WarSclerotic

Israel’s new “first pilot,” Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, was appointed commander of the Israel Air Force in a ceremony that took place in Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz’s office in the Kirya Defense Ministry compound in Tel Aviv on Thursday. Defense Minister Ehud Barak was also at the event, and, together with Gantz and other general staff officers, congratulated Eshel.

Eshel replaces current IAF Commander Maj. Gen. Ido Nechushtan, who is retiring in May after four years in the post and a military career spanning 37 years. A ceremony marking the transfer of authority is scheduled for May 14 at the Hatzor Airbase in the center of the country.

Eshel, who until his new appointment was head of the IDF Planning Directorate, faces the possibility of having to conduct a military strike on Iran during his term.

“Maj. Gen. Ido Nechushtan is leaving behind him a strong and capable air force, having left his own stamp on many of its processes and methods of operation. We are facing significant challenges and are ready for any mission we will be asked to carry out,” Eshel said during the ceremony.

Nechushtan said, “The air force is a unit that is constantly at work, 365 days a year, from the Dan region to Eilat and everywhere else in the world, always thinking of Israel’s security.”

After congratulating Eshel, Barak said, “In the past two generations, the air force has become Israel’s primary deciding factor, and the spearhead of our power of deterrence.”

Gantz thanked Nechushtan for his many years of service and said, “We have the best air force in the world. It carries upon its shoulders a heavy, critical and urgent strategic weight.”

Eshel, 52, was born in Jaffa. He began his career as a Skyhawk pilot and led sorties during the First Lebanon War. During his service, Eshel piloted a range of aircraft including F-16, F-15, Kurnass, as well as Apache, Cobra and Sea Stallion helicopters and several lighter aircraft. He has logged more than 5,500 flight hours.

In 1991, Eshel was appointed to head the Barak flight squadron in Ramat David. Two years later he was promoted to head a Kurnass squadron at the Tel Nof base. In 1996, he headed operations in the Air Force Headquarters, which is considered a key position. Eshel consistently stood out as quick on his feet and as someone who got things done.

In 1999, when he was assigned to the Ramon IAF base, he was involved in a serious training accident that miraculously spared all involved: While training on an Apache helicopter, Eshel and a fellow pilot pushed the ordnance launch button, as per protocol, in an open area, to ensure that the aircraft was not armed. To their horror, a projectile was fired, striking a hill near a group of reserves soldiers. Luckily, no one was hurt.

Two years later Eshel commanded the Tel Nof base and in 2004 he was promoted to the third most senior position in the force: commander of the IAF’s Air Division. It was while he was in this position that the Second Lebanon War erupted (which was initially waged almost entirely from the air). According to foreign reports, it was during his tenure as commander of the Air Division that Israel allegedly bombed a secret Syrian nuclear facility at Dir al-Zur.

Eshel was also a candidate for the IAF commander post in 2008, but it was Nechushtan who was ultimately appointed. Eshel then replaced Nechushtan as head of the Planning Directorate.

The story most frequently associated with Eshel, however, is the non-military flyover at Auschwitz in 2003. Eshel initiated the event and led the flyover. A photo of that flyover can be found in the offices of many senior Israeli officials, both in the military and the government.

The new government can definitely be a force to be reckoned with in the diplomatic arena, both with the Palestinians and with the American administration. Jump-starting the stalled peace process is no longer up to Israel — even the Americans and the Europeans understand that now. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Vice Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz called on Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to take this opportunity and jump on the bandwagon. Mofaz can serve as the ladder that enables the Palestinians to climb off their ledge. The man who at one time formulated an agreement by which Israel would relinquish 100 percent of Palestinian land can be seen as a fresh partner for dialogue and a bridge to Netanyahu’s and the government’s official stance.

Mofaz can assume the role of chief negotiator with the Palestinians and take advantage of the fact that Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who would theoretically be the obvious choice for that role, never took an interest in the issue. As the head of a large centrist party, Mofaz can also change the attitude of the Obama administration toward Israel.

Israel makes a clear distinction between the American administration’s unprecedented security assistance as well as the immense defense aid it dispenses (just this week a budget was submitted to Congress including billions of dollars to be allocated for the Iron Dome defense system) and the disagreements on the Iranian issue, with the attendant personal animosity between Obama and Netanyahu. There, too, Mofaz can be of service.

Mofaz preferred not to accept a specific ministerial portfolio (becoming instead a minister without a portfolio), and the Prime Minister’s Office has denied the rumors that Netanyahu offered him the strategic affairs or the intelligence affairs portfolios. In practice, the prime minister focused Mofaz’s efforts on Iran. Both these jobs have to do with the American connection to the Iranian issue and Mofaz has already served in the past as a minister in charge of relations with the U.S. administration.

One of the central arguments in the recent criticisms by former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former Israel Security Agency director Yuval Diskin was that Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak were a “pair” who were irresponsibly leading the country into an attack on Iran due to their “messianism.”

This week, the “pair” — Netanyahu and Barak — became a threesome, as the top decision making echelon gained a new key player. The Forum of Eight senior ministers became the Forum of Nine. With Barak, Moshe Ya’alon, and new recruit Shaul Mofaz, now one third of the forum are former IDF chiefs of general staff.

After Sept. 4 was set as the date for early elections, a political bombshell was dropped. At the culmination of a dramatic night, the new union was presented. The two grooms marched into the Negev auditorium in the Knesset and stood at two podiums labeled “Prime Minister’s Office.”

Several hours later, during the evening news, newscaster Yonit Levy asked Channel 2’s political analyst Amnon Abramovich: “What is holding this together? Spit and ambition?” On the rival television channel, whose news edition focused on the implications of the new coalition on the Iran issue, commentator Emmanuel Rosen referenced Diskin’s “messianic” accusation and asked, “If Bibi [Netanyahu] is the messiah, what will Mofaz be? The messiah’s donkey?”

Endless words have been said and written about this political maneuver, and it has garnered a plethora of nicknames. Now it appears that, from a political standpoint, it could really be a game changer. The press conference Netanyahu and Mofaz staged on Tuesday, the day their secret deal to form a national unity government was announced, mainly served to satisfy the reporters. The Iranian question came up, as did the stalled peace process, but with the kind of ambiguity that is more typical of other forums. The motivation that the prime minister presented for the move with Mofaz was the Tal Law, which exempts ultra-Orthodox Israelis from mandatory military service. The imminent expiration of the law, and the need to formulate an alternative, was the driving force behind the near-dissolution of the Knesset and the calling of the early elections, prevented at the last minute by the coalition deal between Netanyahu and Mofaz).

The explanations for the coalition agreement did not contain a single reference to the fact that “this is a fateful time for Israel” — Mofaz’s words during the press conference. Were these words intended simply for dramatic effect or are they a hint of things to come? Those who thought that early elections were aimed solely at advancing an attack on Iran — during the reign of an interim government and before the U.S. presidential elections — can stick with that theory now that the early elections have been called off and a national unity government has been established. The prime minister has widened the coalition to 94 MKs and neutralized the main political main opposition to an attack (the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, which will now be chaired by coalition member and former Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter). He has also enlisted a new member to the security forums.

Mofaz also serves as an indispensable liaison to IDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz. The two have been close friends for years and they tend to confer with each other. Up until now it was Opposition Leader Mofaz that the chief of staff was conferring with. Now he will be conferring with Vice Prime Minister Mofaz.

Attempts to analyze Mofaz’s opinion on Iran could prove tricky. Mofaz, born in Iran, obviously knows the dangers involved in a nuclear Iran as well as an attack on Iran. But only weeks ago Mofaz accused Netanyahu of using the Iranian issue to deflect the public’s attention from the social injustices they had been protesting. In other places, and at other times, he expressed a different opinion. Even publicly, like that interview in 2005 when he threatened an attack and set off a spike in global oil prices.

In their joint press conference, Netanyahu and Mofaz declared that “stability has been achieved.” Everyone is now well aware that with such a broad coalition, theoretically the prime minister can get anything approved. He is no longer dependent on the ultra-Orthodox parties and can modify the Tal Law as he pleases. He is no longer dependent on the New Religious Party or Yisrael Beitenu and can order the demolition of the houses in Beit El built on disputed land. Any decision can be approved in accordance with the platforms of the centrist parties.

Under the coalition agreement, Mofaz decided not to demand any ministerial portfolios in the first phase, not for himself and not for his party members. That is where his power lies. He is a provisory partner with very clear deadlines: Aug. 1, when the Tal Law legally expires, and the end of the year for electoral reform (Mofaz stated that the two main reasons that he joined the coalition were to amend the Tal Law and to modify the failing system of government. The coalition deal states that an agreement must be reached on electoral reform by December.

It wasn’t only Israelis who were shocked this week at the political maneuver that canceled general elections at the last minute and produced a national unity government. Officials in Arab capitals, America, and Europe were trying to figure out whether behind the written coalition agreement stood a secret plan, one that would culminate in an Israeli attack in Iran.

It is doubtful that anyone outside the triumvirate of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Kadima Chairman Shaul Mofaz has a clear answer to that question. EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton arrived in Jerusalem two days ago for a uncharacteristic, lightning-quick meeting, in efforts to gather any piece of information on the political mood in Israel. The meeting was scheduled before this week’s political earthquake, but it became far more relevant once it happened. The West fears that Israel will point its fighter jets eastward, so they sent Ashton to find out how much of a chance Israel was willing to give international negotiations with Iran, and whether the new coalition meant that broad political and public support was being prepared for a complicated offensive in Iran.

Ashton, who will head the second round of talks between Iran and the six world powers (also known as the P5 + 1: permanent U.N. Security Council members the U.S., U.K., China, Russia and France, plus Germany), in Baghdad this time, did not leave Jerusalem with clear answers. The triumvirate, together with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, maintained a stern and unified stance: As long as Iran doesn’t feel like it is facing a real threat of attack, it won’t back down from its nuclear aspirations. The world must impose sanctions, and then make them even tougher, rather than sinking into useless, unproductive negotiations.

Sources reported that Ashton made it clear that this would not be the case. Never, she insisted, would Iran be permitted to “play games.” The sanctions already in place will not be reversed and the talks with Tehran are being conducted in a “very tough” manner out of a clear understanding of the severity of the situation and the urgency of the issue.

Israel, the sources added, needn’t make threats: The bells are ringing loudly enough all over the world. But Jerusalem remains unconvinced. Israeli concerns are still confined to private quarters, but they may soon leak out. The main concern is that the world is longing for an agreement with Tehran, almost at any cost. Each player has its own reasons. For Russia and China it is a principle; U.S. President Barack Obama is afraid to make a move ahead of presidential elections; in France there is a new president who was elected on the votes of the Left and the immigrants; he certainly doesn’t want to begin his term with a draconian hike in oil prices. We are left with the U.K. and Germany, who, despite their determination, cannot spearhead an international initiative alone. The (sad) conclusion is this: Even if things are being presented otherwise, we are alone. Our fate is in our own hands.

The real test will be in the Baghdad talks. The Israeli demands, which were raised in the meeting with Ashton again this week, are very clear: an absolute halt to all uranium enrichment activity, the removal of all material already enriched to 20 percent from Iran, and the decommissioning of the new nuclear facility in Fordo.

Iran has already declared that it will not comply with these demands. Various media reports in recent weeks have suggested several possibilities for compromise, all of which are far from satisfying from Israel’s perspective.

What does all this mean? Just as in every other security issue in Israel, there are three options: Iran will succumb to the pressure and abandon its nuclear program entirely (the chances of this happening are slim to none), or Iran will abandon the talks and sever all ties with the West (the chances of this happening are low for fear of an Israeli, Western or joint attack), or Iran will buy time and drag its feet and try to arrive at a compromise that would allow it to continue nuclear development without appearing to be doing so (the chances of this happening are very high).

The third option is, of course, Israel’s worst nightmare: for the world to congratulate itself on striking a deal with Iran, while Israel must decide whether it will fall in line, or forge ahead with an attack (and risk not only a war with Iran but also international approbation). Several political commentators surmised this week that Netanyahu, looking at his options, broadened his coalition to prepare for precisely such a decision. But like other assessments that were cast into the commentary trash, this assessment is also wrong. The only reasons behind Netanyahu’s and Mofaz’s decision to establish a unity government were political (Mofaz feared decimation at the polls, Netanyahu feared being extorted by small parties). The time to decide on Iran has not yet arrived.

Mofaz has so far openly opposed an attack on Iran. True, he suffixed his disapproval with “at this time,” but in interviews immediately following his victory in the Kadima primary he insisted that he believed that Israel still had approximately two years to address the Iran issue by non-military means. It would be difficult to dismiss his opinion as irrelevant, as was done to former Mossad chief Meir Dagan and former Israel Security Agency director Yuval Diskin. All the years Mofaz spent as the chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee have given him continuous, intimate access to all the secrets, including the most pertinent information on Iran.

Mofaz is knowledgeable, up to date, proficient and curious. He is an obsessive documenter (ever since his time in the military he tends to write everything down in big yellow notebooks). In their meetings with Mofaz at the Knesset, defense heads got the impression from him that an attack in Iran at this time would not only be undesirable, it could be dangerous.

When he joins the prime minister’s intimate circle — the Forum of Eight senior ministers, which will now become the Forum of Nine — Mofaz will find ministers Dan Meridor, Benny Begin and Moshe Ya’alon with a stance similar to his own. On the opposing end he will find Netanyahu and Barak, and, to a lesser degree, Lieberman and Interior Minister Eli Yishai. It will be interesting to see the dynamics between the three former IDF chiefs of general staff (Barak, Ya’alon and Mofaz) on Iran, and on anything really, given their personal and political rivalries. Even more interesting will be the dynamics between this opinionated, experienced and at times aggressive trio and defense heads, especially current IDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz.

There will be those, most likely, who will see this as another sign of a coming attack in Iran. Netanyahu and Barak, having failed to win the defense establishment’s support for an attack, are placing obstacles in their path in clever ways. Gantz will now face three of his predecessors, one of which is his friend, Mofaz; the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee will probably now be headed by Kadima MK Avi Dichter, a former head of the Israel Security Agency, whose very presence in Netanyahu’s coalition gives the government a seal of approval — a counterweight to the harsh criticism Diskin issued at Netanyahu. In such a constellation, the commentators would say, Netanyahu will have the complete freedom to make a decision, any decision.

An attack on Iran will probably not be on the table until spring 2013 at the earliest. There are the nuclear talks and the U.S. elections. By then, if Iran pokes the world in the eye, the U.S. may very well join in on an attack, or possibly even spearhead one.

That is the reason that Mofaz believes that there is plenty of time, and that we should wait. On the other hand, Barak keeps warning that Iran will have entered the “zone of immunity” by then, and will be invulnerable to Israeli attack, free to push ahead toward a nuclear weapon. Since currently it is Barak and Netanyahu who set the tone, Israel is expected to kick and scream, as it did with Ashton, to pressure the world to act now.

Will it happen? We need to hope for the best, and prepare for the worst. So believes the newest recruit to the inner circle of decisionmakers on Iran, who, with all due respect to Mofaz, is far more pivotal — Amir Eshel, who will assume the role of Israel Air Force commander on Monday. He will have to prepare, and voice an opinion on the one issue that didn’t factor into the establishment of the unity government, but hangs heavily over it.