From the Border to the Litani River.
In the six years since the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah has established four new lines. What is this new ground defense plan comprised of, and what challenge does it pose?
IDF soldiers in the Second Lebanon War (Photo: AP)
The heads of Hezbollah called the Second Lebanon War “a godly victory.” From their perspective, the organization survived approximately 34 days against one of the best and strongest militaries in the world. It continued launching rockets towards the Israeli homefront from the first day of the war until its end. Above all else, it prevailed.
Following the war, a lengthy process of drawing conclusions began within Hezbollah, as those in the organization knew that not everything worked. The organization suffered heavy losses during face-to-face combat with the IDF, experienced unforgivable intelligence incursions, found it difficult to handle Israel’s total air superiority, and failed to effectively express its arsenal of obstacles on the ground. At the start of the war, Hezbollah had an impressive arsenal of ground defense measures that included charges, mines, and well-concealed hole traps in the field.
Their potential was large and destructive. Many charges were laid in various places, including traps in open areas, in traffic lanes, and in villages. They also prepared numerous, concealed hole traps in key positions and in bottlenecks. However, due to the absence of a professional operational rationale based on field analysis that combined the defensive layouts, these traps were not actually armed or operated. In fact, without integrating these measures into an orderly ground defense plan, they were not able to express their available measures in combat. As such, the IDF was able to circumvent these obstacles.
In the six years after the war, Hezbollah has undergone a profound change in their ground readiness vis-à-vis the IDF. What is this change, and what challenge will it pose for the IDF in the event of another war? In order to assess this, we must understand Hezbollah’s operational perception, which is derived from a diagnosis of the enemy’s weaknesses as compared to the relative advantages of the organization. What is clear is that Hezbollah’s new engineering perception is integrated into a comprehensive and updated operational doctrine.
Preparing for a Maneuver
Hezbollah estimates that in the next conflict, the IDF will carry out a faster and more significant maneuver than in 2006. This perception, along with the limitations imposed on the organization after the Second Lebanon War, resulted in two main changes. Hezbollah transitioned from open areas (including underground bunkers near the border with Israel, nicknamed “natural reserves” by the IDF) to villages and urban areas, while simultaneously constructing lines of defense from the border up to their various assets set deep in Lebanon.
Hezbollah wants to exhaust Israel through “blood and economics.” This means preserving the ability to launch rockets towards Israel’s homefront while exacting a toll in lives and halting the economy. In order to meet this goal, the organization must be able to protect its launch sites at all times. The transition from villages to cities preserves the launch sites better than before. As such, Hezbollah shifted its main headquarters from the “nature reservations” in open areas to fortified underground hideouts within the compounds of cities and villages.
Four Lines of Defense
Hezbollah’s lines of defense are meant to preserve their primary assets: the heads of the organization, its headquarters, and its capability to launch projectiles at Israel’s homefront. For this purpose, they established four primary lines.
The first line, in close proximity to the international border, is for collecting intelligence within the villages and for deterrence; it is not meant to block IDF forces.
The second line protects the expanses near villages where the headquarters and the launch sites are located. This line contains engineering obstacles on the axes, while the outskirts of the villages are controlled with antitank and sniper fire. This line also contains underground systems intended for combat, command and control, and to transfer backup logistics to forces between the headquarters and various combat layouts.
The third line is located just outside the village, city, or compound, and its purpose is to protect assets when defense measures change according to the defense objective.
The fourth line (a major change Hezbollah made) is indicative of the organization’s operational perception. This line represents a combat expanse built from the north of the Litani River. It provides resistance for the more distant launch layouts, launch continuity, and an operational breathing space. The establishment of this expanse also addresses the possibility of the IDF vertically outflanking Hezbollah by sea or from the air, and supports the foremost lines of defense, especially from the perspective of troop morale.
The transition from open spaces to built-up areas allows Hezbollah to adjust its engineering obstacles better than in the previous war. They can now determine defense measures in every line and combat space, which are controlled in part by fire and observation. Some of the obstacles – mostly the ones in the road axes (charges and mines) – can be operated by advanced operating systems located at observation points.
Due to the nature of the guerrilla warfare that adopted Hezbollah, the organization is able to repeatedly lay charges along the same axes, thereby making it more difficult for the IDF to keep them “clean.” Furthermore, establishing the underground expanse in villages and cities provides the organization with numerous defense possibilities that utilize the advantages of the urban and rural expanse.
By developing the engineering threat, they create an area that is saturated with roadside explosive charges inside closely constructed expanses. In an attempt to guide the movement of IDF forces to necessary passages via embankments and construction waste, they conceal these charges and operate them from within the constructed expanse using various sophisticated operating systems.
The underground center within the constructed and thicket-laden areas is surrounded by advanced charges and has booby-trapped entrances. As part of Hezbollah’s defense tactics, some of the buildings are also booby-trapped and even serve to draw in IDF forces. In addition, a considerable part of the structures and launch points are properly camouflaged, as well as the tunnel openings and the underground center.
Many of the obstacles in the open and mountainous areas are positioned at key points and in vital passages that make it more difficult to circumvent the area. The mine-laying lines on and near axes, which emphasize the secondary defense expanse, are integrated and supervised in the new deployment. This allows for a much more professional operation than in 2006.
A Challenge for the IDF
Hezbollah cannot hide its new deployment, which is documented by numerous visible measures and even by the Lebanese and global media.
The field organization and the integration of the engineering capabilities pose an actual challenge to the IDF.
What is the engineering challenge? First, it is important to point out that the engineering obstacles create very complex areas for confrontations, even for professional forces (combat engineering battalions or engineering companies in the infantry brigades), and especially for forces that are not familiar with this field.
With regards to the professional engineering forces, challenges include the ability to identify charges in general and in crowded and constructed areas in particular, as well as the detection of concealed charges, including hole traps in traffic axes and in indispensable crossings.
Locating the underground center, even before it becomes a complex combat site, is a complicated and difficult engineering challenge, as is the destruction of charges and underground layouts. Dealing with an area strewn with explosive obstacles, such as mines and charges, demands that the engineering forces possess planning capabilities alongside an intelligent, professional combat duration.
The issue of axes and the need to keep them open and clear of charges, even with mines opened in a guerrilla combat environment, is a task of the highest importance. It is enough to recall the difficulty in opening the logistic axes in Lebanon in 2006, and this was before Hezbollah refined the threat.
With a multitude of engineering challenges expected at Hezbollah’s various defense lines, it is clear that things will be better if there are more engineering forces close to the maneuvering forces. Moreover, additional engineering forces will allow for a relatively quick maneuver that will narrow the friction between obstacles and charges.
The issue of engineering intelligence is a crucial one: the more the IDF prepares, the easier it will be to overcome obstacles. In addition, providing unique engineering capabilities to the ordinary engineering forces will allow for greater professional flexibility in operating the forces. Lastly, in the field of robotics, it is better if unmanned capabilities are improved and distributed more widely. In an environment saturated with explosive obstacles, and with emphasis on the crowded urban expanse, one of the only measures that will ensure professional capability, while considerably reducing casualties among IDF forces, are the “robots” and the various unmanned tools.
In all, the reorganization of the field, in combination with the various engineering obstacles, creates a significant challenge for IDF forces. It is clear that the next war will be characterized by combat in urban expanses with crowded structures and populaces. As a result, the engineering threat will only increase, since the constructed area plays into the hands of the defender, primarily in terms of engineering obstacles, which includes underground obstacles.
The ground maneuver will remain one of the IDF’s central operational principles against Hezbollah, as was declared by Major General Sami Turgeman, the commander of the IDF’s Ground Forces, during the International Fire Conference (May 21-24, 2012). As such, the IDF must prepare intensively in order to provide a proper response to the complex challenges that already exist in Lebanon, as well as for those to come in the future.
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