WarSclerotic

At the AIPAC conference in Washington earlier this month, US President Barack Obama said that it was time to become more tight-lipped on the Iranian nuclear issue and the military options surrounding it.

Since then, we have been witness to a flood of leaks from the Pentagon, the US National Security Council and the White House, to The New York Times, among others, on just this issue. The results of so-called war games, which see masses of Americans dead if Israel strikes Iran’s nuclear facilities, and other dire scenarios, all of which are negative, have been made available to the media in one form or another, as never before.

People who follow these matters, and understand how governments and media work (or rather how governments work the media) can see a clearly labeled campaign by some in the American administration to create negative American and international public sentiment against an Israeli attack – this either with or without the knowledge of the president.

The focus of the American military today is the Pacific, not the Middle East. It needs to face off China while undertaking an honorable and orderly retreat from Afghanistan, and to mend its fences with the Pakistanis who, after all, do have the bomb. They do not now want to get diverted into a potential war with the Iranians, or to see the oil-sensitive Gulf shipping routes literally go up in flames, especially now with the ever tightening sanctions on Iran making oil supplies more precarious as it is.

So, it is entirely possible that while the US president says, and even means, one thing, there are powerful links in the chain of command who see otherwise and, in their own way, actually believe they are carrying out the president’s true will when they whisper dark secrets into the ears of willing reporters. I know. I’ve been there.

Without being cynical, the strategists who run the world’s only superpower see Israel as another piece on the chess board, not necessarily a pawn, but no more than a rook or a knight, an important piece, but one that can be sacrificed in the grand scheme of things.

When they look at the Iran nuclear issue, they see a tightening sanctions regime in place, greater Iranian openness to inspectors, an intensive diplomatic effort by a broad spectrum of allies being applied to prevent Iran from going nuclear, and an acceptable period of time before the issue really becomes critical.

They see perilous oil prices, thinly deployed troops and Chinese expansion in an age of diminishing American defense budgets. They see a status quo that is acceptable, and one that would be upset by an Israeli attack on Iran’s facilities.

They also sense that the internal situation in Iran, as the impact of the embargo becomes more real, is causing real political rifts in the Iranian regime for the first time, and that the elements of regime change so many have waited for so long, finally seem to be falling into place.

An Israeli attack, they feel, would unhinge all this, and cause the Iranian people to fall in step with their government again. It would reignite international Iranian terrorism on a massive scale, resulting in yet another diversion of American resources from primary strategic goals to tangential ones – something no responsible policy planner can afford to do lightly, and hence the leaks.

The more the American president finds himself in situations where he has to make commitments to Israel that go beyond what his security professionals deem prudent, the more Israel’s leadership speaks about our need to defend ourselves and wave pictures of the Holocaust around, the more intense the leaks will become. A pawn will be moved here, and a castle there; this secret will be revealed and that assessment anonymously made to an important reporter from an important newspaper.

There are those optimists who claim what we are seeing is actually a sophisticated “good-cop-bad-cop” routine by Israel and America working in consort, with America pushing diplomacy forward while Israel carries a threatening stick of military action over everyone’s head.

Initially there may have been some truth to this. Now the folks at the Pentagon, in the broadest sense of the word, do not want unilateral action by Israel. They want to pull the plug on anyone who may have interpreted some of the president’s remarks made at AIPAC as a green light to Israel to move forward on its own, and have done so with each revelation made to the press in the weeks since then.

Now, they want Israel to put its stick away and talk softly, a suggestion that has much merit to it.

For at the end of the day, while we play chess with each other, the other side is sharpening its sword.

The writer is a senior research associate at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. His latest book, The Anatomy of Israel’s Survival, is the recipient of the National Jewish Book Award in the history category for 2011.

The upside to an Iranian missile onslaught on Israel is that it would facilitate new real estate projects on the crammed Coastal Plain and render obstructed sea vistas visible again. Increasingly, such morbid predictions of Tehran-initiated mega-scale land clearances in central Israel crop up in casual conversation.

Pent-up angst is vented via macabre gallows humor which presupposes that our dreadful end is inevitable, that by summertime we’d be flattened by Iranian rockets. We paint ourselves as pitiable pawns in the hands of trigger-happy leaders, as wretched victims of the unrestrained hubris and folly of demented higher-ups.

To hear some of what’s proffered by left-wing gurus and commentators, we’re now living though a terrifying real-life reenactment of Dr.Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. Stanley Kubrik’s 1964 black comedy spotlighted a loony general who ignites a nuclear apocalypse that a coterie of bungling politicians and frantic generals fail to stop.

Cast as the gung-ho paranoids who push for a first-strike to break the MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) stalemate are of course PM Binyamin Netanyahu and anyone else who dares insist that Israel must help itself if no other choice is left.

Those who fear Iranian nukes are deemed deranged. In contrast, those in our midst who have learned to stop worrying and love the Iranian bomb are acclaimed as prudence personified.

Indeed, there’s a plethora of political benefits to be accrued from pooh-poohing the Iranian threat. To begin with, Netanyahu’s unremitting adversaries have homed in on yet another pretext to wallop him – his alleged unhinged obsession about an insignificant explosive device that we could easily be reeducated to live with.

Beyond that beckon greater opportunities to deepen defeatist dispositions. Our truly doctrinaire leftists – as distinct from Israel’s pragmatist and activist founding fathers – have never approved of successful Jewish nationalism.

Israel’s deterrent capabilities were always anathema to those who have made it their mission to take us down a few pegs and shrink us back to what they regard as more befitting proportions.

Hence it almost gladdens certain hearts to see doomsday weapons in the hands of an implacable enemy. There can be no better antidote to what’s perceived in certain quarters as Israeli arrogance.

There’s sneering pleasure to be derived from witnessing cocky Zionists dwarfed and put in their place. Besides, postmodern moral-relativists discern no differences among assorted possessors of The Bomb. Our democracy, they aver, is no better than the ayatollahs’ theocracy.

Their resolve to wipe us off the map is no worse than our resolve to survive.

Seen thus, it might not be so awful if Ahmadinejad adds a few atomic warheads to his arsenal.

It’s much like the unstinting tolerance evinced by yesteryear’s leftists toward Soviet nuclear stockpiles. Their motto back then was “better red than dead.” In other words, accept defeat without struggle. Moreover, further down the line it might be rationalized that not only is it better to be defeated than to die, but that it’s better to be defeated than to be victorious.

In this vein, novelist David Grossman – appointed by his promoters as guardian of our collective conscience – warned against a preemptive Israeli strike in a recent front-page Haaretz op-ed. He argued that “it is better for Israel to reconcile itself, even with gnashing of teeth, to a nuclear Iran.”

“It is forbidden for Israel to attack Iran,” Grossman reasons omnisciently, because “there’s no way to determine with certainty that Iran will attack Israel if it possessed nuclear weapons.”

The subtext: Israeli self-defense is illegitimate before a nuclear mushroom rises over the incinerated Dan Region. Of course, by then it would be way too late, but why quibble.

THE GIST of the Grossmanian logic is that Netanyahu is cynically hyping the Iranian danger – particularly by resorting to Holocaust allusions – and that he might in the end unleash a horrific Iranian vendetta upon us. “Does any man,” Grossman rhetorically asks, “have the right to sentence so many to death only in the name of fear of an eventuality which might never occur?” Grossman, of course will never admit to preying on our fears, but he will unhesitatingly accuse Netanyahu of unconscionably scaremongering.

All the while, the powers-that-be in Tehran recommend vociferously that Israel be wiped off the map. It’s left up to us to decide whether to take them at their word and believe their genocidal bluster, or dismiss it as inconsequential ranting for domestic consumption.

Grossman would balk at historical comparisons, at our observations that we had seen it all before, been there and paid in oceans of blood for dismissing the blunt tirades of other tyrants.

But the incontestable fact is that human nature doesn’t change over the generations, only specific circumstances take on different forms. At heart, we chronically prefer the serenity of today over security tomorrow.

It’s not a cliché. It’s the truth. Neville Chamberlain’s “Peace for our time” was genuinely applauded on his return from Munich in 1938 – first by grateful crowds, then by the House of Commons and subsequently by every British newspaper.

Winston Churchill, who dared swim against the tidal wave of public opinion, growled: “I believe we have suffered a total and unmitigated defeat.”

That didn’t win him adherents. Churchill was heftily booed down. Why? Were the masses stupid? No, they were just like us, concerned about the here and now.

The seeds of World War II germinated on the ostensibly sane and safe middle-ground. Caution facilitated the global cataclysm. Quintessentially judicious and practical Neville Chamberlain was the then-iconic high-priest of responsibility. In his gentlemanly manner, he was the consummate champion of cop-out. It wasn’t a personal failing or an idiosyncrasy. He wasn’t pursuing a private agenda that eventually collapsed catastrophically.

Chamberlain popularly reflected his nation’s zeitgeist. Most Britons wanted to disengage.

That’s why middle-Britons en masse supported the 1934-35 Peace Ballot.

It was promoted by Lord Robert Cecil who won the 1937 Nobel Peace Prize for this inanity.

Some 500,000 canvassers went door-todoor to poll ordinary folk on whether they’re for peace and against war – as manipulative as asking who’s for healing and against pain (or who’s for Grossman’s moderation and against extremism).

With no terms or conditions stipulated, “peace” won by a whopping 10,500,000 votes to a mere 750,000. This gauge of the public’s mood was anything but harmless. The Peace Ballot made London’s deterrence ring hollow, because despite its inherent bias, it encouraged appeasement. It made Europe’s ensuing bloodbath inevitable, having assured Hitler that – much as the Brits abhorred him – the last thing they wanted was to fight.

There’s every chance that word of Grossman’s perceptions, and similar prattles by plenty of others, has reached Ahmadinejad and emboldened him. But let’s suppose, for argument’s sake, that this isn’t the case, that analogies to pre-WWII appeasement are spurious and that we wouldn’t be nuked if we take Grossman’s advice and learn to put up with the Iranian bomb.

What then? Nothing to worry about? Hardly. At the very least Iranian nukes would turn all Israelis into hostages of the very ayatollahs who keep preaching for our extermination.

Although unparalleled on the horrific-hazardscale, even undetonated Iranian nukes are somewhat akin to Gaza’s and South Lebanon’s missile caches. In both cases millions of Israelis are held to ransom via the amassed firepower of Islamic zealots who try to call the shots and stymie our self-defense on pain of punishment.

While the world’s opinion-molders bewailed the blockade on Gaza, they turned a blind eye to its engorged rocket hoards. With equal perfidy, the international community ignored its own obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1701 and allowed Hezbollah to rearm monstrously.

A nuclear threat of course is way more sinister.

For one thing, it’ll trigger a regional nuclear arms race. Saudi Arabia is already showing interest, a fact which should send shivers down all spines everywhere, considering the oil-glutted kingdom’s instability and the fact that al- Qaida’s villains, including the 9/11 perpetrators, mostly emerged from the Saudi hatchery.

Secondary nuclear proliferation to a whole host of terror outfits is an unavoidable complication to boot. Assorted “dirty bombs” in the hands of Allah’s warriors will leave nobody invulnerable.

Extortion opportunities would become limitless.

We could be blackmailed with varying degrees of nuclear hell if we don’t set loose every last convicted terrorist; if we don’t surrender Jerusalem; if we don’t allow Israel to be inundated with millions of hostile Arabs calling themselves descendants of refugees; if we don’t retreat into suicidal borders as delineated by would-be annihilators; if we don’t all dive into the deep blue sea and dutifully disappear beneath its waves.

Food for thought for a nation that released over 1,000 terrorists for one kidnapped solider.

And more tidbits to chew over – what would have happened if back in 1981 Menachem Begin suddenly saw a Grossmanesque light, got cold feet and decided to desist from the destruction of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor? How would we have fared a decade later, in the First Gulf War, if the Iraqi tyrant had the bomb? How would the rest of the world have coped? In all, the “balance of terror” to which the Left readily acquiesces is no great shakes. There are too many shady characters and shoddy ideologies in our neighborhood to instill even a modicum of confidence in any rational stewardship next door of weapons of mass destruction.

That said, ignoring bad bombs in bad hands while hoping for the best might not be the best modus operandi for preserving life and limb – to say nothing of preserving that familiar old roof over our head.

It’s easy to ridicule and it’s easy to resort to smears in the Dr. Strangelove idiom, but fearing Iran’s bomb and seeking to preempt it may be way saner than learning to love it. Needless to stress, the sanest thing of all is just to babble a whole lot less.

http://www.sarahhonig.com

Shortly before the end of the First Gulf War in 1991 and after Saddam Hussein had fired nearly 40 Scud missiles into Israel, the IDF General Staff convened. The discussion was focused on what to do in wake of the development of this new threat to Israel: the threat of one of missiles and rockets.A decision would later be made to establish the Home Front Command (HFC) but at that specific meeting, director-general of the Defense Ministry David Ivry issued a warning that continues to resonate in the Kirya Military Headquarters until today.

“What we are currently seeing with 40-something Scuds is nothing compared to what we will see in the future,” Ivry, who had commanded the Israel Air Force when it bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor a decade earlier, warned IDF generals.

For Ehud Barak, who was sitting in the room and was just weeks away from taking up his appointment as IDF chief of staff, Ivry’s warning continues to strike a chord today – particularly in light of the increasing threat Israel faces from the rocket and missile arsenals that surround it.

“Ivry was right and the threat today is greater than what we ever would have thought it would be back in 1991,” Barak said recently, referring to Hezbollah’s estimated arsenal of nearly 50,000 rockets and missiles.

The problem is that the threat to Israel is not just the quantity of missiles but also has to do with the change in the quality of the missiles.

Maj.-Gen. Aviv Kochavi, current head of Military Intelligence, calls this process “fire-by-6,” a reference to the six changes that have occurred to the various missile arsenals in Iranian, Syrian, Hamas and Hezbollah hands in recent years. According to Kochavi, there are 200,000 missiles and rockets pointed at Israel on any given day.

In comparison to six years ago – before the Second Lebanon War – today’s arsenals have 1) longer ranges 2) larger warheads 3) larger quantities 4) greater accuracy 5) the tendency to be launched from deeper inside enemy territory and not just along the border and 6) are in some cases even buried underground in heavily fortified launchers and silos.

To counter this threat, the IDF’s strategy consists of three primary elements: a counter-offensive aimed at impairing the enemy’s ability to fire missiles into Israel, defensive systems like Arrow, Iron Dome and David’s Sling and passive defense such as bomb shelters, protected rooms and air raid sirens.

The missile threat has in recent years turned the HFC into one of the IDF’s most important branches. This, however, was not always the case and, until the Second Lebanon War in 2006, if an officer was appointed head of the HFC, it usually meant that he was on his way out of the IDF.

That is no longer true and since the war, the IDF has appointed top officers, perceived as having the potential to one day become chief of staff, as head of the HFC. After the war, Maj.-Gen.

Yair Golan was appointed head the HFC. He is now head of the Northern Command. The current HFC chief, Maj.-Gen. Eyal Eisenberg, previously served as commander of the Gaza Division, one of the most complicated postings in the IDF.

As Israel moves closer to the point of having to decide whether it should attack Iran’s nuclear facilities, the HFC is now more important than ever, particularly in light of assessments that in the first days of an Iranian-Hezbollah- Hamas-Islamic Jihad retaliation, Israel could see close to 1,000 rockets a day fired into its cities.

Putting damage to infrastructure aside, there are various predictions regarding how many people would be killed in such a scenario.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak famously said a few months ago that the number would be somewhere around 500 and while the Israeli public has a hard time imagining such large casualties, the estimate is based on comprehensive studies and analyses conducted by the HFC.

For that reason, the HFC is undergoing one of the most extensive changes in its short history. On Monday, the command held its largest draft ever, recruiting hundreds of youth to fill the ranks of its two standing search-and-rescue battalions as well as the third that it is now establishing.

It plans to establish a fourth battalion by the end of next year.

In addition to establishing new battalions, the soldiers are also receiving new skills, such as becoming certified firefighters as well as learning new search-and-rescue and combat techniques.

A similar process is taking place in the command’s reserve units where reservists are being provided with with upgraded combat qualifications and equipment.

The HFC speaks of three different roles in a future war: 1) assisting the IDF in maneuvering through enemy territory 2) saving lives with searchand- rescue teams 3) and supporting local councils and municipalities so they will be capable of continuing to provide services for their constituents.

“We are better today than we were a few years ago but this is a work in progress,” deputy HFC commander Brig.- Gen. Zviki Tessler explained this week.

Tessler is an example of the change. A helicopter pilot, he left the air force a few years ago to take up one of the command’s senior positions. A few years ago, it would have been unheard of for a pilot to switch from the IAF to the HFC.

Another change, demonstrated during the recent round of fighting between Islamic Jihad and Israel, was the HFC’s ability to sound sirens only in the precise city – sometimes even the precise neighborhood – where the rocket fired from Gaza was going to land.

This is the result of two developments. The first was the establishment in mid- 2011 of a joint command center at the Hatzor Air Force Base near Gedera where IAF and HFC officers sit together to track missile launches into Israel and to sound sirens based on the radar’s projections of where they are going to land.

The second development was the HFC’s decision to divide the country up into hundreds of different sections that can independently be warned of incoming missile attacks without needing to scare the rest of the neighboring towns.

In the coming year, once the IDF receives approval to begin sending warnings to individual cellular phones, people will only be required to enter a bomb shelter if they receive two warnings: hear a siren and get a text message to their phones.

These changes are critical in these uncertain times. While the performance of the Iron Dome counter-rocket defense system in the recent conflict in Gaza amazed even its operators, it is not something that Israelis can rely on as being there to protect them in the next, bigger war.

This is because there are currently only four batteries and there is a good chance that these will need to be used to protect strategic national assets or even IAF bases to preserve operational continuity.

That is why the HFC stresses that the best equation is a combination of the active defense (Iron Dome) with passive defense (bomb shelters).

With Iran not changing its course, this equation might be put to the test again sooner rather than later.