I don’t think you do. And so, Jeff: If Obama won’t bring the sanctions to the point where they can truly stop Iran, then how can we trust him to use military force?

You write that failure to stop Iran will mean that Obama goes down in history as another Jimmy Carter. In fact he already looks like Jimmy Carter. As you recently wrote (don’t you hate it when you get quoted against yourself?), Obama has failed to show resolve in Syria. Bringing down Assad – the Arab regime that is Iran’s closest ally – should be one of the administration’s top foreign policy goals. In hesitating on Syria, Obama is repeating his failure to support the anti-regime demonstrators in Teheran in 2009.

To forfeit two historic opportunities to undermine the Iranian regime hardly instills confidence that Obama can be trusted to act decisively against a nuclearizing Iran.

Obama’s mishandling of Egypt likewise reveals poor judgment in dealing with extremist threats. One can argue whether he jettisoned his former ally, Mubarak, too abruptly. One can argue too whether he could have helped slow the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood.
What seems to me inarguable is that he has failed to effectively set limits to the Brotherhood, failed to challenge its growing domestic repression. Instead, he wants to increase foreign aid to Egypt. If this were not an election year, he would have likely met with Egypt’s president, Mohamed Morsi, during the latter’s recent visit to the UN. The result of that policy of accomodationism is that it is Morsi who is setting conditions on America for the relationship between Washington and Cairo (as he recently did in a New York Times interview).
Finally Obama showed misjudgment in repeatedly condemning the ludicrous YouTube anti-Muslim film. By taking out ads on Pakistani TV to condemn the film, the administration encouraged the perception that extremists had a legitimate grievance.

There’s a pattern here of weakness against enemies, of appeasing extremists, of missing opportunities
.
All this is hardly surprising to you: You’ve written as much in recent weeks. “Obama’s record in the Middle East,” you wrote, “suggests that missed opportunities are becoming a White House specialty.” True, you also wrote the following: “On the most important and urgent issue, the Iranian nuclear program, Obama is an activist president.” But can you really fault Israelis for wondering whether, at the moment of truth, Obama will avoid the ultimate missed opportunity?
It’s not only Israelis who don’t trust Obama on Iran. Arab leaders, as you well know, are skeptical too. Worst of all, the Iranian regime doesn’t believe him. That’s why it responds to Obama’s sanctions and threats by accelerating its nuclear program.

You may be right, and I am underestimating this President’s resolve on an issue to which he has repeatedly committed himself.

If so, there’s a deeper question here for Israelis: Can we trust anyone, even the most well-intentioned friend, with an issue of existential importance to us? As someone who knows us as well as any American Jew, this Israeli anxiety will come as no surprise to you.

For many of us the frame of reference is May 1967. At that time, Lyndon Johnson, as good a friend as Israel ever had in the White House, refused to honor President Eisenhower’s commitment in 1957 to challenge an Egyptian blockade of Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. Johnson, preoccupied with Vietnam, had good reason for wanting to avoid American involvement in another war. But the fact remains that, at the crucial moment, America violated its commitment to Israel.

Aside perhaps from May 1967, I can’t think of a more excruciating time for Israel than now. Obama has repeatedly assured us that he understands our angst, that he supports our right to defend ourselves. And still we stubborn Israelis persist in our skepticism.

Maybe what I’m asking from you is unfair, Jeff. Because in the end, no amount of reassurance of Obama’s resolve can convince us that the Johnson precedent won’t return, and that we won’t find ourselves alone again against existential threat.
Yossi

Dear Yossi,

There are two questions here (well, actually there are about 30) but let me grapple with the two most important ones: The first is this: Is President Obama actually prepared to use military force to stop Iran? The second question is, Is Romney prepared to use military force to stop Iran?

When I argue for the idea that Obama may eventually resort to force to stop Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, I’m not judging him against some sort of impossible standard of interventionist muscularity. I’m judging him against the only other man who could be elected president next month. You’re familiar with my argument that Romney is less likely (particularly early in his term) than Obama to use force, so I won’t rehearse it here.

I would add this, however, and I haven’t mentioned this before: If Romney wins, the anti-war movement will become extraordinarily energized in the U.S. Democrats who might have felt compelled to back Obama, or at least acquiesce to military action against Iran, will be on the barricades protesting the possibility of such a strike if it is Romney’s doing. Fierce opposition certainly won’t strengthen Romney’s hand to act, and the consequences of the opposition that is sure to materialize could have profoundly negative effects on Israel’s reputation in America. Israel is already in danger of becoming a partisan issue; the long-term consequences of this could be devastating. If Romney wins, and if Benjamin Netanyahu stays in power in Israel, I can almost guarantee you that you will see a melting away of whatever Democratic support there is for tough action against Iran, and a melting away of whatever liberal support there still remains for a strong America-Israel relationship. American support is a pillar of Israeli national security policy. Israel cannot thrive – and maybe it can’t survive – in a Middle East dominated by a nuclear Iran. But it will also have difficulty surviving without American support, and I’m telling you, medium- to long-term, Israel could be in trouble in the U.S.
.
To answer some of your other questions, do I believe sanctions will work to bring Iran to a compromise? No, probably not. Do I believe that sanctions could work to destabilize, and possible bring an end to, the regime? Possibly yes. I’m not sure why you believe Obama is weak on sanctions; he’s certainly stronger than his Republican predecessor was. And I think Netanyahu’s people are being sincere when they say that there is at least the small possibility that sanctions will work.

On a related subject, I’m not sure why you conflate Obama’s passivity on Syria with his tough actions, and tough words, on Iran. He was never going to go into the regime-change business. He didn’t get elected to go into the regime business. He ran for office in order to get America out of the regime-change business. He is, in this sense, a foreign policy realist. But he did run for office on the promise of stopping nuclear proliferation. He is deeply and sincerely committed, I believe, to a rather too grand vision of a world without nuclear weapons. But the unreality of the ultimate goal serves the needs of those who want Iran permanently denuclearized. He knows, I assume, that he can’t achieve global Nuclear Zero. But he also knows that stopping a nuclear arms race in the Middle East is within his power. I always try to explain to Israelis that Obama isn’t committed to this issue merely because he promised Jewish voters that he would not allow Israel to be endangered. Non-proliferation is a cornerstone of his worldview, and Iran represents the single-biggest challenge to that worldview.

But maybe you’re right – maybe this is going to be Johnson redux. But you have to consider something else: By extracting himself from Iraq, by drawing down in Afghanistan, by staying out of the Syrian civil war, maybe what Obama is doing is preparing for the day when he has to go to the American people and say that he is taking military action against Iran. He’s clearing the decks, in other words. From the Israeli standpoint, maybe you should be glad that he’s taking a pause in the Middle East intervention business. This way, when the Iran issue reaches a boiling point, he won’t be in Johnson’s position – overextended, and unpopular, and therefore not willing to, among other things, come to Israel’s aid.
Jeff

Dear Jeff,

That’s a crucial insight you raise about the anti-war movement and a President Romney. A reenergized anti-war movement could dangerously erode the already-shaky nature of bipartisan support for Israel, which is the only long-term guarantee for maintaining the special relationship. Missiles on Tel Aviv, a multi-front war with Hezbollah, Hamas, what’s left of Syria and of course Iran, the unleashing of global terror against Jewish communities, rising oil prices and eonomic dislocation – Israelis take a deep breath and prepare themselves for those disasters. Risking our relationship with blue-state America is almost one blow too many.

And yet if Israeli skepticism about Obama is right, then I’m ready to take that risk, too. I see a nuclear Iran as a literal apocalyptic threat, and I sense that you do too. The difference between us remains: Can we trust this guy at the moment of truth?

You sat with the President, looked him in the eye and was convinced of his determination. In your place I may well have reached the same conclusion.

But from where I’m sitting, it seems to me unthinkable that Obama, for all his commitment to non-proliferation, will order the bombing of Iran. This is after all the man who thought he was atoning for the abuse of American power by abandoning anti-regime demonstrators in Tehran in 2009.

As for Obama and sanctions: Yes, he’s imposed far stronger measures than his predecessor, but that is, unfortunately, a meaningless comparison. Four years ago, Obama’s sanctions would have been significant. Now, the only question that matters is whether those sanctions are enough to stop Tehran. I don’t believe they are.

I fear that Obama still believes he’s dealing with essentially rational people in the Iranian regime. And now there are reports of secret negotiations between Tehran and Washington. In the end my deepest fear is that Obama will be outmaneuvered by the Iranians, that his longing for a diplomatic solution will be played by the Iranian regime to reach the point of breakout.
But Jeff: If Obama is reelected, all I can do is pray for that moment when you will say to me, I told you so.

Yossi

Sudan Lawmakers Split Over Closer Ties With Iran – Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East.

Sudanese naval officials wave at Iranian Navy helicopter carrier Kharg at Port Sudan at the Red Sea State, October 31, 2012. Two Iranian warships docked in Sudan on Monday, Iran’s official IRNA news agency reported, less than a week after Khartoum accused Israel of attacking an arms factory in the Sudanese capital. (photo by REUTERS/ Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah)

U.S. And Israeli Officials Analyze Sudan Attack.

November 05, 2012

David Fulghum Washington

A bombing raid on the Yarmouk weapons factory near Khartoum, Sudan, destroyed dozens of shipping containers thought to carry rockets and other weapons headed for Egypt’s lawless Sinai Peninsula and Hamas-run Gaza.

About 200 tons of material, including rockets, were torched. Witnesses said they heard jet engine noises just before the explosions started shortly after midnight on Oct. 24. Multiple explosions that blew burning projectiles into adjacent neighborhoods were videotaped and quickly posted to the Internet. The fires, fueled by many small explosions within the plant’s compound, raged for hours.

There has been an impressive string of anonymous attacks on military-related personnel and facilities in the region that are deemed to pose a threat to Israel and moderate Arab states. These include:

•The 2007 bombing of the al-Kibar Syrian nuclear reactor.

•The 2009 bombing of an Iranian-controlled convoy carrying arms across Sudan with the intent of smuggling them across the Sinai Peninsula.

•The Stuxnet and Flame cyber-reconnaissance and attack virus that may have begun probing and damaging automated industrial processes in Iran as early as 2007, even though they remained undetected until 2010 and 2012, respectively.

•The 2011 killing in an aerial strike of a Hamas arms smuggler in Port Sudan.

The 2012 bombing of power lines to Iran’s Fordow and Natanz uranium enrichment facilities.

The open questions include not only who launches these attacks, but what weapons are involved. Israel has both bomb-carrying, manned and unmanned strike aircraft. Moreover, the country now has four, cruise-missile-carrying, German-made, extra-quiet Dolphin submarines that could deliver stealth attacks from very long range.

The ground attacks in Iran could have involved special operations teams of Kurds, Iraqi Sunnis or dissident Iranians. No one has claimed credit for any of the strikes.

In analyzing the latest attack, a senior U.S. Air Force official suggested that the Khartoum attack—if it was conducted by Israeli air force—would likely have been carried out by Tel Aviv’s longest-range aircraft—F-15Is—for several reasons. The round-trip mission would stretch about 2,400 mi. Aerial raids by unmanned aircraft (stationed in the Negev) or cruise missiles (fired from submarines) on a facility in the middle of a built-up, high-density population area would have a high potential for creating collateral damage.

An un-sourced story in The Sunday Times of London states that the attack was conducted by eight F-15Is—with four of them carrying two 2,000-lb. bombs each—two combat search-and-rescue helicopters, an Israeli Aerospace Industries-modified Gulfstream 550 electronic-attack aircraft and a Boeing 707 tanker.

“You certainly don’t need eight F-15s to deliver eight Mk.84s,” says a veteran U.S. Air Force warplanner. Israeli officials agree, telling Aviation Week that they only used four F-15s for the raid in Syria, and far fewer than the eight F-16s and a covering force of F-15s they used to bomb the nuclear reactor in Iraq. Israeli airmen contend that precision weapons and sensors allow them to use much smaller attack units than in the past.

A veteran Israeli pilot says that the Israeli air force—despite its predilection to use smaller, low-profile attack packages—because of the distances involved, would be obligated to increase the size of the force to as many as eight fighters for redundancy. They had to ensure that despite mechanical problems, a sufficient number of aircraft reached the target.

Moreover the extra fighters, tanker and electronic-warfare aircraft would likely have orbited over international waters while only the bombing aircraft penetrated Sudan’s airspace, the Israeli pilot says.

“You don’t really need four F-15s, you only need two with four bombs and they could have used either [500-lb.] Mk.82s or (2,000-lb.] Mk.84s given the accuracy of the weapons now,” he says. “But you want to make sure, so there is no reason not to use Mk.84s [to ensure destruction of the target] if you are not worried about collateral damage. I don’t think it would make sense to use UAVs or cruise missiles for this mission.”

Analysts contend that a number of buildings in the compound also were damaged and destroyed by flying debris. Videos of the fierce fires and a continuing series of explosions showed burning projectiles arcing hundreds of yards into adjacent areas.

While that possibility of collateral damage also exists with manned aircraft, “The IAF’s confidence level in its air and maintenance crews and Sudan’s insignificant air defense might well convince them to risk sending manned aircraft on a mission of that distance,” the first U.S. Air Force official says. “It depends on the planning factors and weaponeering. A UAV cannot carry as much as an F-15I and Israeli planners have a great deal of confidence in their aircrews to carry out such missions.”

The target site had contained dozens of silver shipping containers in a cleared area between warehouses and manufacturing facilities. Sudan has been fingered in the past for allowing trans-shipment of Iranian weapons via Port Sudan and looted weapons from Libya into Egypt. Israeli officials contend that Sudan ensures delivery of both arms to Islamic militants and the trafficking of African immigrants.

What has been identified in satellite pictures by a U.S.-based monitoring group (Satellite Sentinel Project) as six, approximately 50-ft. craters indicate the use of 2,000-lb. bombs, which would be too large to be carried long distances by known Israeli-build UAVs. However, Israeli Aerospace Industries and Elbit are both working on new and larger UAV designs, Israeli officials say. While the country’s new cruise-missile-armed submarines make a formidable stealth weapon, revealing their conventional capabilities on such a vulnerable and unsophisticated target would not be a useful strategic move.

The F-15I also can carry the GBU-28 deep-penetrating bomb, which burrowed through 100 ft. of earth in its original test during the 1991 Persian Gulf war with Iraq. A third U.S. Air Force official—a former senior civilian decision-maker—says that 10 years ago, the National Reconnaissance Office conducted an intense study of an Iranian command-and-control center about 15 mi. north of Tehran as it was built. The 100,000-sq.-ft. structure was buried 35 ft. deep, as were the power and radio-frequency sensor transmission lines that could only be successfully attacked by very deep-penetrating weapons. The U.S. also produced detailed attack plans at the time. Because of the center’s size and buried communications, it was considered a very complicated target that would have taken repeated strikes. But with the service’s new and larger penetrating weapons, the site could be damaged beyond use with three or four bombs, he avers.

Did Israel And The U.S. Just Cooperate On A Dry-Run For An Iran Intervention? | The New Republic.

• Jonathan Schanzer
• November 2, 2012 | 5:00 pm

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