WarSclerotic

Ahmadinejad Personally Ordered Officers to Syria – Middle East – News – Israel National News.

Ahmadinejad

Reuters

Western intelligence officials told the British Telegraph on Thursday that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has personally sanctioned the dispatch of the experienced officers to ensure that the Assad regime survives the threat to its survival.

According to the report, Iran has also shipped hundreds of tons of military equipment, including guns, rockets, and shells to Syria through the regular air corridor that has been established between Damascus and Tehran.

Intelligence officials believe the increased Iranian support has been responsible for the growing effectiveness of the Assad regime’s tactics in forcing anti-government rebel groups on the defensive.

In the past few weeks, the Telegraph noted, pro-Assad forces have seized the offensive by launching a series of well-coordinated attacks against rebel strongholds in Damascus and Aleppo.

The Iranian operation to support Assad is being masterminded by Qassem Suleimani, the head of the Guards’ Quds force which is responsible for overseeing Iran’s overseas operations. The decision to increase Iran’s support for Syria was taken after the Syrian defense minister and Assad’s brother-in-law were killed in a suicide bomb attack at Syria’s national security headquarters in July, together with a number of other senior defense officials.

The Revolutionary Guards officers were flown to Damascus in chartered Iranian aircraft which were given permission to fly through Iraqi air space, said the report. Iranian military equipment is said to have been shipped to Syria by the same route.

A spokesman for the National Council of Resistance in Iran (NCRI) told the Telegraph that some of the Iranians being held by Syrian opposition groups included several brigadier-generals and a number of colonels who had many years of experience serving in the Revolutionary Guards.

“Iran has taken a strategic decision to deepen its involvement in the Syrian crisis,” a senior Western security official told the newspaper. “The Iranians are desperate for their most important regional ally to survive the current crisis. And Iran’s involvement is starting to pay dividends.”

Iran publicly confirmed last week that its government has sent elite Revolutionary Guards to support the troops of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in that country’s civil war.

Commander General Salar Abnoush told a group of volunteer trainees during a speech, “We are involved in fighting every aspect of a war – a military one in Syria, and a cultural one as well.”

On Saturday, a senior official in the Iranian Revolutionary Guards threatened the United States and its allies that the Islamic Republic would respond harshly to a “stupid” attack on Syria.

The quotes, which were published on an official government-linked news agency, were removed a few minutes after being posted, but not before the BBC’s Persian-language website copied them and republished them.

The comments were made by Mohammad Ali Assoudi, the deputy for culture and propaganda of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

“If the United States carries out the stupid act and attacks Syria, Iran and Syria’s allies in the world will react strongly and will turn America into a fiasco,” Assoudi said.

He did not specify what courses of action Iran would take, but stressed that there is a military alliance between the two countries that would require Iran to respond.

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.

By Chris Zambelis

The machinations surrounding Iran’s nuclear program continue to dominate international headlines. A closer look at the atmospherics in play indicates the presence of a web of competing narratives that seek to delineate the threats Iran allegedly poses to its neighbors and global security.

The boilerplate rhetoric out of Washington and US media regarding Iran is well known. But sorting through the cacophony of public threats of war, psychological operations, and propaganda broadcast by Israel and Saudi Arabia – Iran’s primary regional adversaries – is equally crucial toward understanding the geopolitics surrounding the Iranian nuclear question and, in a broader sense, Iran’s place in the region.

Alongside the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia have taken the lead in

articulating a litany of purported threats emanating from the Islamic Republic. On May 21, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the long-standing position held by Israel that views Iran as an existential threat: “Iran wants to destroy Israel and it is developing nuclear weapons to fulfill that goal.”

Relying on a sectarian discourse, Saudi Arabia has also defined its fears of Iran in existential terms. A special series published by the Saudi daily Al-Jazirah just days before the Kingdom dispatched its security forces to Bahrain to suppress democratic opposition protests led largely by Bahrain’s oppressed Shi’ite majority reflects Riyadh’s deep-seated antipathy for the Iran. The inflammatory title of the series, “Safavid Iran’s plans for the destruction of the Gulf States”, is of particular importance. The reference to Iran’s Safavid legacy draws attention to the Persian Empire’s adoption of Shi’ite Islam as its official religion. By highlighting Iran’s Shi’ite character, Saudi Arabia is able to define the perceived threat from the republic in territorial as well as ideological and theological terms.

Paradoxically, Israel and Saudi Arabia are officially enemies. Yet they appear to be acting in lockstep – almost in a perfect symbiosis – when it comes to undermining and attacking Iran and painting it as a threat to regional and world peace. A sampling of the collective responses of both countries to matters related to Iran and other areas of mutual concern, such as the course of the uprisings in the Arab world, suggests that the Israeli-Saudi interface represents more than a temporary pact of convenience. Indeed, the convergence of their interests over Iran constitutes an unspoken strategic alliance that runs deeper than either side cares to admit.

Silence speaks volumes
Israel regularly lambastes Iran for supporting its nemeses Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine. At the same time, it mutes any serious criticism of Saudi Arabia despite Riyadh’s support for the militant Salafist and Wahhabist ideologies that serve as the intellectual and ideological infrastructure of al-Qaeda’s brand of extremism.

Keen to preserve its military superiority in the Middle East, Israel has historically expressed strong opposition to attempts by the US and other major arms producers to sell advanced weapons platforms and defense systems to its neighbors – friends and foes alike. Yet Israel has tempered its usual disapproval of the sales of tens of billions of dollars’ worth of arms by the US to Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies over the past few years. In contrast to its reactions to similar deals concluded in the past, Israel has remained noticeably silent over the most recent of these sales, counted as among the largest arms-transfer agreements ever concluded by the US with foreign nations.

The reasons behind Israel’s quiet acquiescence to the arms sales are telling. On the surface, the timing of the latest sales was designed to bolster Saudi Arabia’s deterrence posture in the face of growing Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf. They also signal Washington’s commitment to Riyadh’s defense amid intensifying tensions with Iran.

An emboldened Saudi Arabia keeps Iran on the defensive and preoccupied with outmaneuvering its neighbors in the Gulf region. Consequently, this scenario indirectly strengthens Israel’s position relative to Iran. These circumstances are amenable to Israel because it does not perceive Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies as threats. On the contrary, their shared interest in containing Iran make Israel and Saudi Arabia natural allies.

Ever sensitive to the precariousness of Saudi Arabia’s position when it comes to any hint of collaboration – both official and covert – with Israel, Israeli politicians are careful to play down the extent of their joint strategic interests with Riyadh. The geopolitics underlying the Israeli-Saudi relationship is not, however, lost by observers in Israel. Media and research institutes there often allude to the convergence of Israeli and Saudi interests when it comes to a range of topics involving Iran. An opinion piece published by the Israeli daily Yedioth Ahronoth in April 2011 titled “Our Saudi Arabian allies” illustrates this point.

While a similar set of dynamics is evident in Saudi Arabia’s behavior toward Israel as it relates to Iran, Riyadh takes a different approach. It is quick to condemn Iran’s nuclear program in public. Riyadh and some of its GCC partners have also gone as far as to threaten to initiate their own domestic nuclear-weapons programs in the event that Tehran were to achieve a nuclear capability.

Saudi Arabia has also implored the US to take action against Iran. According to a US diplomatic cable drafted in April 2008 and exposed by WikiLeaks, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz is reported have called on the United States to “cut off the head of the snake” in dealing with Iran while affirming the kingdom’s commitment to work with Washington to undermine Tehran.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia is curiously reticent when it comes to any mention of Israel’s nuclear arsenal. In addition to fielding one of the world’s most technologically advanced and powerful conventional military forces, Israel boasts a nuclear-weapons inventory that may contain up to 400 warheads. Yet in contrast to its treatment of the Iranian nuclear program, Israel’s nuclear arsenal does not constitute a Saudi concern. While the prospect of a nuclear-capable Iran may spur it to pursue its own nuclear capability, Saudi Arabia has never expressed any interest in matching Israel’s nuclear arsenal with one of its own.

Saudi Arabia’s deference to its quiet Israeli partner extends beyond the Iran portfolio and is especially evident in its approach to Palestine. As a regime that derives its legitimacy from its status as the self-proclaimed guardian of Islam’s two holiest places, Saudi Arabia must tread carefully in how it navigates its tacit relationship with Israel.

Officially, the kingdom supports the Palestinian struggle for self-determination amid Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian land. But despite its formidable geopolitical and economic influence, it has been decades since Saudi Arabia has thrown its weight behind the Palestinian cause. This is the case despite widespread sympathy among Arabs and Muslims more broadly on Palestinian suffering.

Saudi Arabia’s relative inaction toward Palestine is important considering the kingdom’s willingness to engage forcefully on other issues that resonate with Arabs and Muslims. For example, it was in the forefront of organizing a global consumer boycott of Danish products after the publication of inflammatory cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten in September 2005. Muslims around the globe applied a consumer boycott against Danish products, devastating that country’s exports in a number of critical sectors. Saudi Arabia also recalled its ambassador to Denmark, hurting Copenhagen’s diplomatic standing in the Middle East among the global Muslim community.

Saudi Arabia’s official clerical establishment and media helped shape a powerful narrative that resonated among a wide constituency while Saudi diplomacy paved the way for Muslims to direct their ire toward Denmark. Its behavior during the height of the cartoon controversy is illustrative of the kingdom’s potential to shape global events in its favor relatively quickly.

The vigor and unity of purpose displayed by Saudi institutions in the diplomatic, economic, ideological and media realms in the name of Islamic solidarity during the cartoon controversy and on matters related to Iran are noticeably absent when it comes to pressuring Israel to withdraw from Palestinian land or refrain from continued construction of settlements in the occupied territories.

The US linchpin
The nature of the bond between Israel and Saudi Arabia should come as no surprise. The two countries constitute the pillars of an alliance network in the Middle East crafted and honed by the US for decades. In this regard, it would seem rational to conclude that Israeli and Saudi moves against Iran are sanctioned, encouraged, and actively facilitated by the United States.

After all, the US and Iran have been adversaries since the Islamic Revolution ousted the Shah in 1979. Any efforts by the Israelis and Saudis to undercut Iran, by definition, should further US interests.

Such a perspective would suggest that Israel and Saudi Arabia act as surrogates for advancing US interests related to Iran and other regional matters. To a great extent, this scenario applies. In a broad sense, the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia appear to align with US interests in most respects over Iran. All three countries maintain an adversarial relationship with Iran and view it as a threat, in varying degrees, to their respective interests.

A consideration of the history of US foreign policy toward the Middle East lends credence to this argument. During the Cold War, Israel and Saudi Arabia stood alongside the United States in checking the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East and beyond and undermining Arab nationalism.

Emergent divergences and smokescreens
It is worth highlighting that major gaps also exist between the US on the one hand and Israel and Saudi Arabia on the other when it comes to their unique perceptions of and approaches to Iran. This divergence of interests is most apparent when it comes to how each actor assesses the potential impact a nuclear Iran will have on its respective strategic posture.

Despite the hardline rhetoric out of Washington, American planners may have already come around to reluctantly accepting the reality of a nuclear Iran somewhere down the line that will need to be engaged diplomatically. Even a limited rapprochement between the US and Iran would have a profound impact on the geopolitical map of the Middle East.

The hope of improved US-Iranian relations would immediately help ease many of the most acute regional tensions that keep the Middle East on the brink of war and global energy prices at record and unsustainable highs. This possibility would also pave the way for the development of lucrative economic ties between Washington and Tehran in critical sectors such as oil and natural gas. In the long run, the relative importance of Israel and Saudi Arabia to the US would decline as a result of any kind of rapprochement between Washington and Tehran.

In this context, Israel and Saudi Arabia not only have an interest in undercutting Iran; they are also heavily invested in the persistence of US-Iranian enmity. Israeli and Saudi planners are well aware that the US is powerful enough to recalibrate its strategic conception of the Middle East to account for major changes that include the normalization of relations with Iran all the while simultaneously maintaining constructive ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Alternatively, Israel’s relentless threats and diatribes against Iran may have been conceived to achieve a different set of goals. For all its bluster, there is little evidence to indicate that Israel could successfully execute an attack against Iran’s nuclear program and achieve any sort of military success. The scale of the regional conflagration and global economic catastrophe that would certainly follow an Israeli strike is also likely deterring Israel from following through with its threats.

Nevertheless, drawing the world’s attention to Iran enables Israel to divert the eyes of international public opinion away from its ongoing occupation of Palestinian land; doing so provides it with the cover it needs to consolidate its hold permanently over the lives of millions of Palestinians and their natural resources – water, oil and natural gas – in the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem. Defined as illegal under international law, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories continue to be constructed at record pace, creating new facts on the ground. Meanwhile, Palestinians are left to inhabit disconnected and impoverished enclaves reminiscent of the South African-style Bantustans born out of the apartheid era.

Conclusion
The unspoken alliance between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains in full force as popular Arab revolts against tyranny transform the region. Heavily invested in the old status quo, Israel and Saudi Arabia (and its GCC partners) are marshaling efforts to lead a counterrevolution to co-opt fledgling democracies in countries such as Egypt that are seeing previously suppressed demands for freedom, accountability, dignity and independence shape a new politics.

Yet the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia diverge greatly over events in Syria. On the surface, they should equally relish the possibility of Iran’s most important ally crumbling. But only Saudi Arabia, a principal supporter of the political and violent militant factions making up the Syrian opposition, appears determined to destroy the Baathist regime.

Israel stands to lose a great deal in the event that Syria’s Baathist regime falls. The regime has largely ignored Israel’s occupation of its Golan Heights and the thousands of Israeli settlers who inhabit Syrian territory. This has allowed Israel to devote its military resources to other theaters. A post-Baathist order in Syria that sees the rise of an Islamist-oriented regime or the country plunged into years of internecine strife might witness an attempt to recapture the territory based on the model of armed resistance employed by Hezbollah against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon.

In spite of their differences over Syria, however, the course of regional events involving Iran and other matters provide fertile ground for continued strategic cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Chris Zambelis is an analyst and researcher specializing in Middle East affairs with Helios Global Inc, a risk-management group based in the Washington, DC, area. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of Helios Global.

Barak: U.S. Ready to Face Iran on Every Level – Middle East – News – Israel National News.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak

AFP/Pool/File

The United States is ready to “face the challenge on every level” concerning Iran’s nuclear drive, Defense Minister Ehud Barak claimed on Thursday after meeting with the deputy U.S. military chief.

“We face a common challenge but the clock is ticking at a different pace for each of us,” AFP quoted Barak as having said after meeting the vice chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James Winnefeld, for talks on Iran.

“We also have our differences; Israel keeps its sovereign right to act independently, and the U.S. understands this. However, there is no doubt about the U.S. readiness to face the challenge on every level,” Barak said, according to a statement from his ministry.

Earlier, a statement from Winnefeld’s office said he was in Israel as part of a previously scheduled counterpart visit with IDF deputy chief of staff, Major General Yair Naveh.

“While there, Admiral Winnefeld will participate in a series of discussions on mil-to-mil (military-to-military) cooperation and mutual defense issues impacting both Israel and the United States,” the statement said.

Barak, in the statement released from his office, said talks with Winnefeld focused on “the situation in the region, and of course about the Iran issue.”

He reiterated that “only Israel will take decisions regarding its future and security” in a reference to what plans it may have regarding Iran.

Barak added, “However, the U.S. is our most important ally. The intelligence cooperation and the military support are deep and exceptional in scope. I am sure that it will stay this way in any scenario that might happen in the future.”

The meeting had been secret until Army Radio exposed it earlier on Thursday, reporting that Winnefeld was in the country at the invitation of his counterpart, Naveh.

It was not immediately clear when Winnefeld arrived, but he was expected to leave later on Thursday.

Army Radio said the visit had been kept under wraps because of political sensitivities between Israel and Washington over how to handle Tehran’s nuclear program, which both governments suspect is designed to build atomic weapons.

U.S.-Israel relations have been strained over an attack on Iran, which Israel seems to be encouraging but which the U.S. is rejecting for the time being.

Last week, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, appeared to warn Israel that it should not expect U.S. assistance if it chooses to attack Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Dempsey said an Israeli attack would “clearly delay but probably not destroy Iran’s nuclear program” and added, “I don’t want to be complicit if they [Israel] choose to do it.”

Channel 10 News reported on Wednesday that preparations are currently underway for a meeting between Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Barack Obama.

According to the report, Netanyahu and Obama will meet at the White House a day after Yom Kippur, when Netanyahu arrives in the U.S. to speak at the United Nations General Assembly.

It is believed that the meeting between Netanyahu and Obama will lead to Israel agreeing to postpone an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, for a period of several months to half a year.

Earlier this week Netanyahu said that the international community must set a “clear red line” in order to avoid a war over Iran’s controversial nuclear program.

“This is a brutal regime that is racing ahead with its nuclear program because it doesn’t see a clear red line from the international community,” Netanyahu said at a meeting with Israeli and U.S. servicemen wounded in conflict.

He added, “And it doesn’t see the necessary resolve and determination from the international community. The greater the resolve and the clearer the red line, the less likely we’ll have conflict.”

Will Israel Attack? It’s Up to Obama « Commentary Magazine.

Jonathan S. Tobin | @tobincommentary 09.06.2012 – 5:30 PM

Speculation about whether Israel will decide to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities continues to build, but the latest report out of Jerusalem confirms that the answer to the question is still to be found in Washington.

The Times of Israel reports that Israel’s Channel 10 has quoted sources close to Prime Minister Netanyahu that claim the chances of a strike on Iran are declining. What’s more, they say that if President Obama gives Netanyahu assurances that the United States has firm “red lines” that will trigger action against Iran, there will be no need for Israel to act on its own.

The two men are scheduled to meet later this month on September 27 while Netanyahu is in New York to address the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. But the question hanging over this meeting is whether the White House will interpret Netanyahu’s attitude as an opportunity to call his bluff or a challenge that requires the president to start taking the issue seriously.

What the Israelis want is clear enough. They need the United States to stop acting as if they can kick the can down the road indefinitely on this issue. The administration line that a policy of diplomacy and sanctions needs more time to work has no credibility. Iran has already made it clear for years that they have no intention of backing away from their nuclear goal. The sanctions that were belatedly adopted by President Obama are just as unlikely to bring Tehran to its knees even if they were rigidly enforced rather than being routinely flouted.

The latest report from the International Atomic Energy Agency is eroding any lingering doubts about Iran’s intentions or the progress it has made toward realizing its dangerous ambition. But with the number of centrifuges being doubled and now stored in a possibly invulnerable underground facility, the Israelis are rightly worried that time is running out fast before it will be too late to stop Iran.

Unfortunately, the administration has spent most of this year worrying more about Israel acting on its own than about the fact that the Iranian peril may no longer be manageable. But the Israeli preference has always been to act in concert with the United States. The problem is their lack of trust in Obama. They know he has been dragged reluctantly toward confrontation with Iran every step of the way and rightly worry that he will refuse to act if he is re-elected.

Should Obama give a concrete, public promise that action will be taken, Israel’s concerns will be answered and the U.S.-Israel argument will be put to rest. However, if the president interprets this report as Netanyahu weakening his stand and fails to deliver the assurances that are needed, he will squander a chance to end this argument.

As his intervention in the Democrats’ platform fiasco showed, the president is aware that he has a problem with pro-Israel voters. But what is needed now from him is not the traditional boilerplate political rhetoric he has used in the past but a genuine vow to avert a danger to American security as well as an existential threat to Israel.

Israelis Seen Unprepared for Attack on Homeland – WSJ.com.

Officials Fear Residents Need Better Access to Bomb Shelters and Gas Masks in the Event of Attack

By JOSHUA MITNICK

TEL AVIV—Israeli leaders have been talking for months about attacking Iran if it continues to develop its nuclear capacity. But there is anxiety about preparedness for war on the home front, with public officials fretting that millions of Israelis lack immediate access to bomb shelters or gas masks.

Israeli military officers say Iran and its allies in Lebanon and Gaza have tens of thousands of rockets that can reach anywhere in the Jewish state—indicating that a conflict would put all Israeli civilians on the front line for the first time since the 1991 Gulf War.

“The situation is terrible. People are really worried,” said Shlomo Maslawy, a Tel Aviv Council member who complained about a shortage of public shelters in the city’s poorer neighborhoods. “Who will gain entry to the shelters? If something happens, there will be a war between the residents.”

Israel believes its offense its best defense, said Meir Elran, a fellow at Tel Aviv University’s Institute for National Security Studies. Rather than invest in bomb shelters, the government has devoted most of its military budgets to attack and deterrence capabilities.

The possibility that a conflict could spark panic at home is liable to further ratchet up pressure on Israeli military planners and political leaders to quickly escalate Israeli attacks to achieve a quick and decisive victory, Mr. Elran added.

Israeli leaders have consistently said they would attack Iran to prevent it from developing a nuclear weapon, but have maintained a strategic ambiguity about what would trigger an attack.

On Thursday, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, after meeting Vice Adm. James Winnefield, vice chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the “clock is ticking at a different pace” for the U.S. and Israel.

“The next war will be different than all the previous wars because the home front will be on the front line,” said Zeev Bielsky, the head of the parliament’s subcommittee on home-front preparedness. “We have to provide ways and means for people to hide and be more secure.”

Of Israel’s 7.8 million people, 20% don’t have access to nearby public shelters, said Nissan Zeevi, a spokesman for the minister for Home Front Preparedness.

Only 45% of the population has suitable gas masks, according to the Israeli military. The army has quietly been distributing kits for months at home-improvement retailers.

The shortfall is in line with government plans; some 60% of Israelis will have gas masks by next year, Mr. Zeevisaid—adding that the chances of chemical attack are “very low.”

While the supply of gas masks may not be critical because leaders don’t expect a chemical attack, citizens will still expect to be provided with them, Mr. Elran said.

“If nonconventional weapons are used, it’s going to be total chaos and demoralization,” he said. The lack of gas masks “has cast a major shadow on the seriousness of the decision-making process as far as the home front is concerned.”

Israel’s public shelters were built in the 1950s and 1960s to protect city residents from air raids rather than medium- and long-range missiles. Many of those shelters are being used as art studios, synagogues and clubs for teenagers.

Tel Aviv’s 240 public shelters could be unlocked and cleared out for emergency use within 24 hours, city officials said.

The city also plans to open up underground parking decks as shelters. Such facilities might not be sufficient for an initial, unexpected barrage, but would help if hostilities dragged on.

There is no sign of public panic in Tel Aviv. Cafes and restaurants are full, and there has been no rush to stock up on supplies at supermarkets.

“We are going to sit in our apartment and shake from fear,” quipped Shiri Menda, a resident of central Tel Aviv, when asked about her family’s contingency plan for war. “The nearest shelter is in the park, but to the best of my knowledge the shelter isn’t ready or even unlocked.”

Underlying concerns is the lingering memory of 2006, when emergency services stopped functioning during a monthlong war with Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, that subjected northern Israeli cities to daily barrages of rockets.

Since then, Israel’s government has made progress in preparing emergency responders. Israel has also deployed batteries of rocket interceptors designed to knock down the short- and medium-range rockets employed by Hezbollah.

In response to a local media report this year raising concerns about home-front preparedness, the Prime Minister’s office said his administration also had established a special ministry to deal with the matter and devoted more resources to Israel’s agency for national emergencies.

Despite the progress, Israel’s fire service is underfunded and many municipalities could be overwhelmed by attacks, the state comptroller said last year.

The recent reassignment of Israel’s former Minister for Homeland Defense, Matan Vilnai, as ambassador to China spurred more cynicism that Israel isn’t ready.

“If we are going to have a war, why do you send your deputy minister in charge of home front to China,” said Yossi Melman, the co-author of “Spies Against Armageddon,” a book about Israel’s intelligence agencies. “There are jokes that he is running away.”

Many Israelis said they remain hopeful that the war chatter is mostly bluster and that the government won’t order a lone strike.

“I’m not buying anything or planning anything. I’ve served in three wars, and I’m not afraid,” said Meir Solshan, owner of a Tel Aviv dry-cleaning business. “There won’t be an Israel bombing. We’re waiting for the U.S.”

This Week At War: The Pentagon Doesn’t Have the Right Stuff – By Robert Haddick | Foreign Policy.

The Navy can’t ‘contain’ Iran — even if we wanted it to.

BY ROBERT HADDICK | SEPTEMBER 6, 2012

Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may have shed some light on a corner of America’s grand strategy — the real version that officials don’t usually talk about in public.

During a media roundtable at the U.S. embassy in London on August 30, a reporter asked Dempsey whether he would get advanced warning from the Israeli military, should Israeli leaders decide to attack Iran’s nuclear facilities. Dempsey said that he did not ask his Israeli counterpart for such warning, explaining, “I don’t want to be accused of trying to influence — nor do I want — nor do I want to be complicit if they choose to do it. Really. So I haven’t asked the question.” When asked about Israeli concerns about a “zone of immunity” — the time when Israeli’s leaders conclude their military options against Iran will no longer be effective — Dempsey expressed confidence in economic sanctions and concluded, “I don’t think that the zone of immunity that Israel feels itself bound by, I don’t think it’s as significant.” Finally, Dempsey said he had not prepared any military options in response to an Israeli attack on Iran.

Dempsey’s remarks reveal a new approach to security issues in Central Command’s area of responsibility (which stretches from Egypt to Afghanistan). Long gone — and lamented by few — are the days of using offensive action to resolve perceived problems. That approach wasn’t just a Bush-era phenomenon; President Obama escalated the war in Afghanistan in an attempt to seize the initiative, a surge now in rapid reverse. Instead of offense, the new U.S. approach emphasizes defense.

Dempsey’s London remarks show an effort to create as much distance as possible between the United States and a potential Israeli strike. The United States is building a new missile defense radar site in Qatar, it will hold a multinational minesweeping exercise in the Persian Gulf later this month, and it will conduct a scaled-back missile defense exercise with Israel later in the autumn. These steps, while important, are reactive and thus provide a contrast with the U.S. approach over the past decade.

According to the New York Times, some Obama officials believe Israel is pressuring the United States to issue an ultimatum, backed by a public military commitment, in response to the Iranian nuclear program, which the IAEA recently concluded is not slowing down. Dempsey’s remarks clearly pushed back against Israel’s pressure for a commitment to offensive action. But beyond that, they also reveal an attempt by the Obama administration to develop a new strategy in the Central Command region that will require fewer military resources than did the offensive-minded approach of the past.

In contrast with Jerusalem, Washington views Iran as a distant and manageable problem. President Obama has pledged that he will not allow Iran to become a nuclear weapons state and has publicly rejected a policy of Cold-War style containment. However, Iran is not likely to conduct a detectable nuclear weapons test, leaving its nuclear weapons status conveniently ambiguous. And with the memories of the Iraq WMD fiasco still fresh, a U.S. preemptive attack in the face of such ambiguity would seem out of the question.

So, despite what the president has said, in truth, containment will be the long-term strategy. That’s not necessarily a bad thing. Butthe trick will be to implement the strategy with fewer military resources than are currently employed.

The Pentagon currently supplies Central Command with two aircraft carrier strike groups. In order to sustain this commitment, last week the Navy had to send the USS John C. Stennis carrier strike group back to sea four months early and only five months after returning from its last long cruise to the region. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta gave an almost-apologetic speech to the Stennis’s crew before their departure from Bremerton, Washington. This ongoing commitment, mostly in preparation for trouble involving Iran, is absorbing at least 60 percent of the Navy’s total carrier fleet and is requiring an operating tempo that is not sustainable for long.

This is not what the Navy has planned for. And although the administration thinks its defensive strategy will reduce Central Command’s demand for military assets, that does not seem to be the case. Robert Work, the undersecretary of the Navy, recently explained that the service’s long-term assumptions call for permanently maintaining one, not two, carrier strike groups in the Central Command area. Navy planners realize that their responsibilities in the Pacific, always high, will certainly increase as the Chinese navy expands. This implies getting back to the one-carrier commitment to Central Command in order to free up ships for the Pacific. Work explained that the Navy has ways to cope, as shown by the Stennis’s early deployment. But such over-scheduling is not an answer to open-ended problems. Covering the near-term risk around the Persian Gulf with two carriers will eventually become untenable as risks in the South China Sea and elsewhere expand.

How is it that the Pentagon, with base spending totaling $530.6 billion this year, finds itself struggling to cover long-known risks such as Iran? Part of the answer lies with the sheer breadth of the Pentagon’s security responsibilities, which span the globe and range from activities such as providing  veterinary assistance in East Africa, to fighting insurgencies in Central Asia, to chasing drug-runners in the Caribbean, to deterring nuclear war, and much, much more. With such a list of duties, $530.6 billion might not be unreasonable.

Strategists and policymakers have always debated what duties should properly be on the Pentagon’s list and what priority those duties should rate. Regarding the present and future challenges around the Persian Gulf and the western Pacific, the Pentagon’s forces, despite their size and scope, are mismatched to the challenges at hand — the Pentagon has too many capabilities that are unsuitable for these problems and too few that are. Regarding Iran, although the U.S. Air Force has abundant tactical air power, political sensitivities on the Arabian Peninsula, combined with the vulnerability of forward bases to missile attack, apparently prevent the deployment of much of this tactical air power as a hedge. This has left Central Command excessively dependent on aircraft carriers instead. In the Pacific, China’s expanding anti-ship and land-attack missile capabilities increasingly threaten long-standing U.S. basing plans, operating concepts, and procurement decisions, revealing more emerging mismatches between what U.S. commanders have and what they will need to accomplish their assigned missions in the region.

Top Pentagon officials bear responsibility for allowing these shortfalls and mismatches to accumulate. Shortly after assuming office in November 2006, Defense Secretary Robert Gates railed against “next-war-itis” — what he saw as his staff’s excessive attention to future problems, to the exclusion of current problems such as Iraq and Afghanistan. One would think that the Pentagon staff was large enough so that no such choice was required. In any case, those future problems are now here and are more challenging than they need to be because of earlier inattention, poor forecasting, and resistance to adaptation.

It is the nature of large bureaucracies to resist change. However, the outside world is constantly changing, and the Pentagon must adapt. With auto-pilot the default, vigorous leadership is required to impose adaptation. However, according to a recent Washington Post article, we should not expect such disruptive leadership from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who the staff seems fond of precisely because he is not disruptive (a description that also applied to Gates). If someone doesn’t turn the rudder soon, the Pentagon will find itself complicit — in ensuring its own irrelevance.