WarSclerotic

S. Arabia: We’ll intercept any IAF aircraft en route to Iran – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Saudi Arabia has said it would intercept any Israeli aircraft crossing its airspace en route to Iran, Yedioth Ahronoth reported on Thursday. The explicit message was transmitted via the United States, during talks with Obama administration officials in Jerusalem.

Senior Israeli officials have claimed that the Americans are leveraging the Saudi threat in an attempt to dissuade Israel from launching a unilateral offensive on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Some sources estimate that Saudi Arabia, which is equipped with American-made fighter jets, would have allowed Israel to cross its airspace if the latter would have coordinated its military operation with the White House. (Ynet)

Arab Spring no more – Salon.com.

( A VERY astute article.  I know… I couldn’t believe it either.  SALON.COM ? ! – JW )

Born of idealism, Syria’s war is now a battle over Iran and the Sunni vs. Shiite rivalry. An expert explains

By David Case, GlobalPost

A Free Syria Army fighter waves from the top of a destroyed army tank in tn the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria. (AP Photo)

As bombs rain down on Aleppo, Syria’s 17-month-old conflict has entered a new and dangerous phase.

Born of an Arab Spring-inspired desire for greater democracy, experts say that powerful geopolitical forces are now driving the war, with implications across the Middle East.

For an explanation of how the conflict is morphing into a proxy war, and how sectarian rivalries are fueling the violence, GlobalPost turned to Marius Deeb, Professorial Lecturer in Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Professor Deeb is a Syria expert and the author of Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon.

This interview has been condensed and edited by GlobalPost.

Prime Minister Riyad Farid Hijab, who departed from the Syrian government yesterday, is a Sunni Muslim — one of several high profile Sunnis who have split with the regime recently. Is there growing evidence of a sectarian divide in Bashar Al-Assad’s government? More broadly, early on Syria’s conflict was a struggle for liberty. Has that changed?

The protestors started out peacefully, seeking political reform. In the beginning, they were universal — encompassing all sects, and some of the young people are still thinking in these terms. But the regime used violence against them. This led to the emergence of the Free Syrian Army, to fighting against the regular army and to guerilla warfare.

It’s important to understand that Syria has always been sectarian, since day one. The regime has been Alawite-dominated since 1970, when the father, Hafez Al-Assad took power. All the Sunnis who have held senior positions derive their power from the fact that they were working for Alawites. The regime’s backbone in terms of the military and intelligence officers who really control the regime are Alawite.

Having a prime minister leave — so what? Consider, Manaf Tlas, the [Sunni] general who defected in June — [regarded by some as the most prominent military defector so far]. His father was the defense minister, but his father had no real power; the official under him who exercised power was Alawite. The son, Manaf Tlas, commanded a sort of brigade, but really his power derived from Alawite intelligence officers. When he defected, he left alone — the army, his soldiers, would not leave with him.

The Alawites were persecuted by the Sunnis under the Ottomans Empire for years, and therefore they have prepared to defend themselves. The Alawites are not even Muslims, strictly speaking. They claim they’re Shiite, but really, they don’t go to mosques, they don’t go on pilgrimage to Mecca, they don’t fast during Ramadan — they actually celebrate Christmas. That’s the basic problem. From 1971, the regime has prepared for when they’re going to be ousted from power, from Syria, and eventually they have to form their own state.

In the Guardian, Jonathan Steele writes, “Under Saudi, Qatari and US leadership, and with British, French and Israeli approval, [Syria’s conflict] has turned into an anti-Iranian proxy war.” Would you agree?

I agree that from 1980, Hafez Al-Assad made a brilliant move to have a very strong alliance with Iran, which is basically Shiite. The Alawites in Syria regard themselves as Shiite like the Iranians.

In that respect, a fight against the regime would weaken Iran, because Syria and Iran are major allies. It would weaken Hezbollah, which is really an outshoot of the Iranian ideology in Lebanon. Yes, there is an axis evil — Iran, Syria and Hezbollah — and I think the war will weaken Iran. I don’t think Iran will be able to save the regime and control the whole of Syria. I think that’s impossible.

How does the Syrian conflict affect Israel’s quest to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon? Would the war make it easier for Israel to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities?

In a way, yes, because the Syrian army is busy, so it’s not a threat anymore. It’s not going to be threat in the future at all. In fact, the Alawite army might become a friend of Israel.

Iran has problems because Israel could attack, the US could attack, and also it could suffer from cyber attacks, which have been successful in the past — which are more effective and less costly.

Iran has always wanted to have a nuclear weapon, continues to do so, and if we don’t stop it — through negotiations or through military action — it will pursue that goal. I don’t see the Syrian conflict as an important factor, but the Iranians could take that into consideration. For them, Syria and Hezbollah are really the strongest and only allies in the region.

So it would make it more difficult if the Israelis did attack Iranian nuclear facilities — it may complicate efforts to strike back?

With Syria busy, the only option for Iran is to use Hezbollah, which has really been a servant of Syrian and Iranian interests since it was established in 1982. So it could use Hezbollah to create problems for Israel. But I don’t see a major problem in that.

In another way, because Syria is out of the question, an Israeli attack on Iran might make the Sunnis of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Bahrain happy.

Finally, Saudi Arabia has taken an unusually aggressive role in Syria, last week pushing a UN General Assembly resolution calling on Assad to step down. Why is Saudi Arabia is doing this, and how does it affect peace and stability in the region?

It’s about the Sunni-Alawite rivalry. There’s an opportunity to get rid of the Alawites who control Syria, who are allies with Iran and with the rulers of Iraq — who are still supporting the regime in Syria. Putting Syria in the hands of the Sunnis is good for [Sunni-majority] Saudi Arabia. Of course, the Saudis do not believe in political and religious freedom, it’s a bastion of oppression, but it plays its role differently abroad.

How Liberal Democrats who Support Israel Might Think about the Election :: Gatestone Institute.

by Alan M. Dershowitz
August 5, 2012 at 3:00 am

Let me begin by categorically stating that no president has ever completely satisfied me with regard to his policies toward Israel. Every single president, Republican and Democrat alike, has refused to do the right thing when it comes to recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. There may be room for disagreement about some parts of Jerusalem that were captured by Israel during its defensive war with Jordan, but there is no room for disagreement about the status of West Jerusalem, where the Knesset, the Israeli Supreme Court, the Prime Minister’s office, and the President’s residence have always been located. I have been and will remain critical of any president who wrongly believes that recognizing West Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and placing our embassy there will make it more difficult to achieve peace.

I have also disagreed with presidents, both Republican and Democrat, who have suggested that Israel’s settlement policy is the major barrier to peace between Israel and the Palestinians. The major barrier has always been, and remains, the Palestinians’ unwillingness to recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, to renounce their absurd claim to a so-called “right of return,” and to accept reasonable offers from Israel regarding the borders of the West Bank. Though I have long been opposed to Israel’s settlement policy on humanitarian and democratic grounds, I insist that the continuing occupation is largely the result of Palestinian refusal to accept the reasonable compromises offered by Prime Ministers Barak and Olmert. If the Palestinians had been prepared to accept such reasonable compromises, the occupation would end, as would the concerns over humanitarian and democratic issues. The same might be true if the Palestinians were now prepared to negotiate a two-state solution with no preconditions. At bottom, therefore, this dispute is more about land than it is about human rights, because the Palestinians can secure their human rights by being willing to compromise over land, as the Jews did both in 1938, when they accepted the Peel Commission Report, and in 1948 when they accepted the UN Partition Plan.

There have been better and worse presidents when it comes to Israel; some of the best have been Republicans, as have some of the worst. Some of the best have been Democrats, as have been some of the worst. No president has been perfect, and no president has been perfectly bad. (Though Eisenhower may have come close.)

Most presidents have had mixed records, generally supportive of Israel’s security. President Reagan, for example, who is often put forward as the model of a pro-Israel president, voted to condemn Israel for its entirely proper decision to bomb the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. And President Carter, who is put forward as the model of an anti-Israel president, helped bring about a cold peace with Egypt.

The glory of American politics, with regard to support for Israel’s security, is that over the years it has been largely bipartisan. It remains so under President Obama.

It is imperative that this election not be turned into a referendum over Israel’s security in which a vote for the Republican candidate is seen as a vote in favor of Israel’s security, while a vote for the Democratic candidate is seen as a vote against Israel’s security. Such a perception could prove disastrous for Israel since it is very possible—indeed in my view likely—that President Obama will be reelected, and that his reelection will not turn on differences between him and Romney over Israel’s security. That is why I am so concerned about the approach taken by those who argue that every Jew who supports Israel must vote for Mitt Romney, because President Obama’s record on Israel is far from perfect.

When I decide who to vote for in a presidential election, I do not look for perfection. If I did, I would have to stay home. I look for the better candidate based on a wide variety of factors. For example, as a civil libertarian, I was distressed by President Clinton’s regressive policies with regard to criminal justice. I strongly opposed his “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy. I criticized his inaction in Rwanda, and the lateness of his involvement in the former Yugoslavia. But I voted for him enthusiastically because he was so much better than the two candidates against whom he ran.

I remain critical of some of President Obama’s policies, as I was of some of Governor Romney’s policies when he led my state of Massachusetts. But only when it comes to Israel and President Obama does perfection seem to be the test. This test of perfection is put forward largely by Republicans who would never vote for President Obama, regardless of his views on Israel. There are, to be sure, some Democrats, and even some who voted for Obama the first time, who are now prepared to shift allegiances because of their disapproval of Obama’s Israel policies. That is their prerogative in a democracy. But those of us who have a different view should not be labeled as anti-Israel or insufficiently supportive of Jewish values.

I approve of President Obama’s policies on the rights of women, gays and racial and religious minorities. I support his health care bill, his approach to immigration and to taxes, and his appointments to the Supreme Court. If I believed that his foreign policies endangered Israel’s security, that would weigh heavily on my decision how to vote. But instead I believe that there would be no major differences between a President Obama and a President Romney when it comes to Israel’s security.

I will continue to be critical of policies with which I disagree and supportive of policies with which I agree, without regard to the political affiliation of the president. I will vote for the presidential candidate who I believe is best for America and for the world, and in making that calculation I will consider their policies toward Israel because I believe that strong support for Israel’s security is good for America and for the world. And I will try my best to see that support for Israel’s security remains a bipartisan issue, despite the well-intentioned but misguided efforts of some to make such support a wedge issue and the election a referendum that Israel could lose.

This is at least how I, as a liberal Democrat, think about the coming election for President of the United States.

IDF believed to be using armed UAVs – JPost – Defense.

( That’s what took out the Sinai terrorists. – JW )

‘Jalili visited Beirut to support Iran’s p… JPost – Middle East.

Iran preparing for post-Assad era in Syria – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

Though Iran is still loyal to the Syrian regime, the time has come to start considering other options – Iran’s recent political maneuvers show that it is doing just that.

Will Syria survive? – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

The civil war in Syria is not only a war against Assad’s repressive regime. It has taken on religious and ethnic characteristics.

It seems the most important question these days is not whether Bashar Assad survives but whether Syria survives as a state. Syria, in its present borders, is not a homogenous entity, either historically or ethnically, but the outcome of Anglo-French imperialist arrangements made after World War I. They set the borders of the countries that formed on the Ottoman Empire’s ruins.

First came the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the convoluted results of Faisal’s Arab Revolt. Then came France’s decision to separate Lebanon from Syria and annex areas beyond historically Christian Mount Lebanon to form Greater Lebanon. Finally, on the eve of World War II, came France’s capitulation to Turkey’s demands to transfer control of the Alexandretta Province (the Hatay Province ) to Turkey.

In Syria, France was also responsible for encouraging the Alawite minority to serve in the army as a counterweight to the Sunni majority, using the age-old colonialist policy of divide and conquer. This legacy is apparent to this day. It is what allowed the Alawite minority to take power under the secular Baath Party. It also created the paradoxical situation in which Assad’s regime drew – and still draws – significant support from the Christian minority, around 10 percent of the country’s population. The Christians view him – despite his repressive nature – as their best guarantee against a tyranny of the Sunni majority.

Similar to Iraq and Egypt, secularism in Syria went hand in glove with a repressive regime, despite the differences between Saddam Hussein and Hosni Mubarak. The civil war in Syria is not only a war against Assad’s repressive regime. It has taken on religious and ethnic characteristics. In this sense, it is reminiscent of what happened in Yugoslavia. The growing strength of radical Islamic elements in the opposition – at times supported by Saudi Arabia, at other times linked to Al-Qaida – shows that the alternative to Assad’s regime could be far from democratic.

The minorities understand this very well. Some Christians are leaving Syria, and the Kurds in the northeast are thinking about autonomy, possibly even a link-up with the autonomous Kurdish region in northern Iraq. If Assad falls, one cannot rule out a scenario in which the Alawites gather in their mountain stronghold, and who knows how the Turks would react; they have a long score to settle with the Syrians on all border issues. On the other hand, there may also be implications for southeast Turkey’s large Alawite minority and Lebanon’s Sunnis, concentrated mainly in Tripoli near the Syrian border.

The possibility of a disintegrating Syria reflects processes whose ramifications are not limited to the regimes’ future but touch on the these countries’ very existence. The territorial arrangement made after World War I, which political leaders until now have sought to preserve, is starting to crumble. It happened in Iraq, which is no longer a unified national Arab state. It is the case in Sudan, whose borders were drawn during the British occupation at the end of the 19th century and which has already split in two, with further divisions still to come. And in Libya, the people who toppled Muammar Gadhafi are having a hard time maintaining the country’s unity.

In the current charged atmosphere, this op-ed piece could be analysis of a possible development won’t convince anyone who believes in conspiracy theories. But historical processes sometimes have unexpected consequences. Just as in Russia the disintegration of the communist regime did not give rise to democracy but to Vladimir Putin, so it is in our region. The Arab Spring could be in for some surprises.

Israel fears UN chief’s visit to Iran will undermine efforts to thwart nuclear program – Israel News | Haaretz Daily Newspaper.

UN Secretary General has yet to confirm, but sources claim he intends to attend upcoming Tehran summit of Non-Aligned Movement.

‘Syria rebels kill Russian general helping… JPost – Middle East.

Is the Syrian Civil War Hindering a Strike on Iran? :: Gatestone Institute.

by Yaakov Lappin
August 8, 2012 at 4:00 am

Is an Israeli or American strike on Iran’s nuclear weapons program being held up by the raging Syrian war, and the unstable status of Syria’s chemical weapons?

Syria possesses the Middle East’s largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, which include deadly VX nerve gas, sarin, and mustard gas. It has also developed an advanced Scud missile program to serve as a delivery mechanism.

In addition, Damascus has a reported biological weapons program.

There are several factors currently at play in Syria and the region indicating that the future of those weapons is uncertain — a factor that could prompt military planners to push back a strike on Iran to ensure that resources are available to deal with these threats from Syria if necessary, including jihadi organizations of all stripes who could try to snatch these incredibly dangerous arms.

Further, as Syrian rebels continue their country-wide military assault on the Assad regime, pro-Assad elements have taken to the airwaves in recent days to openly threaten outside forces with unconventional weapons.

While Israel has openly been singled out as the target of their devastation, the messages are directed just as much, if not more, at Turkey and other NATO forces who are contemplating a limited invasion of northern Syria.

An invasion would be aimed at setting up safe havens for displaced Syrians, thereby stemming the flood of Syrian refugees who are flowing into Turkey.

“Let me tell you something. I cannot tell a lie. We have biological weapons. What’s the problem? We have advanced weapons. Why lie to the people? We have them. That is what’s known as the balance of power. You [Israel] have nuclear weapons, and we have advanced biological weapons,” Syrian MP Ahmad Shlash, deputy chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, recently told Hezbollah’s Al-Manar television in a clip translated by MEMRI.

The same MP said that Syria has “all types of missiles. All types of missiles! Let them bear in mind and take into consideration that Syria has both chemical and biological weapons”.

In another TV appearance, Syrian MP Sharif Shehade said: “If the Syrian government has weapons of that type – of course they will use them against any attacker. What should we do with them? Make tabouleh or fattoush salads? Of course we will use them against our attackers. That’s only natural.”

The threats emanating out of Syria and Turkey’s posture regarding a potential intervention mean that the civil war could escalate into a regional international conflict involving the possible use of unconventional weapons — a contingency that could also place plans for a military strike on Iran’s nuclear sites on temporary hold.

A military operation targeting Iran at this time could also tempt Assad to join an Iranian and Hezbollah counter-strike that would involve firing of thousands of rockets and missiles at the Israeli home front.

Although Assad would be risking a lethal Israeli knockout blow to his regime by joining a counter-strike, he could reason that if he survived the confrontation, he would regain legitimacy at home and in the Arab world, thereby regaining at least some of his crumbling position. The more desperate and embattled Assad is, the more likely he might be to involve Syria in an Iranian counter-strike.

Waiting until Assad is overthrown would eliminate the most dangerous potential war front that could open up after a strike on Iran.

In the estimate of many Syria experts, once the Assad regime falls, Syria will fracture into warring ethnic-sectarian provinces for a considerable period of time, meaning that Syria would have no ability to initiate conflict with its neighbors.

Even if a new government managed to come to power in Syria, it would in all likelihood be a Sunni-dominated entity, hostile to Shi’ite Iran and its southern Lebanese ally, Hezbollah, both of which have been accessories to the war crimes being perpetuated against Syrian Sunnis. A Sunni-led Syria would go from being an Iranian ally to a hostile foe of the Shi’ite theocracy.

The loss of its major regional ally, Syria, could be a blow to Iran that might even induce it to speed up its nuclear program.

The coming weeks and months will determine if Assad will be overthrown and if Iran will reach the point of no return — and the consequences to the region.