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Putin’s Visit and Israeli-Russian Relations | Geopolitics Right Side News.

An example is Azerbaijan. Russia is still a major weapons provider for Azerbaijan, but the Israelis are now selling it large amounts of weapons and appear to be using it as a base from which to observe and, according to rumors, possibly attack Iran. Russia, which supports Armenia, a country Azerbaijan fought a war with in the late 1980s and early 1990s and technically still is at war with, ought to oppose Israel’s action, particularly since it threatens Iran, which Russia does not want attacked. At the same time, Russia doesn’t feel threatened by Israeli involvement in Azerbaijan, and Israel doesn’t really care about Armenia. Both are there, both are involved and both think Azerbaijan is important, yet each operates in ways that ought to conflict but don’t.

The same is true in the more immediate case of Syria, where its downing of a Turkish plane has created an unexpected dynamic for this visit. To think about this we need to consider Russian and Israeli strategy and its odd lack of intersection in Syria.

Russia’s Need for a U.S. Distraction

Russia has complex relationships in the region, particularly focused on Syria and Iran. Russia’s interest in both countries is understandable. Putin, who has said he regarded the breakup of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical catastrophe, views the United States as Russia’s prime adversary. His view is that the United States not only used the breakup to extend NATO into the former Soviet Union in the Baltics but also has tried to surround and contain Russia by supporting pro-democracy movements in the region and by using these movements to create pro-American governments. Putin sees himself as being in a duel with the United States throughout the former Soviet Union.

The Russians believe they are winning this struggle. Putin is not so much interested in dominating these countries as he is in being certain that the United States doesn’t dominate them. That gives Russia room to maneuver and allows it to establish economic and political relations that secure Russian interests. In addition, Russia has tremendously benefited from the U.S. wars in the Islamic world. It is not so much that these wars alienated Muslims, although that was beneficial. Rather, what helped the Russians most was that these wars absorbed American strategic bandwidth.

Obviously, U.S. military and intelligence capabilities that might have been tasked to support movements and regimes in Russia’s “near abroad” were absorbed by conflict in the Islamic world. But perhaps even more important, the strategic and intellectual bandwidth of U.S. policymakers was diverted. Russia became a secondary strategic interest after 9/11. While some movements already in place were supported by the United States, this was mostly inertia, and as the Russians parried and movements in various countries splintered, the United States did not have resources to respond.

The Russians also helped keep the United States tied up in Afghanistan by facilitating bases in Central Asia and providing a corridor for resupply. Russia was able to create a new reality in the region in which it was the dominant power, without challenge.

The Russians therefore valued the conflict in the Middle East because it allowed Russia to be a secondary issue for the only global power. With the war in Iraq over and the war in Afghanistan ending, the possibility is growing that the United States would have the resources and bandwidth to resume the duel on the Russian periphery. This is not in the Russian interest. Therefore, the Russians have an interest in encouraging any process that continues to draw the United States into the Islamic world. Chief among these is supporting Iran and Syria. To be more precise, Russia does not so much support these countries as it opposes measures that might either weaken Iran or undermine the Syrian government. From the Russian point of view, the simple existence of these regimes provides a magnet that diverts U.S. power.

Israel’s Position on Syria

This brings us back to Putin’s visit to Israel. From the Russian point of view, Syria is not a side issue but a significant part of its strategy. Israel has more complex feelings. The regime of Syrian President Bashar al Assad, while the Soviets were allied with it, represented a significant danger to Israel. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Syria lost its patron and diminished as a threat. Since then, the Syrians under al Assad had two virtues from the Israeli point of view. The first was that they were predictable. Their interests in Lebanon were built around financial and political goals that could be accommodated by the Israelis in exchange for limitations on the sorts of military activity that Israel could not tolerate. Furthermore, Syria’s interests did not include conflict with Israel, and therefore Syria held Hezbollah in check until it was forced out of Lebanon by the United States in 2005.

The second advantage of the al Assad regime in relation to Israel was that it was not Sunni but Alawite, a Shiite sect. During the 2000s, Israel and the West believed the main threat emanated from the Sunni world. Al Qaeda, the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas were all Sunni. Over the past decade, a corrupt minority Alawite regime has appeared preferable to Israel than a coherent majority radical Islamist regime in the north. It wasn’t certain how radical it would be, but at the same time there appeared to be more risk on the Sunni side than on the Shiite side.

Israel’s position on the al Assad regime has shifted in the past year from hoping it would survive to accepting that it couldn’t and preparing for the next regime. Underlying this calculus was a reconsideration of which regime would be more dangerous. With the withdrawal of the United States from Iraq and with Iran filling the vacuum that was left, Iran became a greater threat to Israel than Hamas and the Sunnis. Therefore, Israel now desires a Sunni regime in Syria that would block Iranian ambitions.

In this sense, Israeli and Russian interests continue to diverge. At the same time, the Israelis are aware that they have very little influence over what happens in Syria. They are bystanders hoping that things work out for them. Whether they favor this or that faction in Syria matters little. Indeed, open Israeli support for any faction can hurt that side. Therefore, Syria is a demonstration of the limits of Israeli power. What happens in Syria matters a great deal, but Israel lacks the power and influence to have an impact.

Coinciding Interests

The Russians do have some power and influence. The weapons they supply to the Syrian government can help the regime survive. Their ability to block or circumvent sanctions helps both Iran and Syria. Russia cannot impose a solution, but it may be able to create the circumstances under which the United States is drawn in and diverted. At the same time, it must be remembered that Russia has its own problem with Islamic in the northern Caucasus. These groups are mostly Sunni, but there are a wide variety of Sunnis. While the Russians want to prevent a radical Sunni group in Syria, they could on this level live with a more moderate Sunni group if they cannot keep al Assad or his regime in power.

Putin’s visit is intended to make the United States nervous and to try to lay the groundwork for shifts in Israel’s relation to Russia that could pay off in the long run. The Israelis, however, do have things they need from Putin. They cannot control regime change in Syria, but to some extent Russia can. And here Israeli and Russian interests coincide. Israel would tolerate the survival of the al Assad regime as long as Syria does not become an Iranian satellite.

Russia could counterbalance Iran if al Assad’s regime survived. If, on the other hand, his regime fell, Israel and Russia both have an interest in a moderate Sunni regime. This is where Russia must make a decision — assuming it has the power to affect the outcome. In the long run, a moderate Sunni regime is in its interest. In the short run, it wants a regime that creates the greatest unease for the United States — that is, either the al Assad regime as an Iranian asset or a radical Islamist regime.

There is a point where all this comes together. Turkey has decided, in response to the downing of its aircraft, to call a meeting of NATO. Turkey is not prepared to unilaterally intervene in Syria, but having lost an aircraft it could ask for a NATO intervention of some sort. Turkey has been hostile to al Assad from early on, and this gives it the opportunity to invoke the alliance under its common defense policy.

How NATO will respond is unknown, save that the rhetoric will be intense and the desire for combat restrained. Neither Russia nor Israel would be upset by a NATO intervention. From the Russian point of view, a NATO intervention involving large amounts of U.S. forces would be the best it could hope for, especially if NATO gets bogged down, as tends to happen in such interventions. From the Israeli point of view, having NATO take responsibility for Syria would be the best possible outcome by far.

Of course, this was not on the table when the Israeli-Russian meeting was set up. At that time, the meeting was meant to explore the differences on subjects such as Syria. But with recent events, the benefits of possible NATO involvement, however unlikely, are something that Russia and Israel agree on. Of course, neither is a member of NATO, and getting any NATO country to commit troops to Syria is unlikely. But what was likely to be a pointless discussion now has some point.

Israel would like Russia as a mild counterweight to the United States but without disrupting relations with the United States. Russia would like to have additional options in the Middle East beyond Iran and Syria but without alienating those states. Neither is likely. When we dig into the strange relationship between two countries deeply involved in each other’s areas of interest yet never quite intersecting, an answer begins to emerge.

There is little conflict between Russia’s and Israel’s interests because neither country is nearly as powerful as it would like to be in the region. Russia has some options but nothing like it had during the Cold War. Israel has little influence in the outcome in Syria or in Egypt.

Still, it is in the interest of both countries to make themselves appear to be weightier than they are. A state visit should help serve that purpose.

Asia Times Online :: The Israeli endgame in Iran.

By Brian M Downing

The international effort to limit Iran’s nuclear research has no more ardent a supporter than Israel. Iran, according to some analysts in and out of Israel, is seeking to build nuclear weapons and is almost certain to use them on Tel Aviv and other Israeli cities, making pre-emptive attacks on Iran essential to national survival. The US and European Union (EU) are more skeptical regarding Iran’s intentions – as are even many Israeli experts.

Only Saudi Arabia and a few other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states share Israel’s alarm and hence support immediate, punishing attacks on Iran. Saudi Arabia is said to have offered overflight rights for Israeli strike aircraft and also help with refueling for their return flights. Strange bedfellows in the affairs of the world. But how enduring will this partnership be? Do the two powers have different endgames in mind? A look at Israeli foreign policy toward Iran over the past 50 years suggests different long-term objectives may be in mind. In short, Saudi Arabia almost certainly wants Iran gravely weakened. Israel does not.

The rise and fall of Iranian-Israeli partnership
Lost in the almost two decades of enmity between Iran and Israel is appreciation that they were allies for many years. Their partnership was based on a shared concern over the power and ambitions of Arab states. The latter opposed the creation of Israel and fought it several times over the years.

Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi opposed those same Arab states. Arab-Persian animosities from distant conquests commingled with geopolitical rivalry, border disputes, and dislike for mercurial populist dictators and Wahhabi zealots. An enduring community of interest with Israel developed and remained a steadfast part of regional geopolitics for 40 years. The shah sold oil to Israel and in return received military equipment and intelligence.

The fall of the shah in 1979 changed many things in the region, but not the Iranian-Israeli partnership. Geopolitical interests continued to triumph over religious differences. Israel proved valuable to Iran during the long war with Iraq – a war brought on by a mercurial populist dictator backed by Wahhabi zealots. Israel continued to sell and service equipment. It was a lesson in realpolitik.

Relations deteriorated in the 1990s as a new strategic situation emerged when the Iraqi military was badly mauled in the first Gulf War (1991). Saddam Hussein’s army, already weakened from eight years of war with Iran, took very heavy casualties and his armor was devastated. Saddam, for reasons of his own, ferried off most of his fighter aircraft to his erstwhile enemy, Iran – presumably to keep them safe. Iran has kept them safe ever since.

Iran became relatively more powerful in the region. There was no check on the revolutionary Shi’ite power, and its influence was growing in Lebanon and Syria along Israel’s northern and eastern boundaries. With Egypt signed off on a peace agreement and Iraq’s military in ruins, Iran became Israel’s primary strategic concern. The soundness of this astonishing change in perspective may be debated for quite some time but its importance for ongoing events is clear. Years of partnership ended and a period of growing tension began. [1]

Israel looks ahead
Today, international sanctions are stifling the Iranian economy and punishing air strikes loom, though not as ominously as a few months ago. Saudi Arabia will press for decisive military action including extensive air campaigns on nuclear research targets and key industrial centers as well. It will also seek an effort to fragment Iran by encouraging insurrections in Kurdish, Arab and Baloch regions. This would leave Tehran a gravely weakened country, and Riyadh the undisputed master of the Gulf. [2]

Dealing a devastating blow to Iran from the air and fragmenting its territorial integrity will have considerable appeal among Israeli strategic thinkers. It would be a tremendous security boon for the country and for its long-standing Kurdish allies in Iran, Iraq and Syria. However, adverse implications will readily appear to strategic thinkers looking further ahead than just the next few years. The firm knowledge that wars lead to unforeseen events and that the Arab world is entering a new, unpredictable period will give Israel much to ponder.

The rise of Saudi power in the region could one day lead to the coalescence of Sunni states under Riyadh’s political and financial leadership. Saudi Arabia and other GCC states are military nullities of course, but they can use their financial assets to garner support in the region, especially from Egypt, Syria, and Sunni parts of western Iraq. Those countries all have significant military traditions; they all need foreign aid; and they all dislike Israel.

Better, then, to concentrate on halting Iran’s nuclear program and even detaching Iran from Syria, but not on gravely weakening and fragmenting the country. Today’s nemesis can be tomorrow’s ally, as even a look into just the past 25 years will reveal. Iran was once an ally against Arab states and may be one again, if only out of the turbulent dynamics of regional geopolitics that have been made all the more changing by recent wars and uprisings.

The US and the EU seek, at least in the long term (and probably the very long term), to help bring democracy to Iran. From the perspective of Israel, however, a democratic Iran, while desirable in principle, would not necessarily be non-nuclear or friendly. The key to Israeli-Iranian comity was based on geopolitical interests, not the goodwill of a shah or ayatollah or president.

1. See Trita Parsi’s masterful Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 2. See The Saudi endgame for Iran (It isn’t everyone else’s), Asia Times Online, June 22, 2012.

Brian M Downing is a political/military analyst and author of The Military Revolution and Political Change and The Paths of Glory: War and Social Change in America from the Great War to Vietnam. He can be reached at brianmdowning@gmail.com.

Fierce clashes reported as Annan presses to invite Iran to meeting on Syria transition.

Tuesday, 26 June 2012

Demonstrators protest against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in Kafranbel, near Idlib. The placard reads: The Russian solution. (Reuters)

inShare4

Jerusalem Post – Breaking News.

British forces in Syria, Assad presidential compound said under attack.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 26, 2012, 11:59 AM (GMT+02:00)

British special forces on field mission

Unconfirmed first reports from British, French and Turkish sources say British special operations forces crossed from Turkey into northern Syria Tuesday, May 26, and advanced up to 10 kilometers inside the country. The same sources report heavy fighting around the Presidential Guards compound on the outskirts of Damascus.
debkafile’s military sources note that this compound exists to defend Bashar Assad’s presidential palace on Mount Qaisoun overlooking Damascus

.
British and Gulf TV stations are again running interviews with dozens of Syrian soldiers taken prisoner by rebel forces and transferred to Free Syrian Army centers in South Turkey. But this time, they are being aired in conjunction with those two developments, indicating pivotal and coordinated military action inside the embattled country, or even the start of western intervention against the Assad regime.
Later Tuesday, Gulf military sources confirmed the presence of British special forces in Syria.
Our military sources estimate that the British military drive into Syria, if confirmed, is designed to establish the first safe zone along the Syrian-Turkish border, to be followed by more Western military incursions to establish additional zones of safe asylum in other parts of Syria.
This follow-up action would depend substantially on Syrian, Russian and Iranian (+ Hizballah) responses to the initial stage of the operation.
The reported British incursion, if confirmed, occurred at the tail end of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 24-hour visit to Israel Tuesday morning and would have posed a direct challenge to his repeated warning that Moscow would not tolerate Western military intervention in Syria and actively prevent it. Similar warnings have issued from Tehran.
As for the timing, the double military drive against Assad also occurred hours before a NATO “consultation” in Brussels on the shooting down of a Turkish warplane by Syria last Friday, June 22,  which Ankara stated Monday “must not go unpunished.”

The two-pronged operation – the reported British incursion and major clash at the front door of Assad’s presidential palace – would appear to be designed to widen the cracks in his regime and speed its final breakup.

Putin visits Western Wall – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Russian President makes late night visit to holy site, says ‘Jewish past is engraved in Jerusalem stone’

Kobi Nahshoni

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Western Wall overnight Tuesday.

Putin arrived at the Old City at 1:30 am, saying that he did not want to miss out on visiting the two holy sites, which have a “special feeling.”

‘Special feeling.’ Putin at Western Wall (Photo: Shalom Freund)

Putin prays at Western Wall (Photo: Shalom Freund)

This is the third visit of the Russian president to the Western Wall. His first visit was before he was elected president, and his second visit was in 2005, during Passover.

Throughout the visit, Putin demonstrated curiosity, asked many questions on the history of the place, and spoke about the Jewish connection to the holy site: “You can see how the Jewish past is engraved in the Jerusalem stone,” he said.

The late night visit followed a busy day of meetings with top Israeli officials including President Shimon Peres, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman.

BBC News – Turkey warns UN over Syrian ‘threat to security’.

Turkey has warned the UN Security Council that Syria’s shooting down of a Turkish military plane represents a “serious threat” to regional security.

Turkey’s deputy prime minister also said Syria’s actions “would not go unpunished”, but made it clear it was not seeking military action.

The comments come as Nato’s governing body prepares to hold an emergency meeting to discuss Friday’s incident.

Damascus insists the F-4 jet was shot down inside Syrian airspace.

In a letter to the Security Council, Turkey condemned the “hostile act by the Syrian authorities against Turkey’s national security”.

It said it posed “a serious threat to peace and security in the region”.

The BBC’s Barbara Plett at the UN says the letter does not ask the council to take any action.

Unknown intruder

Turkey, a Nato member, has requested a meeting of Nato representatives in Brussels and said it would press the alliance to consider the incident as an attack on the whole military alliance.

Following Friday’s incident, Turkey invoked Article 4 of Nato’s founding treaty which entitles any member state to request consultations if it believes its security is threatened.

Syria’s foreign ministry spokesman said the Turkish plane appeared to be a threat

A Nato official quoted by AP news agency said Turkey’s Nato envoy would inform other ambassadors of the details of the incident at Tuesday’s meeting.

The envoys are then expected to discuss Turkey’s concerns but not decide on anything specific, said the official.

The North Atlantic Council – which consists of ambassadors from all 28 Nato countries – works by consensus and all members must approve any action.

Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to outline his next step when he addresses parliament on Tuesday.

‘No warmongering’Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc, speaking after an emergency cabinet meeting on Monday, called the shooting down of the jet “a hostile act of the highest order”.

He vowed that Syria would “not go unpunished” but added that Turkey had “no intention” of going to war.

“We don’t believe warmongering or provoking the crowds by being righteous is the right thing to do. What needs to be done will be done within a legal framework,” he said.

Tensions between Syria and Turkey rose even higher on Monday when Turkey accused its neighbour of firing on another of its planes.

Mr Arinc said the CASA search and rescue plane – which had been looking for the F-4 Phantom jet – was not brought down.

He said the Syrians stopped firing after a warning from the Turkish side.

Ankara has said the jet strayed into Syrian airspace by mistake last Friday but was quickly warned to change course by Turkish authorities and was one mile (1.6km) inside international airspace when it was shot down.

Syria said it was unaware that the plane belonged to Turkey and had been protecting its air space against an unknown intruder.

But in its letter to the UN Security Council, Turkey says that intercepted radio communication shows that Syrian units were fully aware of the circumstances of the flight.

Relations between the two countries were already highly strained before the F-4 was shot down.

Mr Erdogan has been outspoken in his condemnation of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose government he accuses of brutally putting down opposition protests.

Alleged flightpath of downed Turkish F-4 Phantom

1. F-4 Phantom takes off from Erhac airbase, Turkey, at approximately 10:28 local time (07:28 GMT), on 22 June

2. Syria says the jet enters its airspace at 11:40 (08:40 GMT)

3. Turkish military loses contact with the plane at 11:58 (08:58 GMT), while it is over Hatay province

4. Syria says its air defences engaged aircraft about 1km (0.5 nautical miles) from the coast and that it crashed into the sea 10km (5 nautical miles) west of Om al-Tuyour. Turkey says the plane was 24km (13 nautical miles) from Syria, which under international law is considered international airspace

Give Iran the Bomb? A Very, Very Bad Idea | Jewish & Israel News Algemeiner.com.

Nuclear explosion. Photo: wiki commons.

Worried about a nuclear Iran? Do you think such a development would not only threaten Israel’s very existence but would intimidate the Arab countries of the Gulf, put the radical Islamist regime in position to threaten the West, and lead to unmanageable nuclear proliferation?

Have no fear. Along comes Kenneth N. Waltz, the highly respected professor of international relations at Columbia University, who argues in a feature-length article in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs magazine that not only is there nothing to worry about, but in fact, “Iran Should Get the Bomb.”

While Waltz takes a highly unusual approach to the issue by actually arguing that an Iranian bomb would stabilize the Middle East, he knows (and maybe Foreign Affairs knows) he is planting his ideas on somewhat fertile soil. There are significant players around the world who are unhappy with the international efforts to prevent Iran from going nuclear. Those players use some, if not all the arguments that Waltz brings to bear.

The opposition to action against Iran operates on different levels.

It starts with a kind of panic about the possibility of Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. Indeed, the single largest reason why after more than a decade of inaction the international community in the last year-and-a-half has mounted serious sanctions is because of the fear of an imminent Israeli attack. You don’t have to do it, says the world, because we are imposing sanctions and pursuing a diplomatic solution.

In other words, even the positive steps taken to pressure Iran come out of a negative.

Other arguments come into play which are not merely intended to prevent Israeli military action, but which question the wisdom of any kind of a campaign to stop Iran. One argument is that Iran is a completely rational player and therefore the policies of containment that worked between the Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war can now work between Iran and Israel.

Of course, Iran is not the Soviet Union. However evil the Soviet Union, they were not crazy. In the case of Iran, as one Israeli expert put it, there is a high degree of rationality in their policy-making. But there is enough of an element of irrationality and apocalyptic thinking that makes it impossible for Israel to live with a nuclear Iran under such uncertainty.

Others argue that as long as Israel has a nuclear arsenal, the world has no right to deprive Iran from doing the same. Under the rubric of a nuclear-free Middle East, a noble goal, efforts to stop Iran from going nuclear are seen as one-sided and unfair.

Waltz has now brought these various arguments together in one piece and extended them further. It is as if he worries that at this point, any international efforts against Iran will end up leading to the military option rather than prevent it. And therefore he feels the need to say that all such efforts are invalid because Iran’s getting a bomb will be a good thing.

Waltz stretches reality to the breaking point to reach his conclusion, so, it is reasonable to assume he falls into the category that says: there is nothing worse than an Israeli military attack, and that includes allowing Iran to have a bomb.

Waltz is particularly out of touch in two of his claims: that Iran’s having a bomb will bring more stability to the region, and it will not lead to nuclear proliferation in the region.

Just ask the Arab states whether they agree with these conclusions. The U.S. diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks made clear that the Gulf States are just as concerned about an Iranian bomb as is Israel.

They see an Iran with a bomb as a nation that will try to intimidate its neighbors, make greater claims over disputed territories and try to promote Shia interests over Sunni — in other words, a major force for instability.

And what will they do about it? Inevitably, some will seek their own nuclear capacity to offset Iran.

Waltz argues that proliferation will not happen because it did not happen for decades when the Arabs learned their enemy — Israel — had its own weapons.

In fact, the example of Israel proves the opposite point. In the case of Israel, the Arabs did not see a need to build their own bombs because they knew, despite their rhetoric, that Israel was no threat to them.

In the case of Iran there is true anxiety in the Arab world and the likelihood of proliferation is very high indeed.

In sum, Iran is and should be seen as a threat by Israel, by the Arabs, by the Western world.

Waltz’s piece is a last-ditch and fairly pathetic effort to argue against international moves to stop an Iranian bomb. It is absurd on its face.

But because of where it was published and by whom, and because there are many in the elites who share at least some of his thinking, we probably haven’t heard the last of this.

Abraham H. Foxman is National Director of the Anti-Defamation League.

After an Israeli Strike on Iran – Daniel Pipes – National Review Online.

The consequences wouldn’t be cataclysmic.

By Daniel Pipes

How would Iranians respond to an Israeli strike against their nuclear infrastructure? The answers given to this question matter greatly, as predictions about Iran’s response will affect not only Jerusalem’s decision, but also how much other states will work to impede an Israeli strike.

Analysts generally offer best-case predictions for policies of deterrence and containment (some commentators even go so far as to welcome an Iranian nuclear capability) while forecasting worst-case results from a strike. They foresee Tehran doing everything possible to retaliate, such as kidnapping, terrorism, missile attacks, naval combat, and closing the Strait of Hormuz. These predictions ignore two facts: Neither of Israel’s prior strikes against enemy states building nuclear weapons — Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 — prompted retaliation; and a review of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s history since 1979 points to, in the words of Michael Eisenstadt and Michael Knights, “a more measured and less apocalyptic — if still sobering — assessment of the likely aftermath of a preventive strike.”

Eisenstadt and Knights of the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy provide an excellent guide to possible scenarios in “Beyond Worst-Case Analysis: Iran’s Likely Responses to an Israeli Preventive Strike.” Their survey of Iranian behavior over the past three decades leads them to anticipate that three main principles would likely shape and limit Tehran’s response to an Israeli strike: an insistence on reciprocity, a caution not to gratuitously make enemies, and a wish to deter further Israeli (or American) strikes.

The mullahs, in other words, face serious limits on their ability to retaliate, including military weakness and a pressing need not to make yet more external enemies. With these guidelines in place, Eisenstadt and Knights consider eight possible Iranian responses, which must be assessed while keeping in mind the alternative to preemptive action — namely, apocalyptic Islamists controlling nuclear weapons:

1. Terrorist attacks on Israeli, Jewish, and U.S. targets. Likely, but causing limited destruction.

2. Kidnapping of U.S. citizens, especially in Iraq. Likely, but limited in impact, as in the 1980s in Lebanon.

3. Attacks on Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan. Very likely, especially via proxies, but causing limited destruction.

4. Missile strikes on Israel. Likely: a few missiles from Iran getting through Israeli defenses, leading to casualties likely in the low hundreds; missiles from Hezbollah limited in number due to domestic Lebanese considerations. Unlikely: Hamas getting involved, having distanced itself from Tehran; the Syrian government interfering, since it is battling for its life against an ever-stronger opposition army and possibly the Turkish armed forces. Overall, missile attacks are unlikely to do devastating damage.

5. Attacks on neighboring states. Likely: especially using terrorist proxies, for the sake of deniability. Unlikely: missile strikes, for Tehran does not want to make more enemies.

6. Clashes with the U.S. Navy. Likely, but, given the balance of power, doing limited damage.

7. Covertly mining the Strait of Hormuz. Likely, causing a run-up in energy prices.

8. Attempted closing of the Strait of Hormuz. Unlikely: difficult to achieve and potentially too damaging to Iranian interests, because the country needs the strait for commerce.

The authors also consider three potential side effects of an Israeli strike. Yes, Iranians might rally to their government in the immediate aftermath of a strike, but in the longer term Tehran “could be criticized for handling the nuclear dossier in a way that led to military confrontation.” The so-called Arab street is perpetually predicted to rise up in response to outside military attack, but it never does; it’s likely that unrest among the Shiite Muslims of the Persian Gulf would be counterbalanced by the many Arabs quietly cheering the Israelis. As for Iran leaving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and starting an overt, crash nuclear-weapons program, while “a very real possibility,” the more the Iranians retaliated against a strike, the harder they would find it to obtain the parts for such a program.

In all, these dangers are unpleasant but not cataclysmic, manageable not devastating. Eisenstadt and Knights expect a short phase of high-intensity Iranian response, to be followed by a “protracted low-intensity conflict that could last for months or even years” — much as already exists between Iran and Israel. An Israeli preventive strike, they conclude, while a “high-risk endeavor carrying a potential for escalation in the Levant or the Gulf . . . would not be the apocalyptic event some foresee.”

This analysis makes a convincing case that the danger of nuclear weapons falling into Iranian hands far exceeds the danger of a military strike to prevent this from happening.

— Daniel Pipes is president of the Middle East Forum and Taube Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. © 2012 by Daniel Pipes. All rights reserved.

Putin: Don’t rush to strike Iran – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Warning from Putin: Visiting Russian president cautions Israel against hasty military action in Iran, says ‘look at what happened to the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan’

Attila Somfalvi

President Vladimir Putin expressed his reservations over the prospect of a military strike in Iran, urging Israel Monday to learn from negative US experience in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Putin’s comments were made in a meeting with Shimon Peres in Jerusalem, after Israel’s president asked the visiting leader to speak out on the Iran issue.

Related stories:

• Putin in Israel, inaugurates WWII memorial 
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“Look at what happened to the Americans in Afghanistan and in Iraq. I told Obama the same thing,” the visiting president said in a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, cautioning against hasty military action. “There is no need to do things too quickly; one should not act without thinking first.”

“Iraq has a pro-Iranian regime after everything that has happened there. These things should be thought out ahead of time before doing something one will regret later,” he said. “One should not act prematurely.”

‘Russia wants peace for Israel’

Earlier in the evening, Putin said that his country “has a national interest in guaranteeing peace and tranquility for Israel.”

The Russian president noted that the former Soviet Union supported the State of Israel’s establishment, adding that his talks earlier Monday with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu were constructive and pertained to the need to boost strategic ties between the two countries.

Friendly visit (Photo: Gil Yohanan)

Speaking at a state dinner held for his Russian counterpart, Peres expressed his hope that Putin would contribute to the achievement of peace in the region, making note of his “warm attitude” towards the Jewish state.

Peres added that “the Iranian people are not our enemy. Israel does threaten their existence. It is Iran’s current regime that indentifies itself as an enemy of Israel and a threat to its existence.”

BIbi: Israel, Russia agree on Iran

Israel and Russia agree that Iranian nuclear weapons would constitute grave danger for the Jewish state and for the whole world, PM Netanyahu said earlier Monday following his meeting with Putin.

“I believe that we should be doing two things now: Boosting the sanctions (on Iran) and also boosting the demands,” Netanyahu said.

Putin and Netanyahu (Photo: Marc Israel Sellem)

The Russian president said the two leaders “spoke in detail about the Syria issue and about the Iranian nuclear program.”

“I would like to stress again that the negotiations were detailed and very effective,” he said. “I’m convinced that the cooperation between Russia and Israel will develop later as well, and this matter certainly meets the demands and interests of both states, in the region and in the world at large.”

‘Friendly ties’

Speaking to the media after meeting PM Netanyahu, Putin thanked Israel’s leadership for inviting him to visit.

“My visit here reinforced the assumption that we have friendly relations, and these are not just friendly relations,” Putin said. “This is a solid basis for building dialogue and partnership.”

Putin greeted by PM’s wife (Photo: Amos Ben Gershom, GPO)

Earlier Monday, President Peres greeted Putin in a dedication ceremony for a memorial to the Red Army’s victory over Nazi Germany in Netanya. Peres said he is certain that Russia, which fought fascism, will not tolerate similar threats, “not an Iranian threat and not bloodshed in Syria.”

Signal to Egypt

During Monday’s press conference, Netanyahu also addressed regional realities, referring to the Islamist victory in Egypt’s presidential elections.

The PM said that Israel “appreciates the democratic process in Egypt” and respects the Egyptian election results.

“We look forward to working together with the new administration on the basis of the peace agreement between us,” Netanyahu said. “I believe peace is important for Israel. I believe peace is important for Egypt.”

Meanwhile, President Putin addressed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, asserting that “against the backdrop of events in the Middle East, it is important to resolve longtime conflicts.”

“We urge all sides to renew negotiations; this is the only way to resolve the problem,” the Russian president said.