Archive for March 2012

US Senator proposes naval blockade on Iran

March 11, 2012

Israel Hayom | US Senate proposes naval blockade on Iran.

Democratic Senator Carl Levin says blockading Iran’s export of oil will up the pressure on Tehran • Levin: I wouldn’t be surprised if Israel attacks Iran within two months.

Yoni Hirsch and Reuters
Satellite image of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran.

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Photo credit: AP

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IRAN’S WEAK LINK

March 11, 2012

IRAN’S WEAK LINK | UTSanDiego.com.

DAVID IGNATIUS The Washington Post

Originally published March 11, 2012 at 12:01 a.m., updated March 9, 2012 at 2:29 p.m.

At the end of another week of near-constant talk about war with Iran, here’s one counterintuitive possibility: The Obama administration, in its eagerness to deter an Israeli strike, has committed itself to a pressure campaign that, if pursued vigorously, could eventually lead to regime change in Iran.

President Obama’s pledge of escalating economic, political and other pressure on Iran goes to that regime’s weak link. For the mullahs’ greatest vulnerability is their political structure, which is divided and unpopular, rather than their nuclear program, which appears to have fairly broad domestic support. And this political foundation may be shaken by the campaign that is under way.

The clerical regime isn’t an explicit target for the U.S., but it’s at growing risk because of the forces now in motion. Month by month, sanctions and other activities will undermine the regime’s political and financial base – squeezing the Iranian leadership and tempting it to take rash actions that would trigger a devastating response.

The situation resembles a hunting trap that gets tighter the harder the prey tries to escape. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta made that explicit when he said Thursday that the U.S. was preparing military options should nonmilitary pressure fail.

Ironically, the worst option in terms of regime change would probably be a unilateral Israeli military strike. Given limited Israeli capabilities, a strike would do enough damage to rally political support behind the Iranian leadership (and deflect the Arab Spring) but not enough to cripple the nuclear effort. An Iranian opposition leader told me last week that such an attack would be “a gift from God for the mullahs,” enhancing their political position rather than weakening it.

What has emerged from last week’s U.S.-Israeli discussions is a sort of tag team: The West is moving toward what it describes as crippling sanctions, while Israel waits restlessly outside the ring, apparently eager to jump in and strike a military blow. This combined pressure has already brought Iran back to the negotiating table, which is welcome but hardly a reason for the West to back off.

As the sanctions bite deeper into Iran’s oil exports and revenues, further enfeebling the regime, Tehran may have to contemplate the kind of negotiated settlement that Ayatollah Khomeini once likened to drinking from a “cup of poison.” Or the regime may lash out with military action of its own – a dangerous course given America’s overwhelming retaliatory power and the ability of Israel and Saudi Arabia to absorb Iran’s initial punch.

For Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, it’s a double bind: If he offers a deal on the nuclear program that would be acceptable to the West, he risks undermining what he sees as the regime’s legitimacy. But if he doesn’t offer a deal, the steady squeeze will continue. Eventually, something’s got to give.

Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace whose views are closely studied at the Obama White House, argues that the Iranian regime is gradually bleeding itself to death for the sake of its nuclear program. He likens the process to the demise of the Soviet Union, which bankrupted itself in an arms race with the United States.

Sadjadpour likes to invoke an old saying on the dilemma facing dictators: “While these regimes are in power, their collapse seems inconceivable. But after they’ve collapsed, we say that it was inevitable.” Iran, he argues, is “at the crossroads of that maxim.”

Now that the squeeze on Iran has begun, there’s a potential risk if it stops too quickly, leaving a damaged but still potent Iran seething for vengeance. That early termination could happen through a quick U.N. cease-fire after a unilateral Israeli strike, or because the West calls off sanctions prematurely, leaving Iran’s nuclear tool kit still largely intact.

The West has an additional hidden capability in this crisis, between sanctions and open military conflict. It’s a way of increasing the cost of Iran’s actions, short of war. Officials don’t usually talk about this terrain of “covert action,” for obvious reasons, but it’s easy to imagine what might be possible: Defense-related research facilities could be disrupted; financial and other commercial records could be scrambled. And these are just the nonlethal options.

“You can cause a lot of mischief inside Iran,” says one foreign official. The pressure campaign now under way may not force Iran’s current leadership to make a deal, this official notes, but it increases the chance that the regime will sink as a result of its own defiant behavior.

Walter Russell Mead: America Is Stuck With the Mideast – WSJ.com

March 11, 2012

Walter Russell Mead: America Is Stuck With the Mideast – WSJ.com.

By Walter Russell Mead

The Middle East is on fire. As waves of populist, ethnic and religious unrest sweep the region, long-established regimes totter like ninepins, violent conflicts explode in once-quiet countries, and all the rules seem up for grabs.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is on life support and Iran is marching steadily toward obtaining a nuclear weapon. And even as President Obama assures us that he has Israel’s back and “will not countenance” Iran getting a nuclear weapon, as he did this week, his administration speaks about “leading from behind” and of a “pivot toward Asia.”

Many observers see all this as reflecting a sharp decline in American power. But the reality is more complicated and less dramatic. The reality is that the United States remains the paramount power in the region and will remain committed to it for a long time to come.

In all the tumult and upheaval, it’s easy to miss the main point: America’s interests in the Middle East remain simple and in relatively good shape. The U.S. wants a balance of power in the region that prevents any power or coalition of powers inside or outside the region from being able to block the flow of oil to world markets by military means. It wants Israel to be secure. And in the middle to long term, it hopes to see the establishment of stable, democratic governments that can foster economic growth and peace.

If it must, the U.S. will act directly and on its own to achieve these goals. But given its global responsibilities and the multitude of issues in which it is concerned, the U.S. by nature is a burden-sharing rather than a limelight-hogging power. It prefers to work with allies and partners, preferably regional partners.

Paul Corio/Inxart.com

In today’s Middle East, core U.S. goals enjoy wide, even unprecedented support. As the Sunni Arab world joins hands with Europe, pushes back against Iran, and works to overthrow Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, a strong coalition has formed around Washington’s most urgent regional priority—the Iranian drive for regional hegemony capped by its nuclear program.

France and the Arab League cursed the U.S. when it invaded Iraq in 2003; in 2011 they seconded and promoted the overthrow of Libya’s Gadhafi. Turkey hesitated but joined. Now, as the crisis in Syria sharpens once again, U.S. objectives command enormous support across the region.

If this is decline, we could use more of it.

Yet those who believe the U.S. can now turn its full attention on Asia, ignoring the unhappy Middle East, miss the degree to which U.S. interests remain deeply bound up in the fate of the region. In recent weeks, rising Middle East tensions have helped drive up the price of gasoline in the U.S. More price increases will anger voters, scare consumers, and could well knock the nascent U.S. economic recovery on its head.

For President Obama, those developments would pretty much doom his re-election efforts. The same will be true of his successors. Even as the U.S. reduces its direct dependence on Middle East oil, the global nature of the world oil market, and the effect of supply insecurity in other major markets, which affect our economy given the globalization of commerce, means that American presidents will simply not be able to set this region off to the side. It is easier to pivot toward Asia than to pivot away from the Middle East. The reality is that the U.S. will have to walk and chew gum at the same time.

The U.S. government first began to play a major role in Middle East power politics after World War II. (As late as World War I, the U.S. stayed resolutely away, refusing to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and rejecting proffered League of Nations mandates over Armenia and Palestine.) That role has never been particularly pleasant. During much of the Cold War, public opinion in much of the Middle East favored the Soviets. America’s relations with Israel were never popular in the Arab nations. Friendly regimes left over from the British era toppled in many countries, yielding to radical and anti-American juntas and dictators.

The U.S. changed alliances many times during the Cold War. Egypt started out as a pro-Western country, shifted to radical socialist nationalism, and came back to the West in the late 1970s. Iraq and Iran turned from staunch allies of the U.S. to bitter opponents. The Gulf states and the Saudis had little love for the U.S., but their interests lay so close to ours that most of the time alliances prospered even if friendship soured.

Today the grounds of alliance are once again shifting, and in unpredictable ways. Turkey and the U.S. are closer than they were three years ago; Egypt and the U.S. are further apart. The Saudis if anything are impatient with U.S. moderation on Iran; here they and the Israelis are reciting from the same book of prayers.

Should political conditions change in Iran, the kaleidoscope could change again. Before 1979, the U.S. and Iran were close allies; new leadership in Tehran might seek to rebuild the relationship. The Sunni world will likely divide if the Iranian threat diminishes, and as usual, some Sunni states will want U.S. support to protect them from others.

For now at least, the past looks like a good predictor for the next phase of American engagement with the Middle East. Often hated, rarely loved, the U.S. remains indispensable to the region’s balance of power and to the security of the vulnerable oil-producing states on the Gulf. There are many people in the Middle East who would like the U.S. to bow out of the region, and there are many people in the U.S. who would like very much to leave.

For now, both groups must learn to accept disappointment.

Mr. Mead is a professor of foreign affairs and humanities at Bard College. His blog, Via Meadia, appears at the American Interest Online.

American expert: U.S. ‘green light’ for Israeli attack on Iran depends on ‘whether it can get the job done’

March 11, 2012

West of Eden-Israel News – Haaretz Israeli News source..

Walter Russell Mead, one of America’s foremost foreign policy gurus, tells Haaretz Iran may soon offer compromise formulas aimed at ‘driving a wedge’ between Israel and the U.S.

By Chemi Shalev

U.S. President Barack Obama is capable of ordering a military attack on Iran, but the U.S. would probably prefer to yield to Israel if it was convinced that it “could get the job done” – this is the assessment of Walter Russell Mead, a renowned expert on American foreign policy.

“The U.S. has a lot of things to think about in a lot of places and I’m sure Obama feels that he has enough wars in the Middle East already,” Mead said in a conversation with Haaretz.

F-16 Israel Air Force F-16 fighter jet.
Photo by: Ilan Assayag

But he said that if America became convinced that an attack on Iran is necessary and that only the U.S. is capable of carrying it out successfully, then Obama “would not hesitate to pull the trigger.”

Mead said that it is probably the Republicans themselves, and not Israel, that has turned Iran into a partisan issue in American politics, though it is unwise for Israel “to collaborate” with this Republican agenda, which is harmful to Israel’s short and long term interests.

At the same time, Mead said that he believes both Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu realized this year that they need a “more correct relationship” than the confrontational mode in which they found themselves during the 2011 AIPAC Conference, when Obama spoke of the 1967 borders.

“After spending the first half of his Administration having Prime Minister Netanyahu regular beat him at the game of American politics,” Mead said, “Obama has gotten tired of that and he has a better sense of what he needs to do so as not to keep losing control of the policy process in the U.S.”

Mead, whom the New York Times once described as “one of the country’s liveliest thinkers about America’s role in the world,” said that Israel needs a leader who is a “Tony Blair type” who can work well with both parties; but he also said that, as far as he can see, it was Obama, and not Netanyahu, who was mainly responsible for the initial friction in the relationship between the two.

Mead said that AIPAC’s fortunes rise and fall in accordance with Israel’s position in American public opinion. He added, though, that if he was heading AIPAC he would be thinking about how to sustain this support because “if a lobby group starts to think that it is the tail that wags the dog it will find out sooner or later that that dog isn’t so cooperative anymore.”

On Syria, Mead said that while he is not privy to the secret information on which the White House bases its policy, “I think the line that Assad is on the way out soon has been a little bit overplayed.”

Mead, who has authored several widely-acclaimed books on American foreign policy, said that until now, the confrontation with Iran has “benefitted from a certain sense of clarity” because of Tehran’s refusal to negotiate. But with Iran showing signs that it may soon “start to offer U.S. compromises” – things will become murkier. Tehran, he believes will be trying to drive a diplomatic wedge between both the U.S. and Israel and between the U.S. and Europe.

Mead, who was fiercely critical of Obama’s foreign policy during the first part of his term, said that the president had changed and is now “a much more skilled and experienced leader who is much more comfortable with the use of force. More than once, he has not hesitated to pull the trigger.”

Mead said that Obama has become “more aware of the need for a forward presence for the U.S. and less convinced that a lower U.S. presence would solve all the world’s problems.”

Mead said that Obama is resolute about denying Iran nuclear weapons, adding “people often underestimate the degree to which Obama sees nuclear nonproliferation as a cornerstone of American security strategy and of the kind of legacy that he would like to leave. And my impression is that the Administration accepts the analysis that an Iranian nuclear bomb pretty well ends any likely prospects for successful non-proliferation activities.”

Mead said that it was hard to gauge in advance how long the American public would sustain its support for a military attack against Iran. “If Israel attacks Iran, and Iran attacks American targets, you might bet a ‘Pearl Harbor’ response against an unprovoked attack by a vicious enemy. There is a tremendous amount of residual ill-will toward Iran in America,” he added.

The Fury Of Foiled Fanatics

March 11, 2012

Israel: The Fury Of Foiled Fanatics.

March 11, 2012: In the last three days, Palestinian terror groups have fired over 120 rockets and mortar shells into Israel. In response Israel has attacked men seen setting up rockets in Gaza and bombing known terrorist bases (including one site used to store rockets) there. This resulted in another 14 Palestinians being killed. Nine Israelis and foreign workers were wounded by the Palestinian rockets. Israel closed schools today, which were within range of the longer range 122mm rockets. This kept about 200,000 kids at home.Longer range, factory made rockets fired by the Palestinians at more distant targets. Most of these long range rockets were fired at the cities of Ashkelon and Ashdod, but the Iron Dome defensive system guarding the area intercepted 90 percent of the rockets predicted to land in or near residential areas. The Palestinians are eager to kill Israeli civilians with these rockets. The last time this happened was five months ago, and that was cause for celebration in Gaza, because only about one in 300 rockets kills an Israeli. The Palestinians celebrate these killings regularly, especially terror attacks that kill a large number of Israelis. Doesn’t matter if the victims were civilians or even children, each death is a victory and Israeli counterattacks are war crimes. Turkey had now adopted this attitude, and has criticized the Israeli counterattacks without making much mention of the Palestinian attacks.

Hamas is trying to arrange a cease fire, but is unwilling to use force to stop the small terror groups from setting up and firing rockets. Gaza is a small place, and Hamas could set up roadblocks and patrols to keep people out the northern Gaza areas where the rockets are fired from. Hamas responds to criticism of its inaction by pointing out that the smaller terror groups could launch their rockets from residential areas of Gaza. The terror groups are reluctant to do that because it risks bringing Israeli fire to these launching sites. That could get Palestinian civilians killed, and angry at the Palestinian terrorists. But all the terror groups, including Hamas, wants civilian deaths as this makes great anti-Israeli propaganda, and the funerals are an opportunity to give more “hate Israel and support us” speeches.

Hamas, meanwhile, has other problems. Hamas has broken with its sponsor Iran over Syria. Hamas supports the uprising their (mainly of Sunni Moslems), while Iran supports keeping the Syrian dictator (who belongs to a Shia minority there) in power. As a result, Iran has shifted its support to smaller Islamic terror groups (all of them Sunni) in Gaza. These groups consider Hamas corrupt and ineffective in the war against Israel. But Hamas is responsible for running Gaza and has learned that it cannot do this and be at war with Israel at the same time. The smaller terror groups see this as a weakness, and Hamas does not want to start a civil war in Gaza by trying to destroy the smaller terror groups. Egypt is annoyed at all this, because some of the smaller terror groups that have set up shop in Gaza are dedicated to attacking Egyptian targets.

On the Lebanese border, bulldozers are creating a one kilometer long five meter (15.5 foot) high earth wall right on the border to separate Israeli and Lebanese villages that are adjacent to each other. Hezbollah, and other Islamic groups, have been holding demonstrations in the Lebanese village and trying to use crowds of civilians to force their way across the border. Hezbollah does not want to risk another war with Israel. The 2006 conflict, although declared a victory by Hezbollah, was in reality a defeat, because Hezbollah, and Lebanese, losses were much higher. Israel makes no secret of how it plans to do a lot more damage if Hezbollah fires rockets into Israel or tries to kidnap Israelis. So Hezbollah seeks other ways to prove to the Moslem world that it is still “fighting” Israel. The new wall is a response to the new Hezbollah tactics.

Gaza continues to suffer from severe electricity shortages. This is because Hamas does not want to lose the “tax” it collects on fuel smuggled in via tunnels. This is fuel is bought cheaply in Egypt because the government there subsidizes fuel prices for consumers. The Egyptians do not like seeing the Gazans exploit the subsidies this way, so last month the Egyptian government cracked down on fuel smuggling (demonstrating that they could stop tunnel smuggling if they wanted to) and told Hamas they could either buy fuel from Egypt at the export (non-subsidized) price, or buy it from Israel (at a similar price). Hamas refuses to do either, and accuses Egypt of oppressing the Palestinians in Gaza (who now only get a few hours of electricity a day.)

March 9, 2012: Israeli aircraft fired missiles to kill two members of the Palestinian terror group PRC (Popular Resistance Committees). One of those killed was the head of PRC and Israeli intelligence had learned that PRC was planning a major terror attack on Israel along the Gaza border. So Israel tried to disrupt this attack by going after the guy in charge. PRC was responsible for a similar attack last August that killed eight Israelis. The PRC, and other Palestinian terror groups responded to this Israeli use of disproportionate force by firing as many rockets as they could into Israel.

March 7, 2012: Israeli troops shut down two illegal Palestinian TV stations in the West Bank. The two groups were also using broadcast frequencies that interfered with operations a major airport nearby.

March 5, 2012: An Israeli patrol confronted a group of fifteen armed smugglers coming across from Egypt. The smugglers opened fire, and the Israelis shot back, killing one smuggler and possibly wounding others. The smugglers fled. Usually, the smugglers are bringing in drugs, but they will also work for terror groups and bring in explosives and other weapons for terrorists (usually Israeli Arabs) or criminal gangs (Jewish and Arab). Israel is building a security fence along this border, which will be complete by the end of the year. The fence will also have a network of sensors. All this will make it much more difficult for smugglers to get across.

For the 13th time in the last year, anti-Israel terrorists (or Bedouins trying to extort concessions from the Egyptian government) bombed the gas pipeline from Egypt to Israel. Israel is building a terminal for receiving shipments of liquefied natural gas, to make up for the missing Egyptian gas until next year, when Israel’s own offshore gas fields will be producing enough gas. Egypt managed to keep the pipeline safe for a month this time, and promises to do better. The Egyptians need all the income they can get, and they don’t get paid for gas they cannot get through a broken pipeline.

March 1, 2012: The Egyptian military government agreed to let 43 foreign pro-democracy advocates out of jail on bail of $330,000 each. The U.S. government paid the ransom (bail) for the 16 that were U.S. citizens and the bail deal allowed the foreigners to get out of Egypt. The military sided with the majority of Egyptians last year and refused to attack the large groups of demonstrators demanding a new government. Unrest continues in Egypt because the army, and its many corrupt officers, is still running a caretaker government, and because the unrest has caused higher unemployment (because tourists have stopped coming and foreign and local investment has slowed down a lot because of the uncertainty.) Fearing that the Islamic conservatives, who won most of the seats in recent parliamentary elections, would prosecute corrupt army officers and dismantle the economic empire the army has built over the last few decades, the military is more actively attacking demonstrators, journalists and organizations that advise on how to make a democracy work. The urban democrats are uneasy about the Islamic conservative political parties and the possibility of a religious dictatorship. But Islamic conservatives, at least most of them, insist this will not happen.  The foreign pro-democracy activists were helping Egyptians more effectively demonstrate against the army, and the army struck back. But Egypt depends a lot on foreign aid, much of it going directly to the army. These aid donors did not like seeing their citizens locked up, and pressured the Egyptian generals to let them go. But the revolution is not over in Egypt.

February 28, 2012: Azerbaijan has incurred the wrath of Iran for buying $1.6 billion worth of weapons and military equipment from Israel. Azerbaijan is engaged in a military buildup for another round of fighting with neighboring Armenia over a territorial dispute. About a quarter of Iran’s population is Azeris (a Turkic people) and two centuries ago Russia and Iran ended up dividing control of Azeri population in the area. For a while after World War I, and after 1991 (dissolution of the Soviet Union) the Russian Azeris were independent. While the Iranian Azeris are generally loyal to Iran, they are still Turks and speak a different language than the ethnic Iranians. Seeing Azerbaijan allying itself with Israel, for whatever reason, does not sit well with Iran. But there’s not a lot Iran can do about it. Iran was not able to provide the weapons, or other military assistance, the Azeris need to overcome the Armenians, so the Israelis were called in. The Azeris have proved to be good allies. Earlier this year they broke up an Iran sponsored terror plot and arrested three suspects who were planning to attack Israelis in Azerbaijan. Iran was believed behind this plot, and Azerbaijan did not appreciate it.

Israel: Jihad Islami will pay dear if Fajr missiles fired. US, Egypt seek ceasefire

March 11, 2012

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report March 11, 2012, 1:19 PM (GMT+02:00)

 

Egyptian Intelligence Chief Gen. Murad Muwafi

Israel has passed a stern warning to the Palestinian Jihad Islami shooting missiles from Gaza for the third day to expect Israel punishment on a different scale from the current surgical air strikes if they dare fire the Fajr surface missiles supplied them by Iran, debkafile reports. The warning was relayed Sunday, March 11, through Egyptian Intelligence Chief Gen. Murad Muwafi who is working with Washington to halt the Gaza violence.

The Iran-backed Jihad has in its arsenal Fajr 5 missiles whose range is 110 kilometers and Fajr 3 which has a 60-kilometer reach. They bring into range Israel’s urban, commercial and population hub cities between Tel Aviv and Rehovoth, which are outside the range of the Grads and Qassams, more 110 of which were fired from Gaza since Friday.

Military sources told debkafile that the Jihad terrorists are aiming for a spectacular, multi-fatality strike in a major Israeli city before ending this round of violence on order to strut as victors in Palestinian and Middle East public eyes. This ambition has been frustrated for three days by the Israeli invention, the Iron Dome interceptor of short-range missiles, which has saved important towns like Beersheba and the ports of Ashdod and Ashkelon from casualties and serious damage by intercepting the Grads before they land.
Islami Jihad tacticians are thought to be wracking their brains for some gadget capable of disarming the Iron Dome batteries.
They efforts of Gen. Muwafi to negotiate a ceasefire are complicated by not knowing whether Jihad Islami went into action against Israel on its own initiative – although the victim of Israel’s targeted killing Friday, March 9, was not one of its members, only the Popular Resistance Committee’s chief Zuheir al-Qaisi – or on instructions from its masters in Tehran and Damascus to promote their own interests.
The general assumption in Cairo and Washington is that the Jihad chiefs jumped in at first without asking for permission. But after 110 missiles pounded Israeli without incurring serious retribution, the decision about carrying on passed to Iran and Syria.

Both have an interest in a relatively low-intensity Palestinian missile offensive continuing against Israel.

Tehran sees it as a card to play at the nuclear talks with the six powers opening in Istanbul next month. It would show them that Iran is capable of generating a war situation in the Middle East without risk of a confrontation with the United States.

The Assad regime would typically use the Gaza Strip violence to turn the glare of international and Arab publicity away from its savage crackdown on the opposition and show the Israeli military to be the real persecutors of Arab civilians.
Gen. Muwafi’s queries have brought no responses from the Palestinian side and so it is hard for the American and Egyptian mediators to judge which way the wind is blowing in Damascus and Tehran.
Amid the uncertainty about the players behind the Gaza scenes and their motives, debkafile’s military sources foresee a Palestinian war of attrition stretching out into the next couple of months. Unless halted by a ceasefire, it could escalate sharply if Jihad introduces Fajr missiles to its operations and./or if Israel decides to send its army into the Gaza Strip and finally root out the missile threat Palestinian extremists have been wielding against Israeli civilians for a decade.

Hamas Seeks Ceasefire to End Escalation in Gaza

March 11, 2012

Hamas Seeks Ceasefire to End Escalation in Gaza – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

After more than 100 rockets were fired from Gaza into southern Israel, Hamas is trying to reach a ceasefire mediated by Egypt.
By Elad Benari

First Publish: 3/11/2012, 2:48 AM

 

Qassam rocket (archive)

Qassam rocket (archive)
Israel news photo: Flash 90

After more than 100 rockets were fired from Gaza into southern Israel over the weekend, the coastal enclave’s terrorist rulers are seeking a ceasefire.

According to a report on Kol Yisrael radio on Saturday night, Hamas is trying to reach a ceasefire through Egyptian mediation.

Hamas spokesman Taher al-Nunu acknowledged in a conversation with Kol Yisrael said that the terror organization’s Gaza prime minister, Ismail Haniyeh, is handling the contacts with Egypt.

Al-Nunu said Hamas is awaiting Israel’s response to the request for a ceasefire, which will be delivered through Egypt. Al-Nunu said that if Israel stops attacking in Gaza, Hamas would be willing to discuss putting an end to the rocket fire.

Approximately 135 rockets had been fired from Friday afternoon and until 7:30 p.m. Saturday (Israel time), according to the IDF. 74 of the rockets struck within Israel. The Iron Dome system intercepted the rockets in 28 out of 31 attempts to do so.

Eight Israelis have been wounded by the rockets. Most suffered light to moderate wounds. One, a foreign worker, was seriously injured on Friday evening and was taken for treatment at the Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva.

The escalation in the rocket and mortar attacks began after the IDF hit and killed several Gaza-based terrorist gangs, including a senior leader of the Popular Resistance Committees terror group.

Shortly before 5:00 p.m. (Israel time) on Friday afternoon, IAF aircraft struck and killed the head of the Popular Resistance Committees, Zuhir Musa Ahmed Qaisi and his deputy, in a precision attack highlighting Israeli intelligence resources in Gaza and its efforts to avoid civilian casualties.

Qaisi planned and led in recent days a terrorist attack against Israeli targets on the Israel-Egypt border, the IDF said in a statement. The terror attack had been in its final preparation stages when Qaisi was struck and killed, the statement added.

Qaisi was one of the planners of the attack on Highway 12 near the border with Egypt in August of 2011, which killed eight Israelis, and was also involved in the firing of rockets at southern Israel, according to the IDF.

Shortly after 8:00 p.m. (Israel time), the IDF struck two additional terrorist cells, one in central Gaza and one in northern Gaza. According to reports in the Israeli media, two terrorists were killed in this attack, both from the Islamic Jihad.

Due to the escalation in the region, the Civil Defense (Home Front) Authority announced that schools will be closed Sunday in southern Israeli communities located between 7 and 40 kilometers from Gaza,  including those in Be’er Sheva, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Kiryat Gat, Kiyrat Malachi, Yavneh, Ofakim, Netivot, Sderot, Gedera, Lakiyeh and Rahat will be closed. So will schools in the Hevel Yavneh, Gederot, Bnaya, Kidron and Gan Yavneh, but not Mateh Yehudah, Nahal Sorek and Brenner regional authorities. Fortified schools in the Gaza Belt communities close to Gaza will be open.

Gatherings of over 500 people in one place are forbidden. This includes performances, soccer games, etc. There are no restrictions on attending nonessential workplaces or going to shopping malls.

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu spoke with the heads of the councils in the south that were fired at (Be’er Sheva, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Kiryat Malakhi, Gan Yavneh, the Eshkol Regional Council, the Sha’ar Hanegev Regional Council and the Bnei Shimon Regional Council). He asked the council chairmen to convey to residents his esteem for their fortitude. The mayors noted the security that the Iron Dome system provides to their residents.

Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “We will continue to hit whoever plans to attack citizens of the State of Israel. At the same time, we will continue to improve home front defense.”

Grad rocket attack on Ashdod

March 11, 2012

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Hizbullah Accuses Israel of ‘Cowardly Crime’

March 11, 2012

Hizbullah Accuses Israel of ‘Cowardly Crime’ – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

The Hizbullah terrorist organization has broken its silence and accused Israel of the “cowardly” elimination of a Gaza terrorist leader.
By Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu

First Publish: 3/11/2012, 12:13 PM

 

Gaza, seen from near Ashkelon after IDF hit

Gaza, seen from near Ashkelon after IDF hit
Reuters

The Iranian-funded Hizbullah terrorist organization has broken its silence and accused Israel of the “cowardly” elimination of a Gaza terrorist leader.

The IDF last Friday killed Popular Resistance Committees (PRC) leader Zohair al-Qaisi, who was planning another attack in southern Israel. The PRC also was involved with the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit nearly six years ago.

His issued a statement calling the Israeli counterterrorist maneuver a “terroristic, Zionist crime,” Now Lebanon reported. Al Qaisi and another PRC terrorist were killed.

“The assassination came at a time when the [Arab countries are not] following up on Zionist terrorism; they are preoccupied with internal affairs, [and] some Arabs [are following] the American-Zionist plan,” Hizbullah stated.

Hizbullah’s statements are the first time the terrorist group has commented on the renewal of violence on Israel’s southern border. Hamas has enjoyed support from Iran but relations with Tehran have cooled since Hamas took a stand against Syrian President Bashar Assad, a key ally of Iran.

Israel has staged approximately two dozen attacks on terrorist targets in Gaza since the hostilities renewed Friday night. The Air Force late Sunday morning targeted a terrorist cell trying to launch rockets at Israel. Earlier in the day, Hamas sources told foreign media that one of those killed in a strike was a 12-year-old boy, but there was no confirmation.

An Islamic Jihad leader rejected talks of a ceasefire, but Egypt has been trying to arrange to a halt in the missile attacks on Israel and the retaliation by the IDF.

Gaza terrorists want guarantees that Israel will not target their leaders, but Israel always has reserved the right to strike “ticking bombs” terrorists who are planning imminent attacks, such as the one the Air Force prevented Friday night with the targeting of the Popular Resistance Groups terrorists.

U.S. Shifts Focus from Syria to Iran

March 11, 2012

U.S. Shifts Focus from Syria to Iran.

Al Arabiya

U.S. focus is currently centered on the Iranian issue, including its Israeli military dimension and the Russian-Chinese factor in international diplomacy. The case for undermining Iran through Syria, by mobilizing all efforts to overthrow the regime there, has somewhat receded. Yet, this does not mean that the goal of toppling the regime has been quashed or completely withdrawn, and there are differences regarding the means to achieve this and overall priorities. It seems that the main focus now in the rhetoric of the U.S. military, governmental, intellectual and media institutions has moved to Iran. This is happening in the wake of the success achieved by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in diverting the direction of American attention away from Syria and towards Iran. Here, most scenarios are military in nature, scenarios that are abundant and remarkable in their disarray and their implications for the domestic arena in the United States, having effectively become a major issue in the elections there.

During his visit to the United States a few days ago, Benjamin Netanyahu managed to score a great victory when he forced U.S. President Barack Obama’s hand into removing the containment of Iran as a hitherto main tenet of his policy, since the beginning of his term. This is a significant achievement for Netanyahu, given the fact that he has introduced to the U.S. political discourse a commitment at the level of the presidency to abandon the policy of containment. In fact, this policy has kept the military option at bay and instead focused on extended sanctions as a means to entice Tehran to cooperate, on the one hand, and to undermine and exhaust the regime in Tehran, on the other.

The other achievement Netanyahu secured was that, as he said, Obama has now acknowledged Israel’s sovereign right to defend itself. The word sovereign here, according to some, means that Netanyahu got Obama’s approval for Israel to unilaterally carry out a military strike against Iranian sites with a view to eliminate – or delay – the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

In truth, the military option is a subject of dispute for the Israelis, Americans and Arabs equally. There is a school of thought that says that it would be foolish to grant Tehran the ammunition of Islamic and internal support for the regime that would break its isolation and give it the equivalent of an escape rope. Proponents of this view believe that laying siege to Iran by means of the sanctions and international isolation is the most effective option, especially since a military option would be open to the possibility of failure, retaliation and perhaps even a catastrophic deployment of WMDs in the region. They also add that the best option to get rid of the regime in Tehran lies in shutting down the Syrian gateway to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which requires overthrowing the regime in Damascus. This in turn would encourage the Iranian people to rise up against the regime, especially if there is going to be external support to do so.

The opposing school of thought, meanwhile, cites what Israel considers to be an existential threat, meaning that a nuclear-armed Iran threatens to wipe Israel off the map. Thus, the Israeli leadership has decided that now is the right time to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, for reasons related to Iran, Israel and the United States.

With respect to Iran, the above holds true given the fact that intelligence estimates maintain that Iran has come a long way in building up its nuclear capabilities; therefore, when containment takes effect, it may be too late, because Iran would have then acquired nuclear weapons capabilities. And with respect to Israel, the political calculations of both the Prime Minister and the Defense Minister Ehud Barak have concluded that the military window is open to Israel only before the U.S. presidential elections, not after. Both men do not have confidence in that Barack Obama will deliver on any military promises against Iran if he is to be elected for a second term. Thus, Netanyahu and Barak reached the conclusion that the matter cannot bear any adventures. Then with respect to the United States, the electoral battle opens the door wide open for Israel to achieve the maximum possible amount of support for anything it wants, even if that should be a war rejected by the American public.

The timing of the military strike, according to the information circulated by American circles close to Israel, may be before June or may be delayed until October, in accordance with military considerations and political calculations. What is important is that the strike must take place before the presidential elections, as some are saying. However, there is another opinion that says that what Obama and Netanyahu agreed to is to delay the military strike until after the elections, with the U.S. President pledging to be a stronger partner for Israel in this endeavor. Of course, there is a third view that believes that all this talk about a military strike is posturing with a view to intimidate and pressure Iran to comply with the efforts of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany for a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. According to this view, Iran and Israel have never fought a direct war in both their histories, while appeasement seems to be a feature of the historical co-existence between Persians and Jews.

Those who assert that an Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear sites will certainly take place expect it to be a purely Israeli operation, and not a joint U.S.-Israeli one. However, this involves the first wave only, bearing in mind that any Iranian retaliation against Israel will cause the United States to carry out qualitatively different military operations, which a former general said would be devastating on a large scale and would instill fear and terror in the heart of the Iranian leadership and destroy it.

The exit strategy scenario some invoke, meanwhile, is notable albeit unconvincing. The scenario revolves around letting the leadership in Tehran know that it would be better for it not to retaliate against an Israeli military strike targeting the Iranian reactors, because non-retaliation would enable the leadership to remain in power while a response would lead to its defeat.

In other words, advocates of this theory want to tell the leadership in Tehran that retaliation against an Israeli strike will invite the United States to enter as a direct party in military strikes against critical sites for the regime in Tehran, which would ultimately lead to the downfall of the regime. Otherwise, if the leadership in Tehran ‘swallows’ the Israeli strike without retaliation against Israel, then this would be one way to stay in power.

What does not seem to worry the proponents of this view is a potential response by Iran through proxy wars, for example by using Hezbollah or other groups against GCC countries. This is not a pressing concern for them, because the only priority is for Iran not to become involved in direct or proxy war against Israel, through Hezbollah.

Syria for these people is not an issue they are concerned about today, and the fact of the matter is that they don’t care whether Bashar al-Assad remains in power or steps down. They are speaking the language of ‘what is the alternative?’ and not the language of ‘the regime must be overthrown’, which was popular a few months ago. While these voices may be rather marginal in decision-making, they indeed influence the process of decision making, being senior pillars of the military and media institutions.

In truth, the Obama administration has in turn backpedaled from its enthusiasm for overthrowing the regime in Damascus by any means. Indeed, the administration has made it clear now that it will not take part in arming the opposition, will not intervene militarily as proposed by Republican Senator and former presidential candidate John McCain, and will not take a tough stand in the Security Council as it had previously done. For this reason, negotiations over the U.S. draft resolution tell us that the Obama administration is willing to appease, rather than confront, Russia, and therefore, the U.S. draft resolution will most probably be a toothless one.

It could be that the pillars of the Obama administration are giving priority to cooperation with Russia and China in the Iranian issue, which is now ever more urgent because of what the Israeli government has elucidated. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the Obama administration has resolved to maintain the Assad regime in Damascus, but rather it believes that its ouster and disintegration will inevitably come.

It is for this reason that both U.S. and British diplomacy speak the language of peaceful resolutions, humanitarian aid and negotiations, and not that of regime change by arming the opposition – but of regime change through Syrian-made solutions. However, this does not intimidate the regime in Damascus, which is undaunted by talk of isolation and sanctions, as much as it would be frightened by arming the opposition and the reiteration of the need to overthrow the regime.

It is in this context that the mission entrusted to former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a joint UN-Arab League envoy can be understood, as tantamount to a mediation mission between the United States and European countries on one hand, and Russia on the other. This is not to mention its self-evident effect in buying time for the Syrian regime on one hand, and for the benefit of the efforts for reconciliation between the United States and Russia on the other.

While Russia is not budging from its basic positions, it is making room for enticements here and foreclosing prejudgments there. Currently, Russia is partner to the Americans in scaremongering against al-Qaeda and the unknown elements in the ranks of the Syrian opposition. Russia is also partner to a segment of the Israelis in trying to persuade the other hesitant segment that the present situation in Syria is better for Israel than a restive alternative with unknown orientations.

As there are divisions in Israel with regard to the Syrian regime, there are divisions in the Arab- and even the Gulf- camp, as evidenced by the developments of last week. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are at the vanguard of the efforts and strategy to arm the Syrian opposition, while other countries in the GCC – and also the Arab League and Turkey- want regime change in Damascus to take place by way of isolation, containment and sanctions, and not through arming the opposition.

Things are getting more complicated and obscure with the emergence of the Iranian question as an Israeli and American priority. U.S. officials are saying that while they are not fond of the idea of the U.S. taking part in arming the opposition, they do not mind if others do so. And while Gulf countries may not mind an Israeli military strike against Iran, they do fear U.S. military involvement as this may invite reprisals and anger against them.

It is an extremely dangerous phase then, and everybody is on the line regardless of whether any party is pretending to be safe and impervious to harm.

(The writer is a columist and political commentator. This article first appeared in Dar Al Hayat on Mar. 9, 2012)