WarSclerotic

Why Obama Still Won’t Go to Israel « Commentary Magazine

Jonathan S. Tobin | @tobincommentary 08.21.2012 – 12:00 PM

The disagreement between Israel and the Obama administration over whether it’s time to acknowledge that diplomacy has failed to stop Iran’s nuclear program is starting to make a lot of people nervous.

Both Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak seem to be interpreting the administration’s staunch refusal to abandon a diplomatic track that has already clearly failed as meaning that the president won’t make good on his promise to stop Iran from going nuclear. That has led to talk that Israel will strike Iran without U.S. assistance or permission and that it may do so even before the November presidential election.

The Americans are doing everything they can to persuade the Israelis to stand down but in the absence of trust in the president, mere words may not be enough. That’s why one of Obama’s leading Jewish supporters, columnist Jeffrey Goldberg, believes it’s time for some symbolism. Goldberg writes today in Bloomberg that a long sought presidential visit to Israel before the election would do the trick. He’s right. If President Obama were to take time out from the campaign for a stop in Israel some time in the next few weeks, Netanyahu would have no choice but to postpone any attack plans. Though it is possible that Obama will listen to Goldberg, such a visit with less than 90 days before the election is a long shot. It is far more likely that the president will rely on his usual form of method of trying to communicate with the Israelis: pressure and threats aimed at making Netanyahu back down. But since that has never worked in the past, Obama’s supporters ought to be asking themselves what’s behind the president’s reluctance to act in a manner that might convince both Israelis and their Iranian foes that he isn’t fibbing about being prepared to act on the issue during his second term.

Though the Democrats’ campaign staff may think any time not spent in a swing state is a bad idea, an Obama visit to Israel now would be a coup for the president. It would monopolize media attention during the trip and thus hurt Mitt Romney. It would also bolster the president’s sagging Jewish support.

Even more important, such a dramatic gesture accompanied by a presidential speech in which he warned Iran that they must halt their nuclear program or face the consequences would convince the Israeli public that he could be relied upon to keep the promise he first made about stopping Tehran during the 2008 campaign. Under those circumstances, there would be no possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack since Netanyahu could not then justify such a move by pointing to distrust of Washington.

It would all be so easy but the question to ask about this scenario is why the president has always been so reluctant to show the Israelis some love when it would cost him so little and bring such a great reward?

The only possible answer is the one we always are forced to return to when discussing the problematic relationship between the Obama administration and Israel: the president’s equivocal feelings about the Jewish state. As veteran diplomat Aaron David Miller memorably put it a few weeks ago, Barack Obama is the first president in a generation “not in love with the idea of Israel.” That’s compounded by his open and very public dislike of Benjamin Netanyahu.

While Obama’s defenders are right to note that there’s nothing all that unusual about the lack of a visit to Israel during a first term, this is a president who has gone out of his way to pick fights with Jerusalem and to avoid the country during trips to the region. It appears that if Obama is to go to Israel, as his campaign hinted earlier during this summer, it would only be as a re-elected president with the whip hand over Netanyahu and not as a candidate who has to show some deference to his ally.

One imagines that Obama is recoiling at the very idea of being forced to pretend to be friendly with Netanyahu even if it meant avoiding an attack on Iran that he opposes or helping his re-election. Given the stakes involved, his refusal to take some good advice from a supporter tells us all we need to know about the president’s attitude toward Israel.

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.

( An intelligent summary of the current situation. – JW )
By Victor Kotsev

So heated and so public has become the debate over whether Israel would and should attack Iran in the fall that the editor-in-chief of the Israeli daily Ha’aretz remarked sarcastically in an editorial: “[Israeli Prime Minister] Benjamin Netanyahu and [Defense Minister] Ehud Barak deserve a medal for their contribution to strengthening Israeli democracy. For the first time a broad and noisy public debate is taking place over whether to go to war, with the encouragement and participation of the prime minister and the defense minister.”

The donnybrook among both Israelis and Americans is quickly turning into a free-for-all; the dominant narrative that Jerusalem is feverishly pushing for a strike while Washington is feverishly pushing back, while not necessarily wrong, is proving simplistic.

In both countries there are different camps and sub-camps divided over the issue, which are simultaneously grappling and bargaining with each other, while trying to jointly bargain and grapple with the Iranians. The Iranian camp is equally diverse and divided, and other American allies, such as Saudi Arabia, are bringing their own narrow interests into the dispute. The result: a genuine mess.
It is generally believed that Barak and Netanyahu are the two chief hawks in the Western camp, while United States President Barack Obama is the top dove. Some heavy blows were exchanged among the three in the last weeks. Obama’s recent pressure on Barak and Netanyahu, epitomized by a series of visits by top US officials in Jerusalem, resulted in an explosion of rhetoric and positioning.

To name a few key incidents: the hawks retaliated by leaking information on a brand new American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which reportedly reverses previous findings, arguing that Iran has accomplished significant progress toward building a nuclear bomb. To quote the Israeli defense minister, “As far as we know it brings the American assessment much closer to ours.”

If confirmed, this information about the 2012 NIE would constitute a serious coup for the war camp. Needless to say, the entire American decision-making process is far more complex than just Obama’s, and the weight of established bureaucratic procedure is palpable even in the president’s office.

Thus, the 2007 NIE, which stipulated that Iran had “halted” its military nuclear program in 2003, arguably tied the hands of former US president George W Bush (whether the latter, previously known as a hawk, was happy to have his hands tied at that point, is the subject of another debate). Similarly – though to the opposite effect – the 2012 NIE could help force Obama’s hand to start a war down the road.

At the very least, the leak would make it harder for Obama to keep negotiating with Iran. Ironically, in the immediate American response to the reports we can find some of the very few existing signs that the talks are still alive: White House Spokesman Jay Carney told Ha’aretz on August 9 that the administration would not comment on the information and remains focused on the negotiations.

Still, the White House took only a few days to return the blow, in the face of the top American soldier, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US armed forces General Martin Dempsey. Dempsey’s comments that Israel could “delay but not destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities” were widely perceived as a “punch” in the faces of Barak and Netanyahu. [1]

Shortly afterwards, Netanyahu introduced the new Israeli home front defense minister, former Shin Bet (counter-intelligence) chief Avi Dichter, who resigned from his opposition seat in the Israeli Knesset (parliament) in order to join the government.

Importantly, Dichter also joined the so-called security cabinet – the body of eight, now nine, who make important security decisions such as the decision to attack or not to attack Iran. Rumor has it that the security cabinet was split in the middle over the Iranian nuclear program, and that Dichter is likely to support Netanyahu and Barak. [2]

Not only that message to Obama; a series of former Israeli officials and military analysts stepped forward and offered publicly the information that if, essentially, Obama commits to attacking Iran by June 2013 (in the absence of a peaceful resolution to the issue), Israel would agree to hold off from striking on its own in the run-up to the US presidential election in November (which also roughly coincides with the time when bad winter weather sets over Iran, greatly hampering any strike).

Some Americans also made proposals in a similar vein, and one Israeli report even claimed that Obama had accepted the deal. [3] Much of the speculation currently centers on whether there will be a meeting between the Israeli and American leaders around the time of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in late September.

In many ways, this is a stereotypical Middle Eastern bazaar response when met with the intractable wishes of a powerful (or wealthy) stranger: everything has a price, and the stronger the stranger’s desire, the higher the price becomes (some military gear and cash gifts are also reportedly under discussion).

Incidentally, Middle Eastern bargaining is also usually accompanied by flowery story-telling, and both camps have their own apocalyptic scenarios and counter-arguments. To see two versions of this debate, click here (registration required) and here

Still, Obama might personally profit from such a deal. It would allow him to polish his security credentials – which already received a boost with the killing of Osama bin Laden last year – in the run-up to the vote while simultaneously avoiding a war and kicking the Iranian problem further down the road.

He has often been accused by critics of handling foreign policy issues in the latter way, but if he can persuade both domestic hawks and doves that he is doing their bidding, and that right before the vote, it might work for him spectacularly for once. (If Iran collapses economically meanwhile and surrenders its nuclear program peacefully, he would have hit the jackpot.)

The exchange continues. Amid a flurry of leaks and reports in the Israeli press, which some observers speculate were aimed at preparing the Israeli public psychologically for war, Israeli President Shimon Peres (recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and incidentally one of the architects of Israel’s own nuclear program) came to Obama’s aid on Thursday.

“Now, it’s clear to us that we can’t do it alone,” Peres said in an interview with the Israeli TV Channel 2. “We can delay [ran’s nuclear program]. It’s clear to us we have to proceed together with America. There are questions about coordination and timing, but as serious as the danger is, this time at least we are not alone.”

It had been widely accepted that Peres was the most prominent Israeli opponent of a strike, but this was his official joining the fray, and his comments reverberated loudly. Ha’aretz published a cartoon of him jumping out of a birthday cake – he turned 89 earlier this month – and firing at Netanyahu and Barak with a sub-machine gun. Moreover, when the prime minister’s people protested that the president had “forgotten his place”, former Israeli president Yitzhak Navon, 93, jumped to Peres’s defense.

Add to their camp a number of former security heavyweights – most importantly, the legendary spy chief Meir Dagan – and it is very hard to claim that the doves in Israel lack historically grounded or authoritative voices.

Nevertheless, it is hard to call who will have the last say. What is truly remarkable about the Israeli debate is that it goes contrary to all military doctrines of the Jewish State, which rely heavily on the element of surprise.

Consequently, some observers have concluded that the Israeli behavior is a complex bluff designed to focus the international attention better on the Iranian nuclear program – a remarkably successful bazaar strategy. Others, however, contend that all the noise actually serves to desensitize the listeners and to create an environment in which the most surprising action paradoxically ends up being the one most frequently discussed – namely, an attack.

Still others caution that Barak and Netanyahu themselves are uncertain which it is, and a war might start without anybody truly wishing it. (Though the latter may sound incredible, there are plenty of historical paradigms for it.)

Ironically though predictably, a lot comes down to the interplay of economics and cold geostrategic calculations. Thus, for example, it could be that some in the corridors of power in Washington would like to see a war between Israel and Iran – if only to test how a future hypothetical missile exchange between the US and China might play out.

As Robert Haddick writes in Foreign Policy,

The outcome of an Israel-Iran missile war will have profound implications for military strategies and investments in Asia. The expansion and modernization of China’s ballistic and cruise missile forces is a recurring topic in the Pentagon’s annual reports on China’s military power. In a recent study CSIS performed for the Pentagon, it noted the vulnerability of US military bases in the Pacific to missile attack and recommended increased missile defenses and dispersal of airfields and aircraft around the region.

Should a lopsided outcome occur in an Israel-Iran missile war, military planners on all sides would likely scramble to reassess their assumptions. Should Arrow and the US Navy’s missile defense systems sweep a large Shahab-3 raid from the skies, American planners would undoubtedly gain confidence in their ability to sustain a forward presence in the Western Pacific in the face of China’s growing missile forces.

By contrast, should Iran succeed in pummeling Tel Aviv and other targets in Israel, US policymakers would likely develop doubts about the long-term future of their forward-basing plans in the Pacific. The outcome of a missile war would also affect the long-running debate over funding the Pentagon’s troubled effort to build limited defenses against intercontinental missiles. [4]

On the other hand, economic considerations seem to be the primary factor holding back a strike. The potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the catastrophic effect the resultant spike in the price of oil may have on world economy has received much attention.

Less known are the effects to the Israeli economy in particular. According to one recent report, the Jewish State stands to lose as much as US$42 billion over the five years following the war. [5] Even just the threats are reportedly hurting Israeli businesses, with foreign customers requesting additional guarantees. [6]

The hawks, of course, will argue that the costs of Iran producing a nuclear bomb would likely be higher, yet this is not an argument that can easily be verified – or, in all likelihood, quantified in specific amounts of money. Moreover, it could be that Tehran’s own economic woes, given enough time, will bring the ayatollahs to their knees and prevent a war.

As a result of the ever-harsher sanctions to which the Islamic Republic is subjected, Iranian oil production is down (exports even more so), the Iranian currency has collapsed in value and the prices of most goods have skyrocketed. Many ordinary citizens are now priced out of foods such as meat, creating much anger and misery.

While the government is reportedly mulling a “multi-tiered exchange rate” akin to that introduced by Venezuela in 2010 in order to subsidize indirectly basic commodities, it is particularly telling that, according to some accounts, it has started to censor images of chicken from movies and TV.

Such an Orwellian situation attests to great distress, as do the ever-uglier Iranian counter-threats. On Friday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad called Israel “a malignant cancer, an insult to humanity”, and expressed his hope for “a new Middle East, with no memory of the American or Zionist presence”. A high-ranking Iranian general chimed in, saying that he would welcome an Israeli strike since it would give the Iranians an excuse to “get rid of Israel forever”.

It is inconceivable that the hardship will not reach the Iranian nuclear program soon, if it isn’t doing so already. Still, whether this will happen soon enough to prevent a war, and how much time is on the clock, is not known.

Notes:
1. US punched Bibi, Barak in the face, Ynet, August 15, 2012.
2. Netanyahu’s pick for home front defense minister – a vote in favor of Iran strike, Ha’aretz, August 15, 2012 (registration required).
3. Obama set to assure Israel that, if all else fails, US will attack Iran by June 2013 — TV report, The Times of Israel, August 14, 2012.
4. This Is Not a Test, Foreign Policy, August 17, 2012.
5. War with Iran could cost Israeli economy $42 billion, The Times of Israel, August 19, 2012.
6. ‘Debate over Iran strike is bad for business’, Jerusalem Post, August 20, 2012.

Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst.

Alon Ben-Meir: Israel’s Posturing: Behind Netanyahu and Barak’s Threats to Attack Iran.

Successive Israeli governments have consistently inhibited in the past any public discussion about Iran’s nuclear program and what Israel might do to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. In recent weeks however, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak have been openly discussing the issue while intimating their readiness to take whatever actions necessary to eliminate the Iranian threat. The question is why Netanyahu and Barak have chosen to “advertise” their deep concerns now and why they have such an urgency to act at this particular juncture, both of which have prompted newspaper reporters and bandits to speculate about what the real intentions are behind this public exposure and what is to be expected. Meanwhile, former and current officials, including President Peres, have expressed pointed objections to taking any unilateral military strikes against Iran, insisting that if such action became necessary, it must certainly be led by the U.S. to shield Israel from being singled out and blamed for the potentially disastrous regional consequences.

Having concluded that sanctions and diplomacy have failed as Iran is either technologically nearing the point of no return or achieving a zone of immunity that will make their most advanced nuclear plants at Fordo (near Qom) impregnable to air attack, the Netanyahu government has decided on a new strategy designed to achieve multiple purposes. While Israel’s determination to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons has not changed, the new strategy is meant to strongly convey that Israel is not bluffing. Israel’s groundwork for the new strategy is as follows: Israel will alert its closest ally, the U.S., alarm its European friends, credibly threaten Iran and gather more information, warn other enemies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, test the private sentiments and public reactions of the Sunni Arab states, and will finally prepare the Israeli public while laying in wait for the right moment to strike, should everything else fail.

The Netanyahu government has already expressed its displeasure with the strategy the Obama administration has adopted to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Whereas many Israelis believe that President Obama’s credibility is on the line and he will act militarily should it become necessary, others, including Netanyahu and Barak, are not so sure. They are concerned that Obama may eventually have to choose between preventing or containing Iran and will settle on the latter by providing Israel and other Arab allies in the region with some kind of security umbrella.

Netanyahu and Barak are troubled by the fact that Obama has relied excessively on a diplomatic solution knowing full well that the Iranians are masters of playing for time. Moreover, he chose to impose gradual sanctions to which the Iranian government was able to adjust instead of inflicting real, crippling sanctions, especially after the failure of the first few sets of negotiations, which could have forced Tehran to change course. This approach, from the Israeli perspective, played into Iran’s hand while engaging the P5+1 (the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China plus Germany) in futile negotiations that have never stood a chance of success.

By asking the P5+1 to declare that the talks with Iran have failed, Netanyahu is alerting the U.S. that time is of the essence and challenging Obama to take more decisive actions against Iran. Netanyahu’s rationale is that since Obama seeks to prevent an Israeli attack in an election year, he will be under immense pressure from his presidential rival, Mitt Romney, not only to adopt a final set of truly crippling sanctions but to be clear about his willingness to use force against Iran before it reaches the point of no return or enters the zone of immunity.

Netanyahu’s message of alarm is directed against the EU, Turkey and China, which will be the most affected by the potential disruption of oil supplies should the Strait of Hormuz become imperiled. Netanyahu and Barak are convinced that the EU in particular is engaged in wishful thinking, believing that continuing diplomatic efforts coupled with stiffer sanctions will force the Mullahs to come to their senses. The EU clearly view Netanyahu as overzealous about Israel’s national security, are extremely worried about an Israeli attack and are convinced that the repercussions will be catastrophic. Thus, for them, no attack should be contemplated as long as Iran is willing to continue to talk.

Using the repeated Iranian existential threat against Israel, and while observing the Western powers’ ineptitude in the past in dealing with the genocide in Bosnia, Sudan and now the wholesale slaughter in Syria, Netanyahu has little faith in what the EU can, or will, do to bring Iran to a halt. The EU, from Netanyahu’s perspective, could have done a great deal more to cripple Iran economically but it still has yet to do so. At the same time, the EU refuses to declare Hezbollah, Iran’s prime surrogate but Israel’s staunchest enemy, as a terrorist organization while it continues to allow Hezbollah to freely raise tens of millions of dollars in Europe, when much of it is used for buying armaments to target Israel.

The direct threat against Iran is based on Netanyahu and Barak’s calculation that although public discussion about the potential attack on Iran provides Tehran more time to prepare for the worst, it will provide Israel with certain advantages. Fear of an imminent Israeli attack will force the Iranian authorities to take additional security measures to protect their nuclear facilities, which will reveal Iran’s preparedness and capabilities, and expose its weaknesses and how much of its boastings of a damaging counter-attack against Israel are in fact accurate. Importantly, Israel will also be in a position to better assess the Iranian public’s reaction and whether the rumors of an imminent attack will precipitate panic, which may reveal how the Iranian authorities react and pacify the public. More than anything, Israel wants Iran to take its threats seriously, which explains why Netanyahu and Barak openly stated that when it comes to Israel’s national security, Israel must, in the final analysis, rely only on itself.

Netanyahu’s and Barak’s exposé is also intended to warn all those who might think of coming to Iran’s aid by engaging Israel on another front (in particular with groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas) that they should think twice before they dare to provoke Israel. By openly discussing their intentions, Netanyahu and Barak want these groups or states to assume that Israel would not have discussed such a sensitive national security matter had it not taken into full consideration their potential involvements. The message to Hezbollah is clear: there will not be a repeat of the 2006 war, Israel will break its back and that this time around no one will come to its aid considering Syria is in shambles and Iran is under intense economic pressure and too busy to deal with the potentially catastrophic effects of an Israeli attack.

The other target of Israel’s open discourse on attacking Iran is to test the Sunni Arabs, especially the Gulf States led by Saudi Arabia. There have been ongoing tacit discussions between Israel and the Gulf States about the potential Israeli strike and how that might affect both their public reactions and their private interests and concerns. There is no doubt that all Sunni Arab states would prefer to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons peacefully. But after failing to do so by diplomatic means, they would support an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, whether the attack is carried out by Israel, the U.S. or through a joint effort. Saudi Arabia in particular sees the conflict between Shiites verses Sunnis in terms of regional domination with a focus on the Gulf, and views Iran with nuclear weapons as a nightmarish scenario that must be prevented at all costs.

Finally, Netanyahu’s and Barak’s message was intended for the Israeli public not only to prepare them for a potential Iranian counter-attack but to begin psychological and logistical preparations ( including the distributions of gas masks, stocking underground shelters with food and water) to avoid public panic and rally the nation around the government’s prospective actions. Although the Netanyahu government is not dismissive of the voices of the Israelis who consider a unilateral attack as ill-conceived and extremely risky, Netanyahu and Barak want to demonstrate unshakable resolve in the face of an existential threat and that the public can ultimately trust their judgment. Moreover, such an exercise, even if a strike is avoided either because of the United States or because of Netanyahu’s/Barak’s readiness to act, will be good for Israel and good for the entire region as long as Iran never acquires nuclear weapons.

Israel has time and again stated in the past that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons or the technology to quickly assemble such arsenals. The Israelis insist that whatever repercussions arise from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities will be far less ominous than allowing Iran to obtain nuclear capabilities, which will have far more reaching geopolitical and security implications that will adversely affect every state in the region.

In the final analysis, an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities may not come as soon as many predict. The strike can and may well happen but it is very unlikely that such an incredibly ominous undertaking will occur without a minimum of U.S. acquiescence, if not outright support and direct involvement. Regardless of how much Netanyahu and Barak may be sure of themselves and Israel’s military capabilities, they cannot afford to make any mistakes or miscalculations because Israel’s future is on the line.

Yet, exactly because of that, no one should think for a moment that Israel is bluffing. Netanyahu and Barak have concluded that diplomacy has run its course and only extraordinary, crippling and immediate sanctions may still have a slim chance of success. Once Israel determines that Iran has either achieved the point of no return or is about to reach the zone of immunity and the U.S. is not prepared to take military action, Israel will attack Iran singlehandedly and no consequences of such an attack, from the Israeli perspective, will fare against such an existential threat.

Iran: Israel in no position to fight us – Israel News, Ynetnews

FM Salehi tells Egypt newspaper Jewish state a ‘malignant tumor that is destined to be destroyed’

Roi Kais

“Israel is not in a position that allows it to wage a war against Iran,” Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi told the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram on Tuesday.

In the interview, Tehran’s top diplomat called the Israel a “malignant cancerous tumor which is destined to be destroyed.”

Addressing the debate in Israel regarding a possible strike on Iran’s nuclearfacilities, Salehi said Israel is “in no position” to attack, adding that “Israeli newspapers have confirmed this.”

The Iranian FM continued to say that the “hints regarding the American and Israeli military option prove that the other options have failed. In any case, we are preparing for every possibility.”

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last week that the “very existence of the Zionistregime is an insult to humanity.”

In the speech which was broadcast live on Iranian TV in honor of al-Quds Day, the Iranian president added that “the western powers cannot tolerate criticism of the Zionist regime. They feel compelled to defend it.

“The Zionist regime is a malignant cancer, if even one cell remains on Palestinian land, the current situation will continue in the future,” the president said and warned: “Zionists want to spread.”

Obama Should Go to Israel – Jeffrey Goldberg – The Atlantic.

Aug 21 2012, 9:41 AM ET 13

Amos Yadlin, one of the smartest Israeli analysts there is (and a former chief of military intelligence), argued this weekend in a Washington Post op-ed that President Obama might be able to forestall an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities by going to Israel and making the case, before the Knesset, that a nuclear-armed Iran is a national security threat to the United States. Showing Israel, and the many Arab countries that worry as well about a nuclear Iran, that there is a direct U.S. self-interest in preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold, could serve to convince doubtful allies that Obama means what he says — that he will stop Iran, by whatever means necessary, from gaining possession of a bomb. Yadlin:

(Obama) must convince Israel, Iran, Russia and even Saudi Arabia that the U.S. military option is credible and effective.

A gesture directly from Obama could do it. The U.S. president should visit Israel and tell its leadership — and, more important, its people — that preventing a nuclear Iran is a U.S. interest, and if we have to resort to military action, we will. This message, delivered by the president of the United States to the Israeli Knesset, would be far more effective than U.S. officials’ attempts to convey the same sentiment behind closed doors.

In my Bloomberg View column, I explicate on Yadlin’s point:
A visit to Israel would do more to delay a strike on Iran than any other step the administration could take. The beauty of this idea is that Obama won’t have to say anything new. He’s on record explaining why the idea of containing a nuclear Iran isn’t an option; he’s on record promising to stop Iran by whatever means necessary; and he’s on record explaining why a nuclear-free Iran is in the interests of the U.S.

“If Iran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation,” he told me in an interview this year.

When I asked him what his position would be if Israel were not in the picture, he answered: “It would still be a profound national-security interest of the United States to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.”

These words, delivered in the Oval Office, are powerful. But delivered in Jerusalem, before the Knesset, they would deeply reassure the prime minister and the Israeli public. What could be more effective than the U.S. president explaining to Israelis, in Israel, that their two countries share the same interests?

Yes, Obama is running for re-election, and it is hard to leave Ohio and Florida. But a trip to Israel — a place he hasn’t visited as president — would put Iran on notice that Obama is deadly serious about thwarting their plans. Combined with stops in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, such a visit would also allay the fears of our Arab allies. Most important, such a visit could prevent war. Which, of course, is a very presidential thing to do.

Iranian leaders in Israel’s sights after calling for its destruction.

DEBKAfile DEBKA

Upping the ante? Iran unveils up… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

The Commentator – Why crunch time is coming for Israel and Iran.

Those who claim Israel will take its biggest gamble since its independence in an operation that could at best gain time and at worst leave Israel as an isolated and weakened country, might be right after all

In recent months, expectations of a coming Israeli pre-emptive strike against Iran’s nuclear installations have become increasingly hyped in the media and the public domain. There is now a well-established assumption among policymakers and analysts that Israel is considering this option and may indeed carry it out before long — an assumption that public utterances by Israeli leaders have reinforced.

Opposition to an attack notwithstanding, one can easily gauge a sense of impending doom in the words of Israel’s Prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and his defence minister, Ehud Barak.

And one should take these words seriously — not just as boisterous rhetoric aimed at forcing others to take action, lest Israel attacks anyway. Israel, after all, is the only country in the world that has ever dared launch a pre-emptive strike against an adversary’s nuclear facilities. In fact, it has done so twice, first in Iraq and later in Syria. If one is to judge Israel by precedent, the words of its leaders should be taken neither as bluff nor as empty threats.

On the other hand, Israel’s pre-emptive strikes — Iraq 1981 and Syria 2007 — occurred early on, before the reactors were operational, against one single target, and with a much lower degree of operational hazard than an operation against Iran would entail. In Iran’s case, it might be just as sensible to assume that Israel may be too late.

The debate about a possible Israeli strike, naturally, intersects with a number of policy dilemmas that Israel must face: first, the discussion over Iran’s nuclear timeline, one which is at the very heart of Israel’s strategic dialogue with the United States; and second, the relationship between Israel and the US — especially at a time when the impression is that the Obama Administration and Jerusalem are on different pages on this crucial issue.

Might Israel risk its most important friend’s support when the chances of success are judged to be slim by most military analysts? Might it be too reckless even for an Israel facing an existential threat to jeopardise its most important strategic relationship during the season of US presidential elections, when a few weeks’ wait could spare the kind of fallout that Israel may come to regret?

On the other hand, missing the October window of opportunity for an attack is not just about postponing it for a few weeks — the first moonless night after US Presidential elections is in mid-November, and by then weather conditions above Iran’s skies may make an Israeli operation too risky to succeed until Spring 2013. By then, Iran might cross one of or both of Israel’s thresholds — either by entering what Barak called “a zone of immunity”, or by actually acquiring nuclear-weapons’ capability. Israel will be too late. It will have to rely on American benevolence to fix the problem — or find a way to live under the shadow of Iran’s nuclear capability.

For Israel, containment is not an option for two reasons that go beyond the possibility of Iran launching a first strike. The first is that the mortal threat posed by Iran will destroy the Zionist appeal for world Jewry and for the Israelis themselves. As Daniel Gordis, a senior vice-president at the Shalem Center in Jerusalem, wrote in Commentary Magazine:

‘What must be understood is that the threat to Israel is not that Iran will one day use the bomb. No, Iran merely needs to possess the bomb to undermine the central purpose of Israel’s existence — and in so doing to reverse the dramatic change in the existential question of the Jews that 62 years of Jewish sovereignty has wrought.”

The second is that an emboldened nuclear Iran would wreak havoc on the current regional balance of power in a way that is inimical to Israel and that would, due to Iran’s nuclear arsenal, severely constrain Israel’s options. Emily Landau, from the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, recently discussed the prospect of nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis Iran, noting that: “The problem is that a potential nuclear attack is not the major cause for concern with regard to Iran becoming a nuclear state.”

And, she continues:

“How does one contain Iran from consolidating its hegemonic hold over the Arab Gulf States due to their fear of their now much stronger neighbour? Does it even make sense to talk about containment in such a scenario? And how will the US contain Iran from having a seriously negative impact on Israel’s ability to defend itself in a war provoked by Hezbollah or Hamas, with the backing of Iran?”

It is not to be excluded then, elections or not, that the Israeli establishment may reach the conclusion that delaying that moment significantly, possibly at the price of a risky military operation, is a gamble worth taking. The impact a successful attack would have on the internal stability of the regime is actually not as clear as some assume it to be. But one can expect a number of dramatic pyrotechnics, alongside the perfunctory public condemnations by Arab states, Non Aligned Countries, most, if not all members of the European Union, and possibly even the United States.

First, Iran will most likely unleash its proxies against Israel – Hezbollah is the Iranian nuclear programme’s first line of defence after all. Secondly, Iran will launch terror attacks against Jewish targets overseas. Third, Iran may retaliate directly against Israel with its missile arsenal. Fourth, Iran may choose to attack US forces in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan or in the Gulf. Fifth, Iran may decide to punish those Arab countries that were seen to have turned a blind eye to Israel, by allowing Israeli fighter jets to cross their airspace en route to their deadly mission. And finally, Iran may seek to seal the Strait of Hormuz, artificially concocting a new oil crisis.

Whatever else may be said of the accuracy of predictions and of the assessments about the pros and cons of an Israeli attack then, this is perhaps one of the hardest dilemmas any Israeli Prime minister has faced since the decision not to launch a pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria on the eve of the 1973 War.

And herein lies the crux of Israel’s domestic dilemma, in terms of deterrence, when it comes to Iran’s nuclear quest.

On the one hand, Israel feels compelled to knock on every nation’s door and alert them to the dangers of a nuclear Iran. It feels the need regularly to inform the world through public utterances that Israel views Iran as an existential threat. It must respond to the ugly Holocaust denial rhetoric coming out of a regime that seems intent on acquiring the tools to perpetrate the very same crime whose historical truth it seeks to deny.

Hence the comparisons with Nazi Germany and with 1938 — and the implicit suggestion that Israel is being put in the same position as Czechoslovakia but will do its utmost to avoid that fate.

This posture is not without disadvantages by the way, because the projection of an image of an erratic, unpredictable Israel that could do something “crazy” propels “saner” governments into action. It’s a bit like the great scene from Mel Brooks’ 1974 movie, Blazing Saddles, where the newly arrived black Sheriff — confronted with the town’s readiness to lynch him — points a gun to his own head and threatens the entire town with executing the hostage if they do not drop their guns, and gets away with it.

For Israel, the occasional muscle flexing and seemingly erratic behaviour serves the purpose of telling the international community that, to avoid an Israeli pre-emptive strike, they must hold Israel back — and the only way to do so is to increase non-military pressure on Iran.

Israel has other purposes as well. It is the homeland of the Jewish people, and it is still animated by the aspiration to promote strong Jewish immigration, Aliyah, to Israel.

That Iran could seriously wipe Israel off the map is not exactly the greatest selling point to prospective immigrants, especially from the Western world. Israel needs to project a completely different image to them — it must convey a sense of safety and security and a promise that though the threat may be existential, Israel’s resourcefulness will keep it in check — which is one reason why threatening military action cannot be done indefinitely without eventually acting upon the threat. Again, do not take Israel’s statements as banter.

Israel is also an economy that relies on the export of sophisticated manufactured products and significant foreign investment. If Israel conveys the sense that the country faces an impending doomsday scenario, Microsoft, Intel and other giants that are investing heavily in Israel’s high tech miracle might be turned off.

Similar considerations apply to Israel’s educated elites and its growing and increasingly mobile upper-middle class. Israelis could leave the country in droves if jobs, passports or visas are available and sufficient financial resources allow them to do so. As Ehud Barak told Jeffrey Goldberg in September 2010: “The real threat to Zionism is the dilution of quality… Jews know that they can land on their feet in any corner of the world. The real test for us is to make Israel such an attractive place, such a cutting-edge place in human society, education, culture, science, quality of life, that even American Jewish young people would want to come here!”

So, quite apart from having to confront a serious strategic threat that will alter the balance of regional power for decades to come, Israel must seek to reassure its own friends and citizens that despite the threat, Israel has the means to contain and counter it in ways that will not diminish the quality of life and the opportunities Israel has to offer. It is not an easy proposition, but it is one that Israeli policymakers need to grapple with in the coming weeks.

Short of a decision to strike Iran militarily, Israel will have to think of creative ways to ensure that it defends itself against the risks of nuclear escalation, that it maintains old and seeks new friendships to isolate and weaken Iran, that it gains assurances and guarantees from allies about a joint, combined set of defence measures from which Israel can benefit and is still able to project enough power to deter any enemy from assuming that, under the shadow of Iran’s nuclear umbrella, they can now act with a higher level of impunity against Israel than ever before.

All of this, of course, may eventually turn out to be irrelevant — Iran’s regime may implode, President Obama may attack. There are compelling reasons to see both options as having entered, in recent months, into the realm of the credible.

But Israel cannot afford to build its policy and its backup plan on these two assumptions — and besides, neither is realistically going to happen until November. Which is why it is reasonable to assume that crunch time is coming, and those who claim Israel will take its biggest gamble since its independence in an operation that could at best gain time and at worst leave Israel as an isolated and weakened country, might be right after all.

Emanuele Ottolenghi is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington

US: Ban, Morsy should not attend… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Will we really know? – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Op-ed: US, Israel may wake up to nuclear Iran if they continue to rely solely on intelligence

Ronen Bergman

“If and when Iran decides to advance to the next stage and produce nuclear weapons, the US and Israel will know about it and share this information,” a senior American official said in an effort to allay concerns stemming from reports of differences of opinion between the sides, which may lead to an Israeli surprise attack in Iran.

But the most worrying aspect of this whole debate is the confidence both sides have in the quality of the intelligence information they have obtained. This is critical, because intelligence information indicating that the Iranians have begun to assemble the bomb would result in an immediate attack on its nuclear facilities.

Jerusalem and Washington agree that Iranian scientists have apparently assured Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei that they would be able to build the first nuclear weapons production facility as soon as they are given the order to do so. Intelligence sources in Israel and the US claim they will “know when this happens,” but disagree on the response to such a development and on whether a preemptive military strike is necessary.

There is no doubt that the extensive efforts by US and Israeli intelligence agencies over the past decade have significantly increased the amount of intelligence information coming in from Iran. The discovery of facilities the Iranians were trying to conceal, alongside the planting of computer viruses and the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists – all acts that were attributed to American and Israeli intelligence agencies – provide further proof of their efficiency. On the other hand, in light of past mistakes, one would expect the intelligence sources and leaders who rely on this information to be a little more modest.

For example, a senior source in Syriawho worked for Israel from the 1970s through the 1990s warned on two separate occasions that Damascus was about to attack. These warnings almost resulted in a preventive Israeli strike – which was eventually avoided due to Washington’s intervention. The information was found to be false.

Israel and the US also believed they had good intelligence on Iraq during the 1980s, but they completely missed Saddam Hussein‘s weapons of mass destruction program, which almost reached the point where Iraq was capable of producing nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, in 2003 the US relied on intelligence information indicating that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction, although it wasn’t.

What all these examples have in common is exaggerated enthusiasm and complete dependence on a limited number of sources, who are supposedly reliable. But this dependence may result in another blunder of historic proportions. What would happen, for instance, if Khamenei informs the nuclear scientists of his decision through new channels that are not exposed to the CIA or Mossad? And what would happen if the Iranians assemble a bomb at a facility that has yet to be discovered? The US and Israel, who are certain in the quality of their intelligence, may wake up too late and find out that Iran has already produced a nuclear bomb and there nothing they can do about it – at least not militarily.

Moreover, opposition elements may provide information that will lead Israel to attack Iran prematurely, before the diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program, including harsh economic sanctions, are exhausted. Without reliable intelligence information, Israel may be under the impression that it is attacking all of Iran’s nuclear plants, when in reality it would only be attacking some of them. The Middle East would pay a heavy price for such a blunder.