Israeli embassy car blast case: Iranian spies did it, says Delhi Police – The Economic Times.

NEW DELHI: The Delhi Police has cracked the Israeli embassy car blast case and traced the conspiracy to Iranian secret agents. According to sources privy to the investigation, it has now been ‘conclusively established’ that Syed Mohammad Kazmi, the freelance journalist recently arrested in the case, was in touch with an Iranian intelligence officer and had even visited Iran as part of the conspiracy.

Sources in the security establishment told ET that the breakthrough in the February 13 blast on an Israel diplomat’s car, will be announced by the Delhi Police in a “day or two.” They added that another couple of detentions have been made in the case.

The questioning of these two persons is underway and their arrests will follow soon. A senior official of the security establishment claimed that the Delhi Police had identified the bomber.

Even before the details of the investigation are placed in the public domain, India made it a point to share them with Israel. On Monday, home minister P Chidambaram is said to have briefed the visiting Israeli national security adviser Yaakov Amidror on the alleged breakthrough in the case.

The “breakthrough” comes even as relatives and friends of Kazmi have been protesting against his arrest and claiming that he was framed by the Delhi Police.

Putting its weight behind the Delhi Police, the MHA on Monday said it completely backs their line of investigation. “Wait for the announcement from the Delhi Police, which will unravel the entire conspiracy and the role of each individual and agency in the attack,” a senior home ministry official told ET.

The outcome of the blast probe confirms Israel’s assessment soon after the blast. Israel had claimed that the blast was carried out by Iran or its protA©gA© Hezbollah, given Israel’s stiff opposition to its nuclear ambitions.

While seeking Kazmi’s remand here last week, public prosecutor Rajiv Mohan had told the court that the accused was one of the conspirators involving international terrorism.

“This is a case of international terrorism. It is not necessary that only Indians are involved and there is a possibility that some foreign nationals might also be involved in the case,” he had said adding that the conspiracy was hatched outside India.

Kazmi has been charged with helping the bomber conduct reconnaissance of the Israeli embassy several times and keeping tab on the movement of Israeli diplomats. He allegedly helped terrorist who planted the magnet bomb on the diplomat’s car.

Kazmi, a freelance journalist, is said to be running a feature news agency, Media Star, besides being a part-time worker with an Iranian broadcaster and also a columnist with Persian newspapers in Iran.

Why the IDF felt it had to strike at Zuhair al-Qaissi | The Times of Israel.

Fear of a kidnap attempt, a major terror attack, and deeper tensions with Egypt prompted Friday’s hit, even though the IDF knew the rockets would fly

Palestinians gather around the wreckage of Zuhair al-Qaissi’s car, targeted in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, Friday. (photo credit: AP photo/Hatem Moussa)

DF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz knew Friday afternoon, as he sent aircraft into the sky to kill Zuhair al-Qaissi, leader of the Popular Resistance Committees, that one million people would soon be tethered to their safe rooms, hundreds of thousands of children would miss school, buildings and infrastructure would be damaged, the local stock market would dip and, it would have seemed only reasonable, some lives would be lost.

He also knew that wars sometimes start with a single, hurried decision. Blood begets blood. Rockets could have reached Tel Aviv or its outskirts. Ground troops could have been called to the front. The politicians, once the ground troops were inserted, would have demanded a tangible achievement, something to go the polls with, and that, Gantz knew, would not be easily attained in the labyrinthine alleys of Gaza, where all changes seem to point in the same direction — increased extremism.

Yet when word reached him that al-Qaissi had gotten into his blue Opel along with another two combatants, meaning they were out in the open and verifiably not surrounded by family members or other civilians, he authorized the hit. Tuesday morning, speaking before new recruits to the Kfir Brigade, he explained why. “The planned terror attack in the south could have had strategic implications,” he said.

This is vague army talk for game-changing results and, based on previous experience with the PRC and the current situation in Sinai, likely meant a combination of two things: a defensive strike in Egypt, perhaps shedding Egyptian blood and damaging the ever-more brittle peace with our neighbor to the south; and the possibility of a kidnapping, either to Sinai or through the porous border to Gaza.

Both possibilities, in today’s reality in the Sinai, were all too likely.

The 25,000-square-mile peninsula, ruled by Israel from 1967 to 1982, is in the midst of fundamental change. Religion is on the rise among the avowedly Muslim but traditionally impious Bedouin, and the rule of law, ever since the Arab Spring, is on the wane. Ehud Yaari argued in a recent paper for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy that these two phenomena, coupled with Israel’s 2005 withdrawal from Gaza — which Israel hoped would lead to greater Egyptian involvement — have facilitated the unprecedented spread of Hamas political and religious ideology among the Bedouin tribes of the Sinai.

Yaari, an editorial board member of The Times of Israel and commentator for Channel 2 News, quoted a Bedouin blogger, Ashraf al-Anani, who depicted the effects of the withdrawal as “a fireball [that] started rolling into the peninsula.”

Hundreds of tunnels link the northern Sinai to Gaza. Terrorists send arms and operatives in both directions. In the past, the main flow of arms, according to intelligence reports, was from Iran by sea to Sudan and from there to Egypt, across the canal, into the rugged desert region – a haven for smugglers for millennia, and today home to a robust $300 million trade – and underground to Gaza. Over the past year, though, according to experts, much of the weaponry is being stored in Sinai, and terror operatives from Hamas and the PRC are taking the tunnel route in the opposite direction, from Gaza to the mountainous desert.

The Egyptian gas line to Israel has been attacked 10 times over the last year. Heavily armed Bedouin tribesmen have chased Egyptian security personnel from key positions. Rockets have been fired from Sinai to Aqaba and Eilat. But the lens through which Gantz was likely looking, when weighing the strike, was the August 18, 2011, attack.

The attack was led, if not necessarily executed by, the PRC, a Gaza-based, three-pronged organization founded at the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. According to Yoni Fighel, a senior researcher at the the IDC’s Institute for Counter-Terrorism and former colonel who served in the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate, it is part of “a consortium of terror groups collectively known as Jaljalat, or rolling thunder.”

The original members were, ironically enough, disgruntled Fatah members who wanted to strike at Israel more openly. Today the organization is comprised of three wings, two of which cooperate with Hamas and are staffed by former Izz a-Din al-Qassam members who, like their Fatah forebears, resent their former organization’s newfound stateliness. The third is more closely affiliated with the global jihad organizations.

Their flag closely resembles Hezbollah’s, according to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center website, and above the raised rifle are the words, from a Koranic Sura much beloved by extremists: “Kill them [the infidels] wherever ye shall find them.”

The IDF at first claimed that, in last August’s attack, members of the two Hamas-affiliated wings, under the command of Kamal a-Neirab, snuck out of Gaza and into Sinai and from there to Route 12, north of Eilat, where they sprung the ambush that claimed eight Israeli lives. Fighel, Yaari and other military and Middle East experts dispute that.

The identities of the terrorists were never revealed. Mourning tents were never assembled in Gaza. Rather it seems more likely that experts from Gaza sneaked into Sinai and readied the Bedouin for an attack of unprecedented severity.

“This was a hugely complex attack,” Fighel said. “They would have needed to be briefed, trained, and maybe run through a full model” of the plan. The 12 terrorists, dressed in Egyptian army uniforms, executed a terror attack that included gunfire, grenades, mines, suicide bombers, snipers and, according to Yaari, shoulder-held surface-to-air rockets that, for the first time, were fired at Israeli aircraft. Their goal, according to the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, an NGO run by and for Israeli intelligence veterans, was to kidnap an Israeli.

The quick arrival of a Golani Brigade force may have been the only thing that foiled their plans. But the deaths of several Egyptian officials led to a swell of anti-Israel sentiment, an Israeli apology and a near-lynching of security personnel in the Israeli Embassy in Cairo several weeks later.

Yaari calls the situation in the Sinai a “time bomb.” He too believes that the terrorists were aiming to kidnap an Israeli. Furthermore, friction along the border, he writes, does not often contain itself to Israel and the terrorist group within the neighboring state, but rather, as in Jordan and Lebanon, drags the state hosting the terror into the fray.

If looked at in that light, Gantz, who knew a targeted killing would trigger rocket fire on Israel and who remains uncertain that the killing has prevented a terror attack in the south, evidently felt he had little choice but to target Zuhair al-Qassi on Friday afternoon.

Iran May Not Open a Site to Nuclear Inspectors – NYTimes.com.

By RICK GLADSTONE

Iran’s War in Gaza – By Jonathan Schanzer | Foreign Policy.

This time, it’s not Hamas firing rockets into Israel — it’s Iranian proxies seeking to create havoc.

BY JONATHAN SCHANZER | MARCH 13, 2012

Israeli jets pounded the Gaza Strip on March 12 in the latest volley of fire since violence broke out late last week. But they were not fighting Hamas, Israel’s traditional bête noire in Gaza. Though radical factions have now fired more than 200 rockets into Israel, the self-described Islamic Resistance Movement has yet to claim responsibility for a single attack. It may be the first time the organization has refused to lead the charge to battle against Israel.

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Hamas has a different fight on its hands. Iran, through the use of its proxies, is fomenting instability in Gaza that it is ill-equipped to handle. Indeed, Tehran is punishing Gaza’s de facto rulers for leaving their long-standing alliance.

Rocket fire out of Gaza is rather common, of course. Before the current spasm of violence, the Israelis had reported more than 50 attacks this year. This latest round began on March 9 after an Israeli airstrike killed Zuhair al-Qaissi, the head of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), a group with deep ties to the Iran-backed Hezbollah. Israeli sources commonly report that the two groups share a financial and logistical relationship. Tellingly, the PRC’s logo — featuring an arm brandishing an automatic weapon — borrows liberally from the Hezbollah flag (which in turns borrows from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps). Qaissi, according to the IDF, was on his way into Israel to carry out a terrorist attack.

Hezbollah condemned the attack from Lebanon, while Iran-backed factions in Gaza fired rockets in retribution. The PRC launched at least 85, by their own (perhaps inflated) count. Palestinian Islamic Jihad — whose primary patron is also Iran, according to the U.S. intelligence committee — reportedly launched more than 185. Groups without ties to Iran accounted for a measly eight rockets fired on Israel, according to Israeli government sources.

One Israeli outlet reported that Hamas has allowed other jihadi groups to fire rockets with a wink and a nod. This is difficult to confirm. Meanwhile, Maan News Agency, an independent Palestinian news source, reported that Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh engaged in intense talks brokered by Egypt to bring a halt to the violence. Those negotiations resulted in a cease-fire that went into effect Monday night, although several rockets have already reportedly been fired since.

In fact, the last thing Hamas needs is a war. The militant faction faces its greatest challenge since its creation in 1987: While it has the hardware necessary to fight Israel, it lacks the foreign backing to mount a sustained campaign.

Years of financial sanctions have hammered Tehran for pursuing its illicit nuclear program, denying Iran the cash that it has long provided to Hamas. And after a year of violence in Syria, Hamas’s external leaders had no choice but to leave its longtime safe haven, while Haniyeh denounced the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. After all, it’s hard to present yourself as a group fighting for justice while your patron slaughters thousands of civilians in the streets.

Numerous reports now indicate that Hamas is drifting from the Iran-Syria axis. While Hamas has not ruptured its relations with Tehran in the same manner that it abandoned Damascus, Iranian leaders are clearly irked that the Palestinian faction has refused to stand by Assad, a key strategic figure for Tehran in the region.

Whereas Iran once respected Hamas’s wishes and helped maintain a modicum of calm inside Gaza, the gloves are now off. Iran is using its smaller and less-expensive proxies, the PRC and PIJ, to create unrest on Hamas’s turf.

As the Iranians see it, Hamas has outlived its usefulness. In the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead in late 2008 and early 2009, during which Israel delivered punishing blows to Hamas in retaliation for rocket fire into southern Israel, the group has become more cautious. Ideologically, it has not changed. But practically, it seeks less to destroy Israel than to preserve its own existence.

The Iranian leadership also has its own reasons for wreaking havoc in Gaza now. For starters, it deflects international attention from Tehran’s nuclear activities. With Israel on the brink of war with the Palestinians, the international community’s Pavlovian response is to rein Israel in and call for calm on both sides. The United Nations is now rushing to avert a war in Gaza instead of looking at new ways to halt Iran’s nuclear drive.

Moreover, any unrest in the region reverberates in the oil markets. Traders don’t like to see violence near their energy sources — just look at the 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon, which drove oil prices up almost 15 percent, despite the fact that Lebanon is not an oil exporter. Causing spikes in oil prices is the easiest way for Iran to circumvent sanctions: The more oil costs, the more cash Tehran can raise as it takes those last fateful steps toward the nuclear threshold.

The current crisis reveals that, for Iran, Hamas is expendable. But even after the alliance has frayed, Iran has maintained influence in Gaza thanks to a “martyrdom” culture it helped cultivate, weapons tunnels it helped build and maintain, and small but lethal terrorist groups it continues to finance. These groups now tempt Israel into another war from which only Iran will gain.

Israelis see Iran ‘mini-drill’ in Gaza flare-up.

Israelis see Iran ‘mini-drill’ in Gaza flare-up

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

An Israeli police explosives expert walks near a car damaged from a rocket fired by Palestinian fighters in Gaza, in the southern city of Ashdod. (Reuters)

inShare1

Israel has emerged from the past few days of fighting with Palestinians in Gaza more confident that its advanced missile shield and civil defenses can perform well in any war with Iran.

Describing how the flare-up in violence had provided an impromptu opportunity to test out Israel’s defenses, one Israeli official said on Tuesday it gave useful indicators for any potential conflict with Tehran: “In a sense, this was a mini-drill,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

“There are significant differences, of course, but the basic principles regarding the ‘day after’ scenarios are similar,” the official added, alluding to Iran’s threat to respond to any “pre-emptive strike” on its nuclear facilities by firing missiles at Israel.

Uzi Rubin, a veteran of the Arrow program, cautioned, however, against relying too far on such defenses as Iranian missiles, if not intercepted, could wreak far more damage than Gazan rockets, many of which are improvised from drainage pipes.

“We are talking about 750-kg (1,650-lb) warheads, enough to level a city block,” Rubin said, noting there would be a greater impact if Iran’s allies on Israel’s borders — Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah guerrillas, and Palestinian militants — joined in.

Yet some Israeli experts see that axis bending to new domestic political pressures, notably after the popular Arab revolts of the past year, which may reduce the extent to which Tehran can count on their support in any conflict with Israel.

Indeed, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak has recently predicted that “maybe not even 500” of Israel’s civilians would die in any counter-attack after a strike on Iran.

Gaza’s governing Hamas movement stayed out of the four days of fighting waged by other militants — a reflection, perhaps, of the powerful Islamist group’s placing of domestic interests over any desire by Tehran to bleed Israel by proxy. Hamas’s ties with long-time sponsors Iran and Syria have weakened this year.

Sanguine assessments by Israeli defense officials are at odds, however, with disclosures by an opposition lawmaker last month that, despite a government-sponsored fortification drive, almost one in four citizens lacked access to shelters.

Budgetary problems no doubt contributed to the lags in construction, and the economic damage of any conflict with Iran is a factor that those who counsel against over-confidence in defensive systems have highlighted.

Rubin noted that while the flare-up with the lightly armed Palestinians in Gaza had disrupted life and business activity only in Israel’s southern periphery, Iran’s missiles were easily capable of striking its main industrial hubs — the Tel Aviv conurbation and Haifa port in the north.

“There would be a total economic paralysis,” he said.

If it is planning to attack Iran, which denies seeking the bomb while preaching the Jewish state’s destruction, Israel must contend with unprecedented tactical hurdles and the disapproval of the United States — underwriter of Arrow II and Iron Dome.

Israel would also depend on Washington’s grants for the two projects to bear the lopsided cost of each interception — between $25,000 and $80,000 for Iron Dome, and $2 million and $3 million for Arrow.

Though Israel is widely assumed to have its own atomic arsenal, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu dubs Iran a mortal threat and described the recent Gaza rockets as a harbinger.

“These terrorist attacks, by Islamic Jihad for example, demonstrate the scale of the danger that will be wrought if, God forbid, a nuclear Iran stands behind them,” he said on Monday.

Time for Gaza Strip war – Israel Opinion, Ynetnews.

Op-ed: All-out war in Gaza Strip is a bad option for Israel, but all other alternatives are worse

Moshe Ronen

We can turn a blind eye. We can say that war is a bad thing and nothing good shall come out of it. It’s tempting to avoid a decision and postpone it to an unspecified date. However, reality is taking shape right before our eyes. Tens of thousands of missiles and mortar shells are being accumulated in Gaza, and the address for each one of them is clear: Us.

My heart’s desire is to seek a solution elsewhere instead of embarking on war. Some kind of agreement. A long-term ceasefire. Another Oslo deal. Maybe peace? But these are apparently pipe dreams.

Hamas rules Gaza and alongside it we see groups that are even more radical, such as Islamic Jihad. They receive a backwind from Muslim movements that are taking over Egypt – the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas’ parent) and the more radical Salafis.

Even if we wish to engage in negotiations with them, they are unwilling to talk to us. Even if they would be willing to talk to us, there is nothing to talk about. They will be willing to discuss a full withdrawal from all the territories, but not in exchange for peace, but rather, some kind of vague, temporary truce. Israel’s leftist camp won’t agree to this either.

So it appears that we have no choice: At some point, the IDF will have to choose the bad option and enter the Gaza Strip. This is certainly the bad option – yet all other options are worse.

Time for painful decision

The implication of the bad option is thousands of fatalities in Gaza and terrible images in the global media. The implication is hundreds of missiles fired on Israel – including central Israel – and dozens of killed civilians.

The Iron Dome missile defense system proved itself in recent days, but it too has limitations. After a certain number of missiles are launched from Gaza, we will be left with no interceptor missiles. We won’t be able to produce them given such murderous rate of fire.

The implication is also quite a few soldiers who will be killed or wounded in Gaza.

This is a terrible option, but what is the alternative? If we wait longer, we may have more Iron Dome batteries, yet the quantity of missiles available in Gaza will grow further, Hamas’ and Islamic Jihad’s armies will be better trained and better equipped, and Arab states may be more committed to the Islamic cause. Our situation won’t be any better.

So perhaps the time has come to make a difficult and painful decision?

Report: 2 Israeli warships cross Suez Canal – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Egyptian newspaper says Israeli warships crossed Suez Canal under heavy guard; destination unclear

Roi Kais

A firm massage to Iran? Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported Tuesday that two Israeli warships crossed Egypt‘s Suez Canal. According to reports, the two vessels and a French ship left Port Said in the north. The destination of the ships is unclear. The IDF has yet to comment on the report.

The two warships, INS Lahav and INS Yafo arrived at Port Said accompanied by a French vessel “Imidisi”, where they joined a fleet.

The Suez sailing supervisor, Ahmed el-Manhali, said that the crossing took 14 hours, and that the ships were accompanied by a Suez authority tow ship for security purposes.

Last month, two Iranian ships crossed the canal, in an act perceived by Israel as provocation. It was the second time within a year that Iranian ships had crossed the canal. The first time was shortly after the ouster of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak.

The last time Israeli naval vessels reportedly crossed the canal was in 2009. Two IDF warships sailed across the canal from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea. The source said the vessels were the INS Hanit and INS Eilat torpedo boats.

A few days earlier, a single missile boat was reported as crossing the canal to the Red Sea for “operational purposes”. The nature of the crossing remains classified.

Top official: Israel gave no guarantees in exchange for Gaza truce – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Around 300 rockets were fired into Israel over four days of hostilities, 56 of them intercepted by Iron Dome; 26 Palestinians killed, 4 of them civilians, according to IDF chief.

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff

After four days of hostilities that subjected much of southern Israel to rocket fire from Gaza, Egyptian mediators managed to arrange a cease-fire on Tuesday. But the cease-fire was broken by four rockets and seven mortar shells fired at Israel in the hours after it took effect at 1 A.M.

Nevertheless, the Israel Defense Forces refrained from aerial attacks on the Gaza Strip yesterday, and in general, relative quiet prevailed.

	An Iron Dome anti-rocket battery in action, March 11, 2012.
	Photo by: AP

When compared to previous rounds of hostilities between Israel and the Palestinian terrorist organizations in Gaza, the cease-fire took hold relatively quickly this time. That is an indication that neither Hamas, which has overall control of the Strip, nor Israel really wished to prolong the latest clash.

Sources in Gaza reported that three Palestinians were injured by IDF fire while throwing stones at Israeli observation posts on the Gaza border, near Khan Yunis, following the funerals of Islamic Jihad militants.

Altogether, about 300 rockets were fired into Israel during the recent hostilities. Of these, 56 were intercepted by the Iron Dome anti-missile system. Since Iron Dome only targets a fraction of the missiles fired – namely, those deemed likely to land in populated areas – that represents a success rate of over 70 percent.

IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz said yesterday that 26 Palestinians were killed in the course of the recent confrontation, of whom 22 were terrorists and four were civilians.

The restoration of relative calm was achieved following two days of indirect negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian factions. Egyptian intelligence officials spoke separately with the heads of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees. On the Israeli side, the talks with the Egyptians were run by the head of the Defense Ministry’s political department, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, and the head of the IDF’s plans and policy directorate, Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel.

Gilad told Haaretz yesterday that the understandings reached were “very simple – quiet in exchange for quiet.” He said the understandings were not spelled out in a signed document, and the only Israeli commitment was that if the Palestinian organizations refrained from launching attacks on Israel, the IDF would also hold its fire.

At first, at the Palestinians’ request, the Egyptians also attempted to obtain an Israeli commitment to refrain from targeted killings of senior figures in the various terrorist organizations. But Israeli officials said this effort was shelved in the face of Israeli opposition. “There were no guarantees and no other promises,” said Gilad, denying Islamic Jihad’s claim that Israel did in fact promise to refrain from targeted killings of the organization’s operatives.

“Major credit goes to the Egyptians for the successful effort they invested in obtaining a cease-fire,” Gilad added.

But other Israeli officials commented that some time elapsed before Cairo intervened in the events in Gaza. They attributed this to the delicate situation Egyptian intelligence has been in since the fall of the Mubarak regime, and especially now, given the upcoming elections in Egypt.

Taking stock

With the hostilities having ended, at least until the next time, both sides are now examining their gains and losses. As usual, the bottom line is a little different from what the leaders are telling both themselves and their publics.

There is no doubt that Israel’s military preparedness, both offensively and on the home front, showed improvement compared to prior rounds of fighting. It is also the case that despite its massive rocket fire, Islamic Jihad didn’t manage to kill any Israelis, mainly thanks to the Iron Dome system.

But with regard to the state of Israeli deterrence, the answers are less clear-cut. It is true that the smaller factions in Gaza, which paid a nonnegligible price in casualties over the past several days, will think hard before undertaking another offensive.

Nevertheless, the latest round began with a targeted killing by the IDF aimed at foiling a Palestinian terror attack via Sinai. This poses the question of whether Israel’s political leadership will lightly approve a similar operation next time it receives an intelligence warning, now that it knows the price may well be hundreds of rockets fired at civilians and the paralysis of nearly a million residents of the south.

Moreover, while the response provided by Iron Dome is sufficient to cope with the relatively limited challenge posed by Gaza, adding Hezbollah in Lebanon to the equation adds another 50,000 rockets and missiles. Four Iron Dome batteries (assuming the fourth becomes available at the end of the month as planned) provide only a very partial answer to this threat.

	President Shimon Peres belatedly celebrating Purim with children from Kibbutz Yad Mordechai, who were forced to postpone the holiday because of rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip.
	Photo by: AFP

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.
DEBKAfile Special Report March 13, 2012, 9:40 PM (GMT+02:00)

MPR-500 made by Israel’s Military Industries

Israel has developed an improved precision, bunker-burrowing weapon which Israeli Military Industries (IMI) unveiled on March 6. The 500-pound MPR-500 is an electro-optical (laser-guided) bomb that can penetrate double-reinforced concrete walls or floors without breaking apart.

The bomb was shown in action penetrating four reinforced concrete walls with fragmentation from the explosion limited to a radius of less than three meters.

The new weapon is designed as an upgrade for the US Mk82 in Israel Air Force stocks. “The lethality, precision… and relatively low weight of the new weapon,” say its manufacturers, “enable its use against multiple targets in a single pass.”

After blowing the first hole in the targeted underground site, the next bombs continue to extend and deepen it.

The MPR-500 bridges an operational gap between the 250-pound US GBU-39 small-diameter bomb, 1,000 of which were approved for sale to Israel and the 5,000-pound GBU-28 American super-bunker buster. debkafile notes: The IMI’s presentation of the MPR-500 took place at the height of Israel’s argument with the Obama administration over the need for a near-term strike on Iran’s nuclear sites – especially those Tehran is busy transferring to fortified underground bunkers.

It attracted little attention because on the same day, Iran was invited by the Six Powers for nuclear negotiations, Tehran sent out its own invitation to UN nuclear inspectors to visit the suspect military site of Parchin (about which Iran has been hedging since) and the British cabinet received a top-secret intelligence briefing on the likelihood of an Israeli attack.
The Israeli Air Force is also reported to be planning to enlarge its Boeing-707 based aerial refueling tanker fleet, another key component in Israel’s ability to carry out an aerial strike against a target as distant as Iran. The expanded tanker fleet, by providing nearly 2 million pounds of fuel, would allow dozens of Israel F-15 and F-16 warplanes to carry more weapons on this mission.

Israeli officials have consistently challenged the claims of some experts that the lack the military capacity for a successful strike against Iran’s nuclear facilties.

Iron Dome’s worth – JPost – Opinion – Editorials.

By JPOST EDITORIAL

03/12/2012 22:46

Despite the prohibitive costs, Iron Dome is worth the expense.

By REUTERS

The Iron Dome rocket-defense system has proved to be a major game-changer in the most recent round of conflict with Islamist terror organizations operating in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.

Since it was first deployed in March 2011, Iron Dome’s interception success rate has significantly improved from about 75 percent to 90 percent.

During the current round of fighting, the three anti-rocket batteries – positioned in Beersheba, Ashkelon and Ashdod – have successfully knocked out of the sky well over 40 rockets which, according to computations made of their trajectory by Iron Dome’s computer brain, were headed for populated areas.

If one of these rockets had, God forbid, killed innocent Israeli civilians – as intended by Islamic Jihad and Popular Resistance Committee terrorists – Israel’s politicians would be under tremendous public pressure to launch a major military offensive into Gaza Strip as was the case in the months that led up to Operation Cast Lead, the 22-day military incursion into Gaza Strip that began in December 2008 and ended in January 2009.

But recognition of Iron Dome’s merits was not always taken for granted. Former IDF Southern Command head Dan Harel admitted Sunday on Army Radio that he had originally opposed investing in the development of Iron Dome when the idea was first proposed at the beginning of 2007, although he has since changed his mind. He felt it would be a waste of money. And he was not alone.

Other leading defense officials and IDF commanders were skeptical about Iron Dome. MK Amir Peretz (Labor), who served as defense minister at the time Iron Dome was first proposed, should be praised for having the foresight to recognize the rocket-defense system’s potential.

But some have wondered whether the hefty cost of operating Iron Dome – which has been offset by a $205 million grant provided by the Obama administration in 2011 – is worth it.

Each Tamir missile fired by Iron Dome at a Kassam or Grad rocket costs about $50,000 and usually two are fired at a time. Assuming more than 40 Tamirs have been fired to intercept rockets fired from Gaza, operating Iron Dome during the recent round of conflict has cost at least $4m., and this does not include development costs. Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz said that as effective as Iron Dome is, it is unrealistic to think that Israel could fund the purchase of enough batteries to provide cover for all parts of Israel.

Still, Defense Minister Ehud Barak is pushing to increase the number of batteries from three to 13.

Despite the prohibitive costs, Iron Dome is worth the expense.

First, it saves lives, which is priceless. In Jewish tradition anyone who saves a single life is seen as saving an entire world. Also, the economic damage caused by Kassam and Grad rockets that hit houses, schools or businesses can easily amount to millions of dollars.

What’s more, Iron Dome significantly improves Israel’s deterrence. Knowing that the vast majority of rockets targeting population centers will be shot down, Palestinian terrorists are under pressure to fire more of them. But in order to fire Kassam and Grad rockets, terrorists must temporarily come out in the open where they are exposed to fire from Israeli helicopters and planes.

Assuming that the building of a single Kassam rocket costs about $800, and assuming that Gaza’s economy is significantly less developed than Israel’s, increasing the number of rockets fired from Gaza could quickly become very expensive, relatively speaking, for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Resistance Committee and other terrorist groups. And Iron Dome shoots down only rockets which are slated to hit a populated area or strategic target. These rockets accounted for just a quarter of those fired at Israel during the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

Finally, Israel will be able to profit from Iron Dome, which has proved itself in combat situations, by selling it to other countries. NATO, South Korea, India and the US have all shown interest.

Turning a weakness into a strength is an old Jewish trait. In this context, Iron Dome is an eminently Jewish response to Palestinian aggression.