Archive for October 7, 2012

UAV intrusion: Iranian act of belligerence against US and Israeli military targets

October 7, 2012

UAV intrusion: Iranian act of belligerence against US and Israeli military targets.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Analysis October 7, 2012, 8:45 AM (GMT+02:00)

 

Israeli search for enemy UAV fragments
Israeli search for enemy UAV fragments

However Israeli official spokesmen present the incident of Saturday, Oct. 6, the penetration of Israeli air space by a large unmanned helicopter should not have been allowed to happen. The surprise interloper should have been shot down before spending nearly half an hour over southern Israel. The incident showed ID intelligence and command not up to handling enemy surprises, even after countless drills and exercises.
Four months ago, on July 20, Hizballah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah said in a speech, “The resistance movement will surprise Tel Aviv in any future war.”
Hizballah with Iranian backing almost certainly proved its point Saturday, very likely in collaboration with its Palestinian ally, Hamas.
Our intelligence experts note that before the Israeli Air Force fighters scrambled to shoot it down, the intruder would have had enough time for its surveillance equipment to beam to its Iranian control station, wherever it was, the electronic signatures of US and Israeli military installations within its purview in the South and the Negev.

This was a major lapse.
The alien aircraft should have been intercepted the moment it flew in from the Mediterranean and entered the skies of the Gaza Strip. By then, it was clearly seen heading toward Beersheba. Had there been weapons aboard, the incident would have ended in a worse disaster, reminding Israel of its worst nightmare: an Iranian plane flying over with a nuclear bomb.
As it is, the sophisticated aerial surveillance vehicle was able to cover the space over the IDF’s southern facilities, the town of Beersheba and the Israeli Air Force base at Nevatim before it was shot down over the Yatir forest south of Mt. Hebron. Its primary missions may have been to record the electronic signatures of the Dimona nuclear reactor’s air defense systems and the American X-band radar station in the Negev, which is linked to the US X-band station in Turkey. Together, they are the “forward eyes” of the joint US-Israeli shield against Iranian ballistic missile attack.
If the intruder came to spot the gaps in that shield, it would have succeeded.
It is therefore important in this context to recall a more recent and explicit threat, this one by Brig. Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s ground forces, who said on Sept. 23 that his country was not waiting to be attacked but ready to carry out preemptive operations against the US and Israel.
The aerial overflight Saturday may well have been a preparatory step for such an attack.
Tehran would also have noted the time lapse before Israel acted: The IDF asked the Defense Minister Ehud Barak what to do instead of acting at once and Barak passed the buck to the prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu.
They decided initially to down helicopter by electronic means and capture it intact in an attempt to establish who sent it and study its systems. However, the Iranian controllers fought back – hence the cyber battle rocking back and forth over southern Israel for nearly half an hour – before shooting it down.
The image the IDF spokesman put out of a ball of fire in the sky was misleading. On its way down to earth, the vehicle broke up into fragments large enough to offer up important secrets to Israel’s military researchers.
On Saturday, Israel’s electronic warfare systems were fully operational and effective. However, Israel’s leaders were struck dumb and caught unawares by Iran’s audacity in springing on them an overt act of belligerence against their own and American military installations housed in the Negev. Israel officials have vowed to respond to an obvious act of war.

Ex-Air Force Chief: Google Map Better than Drone

October 7, 2012

Ex-Air Force Chief: Google Map Better than Drone – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

Google Maps provide better pictures than those probably sent by the enemy drone downed on the Sabbath, says a former Air Force chief.

By Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu

First Publish: 10/7/2012, 10:28 AM

 

Dan Halutz as Chief of Staff (file)

Dan Halutz as Chief of Staff (file)
Israel news photo: Flash 90

Google Maps provide better pictures than those probably sent by the enemy drone downed over the Sabbath, says a former Air Force chief.

Another former Air Force general said in a separate interview that the drone, presumably launched by Hizbullah in Lebanon, represents a significant advancement in the terrorist organization’s technology.

Halutz, who was chosen by then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to head the IDF and carry out the expulsions of Jews from Gaza under the “Disengagement Plan” after opposition from then-Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, said he is not concerned over the penetration of Israeli air space by an enemy drone.

The incident can be regarded as an Iranian violation of Israel’s sovereignty in view of the fact that Tehran finances and, to a certain extent, gives orders to Hizbullah.

Halutz claimed in an interview with Voice of Israel government radio that the quality of the photos from the drone are of low quality and that the enemy could see better pictures by using Google Map. The drone did not cross over any strategic sites, although the IDF may have carried out a cyber attack to divert it from a course towards the nuclear reactor near Dimona.

Halutz failed to note that Israel, as well as many other countries, have censored or blurred many Google Map photos for security reasons, pointed out Independent Media Review and Analysis (IMRA) director Dr. Aaron Lerner.

In a separate interview with Army Radio, Air Force Brigadier General Aryeh Fishbein said the IAF is familiar with the drone that was downed. He said it can fly up to 250 miles an hour and carry a payload, either a small bomb or camera, weighing up to 65 pounds (30 kilograms).

The IDF denied claims from Gaza that the drone had been launched from there, and all indications are that it originated in Lebanon, flew south over the Mediterranean Sea outside Israel’s territorial waters and then turned east at Gaza.

The IDF immediately indentified it as it flew east, the drone then took a U-turn, indicating that Israel may have taken over its operation and guided it away from the area of Air Force bases and the nuclear reactor and instead towards the Yatir Forest, approximately 25 miles north of Be’er Sheva.

Israel checking: Was drone headed to Dimona?

October 7, 2012

Israel checking: Was drone headed to Dimona? – Israel News, Ynetnews.

After IDF collects remnants of unmanned aircraft shot down over southern forest, security establishment examining possibility it was launched by Hezbollah to photograph Israeli reactor; army fears drones will be used to hit strategic sites

Ron Ben-Yishai

Published: 10.07.12, 00:37 / Israel News

After Israeli fighter jets shot down a drone over the Yatir forest in the south Mount Hebron area on Saturday, the army is trying to figure out what its destination was. One of the possibilities the security establishment is looking into is that the unmanned aircraft, which was apparently Iranian-made, was on its way to test the option of infiltrating the nuclear reactor in Dimona, perhaps even to examine the option of targeting the plant in a future conflict.

A drone such as the one that was downed on Saturday after penetrating Israel’s airspace through the Mediterranean Sea could not cause serious damage to the reactor, but such an incident would mark a psychological victory for Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah, whose leader Hassan Nasrallah recently threatened to attack strategic targets in Israel, including power plants.

The Iranians are aware that Israel has the capability to deal with rockets and missiles with its Iron Dome and Arrow air defense systems, but dealing with the threat of a slow drone poses a different kind of challenge.

Operating a drone by remote control from such a long distance requires advanced capabilities, which Israel was not aware Hezbollah had acquired. By examining the drone’s parts, the army hopes to find out whether the drone was controlled from a command center in Lebanon or was directed by a space-based satellite navigation system (GPS) according to predetermined coordinates. If that was the case, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) may have directed itself automatically and was supposed to return to its base or self-destruct over the sea.

דובר צה”ל

 

Watch: Drone shot down

As far as Israel is concerned, Saturday’s incident calls for increased alertness and preparations to thwart such infiltration attempts in the future. In light of the successful interception and the volatile situation in the Middle East, Israel may decide to act with restraint and not respond at all. It will certainly want to avoid a massive response that may ignite the entire region.

“Israel is aware of Iranand Hezbollah’s technological capabilities. The current discussion is about how Israel should respond to such an infiltration of a drone and if it should be compared to the launching of a missile or rocket from Lebanon, which has always drawn an immediate response in the form of artillery fire or aerial strikes on targets in south Lebanon,” a senior security official told Ynet Saturday night.
כוחות צבא סמוך למקום היירוט (צילום: חיים הורנשטיין)

IDF forces search for drone remnants (Photo: Haim Horenstein)

The drone apparently began its flight in Lebanon and then headed in the direction of Gaza’s coastline after flying over the Mediterranean Sea. The drone’s operators may have planned to take advantage of this fact in hopes of confusing Israel’s detection and interception systems. However, the drone was detected while it was still flying over the Mediterranean Sea and was downed a half-hour later over the south Mount Hebron area after IAF jets made certain it was not carrying any explosives and that its main mission was intelligence gathering.

The IDF is working to improve its aerial detection and interception capabilities in light of the changes in the Middle East and due to the fact that Israel’s enemies have upgraded their military capabilities. The army is placing an emphasis on detecting drones, fearing that they may be used as a missile to target Israeli strategic sites.

“In the next war Syrian and Iranian drones will also be sent on ‘suicide’ missions,” a senior Air Force official recently told Ynet.

Iran and Hezbollah have yet to respond officially to the downing of the drone, but in an interview with English-language Iranian network Press TV, retired Lebanese general Hisham Jaber estimated that the drone was American.

“The Negev desert is a very sensitive area,” he added. “Everybody knows that the Dimona nuclear center is there and the Negev is also the nuclear reserve for the Israeli armed forces.

“No one knows where the drone came from yet, but the Palestinians do not possess such sophisticated aircraft. Maybe it came from Sinai and Egypt, but I prefer the idea that since it came from the sea it may have come from an American aircraft carrier and was shot by accident,” the general said.

The retired general said the drone may have departed from one of the American bases in Saudi Arabia and rejected the possibility that it was launched from Lebanon or Jordan.

“If Israel will remain silent after its investigation and will close the file, that means that – like we said – it (drone) came from a friendly side and it is not in their interest to talk about it,” he argued.

Yoav Zitun contributed to the report

Israeli attack on Iran this fall is no longer in the cards

October 7, 2012

Israeli attack on Iran this fall is no longer in the cards – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

Israel, which for months downplayed the impact of sanctions, has recently done an about-face and become a significant contributor to the new discourse.

By Amos Harel | Oct.07, 2012 | 1:24 AM

The wave of demonstrations in Tehran over the last few days, sparked by the plummeting value of the Iranian rial and the consequent rise in the price of staple products, has significantly changed the nature of the international discourse on Iran. The harsh international sanctions that took effect in July are now being felt with increasing force. Thus the question of whether continued economic pressure could bring about regime change in Iran has once again become legitimate.

Israel, which for months downplayed the impact of sanctions, has recently done an about-face and become a significant contributor to the new discourse. Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has spoken publicly about the possibility that the ayatollahs’ regime could collapse in 2013, and his ministry has been stressing the impact of sanctions. There has also been much speculation that June’s presidential election in Iran could prompt a repeat of the Green Revolution: the massive – but ultimately unsuccessful – demonstrations that followed the 2009 election.

So far, Lieberman’s prediction still appears excessively optimistic. Nor is there any evidence that Iran’s leadership is willing to halt its nuclear program to ease the international pressure. Yet this debate over the possibility of regime change would clearly never have reemerged had Israel carried out its threat to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities this fall.

Public opinion, like the media, has a short attention span. But it’s worth recalling that from early July to early September, the possibility that Israel would attack Iran’s nuclear facilities before the U.S. elections on November 6 topped the agenda of both the Israeli and the foreign media.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu completed his descent from that tree in his speech to the UN General Assembly 10 days ago. While his drawing of a bomb attracted the most public attention, he also made it crystal-clear that he had extended his deadline to the international community from this autumn to the spring or summer of 2013. Only if all other efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program had failed by then would Israel decide to attack Iran on its own, Netanyahu implied.

It is, of course, necessary to consider another possibility: That Netanyahu and the man who until recently was his closest ally, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, are now engaged in a brilliant campaign of deception, which will culminate in Israeli planes taking off to attack just when the international community is expecting it least. But at the moment, that looks like a highly unlikely scenario.

For most of the year, Iran has been at the forefront of our concerns, the explanation for every political move – from Netanyahu’s announcement of early elections this summer through his decision to postpone them and bring Kadima into the government instead, to Kadima’s abrupt departure from the coalition. Now, a new agenda has come to the fore, a traditional political one. Iran seems less urgent.

Was an attack imminent?

What happened this fall was an exact repeat of the two previous autumns, in 2010 and 2011. Then, too, there were various assessments suggesting a possible Israeli attack. How close were we to really doing it this time? The degree of concern broadcast by both the Obama administration and President Shimon Peres – who deviated from his usual custom by publicly voicing opposition to an attack that wasn’t coordinated with Washington – seem to indicate that an Israeli attack really wasn’t far off.

From the prime minister’s speech to the AIPAC conference in March until sometime in June, it seemed as if the public statements by Netanyahu and Barak had fulfilled their purpose: spurring the international community to impose tougher sanctions on Iran. But then, Israel turned the screws one notch too far and sparked genuine worry in Washington, prompting a constant stream of visits by senior administration officials.

When chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey warned publicly in August that a solo Israeli attack couldn’t deal Iran’s nuclear program a significant setback, it was clear that America had pulled out all the stops in its effort to prevent such an attack. American officials have sensitive antennae when it comes Israel’s leadership, and an effort of this magnitude indicates real fear.

Opposition at home

But it wasn’t just American opposition that kept Netanyahu from military action; domestic opposition did as well. Warnings by senior army and Mossad officials against any attack that wasn’t coordinated with America, which were leaked to the press at critical moments, tied the premier’s hands.

Another important factor was Barak’s last-minute u-turn. Until the summer, Barak had been the leading supporter of an Israeli attack. But after he said an Israeli attack would delay Iran’s nuclear program by only a year or two, warned against a rift with the United States and objected to trying to force U.S. President Barack Obama to set “red lines,” it was clear that Netanyahu had been left alone at the front.

Now, officials in Jerusalem are pointing out that Iran has used some of the uranium it enriched to a 20 percent level for medical research – meaning it isn’t all being earmarked for a nuclear bomb. But that fact was already known back in August. Israeli officials are also highlighting reports of the protests over inflation in Iran.

Before this about-face, Israel had invested some NIS 10 billion in preparations for an attack. It’s quite possible this was necessary to rouse the world to action. But it also had many negative side effects, from panicking the Israeli public to causing some foreign investors to flee.

Netanyahu hasn’t abandoned the idea of attacking Iran; the issue will likely be back on the agenda in the spring of 2013 if the ayatollahs show no signs of buckling by then. But an attack on Iran this fall – which had until recently been viewed as an almost sure bet in light of Israeli leaders’ public rhetoric – is no longer in the cards.

The rial’s fall

October 7, 2012

The rial’s fall – JPost – Opinion – Editorials.

By JPOST EDITORIAL
10/06/2012 22:43
This is not to say that sanctions should be abandoned. If anything, they should be tightened. Yet at the same time we must not rely on them to deliver the ultimate goods.

Iranian rial Photo: Reuters

Iran’s currency is nose-diving. There can be no disputing this fact. On Tuesday, the rial hit a record low of 36,100 for one US dollar (at unofficial street-trading rates). A week earlier a dollar cost 24,000 rials. In 2011, the figure was 10,000.

This has not only imposed extreme hardship on Iran’s already hard-pressed population but also created opportunities for all players to hype their self-serving spins.

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as expected sought to bolster sagging morale by asserting that his country’s financial woes were all “due to psychological pressures.”

In his view, sanctions constitute a component of the “heavy battle” that has been driving down oil sales “a bit.” That conceded, however, Ahmadinejad insists that his government possesses sufficient cash to make do, enabling it to ride out sanctions and to expand oil exports to Asian markets such as China.

From the other side of the diplomatic divide come crows of self-congratulation. The West – both in Europe and the US – waxes triumphant. The sad state of the rial is cited as proof positive that sanctions against Iran work, that they are doing precisely what was predicted they would and that, if given more time, they will obviate the need for any other – presumably military – measures to keep Tehran from producing nuclear weapons.

But is this upbeat Western spin any more credible than Ahmadinejad’s pep talk to his compatriots? Odds are it is not.

Even tougher sanctions would probably be less than crippling because, like it or not, Iran is not bereft of friends. Russia, China and assorted Latin American and Third World sidekicks can dent trade and banking embargoes.

Moreover, even when sanctions work, it can take a long time for their effects to become so devastating as to inundate the streets with rebellious downtrodden multitudes.

The tipping point of desperation may be different for long-oppressed Iranians – many of whom are poor, unemployed and subsist on very little – than it is for their softer counterparts in the pampered West. Pain thresholds are considerably higher in autocracies where the people have gradually grown inured to harsher and harsher conditions.

Perhaps no society epitomizes this better than North Korea. It has been subjected to sanctions longer than any other country and its population teeters on the brink of starvation. Yet the citizenry’s welfare is hardly the highest priority for Pyongyang’s powers-that-be. They had already detonated two nuclear devices while sanctions were enforced.

Tehran’s ayatollahs are hardly more caring than Pyongyang’s tyrants. Neither regime is likely to back down out of compassion for the suffering masses. And Tehran learns well from its tutors in Pyongyang.

The primary lesson is that the West’s actual goal is not to prevent the world’s prime sponsors of terrorism from developing nuclear warheads as much as it is to induce them to return to the negotiating table.

This wrongheaded premise failed miserably in the case of North Korea, which had no qualms to renege on its obligations almost as soon as seeming compromise was reached. Iran is equally adept at making mockery of Western envoys. Nonetheless, a similar premise decrees that suave diplomats can cool the Iranians’ ardor to harness nukes in the service of fanatical Islam.

This is not to say that sanctions should be abandoned. If anything, they should be tightened. Yet at the same time we must not rely on them to deliver the ultimate goods.

The only way sanctions can succeed is if they trigger critical disturbances that can topple the mullahs from power. However, the Obama administration’s cold shoulder to brave Iranian protesters in 2009 generates powerful disincentives for another attempt at regime change. Besides, successful Arab Spring uprisings were those backed by Islamists. Here we have the reverse situation of opposition to an Islamist theocracy.

There is certainly dissent in Iran, but it may be concentrated among the intelligentsia rather than in broader strata of society. Privation may prove a double-edged sword and unify the masses against the West rather than the other way around. That is the principal thrust of Ahmadinejad’s spin and he has time to solidify support while his nuclear centrifuges keep spinning.