Archive for August 2012

The nuclear triangle: Israel, the US, and Iran

August 17, 2012

Israel Hayom | The nuclear triangle: Israel, the US, and Iran.

Israel is perceived to be threatening the stability of the region. Obama’s America is fearful that an Israeli attack will undermine stability just before the elections. Europe is fearful of the economic consequences of an attack, and the Arab world is petrified of the fall even more than it is of “spring.” Iran is the only country going about its business.

Boaz Bismuth
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is the only leader in the region going about his business as usual.

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Photo credit: AFP

Eilat mayor: We’re a city living under the threat of rockets

August 17, 2012

Israel Hayom | Eilat mayor: We’re a city living under the threat of rockets.

An unheard of organization called “The Salafist Front in Sinai” claims responsibility for the rocket attack on Wednesday • Security forces continuing to search for remnants of rockets that fell around the southern beach city.

Ronit Zilberstein and Daniel Siryoti
Tourism remained unaffected in Eilat on Thursday after two rockets exploded the day before.

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Photo credit: Sasi Horseh

Unilateral action — a test of sovereignty

August 17, 2012

Israel Hayom | Unilateral action — a test of sovereignty.

Yoram Ettinger

Maintaining Israel’s independence of action — in face of Iran’s nuclear threat — is consistent with Israeli-Jewish history, with common sense, with regional stability and with the enhancement of vital U.S. national security interests. On the other hand, surrendering Israel’s inalienable right of self-defense would undermine Israel’s sovereignty, erode its posture of deterrence, jeopardize its existence, fuel regional chaos and undermine U.S. interests in the Middle East.

On June 3, 1967, U.S. President Johnson pressured Prime Minister Eshkol against pre-empting the pro-Soviet Egypt-Syria-Jordan military axis, which threatened the survival of moderate Arab regimes (e.g., Saudi Arabia) and Israel’s existence. Johnson advised that “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go alone. We cannot imagine that [Israel] will make this decision.”

Johnson warned that a unilateral Israeli military pre-emptive strike could trigger severe regional turmoil, transform Israel into a belligerent state, and preclude assistance by the U.S. Johnson refrained from implementing the 1957 unilateral and multilateral guarantees issued to Israel by Eisenhower. He insisted that Israel should rely on the diplomatic-multilateral option.

Eshkol defied Johnson. He pre-empted the anti-U.S., Arab axis; devastated a clear and present danger to vital Western interests; rescued the House of Saud from the wrath of Nasser; expedited the end of the pro-Soviet Nasser regime and the rise of the pro-U.S. Sadat regime in Egypt; dealt a major setback to Soviet interests; and demonstrated Israel’s capability to snatch the hottest chestnuts out of the fire, without a single U.S. boot on the ground. He transformed the image of Israel from a national security consumer (a client state) to a national security producer (a strategic ally).

Eshkol realized that a defiant national security policy — in defense of the Jewish state — yielded a short-term political and diplomatic spat with the U.S., but resulted in a long-term national security upgrade and dramatically enhanced strategic respect.

From time immemorial, the Jewish People has faced powerful adversities in asserting its sovereignty over the Land of Israel, and by undertaking unilateral national security action. Conviction-driven defiance of adversity has earned the Jewish People deep respect.

Israel’s contemporary history demonstrates that dramatic national security enhancement requires unilateral action, in defiance of regional and global powers.

For example, in 1948/9, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared independence, annexed west Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, initiated widespread construction in Jerusalem and refused to end the “occupation” of the Negev and absorb Arab refugees, in defiance of a U.S. military embargo, the threat of U.S. economic sanctions and significant domestic dovish opposition. Ben-Gurion’s steadfastness led Gen. Omar Bradley, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in 1952, to recommend reconsideration of Israel as a major ally in the Middle East.

In 1967, Eshkol reunited Jerusalem and launched construction projects in east Jerusalem, in the face of U.S., global and domestic opposition.

In 1977, Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s initiative to negotiate directly with Egypt, circumvented President Jimmy Carter’s initiative to convene an international conference, which intended to focus on the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem.

In 1981, Begin concluded that the cost of a nuclear Iraq would dwarf the cost of pre-empting Iraq. He realized that diplomacy would not stop Iraq’s nuclearization, and that most Arab/Muslim countries considered a nuclear Iraq to be a lethal threat. Therefore, he pre-empted, destroying Iraq’s nuclear reactor, in spite of the U.S. threat of a military embargo and a nasty diplomatic U.S. reproach, worldwide condemnation and vocal domestic opposition, especially in national security circles.

Begin’s daring unilateral initiative in 1981 averted regional chaos, sparing the U.S. a nuclear confrontation in 1991, which would have devastated vital U.S. human, economic and military concerns.

In 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu is aware that sanctions against Iran are inherently ineffective due to noncompliance by Russia, China, India, Japan and some European countries. He recognizes that sanctions provide Iran with extra-time to develop/acquire nuclear capabilities. He knows that sanctions did not prevent Pakistan’s and North Korea’s nuclearization. He has concluded that Iran’s time-to-develop/acquire is unpredictable and uncontrollable. He realizes that a nuclear Iran would doom the pro-U.S. Gulf regimes; would traumatize the supply and price of oil; would accelerate nuclear proliferation; would provide a tailwind to Islamic terrorism and scores of sleeper cells in the U.S.; and would entrench Iran’s military foothold in America’s backyard — Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico. He understands that a military pre-emption — with no boots on the ground — is a prerequisite for regime change in Iran. Just like Begin, Netanyahu is convinced that the cost of a nuclear Iran would dwarf the personal, diplomatic, political, economic and military cost of pre-empting Iran.

Just like the aforementioned prime ministers, Netanyahu is cognizant of the cardinal Jewish proverb: “If I am not for myself, who will be for me? If not now, when? (Ethics of the Fathers 1:14).”

Will America act against Iran?

August 17, 2012

Israel Hayom | Will America act against Iran?.

Dore Gold

In the internal debate in Israel over the subject of Iran, it is generally assumed by many that at the end of the day the U.S. will destroy the nuclear infrastructure of Iran when it becomes clear that sanctions and negotiations have failed. But is that a reliable assumption? True, President Barack Obama made clear last March during his address at AIPAC that he would use “all elements of American power to pressure Iran and prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon.” However, with the exception of the 2003 Iraq War, which was launched in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the historical precedents indicate that the U.S. has not used military force in the past to stop rogue states from developing nuclear weapons.

Writing in Haaretz on August 8, Israel’s former ambassador to the U.S., Salai Meridor, warns that it cannot be assumed that Washington will act in the Iranian case as well. He correctly noted that in the past, the U.S. in fact condemned the 1981 attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and it refused to take military action against the Syrian nuclear program. He doesn’t completely rule out the possibility that the U.S. will act, but he points out that it is not at all certain, for when past administrations were faced with making a decision and the moment of truth was reached, they chose to accept the nuclearization of rogue states over starting a war.

The case of North Korea stands out as an instance in which the U.S. would not take action against a dangerous rogue state that was developing a nuclear weapons capability. In March 1994, North Korea blocked inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from inspecting its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. By June, it appeared that the North Koreans were about to take the spent fuel rods from the reactor and extract enough weapons-grade plutonium for five or six bombs.

The U.N. imposed economic sanctions on North Korea. President Clinton wrote in his memoirs that he was determined to stop North Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal, “even at the risk of war.” The Pentagon planned to destroy the Yongbyon reactor, but ultimately pulled back from its threats. Just like today, high-level U.S. officials said that all options are on the table — but that was as far as they went. Negotiations were launched with North Korea that led to the signing of the “Agreed Framework,” which the North Koreans violated within a few years. It would become clear that Washington had not pushed hard enough.

The weakness of the “Agreed Framework” was revealed in December 2002, when North Korea removed the IAEA seals from the containers with the spent fuel rods and began to produce plutonium from them. In the months that followed, the Bush administration took no firm action. North Korea then expelled the IAEA inspectors and announced early 2003 it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Four years later on Oct. 8, 2006, the North Koreans conducted their first underground test of an atomic bomb.

As a result, the U.N. Security Council adopted a tough resolution on North Korea , but the U.S. did not take any measures to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure. Six-party negotiations began leading to another agreement in 2007 that was similar to the “Agreed Framework” of 1994. For its part, North Korea was clearly unimpressed with the Western reaction to its atomic test. Thus it conducted a second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, when President Obama was already in office.

Why has the U.S. not taken more forceful action against rogue states crossing the nuclear threshold? First, there is the issue of intelligence. Even a superpower like the U.S., may not have a sufficiently clear intelligence picture that would allow it to detect that a state like North Korea, which is isolated from the world, is about to conduct a nuclear test. This is also a problem for the American intelligence agencies in a country like Iran.

Indeed, just two years ago, Robert M. Gates, who was then the defense secretary, was quoted saying about the Iranians: “If their policy is to go to the threshold but not to assemble a nuclear weapon, how do you tell that they have not assembled? I don’t actually know how you would verify that.” Gates comments were important. He was a former head of the CIA and has a keen understanding of the real limits of intelligence.

The problem that Gates describes explains why it is hard to move against states developing nuclear weapons if you don’t know they are actually taking the last steps towards a bomb. In his memoirs, former Vice President Dick Cheney adds that since the Iraq War, the U.S. intelligence community is afraid of repeating the same error of relying on false intelligence, thereby affecting its decision-making even when it has “solid” information, as was the case with Syria.

According to President Bush’s account, while CIA Director Mike Hayden said that he had “high confidence” that the Syrians were building a nuclear reactor, since he could not find the facility for the weaponization of the plutonium that the reactor generated, he only had “low confidence” that the Syrians had a nuclear weapons program. Bush concluded that the U.S. could not operate against the Syrians with such a murky intelligence picture. According to foreign sources, Israel had to strike instead.

Thus, U.S. decision-makers understandably demand a level of certainty that intelligence agencies cannot always supply. Before acting, Obama will want to know how definite the information is that Iran has enriched uranium to weapons grade, has assembled a nuclear warhead, and is mounting it on a Shahab-3 missile.

A second limitation influencing the U.S. is the United Nations Security Council and the American dependence on multilateral approval. President Obama justified American military involvement in Libya to Congress by repeatedly saying that he had U.N. authorization. Following administration policy, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 7, that in the case of Syria, before the U.S. could get militarily involved, “our goal would be to seek international permission.” Since that time the Russian and Chinese have proven that they are willing to block a consensus in the Security Council over a resolution calling for stopping the bloodshed in the Syrian uprising.

Given this international environment, the chances the U.S. would receive United Nations authorization to take action against Iran’s nuclear program are virtually nil. The U.S. would have to act outside of the U.N., which it has done in a number of notable cases, like Kosovo, under President Clinton. In the case of the Obama administration that would require a sharp break in past policy.

Finally, it must be remembered that the U.S. is a superpower with global commitments. That means it has conflicting priorities, which constrain its ability to take on missions against rogue states that are in the last phase of assembling nuclear weapons. The Bush administration was focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, which undoubtedly affected its approach to North Korea — and later Syria. Perhaps, in the near future, the Obama administration will be involved in supporting an international intervention against the Assad regime in Syria, and will not be focused on the Iranian issue.

Then there is the issue of America’s forward-deployed forces around the world. During the Clinton administration it was understood that a strike on North Korea could lead to a retaliatory attack against U.S. ground forces along the Demilitarized Zone protecting South Korea. In the debate over whether the U.S. should take out Syria’s nuclear reactor, the risks of Syrian retaliation against U.S. forces in Iraq was raised. Thus while the U.S. unquestionably has the military power to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the world’s most dangerous states, or organizations, repeatedly successive administrations have been reluctant to use their vast military capabilities for that purpose because of the international circumstances they have faced.

Hezbollah chief : We can change the face of Israel

August 17, 2012

Hezbollah chief : We can change the face of Israel | Ya Libnan | World News Live from Lebanon.

The leader of the Lebanese Shiite militant Hezbollah says his group will transform the lives of millions of Israelis to “hell” if Israel attacks Lebanon.

“We have been noticing an escalation of threats by Israel about destroying Lebanon. We do not deny that Israel has the power to do so … I’m not saying I can destroy Israel but I can say that Hezbollah has the ability to turn the lives of millions of Zionists in occupied Palestine into a real hell,” Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah said.

“We can change the face of Israel.”

Nasrallah says the group has a list of Israeli targets that it can hit with few rockets.

The threat came as Israel debated whether to attack Iranian nuclear facilities. That could trigger retaliation from Iran’s allies, like Hezbollah.

Nasrallah said Iran’s response to any Israeli attack would be “lightning” and huge.

Nasrallah spoke in a televised speech marking Jerusalem Day on Friday.

Israel and Hezbollah fought a deadly, inconclusive monthlong war in 2006, when Hezbollah fired about 4,000 rockets

AP

‘Iranians planned to assassinate Israeli ambassador’

August 17, 2012

‘Iranians planned to assassinate Israeli ambassador’ – Israel News, Ynetnews.

As Danny Ayalon seeks African nations’ support for Iran stance, Kenya’s intelligence services reveal they prevented plan to assassinate Israel’s Ambassador in Kenya

Itamar Eichner

Published: 08.17.12, 15:04 / Israel News

Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon on Thursday praised the Kenyan goverment for its efforts to stop Iranian terror threats against Israeli and Jewish targets. .

Ayalon who is currently visiting Kenya as part of a round of visits in three African countries – Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya, praised the local authorities after they arrested the two Iranians in June when the suspects led Kenyan security forces to 15 kilograms (33 pounds) of RDX, a powerful explosive, in the coastal city of Mombasa where several hotels are owned by Israelis.

It has now been revealed that the targets included Israel’s Ambassador to Kenya, Gil Haskel.

One official said the Iranians are members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force, an elite and secretive unit.

During Ayalon’s visit, all three countries expressed concern regarding Iran’s attempts to increase its terror activity in Africa.

Ayalon is also using the visits to conduct a diplomatic battle against Iran, and is trying to convince the African leaders not to take part in the conference of Non Aligned Nations at the end of the month in Teheran.

Avi Granot, deputy director of the African section in the Foreign Ministry, said that the Israeli request to send a delegation of lower ranking representatives was being mulled.

A week before Ayalon arrived in Africa Iranian Vice President Hamid Bakai visited the continent for a round of visits and handed each leader a personal invitation to the conference.

Security and Defense: Delaying Iran’s nuke program

August 17, 2012

Security and Defense: Delayi… JPost – Features – Week in review.

08/16/2012 21:51
The disagreement between the US and Israel on striking Iran seems to be about trust and timing.

uranium-processing site in Isfahan

Photo: Reuters

There are those who call it a “strike,” while others refer to it as an “operation.” What exactly it will entail no one really knows, although most assessments stress that there will be surprises – and lots of them.

Either way, when Israel decides to launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities it will be looking to inflict as much damage as possible with the aim of preventing Tehran from rebuilding its nuclear program for years to come.

The question is, how far can Israel set back Teheran’s nuclear program? While the media have played up reported disagreement between the IDF and the government over the effectiveness of a strike, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey made made his position clear on Tuesday when telling reporters that Israel cannot “destroy” Iran’s nuclear program but can, at best, “delay” it.

The disagreement between Israel and the US seems to be about trust and timing and, more specifically, about whether Israel should attack Iran now or wait and give US President Barack Obama time to do the job on his own.

While both Israel and the US agree that Iran is not yet building a nuclear weapon, Jerusalem argues that if it waits too long it might miss the point when assembly begins and will no longer be able to attack. The US dismisses the argument and believes that it has a strong handle on what is happening in Iran and that missing the point is not an option. Unfortunately, due to North Korea, history is not on America’s side.

The conclusion that a strike can be effective is based on the answer to four key questions: Does Israel knows the location of all of Iran’s nuclear facilities? Can Israel reach all of them with either air force jets or surface-to-surface missiles? Can Israel overcome Iranian air defense systems? And can Israel penetrate some of the hardened/underground facilities?

The potential targets might vary, but the main targets appear to be Natanz and Fordo, the two uranium enrichment facilities – both buried underground.

In addition, Israel would likely want to destroy Parchin, a military base near Tehran where Israel and the US claim Iran has been working to develop a nuclear warhead, as well as Esfahan, the main uranium conversion plant that feeds Natanz. Another target would likely be Arak – a heavy water facility that could one day refine plutonium (although it is still a couple years away from becoming operational).

Iran has additional facilities that are less known, where, for example, the weapons group – a team of scientists tasked with assembling a warhead – work. These could also be targets even though some of them are located in population centers.

But these are only the facilities affiliated with the nuclear program.

Military planners would also likely want to try to destroy Iran’s long-range missiles and associated launchers to prevent, or at least minimize, the regime’s ability to retaliate. The same would apply to the Iranian air force and a strike against Iran’s oil plants may also be considered as a means of preventing the regime from financing the rehabilitation of its program.

Getting to Iran, though, will not be simple. When former IDF chief of staff Lt.-Gen. (res.) Dan Halutz was once asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran, he responded: “Two thousand kilometers”, roughly the distance it would take to reach Iran’s nuclear facilities.

IAF fighter jets could take three possible realistic routes from Israel to Iran: The first route – to the north – skirts along the Turkish- Syrian border into Iran. This route entails several risks and needs to take into account Syrian air defenses and Turkish opposition to violating its airspace.

Unlike in 2007, when Israel flew through Turkish airspace to bomb Syria’s nuclear reactor, Jerusalem and Ankara no longer have close ties that would enable the toleration of such a violation once again. On the other hand, it would be hard to see Turkey – a member of NATO – intercepting Israeli aircraft even if they flew over unannounced.

In addition, the threat of Syrian air defense systems might not be as serious today, as President Bashar Assad appears to be preoccupied with trying to hold onto his power. In 2007, Israel also reportedly used impressive electronic warfare technology to hack into Syria’s network and blind its radar systems, something it could potentially try to do again.

The central route would take IAF jets directly over Jordan and Iraq. While this is the most direct route, it would require overcoming serious diplomatic obstacles and potentially undermine Israel’s peace with Jordan, which could then face the brunt of an Iranian reprisal.

The last route would be from the south, and would take the aircraft over Saudi Arabia and into Iran. While this path is significantly longer than the one over Jordan and Iraq, Israel, according to a number of media reports, has discussed this possibility – including landing in the Saudi desert to refuel – with the Saudi kingdom. One report claimed a number of years ago that Saudi Arabia had even conducted tests on its air defense systems to ensure that they would not engage IAF fighter jets in case such a strike takes place.

A recent report in one Israeli newspaper, claiming that the Saudis have threatened to shoot down IAF aircraft, could be looked at in two ways. If it is genuine, then, despite the Saudis’ obvious strife with Iran, they will try to intercept IAF aircraft.

Alternatively, the report might be an intentional leak aimed at setting up the Saudis’ excuse for the day after Israel flies over their country. This way they will be able to say to the Iranians, “We tried to stop them and even threatened, but we didn’t succeed.”

Unlike the US Air Force, the IAF does not have specially designated bombers or interceptors; instead, each of its F-15s and F-16s are expected to fill both roles as needed.

For that reason, an Israeli strike package would likely include a significant portion of the IAF’s combat fleet, led by the advanced F-15I and F-16I and complimented by an assortment of F-16 C/Ds and F-15A/B.

The IAF has spent recent years qualifying its older combat aircraft – the A/B and C/D models – for long-range missions like those to Iran as well as with carrying specialized standoff munitions, like Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).

In addition to the combat aircraft, the IAF would also likely use its small but advanced fleet of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), based on Gulfstream G550 business jets. The aircraft can create an aerial image without relying on land-based radar systems and would help the IAF detect enemy aircraft as well as missile fire.

Hercules C-130 transport aircraft might also play a role in ferrying special forces – if needed to infiltrate and destroy some of the underground facilities and conduct poststrike assessments – as well as in deploying search-and-rescue teams nearby to be able to rescue pilots shot down over Iran.

The IDF has been working over the years to establish airborne hospitals inside a Hercules. One of those might come in handy, depending on estimates regarding wounded and casualties.

But now the question is whether Israel can penetrate the Iranian facilities. In recent years, the IAF has bolstered its arsenal of bunker-busters, some even supplied by the Obama administration. The GBU-27 and GBU-28 bunker buster bombs can carry anywhere from 1,000 to 3,000 pounds of explosives and are believed to be capable of penetrating the main uranium enrichment hall at Natanz.

But even if the bombs on their own cannot penetrate the facilities, former IAF commander Maj.-Gen. (res.) Eitan Ben-Eliyahu explained in an interview a number of years ago that pilots could “guide other bombs directly to the hole created by the previous ones and eventually destroy any target” In addition, and in contrast to the 1981 bombing of the Osirak reactor in Iraq, nowadays pilots do not need to fly directly over their targets before dropping their bombs and can instead use standoff weapons like JDAMs, which are guided by GPS, or other laser-guided munitions.

Due to the complexity of such an operation though, it might be worth to expect some surprises.

Firstly, Israel could, according to foreign sources, potentially use the Jericho two-stage ballistic missile, whose range is reportedly thousands of kilometers, encompassing all of Iran with a high-degree of accuracy.

Israel does not publicly admit to possessing the missile, but the Shavit – a launcher developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and used to put Israeli satellites in space – is reported to be a copy of the Jericho. According to various reports, the Jericho, also believed to be capable of carrying nuclear warheads, is stored inside an IAF base near Beit Shemesh.

The advantage in attacking Iranian facilities with surface-to-surface missiles is twofold: On the one hand, pilots are not in danger of being shot down, killed or captured.

In addition, there is no immediate proof that Israel is behind the strike since there won’t be any F-15s with Stars of David spotted flying over Iran.

The same thinking can be applied to IAF drones, some of which are reportedly capable of carrying missiles. In both cases though, the penetration capabilities of missiles carried by drones as well as the capabilities of the Jericho are unknown and might be limited, meaning that they might only be effective against targets located above surface.

While most assessments are confident in Israel’s ability to cause the required damage to delay Iran’s nuclear program, most also agree that its success borders on the extent of the IDF’s capabilities and possibly just beyond.

For that reason, when Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu refers to the bombing of Osirak in 1981 – as he has done numerous times in recent weeks – it is not only a reference to the courage he sees in Menachem Begin’s decision to attack but also in the IAF’s ability to do things that appear to be impossible.

In 1981, the IAF F-16s returned from bombing Osirak on the fumes from their empty gas tanks. This time, most officers will be thinking about the day after the strike and the war that is expected to come.

But another question on Israel’s mind will be the price it will pay in the US if it goes ahead with unilateral and uncoordinated military action.

In 1981, after Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak reactor, the Reagan administration decided to delay the delivery of a batch of F-16 fighter jets to Israel.

How the Obama administration would react to uncoordinated and unilateral Israeli military action against Iran is unclear, although Israel is once again waiting for the delivery of advanced combat aircraft.

This time it is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a fifth-generation stealth fighter jet that the IAF looks forward to receiving in the coming years and which will help Israel retain its qualitative military edge in the region.

Delaying aircraft, though, is just one punitive measure that the US can potentially take against Israel in the aftermath of such an attack.

Other steps could include a general downgrade in Israeli-American intelligence cooperation, defense ties and even support for missile defense systems.

Just a few weeks ago, Obama signed a new bill to enhance Israeli-US security ties, which included an additional $70 million toward the Iron Dome counter rocket defense program.

These funds are critical for Israel, especially now, in the face of an economic downturn.

Israel has yet to decide what it will do, but Jerusalem has made one point extremely clear in recent weeks: time is running out.

Backstabbing Democracy: A Nuclear Iran and the Israeli Media

August 17, 2012

Backstabbing Democracy: A Nuclear Iran and the Israeli Media | Jewish & Israel News Algemeiner.com.

( The central thrust of this article is accurate.  I simply don’t think many pay much attention to the lefty press here.  It’s OUR lives at stake here.  Who would you trust?  _ JW )

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

August in Israel is usually full of hot air, and this one is no exception. The country is sweating under the relentless summer sun, and whatever your occupation and the higher calling in your life, if you’re an Israeli with children, your main agenda is quite simple – keep your kids from destroying the universe during this last month of school vacation, after all the camps have ended.

For the local journalists, August is the “cucumber season”, when the real news is slow and the inherent silliness of the Israeli press (caused by the poor level of recruitment and professionalism) runs wild. In recent years, though, instead of reporting on items like “Chechen fighters establish a colony in Southern township”, the summer tea-time of the collective brain of the Israeli press took a decisive turn to the political.

Last year, it was the “popular uprising” of the well-to-do Israelis of the Centrist-Left persuasion that fascinated the media in the way a kitten is fascinated by a ball of yarn. From the moment the first tent appeared on Rothschild boulevard in Tel-Aviv, the Israeli “watchdogs of democracy” abdicated their responsibility to report and to analyze, much less criticize, and became what Vladimir Lenin called a “collective propagandist, agitator and organizer of the masses”. In the following days and weeks, it became painfully obvious that the socio-economic composition of the protesting crowd matched almost completely the audience of two commercial TV channels who competed between themselves for the privilege of being the most radical and most shrill with the most dramatic shots and the most inflated numbers.

Those outside of Israel who took their cue from the local press and became obsessed with “Tahrir in Tel Aviv” could remind themselves that, far from being real bonfires of the Israeli tribe, both channels, 2 and especially 10 are so incapable of setting a unifying agenda for their potential viewers that they constantly bleed money and balance on a brink of financial extinction. When they embraced the protests of 2011, it was not a great alliance but a kiss of death. Large swaths of the public, suspicious of the journalists and their not-really-hidden real motive – to bring down the Netanyahu government – stayed away from the action. Then September came, and the silly season was over.

This year, despite the attempts to revive the protests in a more extreme and violent form, the Israeli press abstained. Maybe it was preoccupied with its own self-inflicted problems – instead of increased prestige and ratings, the only tangible result of the public outcry against Big Business was the sharp decrease of advertising revenue from Big Business, which brought most of the printed media close to insolvency and brought about massive layoffs. Or maybe it was just disappointed – after all, the demonstrations, however successful in reshaping the Israeli political agenda and bringing forward issues that lay dormant – taxes, prices, housing and social services – haven’t managed to unseat the hated government of the Right, so why bother?

The only aspect of the renewed protest that got media attention, in a morbid and wildly irresponsible way, was the suicide of one of the demonstrators who blamed the government for his business failings. In the following days, the media’s insistence in turning him into some kind of a tragic hero and to transform his personal misfortune into a national tragedy (I am quoting actual headlines here), caused a dozen new attempts by copycat wannabe self-immolators, before saner heads and the deep-seated Jewish aversion to suicide prevailed.

I am bringing this up because without understanding the modus operandi of the rancid mess that is the mainstream Israeli media, it is impossible to plumb the depths of insanity to which it sank in the recent weeks of August 2012. Lead by a member of the Board of Trustees of George Soros’ International Crisis Group (which is, of course, firmly opposed to any kind of military action against Iran), “Yedioth Ahronoth” columnist Nahum Barnea, the press is both whipping up hysteria about an “imminent” Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear installations – AND blaming Netanyahu and the Defense Minister Ehud Barak for their “irresponsible blather”! At the same newspaper, on the same page, you can read an editorial demanding “a widest possible discussion” on the merits of the attack and its’ consequences AND the ruminations of the chief editorial columnist about how in the past, “the responsible leaders ordered such attacks first and only then talked about it”.

Day in and day out, Israelis are bombarded by gossip in the guise of reporting. Today we’re being told that the decision has been made, tomorrow – that it will wait until September when Netanyahu might meet with Obama at the UN. Mysterious “sources” report that the security establishment is against the attack – a day later you’ll learn from the same “sources” that the generals – naturally – prefer an American-led operation. The febrile atmosphere caused the usual Left-wing nuts to erupt – while the increasingly unhinged Yoram Kaniuk called on the “true Beitarim” to rise on Netanyahu and “stop” him, the assorted “progressives” started a Web petition calling on the Israeli pilots to refuse an order to bomb Iran. One of those, law school professor Menahem Mautner, cheerfully proclaimed in a radio interview that a huge difference exists between the Left and the Right with regard to the (blatantly illegal) refusal to obey lawful military orders given by an elected government. Turns out, that the Right refuses, because it wishes to turn Israel into a racist theocracy, and therefore it must be crushed, while the Left wants to preserve Israeli democracy and therefore its refusal is legitimate and must be respected.

There’s of course nothing “democratic” in the idea that in a crisis, an opinion of the military bureaucrats and “intelligence professionals” must prevail over this of the civilian leaders elected by a clear majority of the people. This, in fact, is what the Israeli hard Left has been dreaming about all along – since it can no longer persuade the people to follow its suicidal course, it must utilize tools outside of representative democracy to make the will of the people irrelevant. This anti-democratic mood is fully shared by the ideological elder twins of the Israeli “liberals” in America – that’s why the “progressive” Peter Beinart’s Open Zion is willing to entertain the possibility of a military coup “to save Israel from itself”.

It is also worth noting, without getting into the debate about the merits and dangers of a preventive strike against Iran, that the Israeli “security professionals” were wrong in the past, sometimes – disastrously wrong. From the fateful mistakes that led to the appalling loss of life in the Yom Kippur War to the failure to predict and prepare for the fall of secular dictatorships throughout the Middle East, the Israeli generals and spooks erred time and again, sometimes on the side of war, sometimes on the side of peace. In the last two decades they gave their support to policies of withdrawal and appeasement that failed spectacularly – in Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza – and failed to prepare the armed forces for the inevitable reckoning. Hundreds of Israeli civilians lost their lives, thousands were wounded and traumatized, billions of shekels were lost, because the generals made mistakes for which they weren’t held accountable. Up until Syria exploded, the same generals, united under the Leftist umbrella organization with the deceptive name “Counsel for Peace and Security”, promoted the idea of giving up the Golan Heights “for peace”.

Whatever the outcome of the internal Israeli debate on the pros and contras of the attack on Iran, it must not be hijacked by the anti-democratic Leftist elite, sub-par journalists with ulterior motives and the manipulative security establishment. Israel has suffered enough from insufficient civilian control over its military. Instead of proclaiming generals’ infallibility and giving uncritical support to their anonymous insinuations, the responsible press should have called them to order and demanded to lay their opinions where they belong – at the table of the civilian decision-makers – instead of spreading confusion and panic at the civilian rear.

Vilnai: Israel is more ready than ever for war

August 17, 2012

Vilnai: Israel is more ready… JPost – Features – Week in review.

 

 

LAST UPDATED: 08/17/2012 16:25
In interview with ‘The Jerusalem Post’ outgoing home front defense minister says Israel will only go to war with Iran “if the sword was clearly at our throats”; claims home front prepared for possible multi-front attack.

MATAN VILNA’I Photo: Ariel Jerozolimski

Outgoing home front defense minister Matan Vilna’i nearly gave people who care about Israel around the world a heart attack this week, even though he really intended to ease their fears.

Vilna’i gave a parting interview to Ma’ariv’s veteran Knesset correspondent, Arik Bender, headlined “Vilna’i: There is no reason for hysteria, the home front is ready.” Just as he did in other interviews, he downplayed threats and boasted about the work he had done to prepare Israel for any eventuality.

But the Reuters news agency took a quote from Vilna’i out of context and headlined its reports, which were published around the world, “Israeli minister: Possible war with Iran could be month-long affair with 500 dead.”

Coming from the ultimate expert on Israel’s readiness for war, who happens to be moving 7,130 kilometers away next Wednesday to Beijing, it is no wonder such a headline set off alarm bells. But those familiar with Vilna’i know he did not intend to scare anyone.

Vilnai’s deep voice and calm demeanor could act as a sedative for even the most stressed. He is not running away from Israel to China.

He accepted a plum posting as ambassador to Beijing that will cap off 50 years of public service in which he rose through the army’s ranks to deputy chief of staff and then toiled for 13 years in politics.

For the past five years, he has been in charge of the home front, first as deputy defense minister and then as a minister.

And for the record, a month-long war with 500 dead is the worst-case scenario that Israel is preparing for – it’s not something expected. Whether you are a worry-wart or happy-go-lucky, the fact that such preparations are being made is undoubtedly a good thing.

Vilna’i had something to say to both worriers and warmongers in an interview this week with The Jerusalem Post:
Matan Vilna’i, should we be worrying?

Whenever there is a possibility of war, you have to worry. And everyone who lives in Israel needs to know that at any point there can be a war. The right thing to do is to make sure we are doing everything possible to avoid war until there is no choice. That is correct whether the war is on the home front or in enemy territory. We would only go to war if the sword was clearly at our throats.

Are we prepared to endure attacks on multiple fronts?

Over the past three years, Israel has prepared in a way we never have before. There is no reason to enter hysteria. We can feel very good about what we have done. It won’t be like the Second Lebanon War in 2006, when we were not ready.

What did you mean when you talked about 500 dead in a month-long war?

That people who spoke about thousands were exaggerating. The numbers “500” and “one month” are the Defense Ministry’s assessment for the worst-case scenario that we need to prepare for based on the strength of the enemy. I agree with that assessment, so that is what we are getting ready for. But it could be more and it could be less. In the Gulf War, two Israelis were killed from direct hits of Scud missiles from Iraq while 28 marines in Saudi Arabia were killed from one missile. In the Second Lebanon War, 40 citizens were killed by 4,000 missiles. Now there are are 10 times as many missiles in Lebanon. There should not be panic as though there will be thousands of casualties.

Do you think Israel will attack Iran?

I won’t get into predictions. What I did was not necessarily connected to Iran. I had to get the country ready for earthquakes and for every eventuality. We prepare for the worst-case scenario. I don’t deal with scaring people.

What is the greatest challenge you are leaving for your successor, Avi Dichter?

I left him my outlook and my framework for getting the job done. There is work that will never be done. People have forgotten that at the beginning they said there was no need for a ministry. Now no one is saying that. The home front has changed dramatically.

What about reports that one-third of the population has no shelter of any kind?

Building shelters for the entire population is important, but it is a project of dozens of millions of shekels that I don’t think we should invest in. If people listen to our warning systems and get to the most protected place possible, that is what should be done. Educational commercials will start airing soon about choosing the best place to go in an emergency.

Can you understand why the public would think you are escaping a troubled ministry on the eve of a potential conflict?

The press may say we are on the eve of a conflict but I am not so sure. I built a whole system to deal with any scenario. I have been dealing with security for 50 years and now I have a right to go do something else. The prime minister and foreign minister asked me to go to China. I have learned a lot about China over the past few months, I am excited about the opportunity and I intend to do that job well.

Can you persuade China to cooperate with efforts to prevent the nuclearization of Iran through non-military means?

I will do everything I can. I don’t think I can persuade them. They have their considerations. I will do what I can to represent Israel’s interests.

What is your greatest accomplishment and your biggest regret?

I took the home front, an issue that politicians didn’t want to touch for 60 years. There were 20 years of un-implemented decisions, and I took care of it.

Warning for Dichter: Home Front Not Ready

August 17, 2012

Warning for Dichter: Home Front Not Ready – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

Former general warns response system lacks coordination, says lessons have not been learned.

By Maayana Miskin

First Publish: 8/17/2012, 11:56 AM

 

Children in bomb shelter (illustrative)

Children in bomb shelter (illustrative)
Flash 90

The Home Front is not prepared to respond to disasters, warns Brigadier-General (res.) Amatzia “Patzi” Chen. Different organizations tasked with first response still do not coordinate their actions, despite previous tragedies such as the Carmel fire disaster, he told Arutz Sheva.

“The lack of coordination between systems brought about all the problems that were revealed during Operation Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War,” he said.

Avi Dichter’s appointment is really the marking of the first person to be fired by the committee of inquiry that will be set up if the Home Front is attacked,” he warned. “So I suggest that Dichter check to see if all the systems that are supposed to work are working, and to see how to get them ready for a state of war.”

The United States set an example by learning from disasters in Vietnam, he said, and putting a top commander in charge of communications between forces – a move that helped the American army in Iraq. Israel should do the same, he said, “There should be coordination between all government offices and every branch of the IDF.”

Chen called for public discourse over Home Front preparedness. Currently, the topic “isn’t on the agenda,” he lamented.

Instead, he said, there is a public discourse on the possibility of an Israeli strike in Iran. He condemned those who openly called on pilots not to obey strike orders, calling them “an irresponsible gang motivated by personal interests” that is “undermining the foundations of democracy.”