WarSclerotic

Is Israel still bluffing about attacking Iran? – Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv.

Originally published: October 5, 2012 12:23 PM
Updated: October 5, 2012 4:00 PM
By YOSSI MELMAN AND DAN RAVIV

Photo credit: Getty Images | Benjamin Netanyahu, prime minister of Israel, points to a graphic showing when he believes Iran‘s development of nuclear capabilities must be stopped, during an address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. (Sept. 27, 2012)

When Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, used a red marker to draw a line at the United Nations in New York recently, the world thought it was seeing a warning of possible war against Iran — if that country enriches uranium beyond that red level to weapons-grade.

Now that the prime minister has returned home, it turns out that his message was also part of Israel’s domestic politics. Netanyahu is almost certainly going to reap the dividends of his carefully worded, expertly delivered speech by calling early parliamentary elections. Political sources expect that this coming February, he will consolidate his ruling coalition and win a fresh four-year mandate — just in time for fateful decisions concerning Iran and relations with the United States.

In some ways, his UN speech and his controversial use of a cartoon bomb to represent Iran’s nuclear program can be seen as a white flag of surrender. His new timetable suggests Iran will amass enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear bomb by spring or summer of 2013, and that is a tacit confirmation that he has been bluffing.

The leader, nicknamed Bibi, and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, were thundering for years that they might have to attack Iran at any moment — because soon it would be too late. Many world leaders believed them and prepared for the worst-case scenario. The French embassy in Tel Aviv, for example, prepared a contingency plan to evacuate tens of thousands of French-Israeli citizens this past summer in case of a war. We found ourselves among a very small group of analysts who tried to explain that the B&B duo — Bibi and Barak — were bluffing and had no intention of ordering the Israeli air force to bomb Iran; certainly not this year.

Netanyahu’s new timetable is a tacit surrender to the Obama administration’s view that no military strike is necessary right now. B&B thus revealed that they were merely rattling sabers, with no intention of using them against Iran.

They might feel compelled to engage in some more bluffing in 2013, but the expected election campaign in Israel has already injected a measure of discord between Netanyahu and Barak, who leads his own small political party. Barak clings to the slim chance of winning a substantial number of seats in the Knesset.

Yet the big winner in the voting is far more likely to be Netanyahu, leader of the Likud Party. His warnings of war have frightened many Israelis, but one result is that more of them will vote for an apparently strong leader at a time of unprecedented insecurity.

As for delaying any likelihood of a military strike against Iran for another two or three seasons, some of Netanyahu’s cabinet ministers are highlighting their optimistic view that “Tahrir Square-type” protests are starting to break out in Iranian cities. Perhaps there is some validity in their hope that Iran’s government will feel extremely hard-pressed to have damaging sanctions lifted, so it will make a deal to freeze or reverse its nuclear work.

Israel’s “red line,” where the risk of triggering a regional war might be deemed necessary, was clarified by the prime minister’s speech. Saying that he was relying on published reports by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency, Netanyahu said that if the Iranians continue with their steady pace of uranium enrichment, then within six to eight months they will have 250 kilograms of 20 percent, or “medium-enriched,” uranium. If this amount is further strengthened to 93 percent, it will yield enough highly enriched material for one nuclear bomb.

At least it is clear, now, that Israel is insisting that Iran be stopped before it produces 250 kilograms of the medium-enriched uranium. Netanyahu noted the American position that intelligence agencies would be able to detect a quick rush by Iran to high enrichment and assembling a bomb. Yet the Israeli leader suggested it would be too dangerous to rely on spies to give sufficient warning.

Friction with the Obama administration thus persists. The American president has devoted as much energy to restraining Israel as he has to stopping the Iranians. Relations with Washington may also suffer because of the widespread perception that Netanyahu would prefer that his old friend Mitt Romney win the White House.

Yet as long as Obama is determined that Iran not become a nuclear power, he and Netanyahu will probably find that they can get more done by working together. The United States and Israel have already cooperated — more than ever, according to officials on both sides — in covert projects aimed at slowing Iran’s nuclear progress. Sources told us that the Stuxnet computer virus, which caused havoc in one Iranian enrichment facility, was a product of such secret cooperation.

The Israeli prime minister can point to even broader benefits from his saber rattling. The world is paying far more attention to Iran’s nuclear program. Negotiations with Iran may again be attempted, and Netanyahu will be pleased if harsh sanctions hurting the Iranian economy are further tightened.

In 2013, we expect that Netanyahu will deploy his Cicero-like rhetorical talents to keep suggesting that war is inevitable — a sequel to the B&B bluff. He appears to hope that the United States and other countries will be convinced that if Israel is about to attack Iran, they might as well join in to make a more effective job of it.

If Netanyahu does win the election he is now expected to call this winter, there are more impacts for the Middle East. Barack Obama, if he is re-elected, may be tempted to relaunch American efforts aimed at Israeli-Palestinian peace. Mitt Romney indicated, elsewhere in the surreptitiously recorded “47 percent” talk, that he feels little or no hope for progress on that front. Either way, a politically strengthened Netanyahu would be in no mood to bow to American pleas for concessions. He would continue to point to Iran as the top priority; and, along with the dangerous unknowns of pro-democracy upheavals in the Arab world, he would reject taking risks by rushing toward a rickety agreement with the Palestinians.

What’s the true Netanyahu plan for dealing with Iran? Sabotage and covert action apparently continue. Sanctions may trigger unrest inside Iran. And, it is and has always been Israel’s hope that the United States will be the one to lead a military strike, if necessary, to eliminate the Iranian nuclear program.

Yossi Melman, a Tel Aviv-based journalist and analyst specializing in intelligence, and Dan Raviv, a CBS News correspondent in Washington, are co-authors of “Spies Against Armageddon: Inside Israel’s Secret Wars.” They blog at IsraelSpy.com.

Rajan Menon: Why Iran Won’t Cave on Nuclear Enrichment.

The plunge of the rial, Iran’s currency, has been breathtaking. In 2010, it traded for about 10,000 for one U.S. dollar. Now, the Iranian government, its dollar earnings halved by the economic sanctions the United States and its allies imposed (supplementing those adopted in the United Nations) to end its uranium enrichment program, is rationing dollars, selling them for about 12,264 to the dollar, and for essential imports only.

Iranians, panicked by the plummeting of their currency, have turned to the bustling black market. But they have to pay a steep price for the trade: this week, about 39,000 rials for a dollar. The government could try to put black marketers out of business, but to do that it would have to close the gap between the official rate and the black market price, in favor of the latter. Not a good choice.

The currency crisis has created big problems for ordinary Iranians. It’s not just that the dollars they need when they go abroad are hard to get (not many of them can afford such outings in any event); it’s that the price of any item made, in whole or part, with imported materials costs a whole lot more now. For the business and commercial class, a politically important segment of the population, the rial’s plight means shrinking profits.

So that’s the economic side of things.

But it’s the political angle that’s getting the most attention in the United States. That’s because the goal of the sanctions is to pressure Iran to dismantle its enrichment program so that the Obama administration can avoid resorting to a military strike, which it has insisted remains an option. Quite apart from the question of whether it would destroy Iran’s enrichment installations (especially the underground complex at Fordow), bombing Iran risks setting off a chain of dangerous events in a part of the world that’s already violent or unstable.

The urgency of finding a non-violent way to change Iran’s mind on enrichment stems in large part from the administration’s fear that Israel might give up on the diplomacy-plus-sanctions approach and attack Iran’s nuclear installations unilaterally, a move that would unavoidably draw the United States into the fray.

Given this context, the question being debated in newspapers and on the airwaves now is this: Does the rial’s precipitous fall prove that sanctions have hurt Iran’s economy to the point that Tehran is now willing to talk about dismantling its enrichment program?

The other political element of the currency drama is what Wednesday’s street protests in Tehran, generated by public anger over the rial’s loss of value and economic dissatisfaction more generally, mean. The question raised by the demonstrations is this: Are we witnessing the beginning of an Arab-Spring-like revolution in Persian Iran that will convince the leadership to shift its position on nuclear enrichment?

The answers to both question is “No.”

Why? No matter how hard the sanctions have hit Iran, Tehran doubtless understands that it would communicate its weakness and panic by shifting its position on enrichment now. It no doubt anticipates that the United States in particular will stick even more doggedly to its position, which is that sanctions will be lifted only once there’s verifiable evidence that enrichment has been terminated. By contrast, Iran has proposed a series of steps, the last of which would be putting activity at the Fordow facility on hold. But it wants sanctions to be eased at the outset and to be lifted fully before it moves on Fordow.

The two positions — Tehran’s presented formally, Washington’s evident from the Obama administration’s myriad statements — are diametrically opposed. Tehran will doubtless assume that moving toward the U.S. position amidst a currency crisis accompanied by internal unrest will surely encourage calls for more concessions because the Obama administration will conclude that Iran’s leadership is desperate.

It doesn’t take a genius to understand that it’s a bad idea to enter a bargaining process when the other side thinks it has you on the run. And the Iranian leadership knows a thing or two about bargaining.

Quite apart from Tehran’s reluctance to come to the table with an even weaker hand than it’s been holding, there’s the problem of achieving consensus among the various institutions and political groups that have a say on the nuclear program. Achieving harmony will be even harder when the heat is on because the advocates of compromise risk being tagged by hardliners as sellouts. It’s not a simple matter of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei snapping his fingers (even assuming that he would do so) to break a deadlock.

What about the effect of Wednesday’s demonstrations? Here there are three things to keep in mind. First, it’s unclear whether they betoken the beginning of bigger protests that could shake the regime’s roots. Maybe yes, maybe no, but the Iranian leadership is not going to change course on uranium enrichment just because of what occurred on the streets this week. Second, even if more protests erupt, the government will use intimidation and force as its first line of defense; and it has plenty of resources with which to instill fear and use violence. Third, hawks with the leadership will argue that concessions on enrichment at a time of internal instability will embolden not just the United States, but worse, the protesters as well.

Paradoxically, there’s a way in which the rial’s nosedive and the public protests ease the pressure on Tehran. President Obama’s case that sanctions are working and should be given more time is stronger now, and Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s refrain that they are not and that it’s time to consider a military attack is weaker.

The bottom line? Don’t expect big changes in Iran’s position on nuclear enrichment anytime soon.

US Congress mulling expansion of… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Joel Rubin: Netanyahu Aligns With Obama on Iran.

While most media attention focused on the cartoon bomb presented by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly, something even more newsworthy passed almost without notice:

Netanyahu made it clear that he has endorsed U.S. President Barack Obama’s policy on Iran. By literally drawing a red line to show how far he could tolerate Iran’s nuclear program, Netanyahu in effect approved of the international efforts led by the Obama administration to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.

In fact, while he would never admit it in the midst of a campaign, even Mitt Romney picked up on this view and has, in practice, endorsed Obama’s approach. That sudden outbreak of unspoken consensus is the real story of the last week of diplomacy. The real question now is, what can be done with the broad agreement that there is both time and space for a diplomatic solution to the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program that has created a new window of opportunity? And that depends on two big wildcards: what Netanyahu’s red lines really are, and Iran’s real intentions and capabilities.

In Netanyahu’s speech, he made it clear that Israel has a red line for the Iranian nuclear program. While this red line for military action has evolved over the years, it now appears to be the point at which Iran has enough low enriched uranium — at nearly 20 percent enrichment levels — to potentially produce one nuclear bomb. In Netanyahu’s estimation, that time won’t come until sometime next year, perhaps in the spring or even the summer. If Iran were to achieve that level, it would be threatening enough for Israel to justify striking Iran, according to Netanyahu.

The prime minister identified this as his red line because it would be the furthest point at which Israel could feasibly attack Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities.

As the prime minister said:

“The relevant question is not when Iran will get the bomb. The relevant question is at what stage can we no longer stop Iran from getting the bomb. The red line must be drawn on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program because these enrichment facilities are the only nuclear installations that we can definitely see and credibly target.”

Israel, according to nearly three-dozen bipartisan national security leaders who signed onto a report by the Iran Project, doesn’t have the capacity to conclusively destroy Iran’s nuclear program. However, it does have the capacity to delay it through bombing enrichment facilities. But that would be a disaster, as it would likely unravel the international pressure on Iran to come clean, unleash a devastating war in the region, fuel antagonism toward the United States and fail to permanently end the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Yet if past is prologue, Israel tends to strike its adversaries’ nuclear facilities when it feels vulnerable, not when the international community deems it wise. Israel struck the nuclear facilities at Osirak in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 — but only made limited strikes. In the case of Iraq, the attack drove the program underground and accelerated its push for nuclear weapons — an outcome that Israel would not want today in Iran.

In this case, by appearing to set a red line Netanyahu actually gave a boost to the role of serious U.S. diplomacy to resolve this issue. This is because of what Netanyahu didn’t say in his speech: that any Iranian nuclear program is unacceptable. This little-noticed absence gives a crucial boost to the prospects for a nuclear deal. He only said that Iran should not be allowed to enrich enough uranium to have the makings of a bomb. By implication, this means that — with strict safeguards, commitments to cap enrichment levels, and export or conversion of uranium for reactor fuel plates — Israel could live with an Iranian nuclear program. This is where the international negotiations, led by the Obama administration, have been heading. And now Netanyahu has publicly signed off on this approach.

Of course, Iran has a role to play, and could continue to keep Israel and the international community on the edge of their seats by proceeding to raise and lower the levels of its stockpile as it sees fit. This is because it takes roughly 225 kg of nearly 20 percent enriched uranium to make one bomb’s worth of fissile material — although that material would still need to be purified up to 90 percent levels. It’s important to remember that, according to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report, Iran recently reduced its stockpile of 20 percent uranium to less than half of that red line, from 101 kg to 91 kg, by converting a portion of the stockpile into fuel plates for use at the Tehran Research Reactor.

But there are severe downsides for Iran to continue to play such games, as the devastating sanctions currently in place will remain. Iran, which needs to get out from under international pressure and isolation, should seize the opportunity to credibly deal at the negotiating table with the United States and its international partners. There is no guarantee that it will do so, but the time will soon come when it must show its cards.

Now that the speeches are over and the threat of immediate war has receded, the real work of diplomacy must step in to resolve this dispute. It’s clear from Netanyahu’s speech last week that a diplomatic deal that allows for some type of Iranian nuclear program is in the cards. It’s also clear that Israel depends on the sanctions that the Obama administration has orchestrated, on the information gathered by IAEA inspectors about Iran’s nuclear program and on the multilateral negotiations underway.

So all eyes are on Washington to guide the diplomacy to resolve this sticky situation without a war. Backing up the support for diplomacy is the fact that the American people oppose getting involved in another war of choice in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the United States and Israel may still decide that they, in fact, have no choice. Yet one thing is certain from last week: U.S. leadership in the Middle East is neither diminished nor irrelevant. If anything, it is clear that it is working, and that it will be counted-on even more in the days to come.

This piece was originally posted on Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel.

Bob Gates and Israel: There He Goes Again | The Weekly Standard.

Elliott Abrams

October 5, 2012 12:15 PM

Israel Hayom | Iran and nuclear deception.

Dore Gold

Assad ‘moved’ chemical weapons, sought cooperation with ‘state of Israel:’ leaks.

Thursday, 04 October 2012

Officially, the Syrian regime and its allies, Russia and Iran, have consistently dismissed allegations that President Bashar al-Assad intends to use or relocate chemical weapons in his ongoing war for survival.

But classified documents obtained by Al Arabiya have revealed that the Syrian regime did move chemical weapons stockpile with the help of Iran and knowledge of Russia.

Furthermore, additional documents also reveal that Assad has also sought cross border cooperation with the “State of Israel” which the Syrian regime often refers to in public as a hostile “entity”.

The confidential files were acquired by Al Arabiya with the assistance of members of the Syrian opposition who refused to elaborate on how they got hold of the documents.

Al Arabiya says that it has verified and authenticated hundreds of these documents and that it has decided to disclose the ones with substantial news value and political relevance.

‘Wareheads ready to be relocated’

Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, told President Assad that the chemical warheads were ready to be relocated. (Al Arabiya)

In a highly-classified — but undated — document sent from Iran, Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, a division of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), addressed President Assad directly, affirming that the chemical warheads are ready to be relocated.

This was in contrary to previous statements by Iran that it would not support any country with plans to use the chemicals.

Iran’s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi had said that Iran could not support any country — including ally Syria — that used such weapons, calling this “a situation that will end everything.”

“If any country… uses weapons of mass destruction, that is the end of the validity, eligibility, legality, whatever you name it, of that government,” he said at a talk given to the Council on Foreign Relations think tank.

Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta had already divulged that the Syrians have moved some of their chemical weapons capability to better secure it.

It was not clear when the movement took place, or even if it was recent, but Panetta told a Pentagon news conference it had occurred in more than one case.

In a recent TV interview, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem accused the United States of seeking a pretext to attack Syria, comparing the tactic to those that preceded the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.

“It is a myth they invented to launch a campaign against Syria like they did in Iraq,” he said.

Reason why document was undated

Syrian President Assad issued orders prohibiting writing reference numbers and/or dates on secret official documents. (Al Arabiya)

In another leaked document, also obtained by Al Arabiya; an order sent from the Syrian Presidential Palace and signed by the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service; Maj. Gen. Bassam Marhej discusses the detection of an “administrative error.”

The error, which apparently is a leak of secret documents, was discovered by the Joint Command (Syria-Iran-Russia) in cooperation with the Syrian embassy in Moscow.

The supposed “error” was likely related to information about Syria’s chemical weapons stockpiles.

According to Marhej — and following the discovery of the “error” — Syrian President Assad issued orders prohibiting writing reference numbers and/or dates on secret official documents.

He also ordered that all top-secret (written) instructions to be delivered ‘by hand’ and to be ‘burnt’ following receipt along with all telegram and written communication in all embassies and diplomatic missions.

Assad’s confidentiality instructions were to be implemented immediately, the document said.

Relation with Israel

The Chief of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Sakr Mennoun, sent a written order to Col. Suheil Hassan to head to the Syrian-Israeli borders and ensure the safety of the frontiers. (Al Arabiya)

Another batch of leaked files obtained by Al Arabiya were related to the Syrian regime’s secret relations to Israel.

Officially, the two states are at war; particularly since Israel is still occupying the Syrian Golan Heights.

On April 3, 2011, less than one month after the beginning of the popular uprising in Syria, the Chief of the Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Sakr Mennoun, sent a written order to Col. Suheil Hassan to head to the Syrian-Israeli borders and ensure the safety of the frontiers.

Mannoun requests from Hassan to secure the borders “in cooperation with the state of Israel.”

Al Arabiya’s exclusive series on the newly-leaked Syrian security documents continues on Saturday Oct. 6.

Killing of captured Iranians to begin in 48 hours, Syrian brigade warns.

Friday, 05 October 2012

The Al Bara’a brigade claimed that it kidnaped 48 members of the elite Iranian Revolutionary Guards and denied Iran’s claims that they were pilgrims.(Al Arabiya)

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Commentary: Why Israel May Go It Alone | The National Interest.

“There are two clocks ticking, one in Washington . . . and one in Israel . . . neither of them in sync.”

On the face of it, these words appear as if they were lifted from any report over the past year characterizing the discord over American and Israeli efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program. But in fact they were spoken forty-five years ago by Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban on the eve of the Six Day War.

Eban had just returned to Jerusalem from Washington, where he was anxiously pressing the Lyndon Johnson administration to provide U.S. guarantees for Israel’s security in the event that Egypt attacked. Previously confident that America would have Israel’s back in the event of renewed warfare, Eban was now despondent at the likelihood that Israel would be forced to face the combined Arab armies alone, again.

For two weeks, Gamal Abdel Nasser had been building up his forces in the Sinai peninsula to the point where they posed a credible threat to the young Jewish state’s existence. Now, Nasser had dismissed UN peacekeepers from the Egyptian-Israeli border and closed the Straits of Tiran, cutting off Israel’s vital access to the Red Sea, through which it imported a majority of its energy supplies. Nasser had provided Israel with casus belli and then proclaimed that “if war comes it will be total and the objective will be Israel’s destruction.”

Two weeks earlier, President Johnson promised to deliver a consignment of military hardware, food, economic aid and loans to Israel totaling nearly $70 million to demonstrate American support and tide Israel over. The U.S. administration also vowed not to let Nasser close the Straits of Tiran. But as Nasser continued his military buildup, as the Soviet Union egged on Egypt and Syria to war and as the Arab World worked itself into a frenzy over the eminent demise of the “Zionist entity,” the commitments that Washington provided to Jerusalem were not met.

In addition to the backtracking, Johnson poignantly warned Israel against initiating hostilities. “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone,” Johnson wrote to Eban. “We cannot imagine that it will make this decision.”

The wavering of Israel’s only ally in the face of what the Israeli security establishment genuinely felt could be an eminent holocaust had the opposite effect of what Johnson intended. Rather than rely on the noncommittal American administration to provide aid in the event of a combined Arab attack, the Israeli cabinet and army felt they had no choice but to attack first and on their own terms, lest they cede the initiative to Nasser and risk being overwhelmed by Arab forces on three fronts.

That Israeli leaders decided to attack in 1967 should have come as no surprise to anyone who understands the Israeli mentality, which remains largely unchanged.

In the political-security realm, the Israeli psyche is governed by one overriding emotion: fear. This fear is a byproduct not just of the Holocaust, which is still a vivid memory there, but of the wars every generation of Israelis has fought. On a collective level, Israel is a society in a perpetual state of post-traumatic stress. But unlike American veterans who return from war to a “safe” environment, the fear of attack remains a rational constant for Israelis.

Even before Israel’s establishment, collective fear derived from the often tragic Jewish history produced the prime tenant within Zionism that Jews should always be strong enough to defend themselves. With the birth of Israel, this belief was translated into the policy that the Jewish state must never rely on another country for its defense.

During its sixty-four-year history, one partial exception has been made to that rule. Since the end of the Six Day War, Israel has allowed itself to be somewhat dependent on the United States because for forty-five years American leaders, strongly supported by the American people, have stood by Israel’s right to exist as a secure Jewish state.

It is this unique trust and semidependency that convinced Golda Meir to refrain from launching a preemptive attack on Egypt in 1973. It was the security and financial guarantees offered by President Carter that persuaded Menachem Begin to sign a peace treaty with Egypt in 1978, despite Begin’s deep reservations to relinquishing land. And it was similar promises made by the George H. W. Bush administration that kept Israel out of the 1991 Gulf War while Scud missiles rained down on Tel Aviv. By contrast, it was a lack of trust Israel had in the Johnson administration in 1967 that produced an aggressive Israeli action.

Forty-five years after the Six Day War, the names have changed, but a remarkably similar scenario is unfolding. Once again, Israel is threatened by an enemy that is developing a military capability that poses an existential threat to the Jewish state. Once again, that enemy’s leaders speak frequently of seeking Israel’s destruction. Once again, Jerusalem is seeking assurances from Washington that the United States will not allow blatant aggression to stand. And once again, an American administration appears, publicly at least, to be wavering on the commitments it made to Israel at the very moment when the stakes are the highest.

In the wake of IAEA reports that Iran has made substantial progress toward enriching uranium and even on preparations to build a nuclear weapon, the Obama administration continues to be ambiguous as to what milestones Iran would have to reach before it decided to act militarily against the Islamic Republic.

As was the case in 1967, Washington is offering rhetorical support for Israel, with President Obama repeating that “Israel’s security is non-negotiable.” But on the other hand, Israel is, once again, being warned by high-level American officials not to initiate hostilities.

Israel may now posses the most powerful military in the Middle East (with a nuclear deterrent to boot), but the Israeli mentality has not changed.

“Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran don’t have a moral right to place a red light before Israel,” Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said recently.

Netanyahu’s statement should be read in light of rising domestic opposition in Israel to a unilateral strike on Iran and the likely reelection of President Obama—two developments with which Bibi is not pleased. Nevertheless, his words are instructive of the corner into which many Israelis feel they are being painted—no firm material commitments from Washington regarding preventing an Iranian nuclear weapon and yet strongly warned not to act themselves.

If the Obama administration truly wants to prevent a unilateral Israeli attack against Iran, it must take the opposite course. Rather than simply directing Israel not to act, it should give the Netanyahu administration clear guidelines regarding when Washington will decide the diplomatic option to halt Iran’s nuclear program has been exhausted and the military option will be implemented. Otherwise, history tells us clearly how Israeli leaders will resolve this dilemma: by trusting the only people they have ever fully trusted—themselves—and initiating an attack.

As Deputy Israeli Prime Minister Yigal Alon said the night before Israel launched the Six Day War: “They will condemn us . . . and we will survive.”

Rafael D. Frankel was a Middle East correspondent for The Christian Science Monitor and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University.

‘Iran will overcome currency con… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Photo: REUTERS