WarSclerotic

The Commentator – Why crunch time is coming for Israel and Iran.

Those who claim Israel will take its biggest gamble since its independence in an operation that could at best gain time and at worst leave Israel as an isolated and weakened country, might be right after all

In recent months, expectations of a coming Israeli pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear installations have become increasingly hyped in the media and the public domain. There is now a well-established assumption among policymakers and analysts that Israel is considering this option and may indeed carry it out before long — an assumption that public utterances by Israeli leaders have reinforced.

Opposition to an attack notwithstanding, one can easily gauge a sense of impending doom in the words of Israel’s Prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his defence minister, Ehud Barak.

And one should take these words seriously — not just as boisterous rhetoric aimed at forcing others to take action, lest Israel attacks anyway. Israel, after all, is the only country in the world that has ever dared launch a pre-emptive strike against an adversary’s nuclear facilities. In fact, it has done so twice, first in Iraq and later in Syria. If one is to judge Israel by precedent, the words of its leaders should be taken neither as bluff nor as empty threats.

On the other hand, Israel’s pre-emptive strikes — Iraq 1981 and Syria 2007 — occurred early on, before the reactors were operational, against one single target, and with a much lower degree of operational hazard than an operation against Iran would entail. In Iran’s case, it might be just as sensible to assume that Israel may be too late.

The debate about a possible Israeli strike, naturally, intersects with a number of policy dilemmas that Israel must face: first, the discussion over Iran’s nuclear timeline, one which is at the very heart of Israel’s strategic dialogue with the United States; and second, the relationship between Israel and the US — especially at a time when the impression is that the Obama Administration and Jerusalem are on different pages on this crucial issue.

Might Israel risk its most important friend’s support when the chances of success are judged to be slim by most military analysts? Might it be too reckless even for an Israel facing an existential threat to jeopardise its most important strategic relationship during the season of US presidential elections, when a few weeks’ wait could spare the kind of fallout that Israel may come to regret?

On the other hand, missing the October window of opportunity for an attack is not just about postponing it for a few weeks — the first moonless night after US Presidential elections is in mid-November, and by then weather conditions above Iran’s skies may make an Israeli operation too risky to succeed until Spring 2013. By then, Iran might cross one of or both of Israel’s thresholds — either by entering what Barak called “a zone of immunity”, or by actually acquiring nuclear-weapons’ capability. Israel will be too late. It will have to rely on American benevolence to fix the problem — or find a way to live under the shadow of Iran’s nuclear capability.

For Israel, containment is not an option for two reasons that go beyond the possibility of Iran launching a first strike. The first is that the mortal threat posed by Iran will destroy the Zionist appeal for world Jewry and for the Israelis themselves. As Daniel Gordis, a senior vice-president at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, wrote in Commentary Magazine:

‘What must be understood is that the threat to Israel is not that Iran will one day use the bomb. No, Iran merely needs to possess the bomb to undermine the central purpose of Israel’s existence — and in so doing to reverse the dramatic change in the existential question of the Jews that 62 years of Jewish sovereignty has wrought.”

The second is that an emboldened nuclear Iran would wreak havoc on the current regional balance of power in a way that is inimical to Israel and that would, due to Iran’s nuclear arsenal, severely constrain Israel’s options. Emily Landau, from the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, recently discussed the prospect of nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Iran, noting that: “The problem is that a potential nuclear attack is not the major cause for concern with regard to Iran becoming a nuclear state.”

And, she continues:

“How does one contain Iran from consolidating its hegemonic hold over the Arab Gulf States due to their fear of their now much stronger neighbour? Does it even make sense to talk about containment in such a scenario? And how will the US contain Iran from having a seriously negative impact on Israel’s ability to defend itself in a war provoked by Hezbollah or Hamas, with the backing of Iran?”

It is not to be excluded then, elections or not, that the Israeli establishment may reach the conclusion that delaying that moment significantly, possibly at the price of a risky military operation, is a gamble worth taking. The impact a successful attack would have on the internal stability of the regime is actually not as clear as some assume it to be. But one can expect a number of dramatic pyrotechnics, alongside the perfunctory public condemnations by Arab states, Non Aligned Countries, most, if not all members of the European Union, and possibly even the United States.

First, Iran will most likely unleash its proxies against Israel – Hezbollah is the Iranian nuclear programme’s first line of defence after all. Secondly, Iran will launch terror attacks against Jewish targets overseas. Third, Iran may retaliate directly against Israel with its missile arsenal. Fourth, Iran may choose to attack US forces in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan or in the Gulf. Fifth, Iran may decide to punish those Arab countries that were seen to have turned a blind eye to Israel, by allowing Israeli fighter jets to cross their airspace en route to their deadly mission. And finally, Iran may seek to seal the Strait of Hormuz, artificially concocting a new oil crisis.

Whatever else may be said of the accuracy of predictions and of the assessments about the pros and cons of an Israeli attack then, this is perhaps one of the hardest dilemmas any Israeli Prime minister has faced since the decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria on the eve of the 1973 War.

And herein lies the crux of Israel’s domestic dilemma, in terms of deterrence, when it comes to Iran’s nuclear quest.

On the one hand, Israel feels compelled to knock on every nation’s door and alert them to the dangers of a nuclear Iran. It feels the need regularly to inform the world through public utterances that Israel views Iran as an existential threat. It must respond to the ugly Holocaust denial rhetoric coming out of a regime that seems intent on acquiring the tools to perpetrate the very same crime whose historical truth it seeks to deny.

Hence the comparisons with Nazi Germany and with 1938 — and the implicit suggestion that Israel is being put in the same position as Czechoslovakia but will do its utmost to avoid that fate.

This posture is not without disadvantages by the way, because the projection of an image of an erratic, unpredictable Israel that could do something “crazy” propels “saner” governments into action. It’s a bit like the great scene from Mel Brooks’ 1974 movie, Blazing Saddles, where the newly arrived black Sheriff — confronted with the town’s readiness to lynch him — points a gun to his own head and threatens the entire town with executing the hostage if they do not drop their guns, and gets away with it.

For Israel, the occasional muscle flexing and seemingly erratic behaviour serves the purpose of telling the international community that, to avoid an Israeli pre-emptive strike, they must hold Israel back — and the only way to do so is to increase non-military pressure on Iran.

Israel has other purposes as well. It is the homeland of the Jewish people, and it is still animated by the aspiration to promote strong Jewish immigration, Aliyah, to Israel.

That Iran could seriously wipe Israel off the map is not exactly the greatest selling point to prospective immigrants, especially from the Western world. Israel needs to project a completely different image to them — it must convey a sense of safety and security and a promise that though the threat may be existential, Israel’s resourcefulness will keep it in check — which is one reason why threatening military action cannot be done indefinitely without eventually acting upon the threat. Again, do not take Israel’s statements as banter.

Israel is also an economy that relies on the export of sophisticated manufactured products and significant foreign investment. If Israel conveys the sense that the country faces an impending doomsday scenario, Microsoft, Intel and other giants that are investing heavily in Israel’s high tech miracle might be turned off.

Similar considerations apply to Israel’s educated elites and its growing and increasingly mobile upper-middle class. Israelis could leave the country in droves if jobs, passports or visas are available and sufficient financial resources allow them to do so. As Ehud Barak told Jeffrey Goldberg in September 2010: “The real threat to Zionism is the dilution of quality… Jews know that they can land on their feet in any corner of the world. The real test for us is to make Israel such an attractive place, such a cutting-edge place in human society, education, culture, science, quality of life, that even American Jewish young people would want to come here!”

So, quite apart from having to confront a serious strategic threat that will alter the balance of regional power for decades to come, Israel must seek to reassure its own friends and citizens that despite the threat, Israel has the means to contain and counter it in ways that will not diminish the quality of life and the opportunities Israel has to offer. It is not an easy proposition, but it is one that Israeli policymakers need to grapple with in the coming weeks.

Short of a decision to strike Iran militarily, Israel will have to think of creative ways to ensure that it defends itself against the risks of nuclear escalation, that it maintains old and seeks new friendships to isolate and weaken Iran, that it gains assurances and guarantees from allies about a joint, combined set of defence measures from which Israel can benefit and is still able to project enough power to deter any enemy from assuming that, under the shadow of Iran’s nuclear umbrella, they can now act with a higher level of impunity against Israel than ever before.

All of this, of course, may eventually turn out to be irrelevant — Iran’s regime may implode, President Obama may attack. There are compelling reasons to see both options as having entered, in recent months, into the realm of the credible.

But Israel cannot afford to build its policy and its backup plan on these two assumptions — and besides, neither is realistically going to happen until November. Which is why it is reasonable to assume that crunch time is coming, and those who claim Israel will take its biggest gamble since its independence in an operation that could at best gain time and at worst leave Israel as an isolated and weakened country, might be right after all.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington

US: Ban, Morsy should not attend… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Will we really know? – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Op-ed: US, Israel may wake up to nuclear Iran if they continue to rely solely on intelligence

Ronen Bergman

“If and when Iran decides to advance to the next stage and produce nuclear weapons, the US and Israel will know about it and share this information,” a senior American official said in an effort to allay concerns stemming from reports of differences of opinion between the sides, which may lead to an Israeli surprise attack in Iran.

But the most worrying aspect of this whole debate is the confidence both sides have in the quality of the intelligence information they have obtained. This is critical, because intelligence information indicating that the Iranians have begun to assemble the bomb would result in an immediate attack on its nuclear facilities.

Jerusalem and Washington agree that Iranian scientists have apparently assured Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that they would be able to build the first nuclear weapons production facility as soon as they are given the order to do so. Intelligence sources in Israel and the US claim they will “know when this happens,” but disagree on the response to such a development and on whether a preemptive military strike is necessary.

There is no doubt that the extensive efforts by US and Israeli intelligence agencies over the past decade have significantly increased the amount of intelligence information coming in from Iran. The discovery of facilities the Iranians were trying to conceal, alongside the planting of computer viruses and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists – all acts that were attributed to American and Israeli intelligence agencies – provide further proof of their efficiency. On the other hand, in light of past mistakes, one would expect the intelligence sources and leaders who rely on this information to be a little more modest.

For example, a senior source in Syriawho worked for Israel from the 1970s through the 1990s warned on two separate occasions that Damascus was about to attack. These warnings almost resulted in a preventive Israeli strike – which was eventually avoided due to Washington’s intervention. The information was found to be false.

Israel and the US also believed they had good intelligence on Iraq during the 1980s, but they completely missed Saddam Hussein‘s weapons of mass destruction program, which almost reached the point where Iraq was capable of producing nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, in 2003 the US relied on intelligence information indicating that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, although it wasn’t.

What all these examples have in common is exaggerated enthusiasm and complete dependence on a limited number of sources, who are supposedly reliable. But this dependence may result in another blunder of historic proportions. What would happen, for instance, if Khamenei informs the nuclear scientists of his decision through new channels that are not exposed to the CIA or Mossad? And what would happen if the Iranians assemble a bomb at a facility that has yet to be discovered? The US and Israel, who are certain in the quality of their intelligence, may wake up too late and find out that Iran has already produced a nuclear bomb and there nothing they can do about it – at least not militarily.

Moreover, opposition elements may provide information that will lead Israel to attack Iran prematurely, before the diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program, including harsh economic sanctions, are exhausted. Without reliable intelligence information, Israel may be under the impression that it is attacking all of Iran’s nuclear plants, when in reality it would only be attacking some of them. The Middle East would pay a heavy price for such a blunder.

What to Do Now About Iran | FrontPage Magazine.

Posted by Louis René Beres and John T. Chain Bio ↓ on Aug 21st, 2012 Comments ↓

“Do you know what it means to find yourselves face to face with a madman?” asks playwright Luigi Pirandello’s Henry IV. “Madmen, luck folk, construct without logic, or rather with a logic that flies like a feather.”

What is true for individuals can also be true for entire countries. In the always bewildering theatre of modern world politics, a drama so unpredictable that it often bristles with absurdity, calculated decisions based on ordinary logic can quickly crumble before madness. Even more ominously, any country’s particular misfortunes could reach the outer limits of tolerability if enemy madness and nuclear weapons should somehow come together.

Enter (stage left and stage right) Israel and Iran. For the moment, there is no discernible evidence to suggest that the leadership in Tehran is mad or “crazy.” At the same time, irrationality is not the same as madness, and these Iranian leaders might nonetheless fulfill the usual criteria of a non-rational state. In such circumstances, Iran’s decision-makers could choose to value certain preferences more highly than national survival, but their hierarchy or rank-order of preferences could still be both determinable and consistent.

Even if there should be no Israeli or American preemption at the eleventh hour, Israeli security would not inevitably be lost. True, an irrational Iran might not be responsive to ordinary threats of retaliatory destruction, as would a fully rational enemy state, but it could still remain susceptible to certain other pertinent threats. For Israel, therefore, this means a primary and prompt obligation to (1) identify such alternative threats, and (2) fashion them into an appropriate new policy framework of viable deterrence.

In principle, by choosing to forgo anticipatory self-defense against Iran, the legal equivalent of a permissible first-strike, Israel would have to live with protracted uncertainty. Here, after all, “coexistence” with Iran could mean living under a literally unending threat of Iranian nuclear attack. With precisely this devastating prospect in mind, Israel has already been expanding and upgrading its complex network of interrelated active defenses.

Improved Israeli interceptors contain new software to deal effectively with Iran’s Shahab and Sajil missiles. There are related technologies to handle Iran’s Conqueror rocket.

The foundation of Israel’s active defense plan for Iran remains the Arrow anti-ballistic missile program. Iron Dome, a reinforcing system, is intended primarily for intercepting shorter-range rocket attacks. David’s Sling, in still earlier stages of development, is designed for use against medium-range rockets and cruise missiles.

Judging from the most recent tests, everything appears technically sound and promising.

A nagging problem could still lie in accepting too many optimistic assumptions about active defense. Nosystem of ballistic missile defense (BMD) can ever be presumed reliable enough to preclude a fully complementary strategy of deterrence. Always, with BMD, there may be unacceptable levels of “leakage,” obviously an especially risky outcome if the incoming warheads should be biological or nuclear.

Now, Israel must move, visibly and verifiably, to strengthen its ambiguous nuclear deterrent. To be dissuaded from launching an attack, any rational adversary, and possibly an irrational one, would first need to calculate that Israel’s second-strike forces were sufficiently invulnerable to any considered first-strike aggressions. Facing Israel’s Arrow, this adversary would likely require steadily increasing numbers of missiles, in order to achieve an assuredly destructive first-strike capability. Over time, however, this adversary could efficiently undermine the core deterrence benefits of Israel’s active defenses, simply by adding regular increments of offensive missiles.

Israel must continue to develop, test, and implement an interception capability that will match the cumulative enemy threat. It must also take innovative steps to enhance the credibility of its still-ambiguous nuclear deterrent. If Iranian nuclearization should proceed unimpeded, for example, Israel will have to prepare, very promptly, to remove its bomb from the “basement.” Undoubtedly, in these unstable circumstances, a continuing posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity could no longer be judged “cost-effective.”

Israel already has a robustsecond-strike nuclear force. This force, hardenedand dispersed, must now be made more recognizably ready to inflict an unacceptableretaliatory salvo. As exclusively “counterforce” targeting could have significant deterrence shortfalls, Israel’s primary nuclear targets must always be identifiable enemy cities. From the critical standpoint of enhancing deterrence, it may also be time for Israel to release selected information about its specifically sea-based retaliatory forces.

Israel must clarify that Arrow and other defenses would operate simultaneously,or in tandem, with Israeli nuclear retaliations. Iran must be made to understand that Israel’s defensive deployments would never preclude, or even render less probable, an Israeli nuclearreprisal.

Looking back, it is clear that Iran should never have been allowed to proceed this far with its illegal military nuclearization.  Presently, of course, Israel will have to deal with a uniquely hostile enemy regime by instituting steady enhancements of both its nuclear deterrence and active defense capabilities. Although the desirability of regime-change in Tehran might at first appear self-evident, such a transformation could ultimately offer Israel little more than an ill-fated illusion of enhanced security.

It is worth considering that a successor regime in Tehran could prove worse for Jerusalem, and also for Washington. Judged from the particularly relevant standpoint of jihadist inclinations, Ahmadinejad may in fact not yet represent the most dangerous expression of Iranian leadership.

There is also the question of enemy delivery systems. In this connection, Iranian nuclear arms could be directed toward Israel, not only via direct missile strike, but also by terrorist-proxy platforms, including cars, trucks, and boats. Should a newly nuclear Iran ever decide to share certain of its weapons-usable materials and scientific personnel with Hezbollah in Lebanon, Israel might then have to face a heightened prospect of nuclear terrorism. Ultimately, the considerable dangers posed could impact American cities as well.

Soon, to adapt a currently popular political metaphor, leaders in Israel and the United States will no longer be able to “kick the Iranian nuclear can” down the road. More than likely, however, in their closing operational calculations, the preemption option will have to be rejected. Almost certainly, this option will have become more costly than gainful.

What’s left? Deterrence, even of an enemy state that might sometime not value its physical survival above all other values, could still work. For Israel, successfully deterring a possibly irrational nuclear adversary in Tehran need not be out of the question.

An irrational Iranian adversary might still have a consistent and “transitive” hierarchy of preferences. In this case, the very top or apex of the preference hierarchy would reveal the immutable religious expectations of Shiite Islam. If properly “encouraged” by Israel and the United States, leaders in Iran could reasonably calculate that the all-important theological benefits of a long-term peace with Israel would actually exceed the expected benefits of war.

Finally, it is also possible, perhaps even most probable, that Iranian leadership elites will remain entirely rational, thus valuing their country’s physical survival more highly than any other preference, or combination of preferences. Iran, in such circumstances, would remain subject to the same “normal” threats of retaliatory destruction as other rational states in world politics. While there can never be any absolute assurances of such a preferred scenario, it would still be premature to conclude that a newly nuclear Iran, whether rational or irrational, would inevitably lash out viscerally or blindly at its enemies.

An irrational Iranian regime might not necessarily lie beyond the ordinary calculations of international deterrence. Of course, it may present Israel with an altogether intimidating aspect of incessant belligerence and bombast, but not necessarily with the face of a “madman.”

Articles: Israel’s Nuclear Warning Shot Option.

By James Lewis

Obama warns Assad of US military action … JPost – International.

Photo: Youtube Screenshot

WASHINGTON – US President Barack Obama bluntly warned Syrian President Bashar Assad on Monday not to cross a “red line” by using chemical or biological weapons in his country’s bloody conflict and suggested that such action would prompt the United States to consider a military response.

Pointing out that he had refrained “at this point” from ordering US military engagement in Syria, Obama said that there would be “enormous consequences” if Assad failed to safeguard his weapons of mass destruction.

It was Obama’s strongest language to date on the issue, and he warned Syria not only against using its unconventional weapons, but against moving them in a threatening fashion.

“We have been very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized,” Obama said. “That would change my calculus.”

“We cannot have a situation where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people,” Obama told an impromptu White House news conference. He acknowledged he was not “absolutely confident” the stockpile was secure.

Obama said the issue was of concern not only to Washington but also to its close allies in the region, including Israel.

Seeking re-election in November, Obama has been reluctant to get the United States involved in another war in the Middle East, even refusing to arm rebels fighting a 17-month-old uprising against Assad.

Syria last month acknowledged for the first time that it had chemical and biological weapons and said it could use them if foreign countries intervene — a threat that drew strong warnings from Washington and its allies.

Western countries and Israel have expressed fears chemical weapons could fall into the hands of militant groups as Assad’s authority erodes.

Israel has said that if Syrian-backed Hezbollah guerrillas used the situation to take control of the weapons, it would “act immediately and with utmost force.”

“We’re monitoring that situation very carefully. We have put together a range of contingency plans,” Obama said when asked whether he envisioned the possibility of using US forces at least to safeguard Syria’s chemical arsenal.

The Global Security website, which collects published intelligence reports and other data, says there are four suspected chemical weapons sites in Syria: north of Damascus, near Homs, in Hama and near the Mediterranean port of Latakia. Weapons it produces include the nerve agents VX, sarin and tabun, it said, without citing its sources.

Obama also used the opportunity to renew his call for Assad to step down.

“The international community has sent a clear message that rather than drag his country into civil war, he should move in the direction of a political transition,” Obama said. “But at this point, the likelihood of a soft landing seems pretty distant.”

Obama said the United States had already provided $82 million in humanitarian assistance for Syria refugees and “we’ll probably end up doing a little bit more” to keep the situation from destabilizing Syria’s neighbors.

War With Iran Could Spark Global Depression.

Arnaud de Borchgrave’s Perspective:

A former chief of Israeli military intelligence, who retired two years ago, takes sharp exception to three more recently retired Israeli intelligence chiefs who disagree on the imperative need to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Amos Yadlin, a former Israeli military head of intelligence, in a column he wrote for The Washington Post, urged U.S. President Barack Obama to visit Israel as soon as possible to “tell its leadership — and more important, its people — that preventing a nuclear Iran is a U.S. interest and if we have to resort to military action, we will.”

Yadlin says his five-point plan for the benefit of the Obama administration is designed to convince allies and adversaries alike that “military action is real, imminent, and doable.”

Three more recently retired heads of Israeli intelligence — Mossad, Shin Bet, and the Israeli military — have spoken out to say that both Israel and the United States should learn to live with an Iranian nuclear weapon.

Three former U.S. CENTCOM commanders — Gen. John Abizaid, Gen. Anthony Zinni, and Adm. William J. Fallon — were the first to reach the same conclusion.

All six are acutely aware of the alternative — Israeli bombing followed by mayhem throughout the Persian Gulf and the rest of the Middle East.

Egypt, under its new Muslim Brotherhood government, backed by a Parliament with Muslim Brotherhood members in almost 50 percent of the seats and Salafist extremists in 24 percent, would immediately denounce the peace treaty with Israel and sever diplomatic relations.

The Syrian civil war, with Iran and Russia on the side of the Assad regime and al-Qaida now in the mix of revolutionary forces in the uprising against Damascus, would quickly assume regional dimensions.

Israel has occupied Syria’s Golan Heights since the 1967 war and the West Bank since the 1973 war. The emergence of an independent Palestinian state between the Jordan River and Israel is already more geopolitical mirage than practical possibility.

And if the United States is involved in military operations against Iran, Egypt’s new Muslim government would probably close the Suez Canal as well. It was blocked during the 1967 war and didn’t reopen until 1975.

Estranged during the 30-year Mubarak era, Iran and Egypt recently agreed to resume full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level.

All six also know that Iran still commands formidable asymmetrical retaliatory capabilities — from the mining of the Strait of Hormuz through which pass daily 25 percent of the world’s seaborne oil supplies; to an 844-mile northern coastline in the gulf within easy missile reach of Qatar where a forward CENTCOM headquarters is based and where the longest airstrip in the Middle East allows U.S. bombers to refuel; to Bahrain, headquarters for the U.S. Navy 5th Fleet, where the majority of the population is Shiite Muslim closely affiliated with Iran’s Shiite regime.

Iran can also activate terrorist networks against Israel and against U.S. travelers in the Middle East and Europe.

These Iranian retaliatory openers would be sufficient to skyrocket oil prices into the stratosphere — and tip the balance in the United States, United Kingdom, and European countries from recession to depression.

Youth unemployment levels in Greece, Spain, and Italy are already at explosive levels. Almost 50 percent of those younger than 25 are jobless in Spain.

“We have to face openly the possibility of a euro breakup,” says Erkki Tuomioja, Finland’s veteran foreign minister and a member of the Social Democratic Party, one of six parties that make up the coalition government.

Israeli opinion is also sharply divided on the need to bomb Iran and the prospect of retaliatory consequences.

Yadlin, one of the pilots who took part in the 1981 attack on Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor, said Israel is fully capable of hitting the nerve center of Iran’s nuclear complex, but that Israel would need U.S. support “both the day after and the decade after a strike.”

Now head of the Institute for National Security Studies, Yadlin is a strong supporter of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak. All three agree that Israel must not leave its fate in the hands of the United States.

Cynics also say that U.S. support is all but assured during an election campaign, a propitious time for Israel to launch air strikes against Iran. GOP contender Mitt Romney already made his position crystal clear on a recent visit to Israel. He sides wholeheartedly with Israel, America’s closest ally, whatever Netanyahu and Barak decide to do.

For Obama, the decision is more complex. His own inclination is to side with the three former U.S. CENTCOM commanders, i.e., learn to live with an Iranian bomb. They reckon that should Iran aim anything at Israel, the Iranian regime and its key nerve centers would be pulverized by return.

Unless he is willing to side with Israel in deeds as well as words, Obama would be facing almost certain defeat.

The latest Newsweek cover picture shows Obama, jacket slung over his shoulder, looking back as he walks away, captioned, “HIT THE ROAD, BARACK — Why We Need a New President, by Niall Ferguson.”

A British historian, Ferguson teaches at Harvard and he was named by Time “one of the 100 most influential people in the world” in 2004.

“We are becoming,” writes Ferguson, “the 50/50 nation — half of us paying the taxes; the other half receiving the benefits.”

“The only ratio that matters,” says Ferguson “is debt to revenue. That number has leapt upward from 165 percent in 2008 to 262 percent this year, according to figures from the International Monetary Fund. Among developed economies, only Ireland and Spain have seen a bigger deterioration.”

Working in Israel’s favor is the U.S. election campaign. Neither candidate can take a chance on criticizing, or seemingly spurning Israeli requests for U.S. involvement in what Israel’s two principal leaders say is an “existential crisis for the Jewish state.”

Noted editor and journalist Arnaud de Borchgrave is an editor at large for United Press International. He is a founding board member of Newsmax.com who now serves on Newsmax’s Advisory Board. Read more reports from Arnaud de Borchgrave — Click Here Now.

via Playing the Iran waiting game Israel media add to frenzy 

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Jerusalem Post – Breaking News.

( They taunt us for being scared.  Maybe that’s just what we want them to think.  The only possibility for surprise lies there. – JW )

Iran war fears hitting Israeli suppliers – Globes.

Businesses tell “Globes” that overseas customers are demanding guarantees over continued production in the event of war.

Rosenberg told “Globes”, “The lively security debate over whether Israel will attack Iran is causing us immense damage and uncertainty. Many US companies which are our customers are signaling pressure and panic and demanding answers from us, such as how they will receive components from us if Israel’s home front is bombarded by hundreds of rockets and missiles a day.”

Rosenberg says that his big customers have lately been demanding guarantees that RH will meet deliveries in the event of a war. In response to pressure from his customers, he has accelerated plans to set up foreign production infrastructure to handle a scenario of a war lasting several weeks and involving missile attacks on the home front that disrupts production. < p> “We are currently investing half a million dollars in setting up infrastructure in Hungary, which will continue production for our foreign customers if Israel is attacked by missiles and economic output is disrupted. Under such conditions, I will move critical production employees, 100-150 technicians and engineers, to Hungary, where they will be able to lead operations and ensure that they are run smoothly. In the meantime, we are exploiting the routine to produce more components to increase inventory to ensure regular deliveries in the event that production is stopped with warning,” says Rosenberg.

Rosenberg slams what he calls the “irresponsible debate”. “I have never seen such a situation in which war is managed in the media. All this debate about whether to attack or not to attack Iran causes immense damage. Everyone is sitting on the fence, not prepared to make decisions about investments or new contracts. The great risk is what will happen to companies that will have to move their production overseas during the fighting. There is no certainty that they will bring the production back to Israel, because they will discover that foreign tax systems and the proximity to markets is much more attractive, and they will prefer to stay there,” he says.

Escrow Europe (Israel) Ltd. managing director Adv. Ronen Slutzky, whose company specializes in source codes for software, databases and industrial designs for private software houses also speaks about such a trend among companies dealing with Israeli high tech.

According to him, in recent months, there has been a significant increase in the number of companies worldwide that demand access to sensitive codes if there is a war or powerful economic crisis that may cause Israeli suppliers to cease to exist.

Source codes are considered the basic language of electronic components and are not given to customers to ensure that these items can be utilized if the manufacturer closes down or their databases disappear. These customers worldwide are demanding that the codes be deposited with trustees.

A senior source in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor said they these were isolated instances and are not a broad scale occurrence. The Ministry’s Foreign Trade Administration conducted a survey which found that there has not been a wave of requests from companies worldwide for guarantees from Israeli manufacturers.