WarSclerotic

In the previous article I wrote on Syria’s civil war, I questioned the unreserved support we in the West give the Syrian rebels. This support is indicative of the identity crisis in Western foreign policy which we keep pretending does not exist, but whose consequences are becoming too important to ignore. Due to intricate regional relationships, the outcome of the Syrian conflict could trigger regional disintegration, or if managed amicably, stave off a very destructive war.

The key players include the likes of Israel and Iran. Let’s briefly review important connections in the area.

Israel is connected to America by a political umbilical cord, to Egypt by peace treaty and to Jordan – the Hashemites’ consolation prize after losing out to the Sauds – also by peace treaty. Apart from these sources of support, Israel does not have friends in the region.

Iran is connected to Syria via official friendly relations, to Lebanon via illicit networks embodied by Hezbollah and its affiliates, to Iraq via the sub-state groups that were one-time insurgency, and to Afghanistan in much the same way. The problem is, Iran’s connections can bring as much trouble as they do profit, but when you find yourself on the receiving end of the West’s sanctions, you have to get creative.

Aside from Egypt and Iran (the only innate regional nation-states), the map of the Middle East was drawn by Western great powers as they saw fit. These borders underlie what I think is the most important system of relationships in the region – Shi’a and Sunni Muslims.

While there are other denominations of Islam in the Mideast, these two are the Earth-shakers, so to speak. Religious tension within Islam also plays out in the foreign policies of countries dominated by one or the other – for example, in Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran’s mutual distrust of one another, although America’s support for the former might also be a big variable in the equation. The current state configuration also means that there are countries, like Iraq, where these religious denominations are divided regionally. Destabilization could very well mean the disintegration of the state along these fault lines.

The war in Syria is a precarious security risk first and foremost for Israel, because the strategic imperative for the Jewish state is to have as much peace and quiet on its borders as possible. When the country next door is blowing up in flames, thinking about a hard power alternative to prevent spillover is only sensible on behalf of Tel Aviv.

The setting for such a confrontation will most likely be Lebanon. Hezbollah is better positioned for any kind of operations, since its capacity is not taken up with domestic unrest. Israel could choose to fight a two-front war in Syria and Lebanon, but this is an option that I think the defense ministry would rather not see play out.

Hezbollah is particularly worrisome because they hold tens of thousands of missiles of various calibre, and Israel’s entire territory is within reach. The Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 was Israel’s attempt to neutralize that arsenal, but that end was ultimately not achieved. In all-out war, countermeasures would be simply overwhelmed by the sheer volume of missiles coming down, and the number of casualties cannot be projected. Key here is a small detail – most rocket-related incidents are reported to end up without damage or death to Israel; however, as Israel is a small country and its geography clear to Hezbollah, directional firing would probably be the order of the day in the event of war.

Should the conflict spill out of Syria’s borders, it would also be an opportunity for Iran to expand its transnational influence. Such an opportunity translates into nearly unacceptable risk for Israel, equivalent to Hezbollah’s rocketry program or Iraq’s nuclear ambitions in the 1980s. The typical reaction is pre-emptive attack to neutralize the threat, but this would quickly escalate from targeting Iran’s asymmetric capabilities to its nuclear program. From there, it becomes a strategic interstate war. At this point, it is not Iran’s sabre rattling, but traditional Israeli foreign policy that becomes the existential threat and poses an incalculable risk. Netanyahu’s incessant calling for an attack is a macabre, but ironic demonstration about the identity crisis in Israeli foreign policy: its utter lack of creativity.

What we’re looking at is a potentially collapsing Syria, nothing less than the pulverization of Lebanon, Hezbollah’s rain of death on Israel and strategic war with Iran. Unwillingly, Israel becomes the centerpiece in this scenario, with the exception that it would be conventionally overwhelmed; Israel is not designed for prolonged war, and this is what could result. God forbid, we resort to nuclear weapons – they are the not only a guarantor of peace, but also a messenger of death on an inhuman scale. If Israel finds itself in a geopolitical corner, will it use its nuclear weapons?

Now, for America’s reaction to this nightmarish scenario. Earlier this week, President Obama said that chemical weapon use by Syria would be a redline for U.S. involvement in the country. Bashar al-Assad knows that it’s one thing to bomb rag-tag rebels at will several times a day, and quite another to fight the best conventional force on the planet; even if down, American power is not out by a long shot.

America would prefer to not get drawn into another prolonged war in the Mideast after Iraq and Afghanistan. Obama has made it clear that America would only come to the defense of Israel, if it is attacked by another state, but will not support Netanyahu’s misguided adventures of pre-emption; if the opposite were true, Israel would have attacked Iran a long time ago. It is unclear if this moment would be where the scales tip for America on supporting Israel: On the one hand, the costs of another war could drive the economy in a very long depression and shut out the Mideast for American foreign policy for decades, if not centuries. On the other hand, sacrificing Israel for wider geopolitical choices is a cold, but rational perspective. This is a choice Washington should not have to make at all.

There is, however, one preferable anti-climax: the conflict doesn’t spill out, Assad agrees to retire from power, the regime reforms to include the rebels, and we wake to an Islamic Republic of Syria; then the familiar sabre rattling continues, Israel is in one piece and people don’t die (mostly). I like that idea better.

 

As the debate intensifies regarding unilateral Israeli action against Iran, everybody seems to be playing kick the can down the road. Blame the other. A very dangerous game.

In an attempt to arrest Israeli action, many figures are calling upon the Obama administration to make its commitment clearer than ever to stop Iran from going nuclear. This makes good strategic sense. But those calls are already being spurned in Washington.

Former Israeli military intelligence chief Amos Yadlin wrote in The Washington Post and told The Times of Israel that the U.S. should take immediate steps to convince allies and adversaries alike that military action is real, imminent and doable. He said that Obama should notify the U.S. Congress in writing that if the steps the administration is relying upon today, like negotiations and sanctions, do not achieve success by the summer of 2013, then the Americans “will deal with the problem via military intervention.” Obama should also signal his intentions via a heightened U.S. military presence in the Gulf, and more. “Time is running out to make this commitment credible to the people of the U.S., Israel and Iran. If you want peace, prepare [credibly] for war.” Former Bush administration NSC official Elliot Abrams wrote the same thing Tuesday in The Weekly Standard: “It is time to authorize the use of force against Iran,” he said.

Similarly, former deputy foreign minister and Oslo architect Yossi Beilin told Haaretz that “What is needed is public diplomacy. The Americans need to take it up an octave and use words that haven’t been spoken yet in addressing the Israeli public. They need to be clearer and sound more steadfast than they have up to now. Since the United States fears an imminent Israeli operation, it must make a statement that commits it to taking action against Iran when the time comes and leaves no room for doubt.”

Ehud Barak’s longtime aide, Brig. Gen. (res.) Michael Herzog, wrote in a Washington Institute article that if the U.S. wants to influence Israeli decision making, “it must reach out to its ally at the highest level both publicly and privately, presenting a clearer roadmap that seriously addresses Israel’s concerns. Such a dialogue cannot wait until after the U.S. election.”

But Obama shill Peter Beinart was quick to angrily dismiss these calls. Calling efforts to elicit an unambiguous U.S. stance “nuts,” Beinart intimates that Israel is overstepping the bounds of good taste by asking the president “to promise to launch war(s) in backroom negotiations with foreign leaders.” Instead, he calls for “debate” in Congress and the American public about American interests vis. Iran — before any promises are made to Israel. “Has either Congress or the media done detailed investigations into how exactly a nuclear Iran would threaten the United States? Or into how American military action might affect the safety of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and the Gulf? Or into what kind of anti-American terrorism an attack might spark? Or into what impact a strike would have on relations with key U.S. allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt? Or into how military action would influence global oil prices and the world economy?” asks Beinart.

Of course, Beinart’s blather backs up Obama’s desire to keep kicking the Iranian can down the road until after the November election. As Jonathan Tobin wrote: “Rather than really wanting a debate about a feckless administration policy that has wasted four years on dead-end diplomacy and engagement with Iran and only belatedly enacted sanctions that are being loosely enforced, what Obama cheerleaders like Beinart really want is to find a way to put a brake on the use of force. His assertion that no one has made a case for stopping Iran being an ‘American interest’ is simply untrue.”

It gets worse. Writing in the establishment Foreign Policy magazine, veteran correspondent and analyst James Traub mocks Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s zone of immunity argument, calling it the “zone of insanity.” He repeatedly calls Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu “crazy” and “frenzied,” and accuses him of trying to “bully” Obama “into making some sort of ironclad promise to launch airstrikes if diplomacy fails to deter the Iranians by a stipulated date.” Traub warns Obama not to “become hostage to Netanyahu’s increasingly swift timetable for action.” Obama should not “back himself into a corner by making his red lines public.”

Traub goes on to mock those who have written about the depth of the anti-Semitism of the Iranian regime and sniggers about Netanyahu’s penchant for flagging such Iranian statements.

Beinart, Traub and their ilk are disingenuous and dangerous in so many ways, primarily in their creation of a caricature of Netanyahu and Barak that does not conform to reality. Despite their insinuations, neither Israeli leader has called upon Obama to commit the U.S. to war at some defined red line in the future. As the unnamed senior Israeli “decision-maker” (obviously Ehud Barak) told Ari Shavit of Haaretz 10 days ago, “The Americans could say clearly that if by next spring the Iranians still have a nuclear program, they will destroy it. But the Americans are not making this simple statement because countries don’t make these kinds of statements to each other. In statesmanship there are no future contracts. The American president cannot commit now to a decision that he will or will not make six months from now. So the expectation of such a binding American assurance now is not serious …”

The real danger, I think, in the undercurrent of administration thought that Beinart and Traub represent lies in the second half of Traub’s column. He calls for another P5+1 attempt to cut a comprehensive deal with the Iranians that would allow Iran “what it claims it wants” — the right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes, along with retainment of its nuclear facilities. In exchange for what Iranian commitment — that’s not clear.

Herein lies the rub. Obama claims that his policy is the prevention of an Iranian bomb, but it smells like he is moving (in a second term) toward containment of an Iranian bomb. He certainly seems to have backed away from the commitment to stop Iran from gaining the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Basically, Obama seems prepared to let Iran get one turn of the screwdriver away from the assembly of an actual bomb. Israel, of course, is not prepared to live with that. Our red lines are indeed different.

In sum, many private agendas are impacting on the Iran debate and not enough people are taking the Iranian threat seriously. Left-wing Israelis eager to isolate Netanyahu and Barak beg to be reassured by the U.S. Some American Jews seek to distance themselves from Netanyahu and Barak — for fear of being accused, again, of dragging the U.S. (or of Israel dragging the U.S.) to war, as was the case with Iraq — so they mock Israeli leadership as nuts. Conservatives seek to portray Obama as a weakling for electoral purposes. Obama seeks to deflect attention from the fact that his ineffective diplomacy let the issue slide for the past four years. His defenders are preparing public opinion for a sellout deal with the Iranians in 2013 that ignores Israel. As I said, everybody is playing kick the can. Meanwhile, the Iranian centrifuges keep spinning….

I see Demsey candidly expressing the difference between American and Israeli perceptions and interests. His comments about delay but not destroy resemble what Israelis with military experience are saying. He has also said that American and Israeli professionals interpret the same intelligence about Iranian activities differently, that the Iranian threat to Israel is to its very existence while that is not the case with respect to the Iranian threat to the United States, and that he is not sure about Israel’s intentions and capacities. He admits that Israel and the United States share a great deal of information, but not everything.

Israel is dependent on the United States, but not totally. The United States also is dependent on Israel, although the balance of dependence is by no mean symmetrical. On several occasions Israeli officials have tempered their actions with respect to one troublesome neighbor or another, in response to American demands. Who is dependent on who? The actions of each country in the Middle East depend to some extent on the other.

There is no precise metric to measure “dependence” in a global, interdependent world. Israel has demonstrated a significant level of independent action on several occasions.

All should understand that Israelis view Iran’s nuclear program, along with its president’s obsession with Israel, as a threat of Holocaust proportions, and remember the tepid response of the United States and other powerful countries to the Holocaust while in progress. Ending that threat, at least temporarily, will be worth the consequences of Iranian, Hizbollah, and Hamas retaliations that will kills hundreds or thousands of Israelis. Iranians, Lebanese, and Gazans should recognize, however, that Israel’s subsequent retaliations are likely to surpass anything they have felt in previous encounters.

Involved in Israelis’ recognition of their capacity to only delay Iran’s nuclear program is the realization that “delay” can be a serious setback, and lead Iranians to realize the costs of their aspirations. True, some Iranians may be spurred to greater efforts by an Israeli attack, but other things can intervene and contribute to their continued frustrations. Observers said that Israel only delayed the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981.

Why doesn’t Israel accept the American assurance that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and go about other business without an obsession with Iran?

There is a problem of trust. One can admire Barack Obama on other issues, yet not rely on his statements about Iran’s nuclear program. His strong and repeated statements about negotiating with Iran have impressed Israelis as more of his naivete with respect to the Middle East. Most impressive, in a negative sense, was his demand that Israel cease construction in Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem acquired after 1967. His approval rating among Israelis dipped to 6 percent by some reckoning, and 4 percent by others. It has improved since then, but he still has a problem with Israelis and with members of the Israeli government.

No surprise that perceptions correspond with politics. While Shimon Peres urges Israel to rely on the United States, Israel Hayom–the paper financed by Sheldon Adelson and closely identified with Prime Minister Netanyahu–quotes a former aide of Dick Cheney, “The American cavalry will not come to your aid . . . Don’t count on an American attack on Iran . . . The United States will act only if something injures it.” On the same page, the newspaper quotes the French paper l’Express on Obama, “He wanted to change the world, and disappointed . . . He did not live up to expectations.”

The cartoon in Wednesday’s Israel Hayom shows Barack Obama with paint and brush, saying “This is my red line. Don’t dare to pass it.” Part of the line in front of Bashar al-Assad carrying a chemical weapon is solid, but the line in front of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad carrying a nuclear weapon is a series of dashes, with space between them.

What happens will happen. My guess is that it is more likely to come from Israel than from the United States, with American officials and citizens responding as they will. If it comes before the election, and my fingers are still working, I am likely to comment.