In 1967, a New Unity Government Foretold Israel’s Preemptive Attack. Will It Again? – Tablet Magazine.

Israel’s new coalition echoes the unity government that came together on the eve of the Six Day War

One thing’s certain: Tuesday’s sudden and dramatic expansion of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government—he now has the support of 94 Knesset members in the 120-seat house—considerably strengthens Netanyahu’s mandate to take what commentators insist on calling “historic steps.” But it is unclear whether the cooption of Shaul Mofaz and his Kadima faction makes an Israeli preemptive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities more likely or more remote.

We’ve been here before. Likud’s political coup carries echoes of another fateful moment: the establishment of a national unity government on June 1, 1967, the eve of the Six Day War, when Israel felt threatened by a burgeoning, militant Arab coalition headed by Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Back then, a left-wing government, led by Labor Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, was joined under popular pressure by right-wing parties (Menachem Begin’s Herut and Moshe Dayan’s Rafi) to present a united front mere days before Israel, on June 5, launched its devastating preemptive strike against Egypt.

Eshkol and Dayan could not have been more different. The prime minister was soft-spoken, with a wry sense of humor and European manners. Dayan, on the other hand, was brash, bold, and outspoken. One could only imagine how Eshkol felt when he had to abandon the ministry of defense—following Ben-Gurion’s precedent, the prime minister also claimed for himself what was clearly the Cabinet’s most important portfolio—forced by intense public pressure to hand it over to his polar opposite. But Eshkol made the difficult call for the sake of national security.

Today Israel faces the threat of a nuclear Iran—and the prospect of attacking Iranian nuclear facilities without a green light from Washington. But Mofaz is no Dayan.

The Iranian-born politician is known as “Mr. Zigzag”—the Israeli equivalent of flip-flopper. A former IDF paratroop commander and chief of general staff, back in the early 2000s Mofaz was a Likud stalwart (and defense minister). But he bolted the party, which he had called his “home,” in 2005 for Kadima when he realized he wouldn’t become the head of Likud. Six weeks ago, he was elected by Kadima’s rank and file as the new leader of the party, replacing Tzipi Livni, who had inherited Kadima leadership with the fall of then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in 2009.

Just days ago, Mofaz vowed not to join Netanyahu’s “crumbling” government and had publicly called the prime minister “a liar” in whom he had no trust. During the past months, he has been a public and staunch opponent of bombing Iran anytime soon, arguing that the nuclear problem must be resolved by the international community through sanctions and diplomacy. In any case, he argued, there was still substantial time before the military option had to be considered.

And yet now, Mofaz will join Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak in a three-man kitchen Cabinet or the fuller eight-man “Inner Cabinet,” where the call of whether or not to launch a military strike against Iran will be decided. Both Netanyahu and Barak are on record as pessimists when it comes to the possibility that sanctions or diplomacy will stop Tehran’s march toward nuclear weapons. Both have made it clear that Israel will have to rely on its armed forces to resolve the problem, whether or not Washington gives Jerusalem a green light.

Thinking in Jerusalem is currently focused on the period between July, when a further round of sanctions against Iran will kick in, and the American presidential elections in November. Netanyahu and Barak believe that President Obama will find it very difficult to punish Israel for attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities just before the elections, since Obama will need the help of Jewish donors and voters, and other supporters of Israel, to win. On the other hand, an Israeli strike after the November elections will incur Obama’s wrath—and, some fear, could translate into sanctions against Israel.

No one knows whether Netanyahu elicited from Mofaz a secret promise to support, or at least a vow not to block, a strike against Iran as the price of his entry into the government, where he will serve as a minister without portfolio. But clearly Netanyahu—recently under attack from a number of senior defense figures, including Yuval Diskin ^[1], the former head of Shin Bet and ex-Mossad head Meir Dagan, both of whom oppose attacking Iran at present; and, more mutedly, by current IDF chief of general staff Benny Gantz ^[2], who said he doesn’t believe Iran will “go the extra mile” and build a bomb—was clearly happy to have Mofaz on board. With the backing of 94 MKs, Netanyahu will present a far more solid antagonist for Obama or any other external or internal doubting Thomases in the coming months.

Mofaz was eager to join the government. The day before striking the deal, the Cabinet had voted for early general elections, to be held on Sept. 4. Opinion polls had predicted that Netanyahu would triumph and emerge as the only politician able to form a new government. Meanwhile, Kadima was predicted to win fewer than 10 seats, which would have relegated Mofaz to political oblivion. (Currently, Kadima has 28 seats, won by Livni in the 2009 elections.) The opinion polls predicted that the lost Kadima seats would have been divided between Labor, with its current leader Shelly Yachimovich replacing Mofaz as leader of the opposition, and Yair Lapid, a popular journalist and son of former center-right politician Tommy Lapid. At least in the short term, Lapid and Yachimovich are the losers in the Netanyahu-Mofaz coup.

Mofaz and Netanyahu—who was not eager to hold general elections because a recent Supreme Court ruling demanded that the government remove an illegal West Bank settlement by July, which would have embroiled the prime minister in bitter controversy with his right-wing allies—have clearly come out the winners. But the Israeli public, too, may well have gained a genuinely unified government, which is why instant opinion polls suggested that the bulk of Israelis supports the Kadima-Likud alliance.

The public opposed early elections as a waste of money that would have delivered no real change. According to the official coalition deal signed between Mofaz and Netanyahu, the new government will promote legislation that will force the ultra-Orthodox community to, at long last, send its sons to do military or other national service and join the labor market (until now, they have basically lived off state subsidies, paid for by the taxes of the largely secular middle and working classes). Getting the ultra-Orthodox to serve in the army and work has been a basic demand of most Israelis, left and right, for decades.

Netanyahu and Mofaz have also agreed to radically change the Israeli political system, which is based on proportional representation. The system has tended to give small, mainly religious parties too much power and the ability to extort political concessions and financial subsidies from the coalitions in which they almost inevitably participate. (Yet most Israeli political commentators have suggested that Netanyahu will balk at implementing such reform, fearing that next time around, the religious parties will take revenge by preferring Labor or a centrist party to the Likud as their potential coalition partners.)

Lastly, Mofaz and Netanyahu agreed to make concessions to last year’s street protesters, who demanded increased government subsidies in education, housing, and other services. Whether the new coalition will indeed deliver is yet to be seen.

Most Israelis are now thinking about their summer vacations in Europe or their unpaid bills (or both). Not Netanyahu. Last week, Netanyahu buried his 102-year-old father, Benzion Netanyahu, a historian of the Spanish Inquisition and, in the 1930s, a vociferous publicist and prophet warning against the impending Holocaust. In interviews in recent years, the elder Netanyahu loudly decried the Iranian nuclear project as a threat to Israel’s very existence. His son, who has in the past three years repeatedly compared Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Hitler, clearly sees neutralizing the Iranian threat as his historic duty and future legacy. He may well have given his father his word on this.

In 1967, the Eshkol-Dayan coalition was a prelude to war. Was adding Mofaz—and 27 other Kadima members of Knesset—part of Netanyahu’s strategy to carry out a risky mission against a similarly brutal enemy? Stay tuned

Obama helped change global opinion on Iran: Biden.

(Truly laughable… Israel had nothing to do with it.  –  JW  )

Wednesday, 09 May 2012

“We were neither fully respected by our friends nor feared by our opponents.” said, Vice President Joe Biden. (Photo illustration by Amarjit Sidhu)

By AFP 

Strenger than Fiction-Israel News – Haaretz Israeli News source..

(While not about the Iran conflict, Strenger’s analysis of the potential solution to the Palestinian conflict posed by the new coalition in Israel is very much worth reading. – JW )

Mofaz’s two-phased plan for peace with the Palestinians could force both Netanyahu and Abbas to make tough, fateful decisions.

By Carlo Strenger

Yesterday’s political bombshell, for obvious reasons, has left both citizens and commentators dumbfounded. It has been pointed out thatNetanyahu is now the undisputed king of Israeli politics: basically no single coalition party has any real power over him; each and every one of them now knows that Netanyahu can live without them.

Of course Netanyahu and Mofaz explained why they went for this move only because of the greater good, and of course most Israelis don’t believe them, because the political interests are too clear. After all this is said, and the winners and losers of this development have been named, we should have a dry look at Israel’s new situation: what can we expect, and what are the major decision points of Netanyahu’s new coalition?

	Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu talks with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on September 2, 2010.
	Photo by: AP

Both Israel’s domestic and the international press focus on Iran. Israeli commentators tend to emphasize that the wall-to-wall coalition provides Netanyahu with more bargaining power, whereas the international press hopes that Mofaz brings a more cautious position on military intervention into the government.

To my mind the most interesting factor is one that has been mentioned only rarely: the new coalition agreement’s commitment to resuming negotiations with the Palestinians. As we know from formerShin Bet Chief Yuval Diskin (and many of us thought all along), Netanyahu rather than Abbas refused to negotiate. So far he had little room to do so, as he was at the mercy of his right-wing coalition partners – and he always indicated that this was the reason he made sure nothing happened.

I have never thought that this was the only reason for Netanyahu’s stalling any movement on the Palestinian front: he has never believed that it is in Israel’s interest to allow a viable Palestinian state to emerge. Whatever the truth may be, the excuse that his coalition prevents him from moving ahead on the Palestine front is no longer valid: with Kadima’s 28 MKs in his coalition, Netanyahu no longer depends on either Shas or Lieberman’s Yisrael Beitenu.

Netanyahu’s new coalition partner Mofaz, for quite some time, has advocated a two-phased peace plan. He proposes to immediately establish a Palestinian state on 60 percent of the West Bank, thus liberating more than 99 percent of Palestinians from Israeli rule. This would create favorable conditions for final status negotiations.

Mofaz’s plan would require dismantling a number of settlement outposts placed in the 60 percent to be ruled by Palestinians. Implementing the Mofaz plan means to put an end to the dream of the greater land of Israel; it would make a Palestinian state a fact, and the question would only be, how the final borders will look.

Hence, in the next eighteen months, Netanyahu’s moment of truth will come: So far Netanyahu’s commitment to the two-state solution in his 2009 Bar-Ilan speech has been nothing but lip-service. He has consistently avoided confrontation with the settlers and with the large faction in his party that continues to believe in the greater land of Israel.

If Mofaz puts his plan on the new government’s table, Netanyahu will either have to make a decisive step towards ending Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the century old conflict with the Palestinians, or go down in history as the man who destroyed any option for doing so.

A lot of ink has been spilled on the question whether his father’s death will give Netanyahu more freedom to act creatively. I am afraid that this is not the only factor: Netanyahu has a characterological distaste for grand moves. As tactician supreme, he feels safe, and his latest maneuver’s success might strengthen his resolve to continue playing for time without making real decisions. His distaste for risk-taking, no less than his father’s Manichean worldview, will determine the road he will take.

If Netanyahu chooses to move ahead with something like the Mofaz plan, Mahmoud Abbas’ moment of truth for will come, because it will not be easy for him to take this road. Palestinians are afraid that if in any multi-phased process, the intermediary stage of a Palestinian state on 60 percent of the West Bank might turn into the final status. Given that the occupation has been in place for forty five years, these suspicions are more than understandable. As a result, Abbas might opt to refuse cooperation on the basis of the Mofaz plan, and demand that the final status agreement needs to be reached first.

This, I believe, would be a historical mistake. Abbas must realize that Israelis need at least a decade of peace on the Palestinian front to accept the idea that Palestine will reach the 1967 borders, and put Israel’s population centers within striking distance of Katyusha rockets. Mofaz’s plan could provide the physical and political conditions for such a decade of peace; it would make Palestinian lives immeasurably better, while safeguarding Israel’s security.

Establishing a Palestinian state with temporary borders would decisively undermine rejectionists on both sides: it would make clear to Israel’s ideological right that its dream has come to an end. If indeed a new reality on the ground would give Palestinians more freedom and dignity, this would strengthen Abbas: it would show Palestinians that there is a political horizon, and that they have only to loose from endorsing Hamas rejectionist line. This, in turn, would force Hamas within a few years to change its political program, and to accept Israel’s existence.

Abbas should therefore engage with the Mofaz plan if it is put on the table. I am completely aware that this will be very difficult for him: he will be accused by his foes to sell out his people’s interest; he will be called a collaborator with the enemy. He will have to use all his political acumen and the leadership status he achieved during the last years to convince his people that this is the only way of establishing a Palestinian state on the ground, and that, in the long run, Palestinians will only gain from this.

UK seeks delay to EU\’s Iran ship… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

Britain tries persuade EU to postpone insurance ban on Iranian oil tankers for 6 months, arguing could cause oil prices spike.

Photo: Tim Chong/Reuters

Reversing Course, Journalist Says Israel Attack Unikely This Year | The Jewish Week.

An Israeli military strike “is not imminent,” and highly unlikely to take place in the next six months, according to Ronen Bergman, the high-profile Israeli journalist whose New York Times Magazine cover story, “Will Israel Attack Iran?” (Jan. 25), concluded otherwise.

Bergman, the polished, self-assured senior political and military analyst for Yediot Achronot, told The Jewish Week that “nothing will happen before the U.S. elections,” and only after that if Iran presents an immediate and serious threat to Israel.

He added with certainty that “the U.S. will not lead” an attack on Iran.

In an interview May 1 prior to his appearance with Rabbi Yitz Greenberg, the founder of Clal: National Jewish Center for Learning and Leadership, at the Riverdale Y, Bergman said Israelis are deeply worried about Iran making good on threats to wipe Israel off the map, and people stop him on the street to ask “when will it take place, not ‘if’,” he said.

Bergman’s thorough report in The New York Times Magazine concluded, “after speaking with many senior Israeli leaders and chiefs of the military and the intelligence, I have come to believe that Israel will indeed strike Iran in 2012,” based on the conviction that the U.S. will not intervene and that Israelis feel only they “can ultimately defend themselves.”

In the interview last week, though, he implied that his Times report may have had an impact on the course of world events since it “created some commotion” among American officials and helped add pressure on the U.S. and Europe to strengthen sanctions on Tehran.

“Many things happened in the last three months” to ease the fear of a looming Israel attack on Iran’s nuclear program, Bergman said, including the Obama-Netanyahu White House meeting in March, which he said left administration officials feeling “a bit more relaxed” that the two leaders held similar positions regarding Iran. Another key factor is the upcoming presidential election in November, he added. (The interview took place before this week’s Likud-Kadima deal, which also appears Iran-related, with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said to be seeking to solidify his political position prior to the American elections.)

Bergman, a prominent print journalist who also has a television show in Israel, said that as recently as two weeks ago a senior Israeli official told him that “nothing has changed” in terms of the thought process of government leaders, who believe that Israel’s decision regarding a military strike will be made strictly based on its assessment of Iran’s actions.

Regarding the tougher economic sanctions in place, Bergman said that two years ago Israeli officials would not have believed them possible and “would have been cheering” over what has been accomplished. “But is it too late” to stop Iran’s push for nuclear arms, he wondered, pointing out that Iran will not meet any of the “four or five preconditions” Israel has set regarding the upcoming negotiations between Iran and the U.S. and its Western allies.

The discussions between U.S. and Israeli officials on the Iran issue are “at the highest level ever,” Bergman said, but the two sides still appear to differ on the timing of a military strike. The U.S. speaks of preventing an attack, while Israel focuses on striking before a bomb is actually prepared.

He noted that both the U.S. and Israel employ vague language to hide their differences.

Bergman says it is “wrong” for Netanyahu to compare the Holocaust to Iran’s threat to Israel, because the Jewish state is strong militarily and “can defend itself.” A grandson of Holocaust survivors, Bergman believes the Shoah’s “memory should remain unique,” and that all Israelis, not only survivors, are “profoundly impacted” by the tragedy.

In the program that evening moderated by Yeshiva University President Richard Joel, launching The Rose Dialogue Series at the Riverdale Y, Rabbi Greenberg said “the Holocaust has to be the guiding light” to Israel’s response to the threats from Iran, and one lesson is that “you take people seriously when they threaten you.”

No Israeli prime minister who feels responsible for the Jewish people could trust its fate to another country, he asserted, adding that it is the responsibility of American Jews to prod Washington in assuring Israel’s security, based on American interests as well as the moral argument of preventing another Holocaust.

Bergman told the audience of several hundred that Israel has numerous allies in the region opposed to Iran obtaining nuclear arms. A number of Arab states, he said, have a “deep fear and hatred of Iran.”

In his initial remarks Bergman focused on the efforts of the Mossad, Israel’s national intelligence agency. (He is writing a book on the history of the agency and says he has interviewed 650 people as part of his research.)

Thanks to its efforts, he said, Israeli intelligence “has regained the upper hand” in the last several years in its clandestine war with Iran and terror groups it sponsors like Hamas and Hezbollah.

Bergman credited Israel’s leaders for a willingness to authorize the intelligence community to undertake “full-risk operations that would put James Bond to shame.”

Moving forward on Iran: Kadima joins Bibi | Jerusalem Post – Blogs.

Ed Kotch

JERUSALEM — Less than two weeks ago, Yuval Diskin, the recently retired chief of Israel’s internal security agency, carried out a blistering verbal assaulton Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his defense minister, Ehud Barak, questioning their judgment in handling what they regard as an Iranian nuclear threat and accusing them of making decisions “based on messianic feelings.”

On Tuesday, as Mr. Netanyahu stood shoulder to shoulder with Shaul Mofaz, a former defense minister and military chief of staff and now the leader of the centrist Kadima Party, and welcomed him into the governing coalition, it was as if the prime minister was offering some kind of response, especially for a jittery Israeli public generally averse to a lone Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

While Mr. Netanyahu and Mr. Barak have presented an aggressive stance against Iran, Mr. Mofaz is regarded as a more moderate voice who opposes any rush into military action. After becoming head of the opposition in March, he said in a television interview that an early attack on Iran could be “disastrous” and bring “limited results.”

Denouncing what he saw as the government’s Iran-centric policy to the detriment of the peace process with the Palestinians, Mr. Mofaz, who is Iranian-born, also said, in an interview in April, that “the greatest threat to the state of Israel is not a nuclear Iran.” Asked at a news conference on Tuesday about their differences on Iran, Mr. Netanyahu, addressing his home audience in Hebrew, said that their discussions “are serious, and will be serious and responsible.” Often referring to himself and Mr. Mofaz as judicious people, he spoke with an air of gravitas.

Many politicians and analysts argued that far from signaling any change in Israeli policy toward Iran, the inclusion of Mr. Mofaz and Kadima in the coalition would strengthen Mr. Netanyahu’s hand.

Yisrael Katz, the minister of transportation, told Israel Radio that if he were President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran, he would be worried “because from today the state of Israel will be more united, both in its ability to deter and also, if necessary, in its ability to act.”

Ayoob Kara, a Likud Party deputy minister, said a strong government was necessary to deal with Iran. “If we are in consensus in Israel,” he said, “it gives us more power.”

Einat Wilf, a legislator from the small Independence faction, led by Mr. Barak, said that it was essential to keep the threat of a military option on the table and that with a broad Israeli consensus, “the credibility is higher.”

While Iran insists that its uranium enrichment program is for civilian purposes, Israeli, American and European officials say they believe that the Iranians are working toward the capability to build nuclear weapons.

Mr. Netanyahu, by broadening his coalition and thereby averting early elections, has bought himself more time and government stability. Since Mr. Barak’s faction may not have won any seats in the next Parliament, the extension is Mr. Netanyahu’s surest way of keeping his defense minister.

“I think it enables him to keep Iran on the front burner,” David Makovsky, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’sProject on the Middle East Peace Process, said in a telephone interview.

“It suddenly buys him quiet for a year and a half,” he said, adding, “He’s able to unite the country easier around the course of action if he incorporates his chief opposition party.”

But with polls showing that Mr. Mofaz’s Kadima could lose more than half its 28 parliamentary seats in an early election, his influence in the government will probably be circumscribed.

“Such weakness,” said Meir Javedanfar, a lecturer on Iranian politics at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, “means that his impact on the government’s Iran policy and narrative is likely to be limited.”

Although Mr. Netanyahu has used almost every platform to warn of what he calls the dangers to Israel and the world of a nuclear Iran, neither he nor Mr. Mofaz referred to the issue directly on Tuesday as they introduced their partnership at a news conference in the Parliament building.

Mr. Mofaz also did not mention Iran in his overnight meeting with Kadima Parliament members about his surprise deal with Mr. Netanyahu, said Nachman Shai, a legislator who had attended. But, he added, “it is always there, somewhere on the horizon.”

Ms. Wilf, of Mr. Barak’s faction, said that personal attacks and differences in language aside, there was broad agreement in Israel on what needed to be done about Iran, which already is the target of international sanctions.

“Everyone is saying they would prefer the sanctions to work,” backed up with the threat of a credible military option, she said. Only if all else fails, she said, should Israel act alone.

“Everyone is saying the same thing,” she said, “though there may be a difference of tone.”

If Obama’s Rhetoric on Syria is a Joke, Why Trust Him on Iran? « Commentary Magazine.

Jonathan S. Tobin | @tobincommentary 05.08.2012 – 6:10 PM

Is Iran just an excuse for Israel\’s new unity government? – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Mofaz has made clear that he does not share Netanyahu’s and Barak’s sense of urgency that a decision must be made even before this year is out.

By Amos Harel

Is Iran just an excuse? That is the main security question floating over the surprise decision to establish a national unity government and forego early elections. Just last week, when Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu decided to move up elections, he explained to a number of media outlets that elections in September would make it easier for him and Defense Minister Ehud Barak to attack Iran. On Tuesday, the exact same claim was heard, but going in the opposite direction: MK Shaul Mofaz and Kadima joining the coalition would stabilize the political situation and make it easier to deal resolutely, if necessary, with Iran.

But this explanation is relevant mainly if decisive new information emerges that changes basic positions on the Iranian question.

	Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Kadima head Shaul Mofaz at a joint news conference announcing national unity government, Jerusalem, May 8, 2012.
	Photo by: Emil Salman

Kadima’s chairman has taken a great deal of fire for his political flip-flop, for joining a government led by a man he described not long ago as a liar, and for breaking his (empty ) promise to lead the social protest this summer. But politicians’ flip-flopping out of dread of the ballot box is nothing new.

What, if anything, actually happens with Iran is more important.

Only a little more than a month ago, after Mofaz was elected chairman of Kadima, he told Haaretz’s Yossi Verter in an interview that at least two years still remained to deal with the Iranian threat. Mofaz has made clear that he does not share Netanyahu’s and Barak’s sense of urgency that a decision must be made even before this year is out.

But now that political considerations have caused him to bend so much, will he be able to stand tall again if a decision to attack must be made?

There is practically no ideological component in the dispute over how to deal with Iran. This debate is strategic and personal. The entire Israeli leadership, past and present, agrees that an Israeli military attack should not be ruled out as a last resort. The debate is over whether Israel should act relatively soon, despite clear U.S. opposition.

Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan, and even more so former Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, inserted the personal element into the discussion in their direct attacks on the purity of Barak’s and Netanyahu’s motives.

Mofaz’s views are not far from Diskin’s and Dagan’s. Thus, unless something fateful happens on the ground, Mofaz’s joining the security forum of eight senior ministers will actually have a moderating effect.

Like most significant decisions Israeli prime ministers make, it will probably take time before we know the real reasons for Netanyahu’s actions, before we get past the official version to the behind-the-scenes considerations.

Even in the surprising decision to make a deal for Gilad Shalit’s release, only in hindsight did it become clear that the need for an achievement which would make the people happy after a summer of social protest played a key role.

At least for now, the most reasonable explanation has to do with politics, not Iran. Netanyahu was facing a double threat: the law to dissolve the Knesset, which he himself set in motion, and the two-month deadline the High Court of Justice set for the evacuation of the houses in the West Bank neighborhood of Ulpana, which could yet set him on a collision course with the settlers. He also failed at the Likud central committee convention earlier this week. Meanwhile, Mofaz was pushed into the unity government because of the polls’ ominous predictions of his party’s crash on election day.

At Tuesday’s joint press conference, the pair hardly mentioned Iran. When Netanyahu was asked about disagreements between himself and Mofaz on the issue, his response was vague. Iran, until proven otherwise, does not seem to be the main impetus behind the unity government.

BusinessDay – Netanyahu surprise gives Israel grand coalition.

Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu attends the weekly cabinet meeting in Jerusalem. Picture: REUTERS