Archive for March 18, 2012

A tale of success and darkness in Iran

March 18, 2012

A tale of success and darkness in Iran – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Even the strongest supporters of an attack – whose numbers, scarily, are increasing – admit there is no chance that Iran will sit idly by, and that an Israeli attack will be countered by a ferocious response.

Let’s not dwell on the possibility of failure. If an attack fails to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities, Israel will receive a Yom Kippur War-like blow. Its deterrence will be compromised and it will be revealed as a paper tiger. Iranian revenge will then be particularly painful.

Let’s hope everything will go well. The planes will drop their bombs, all the reactors and the facilities will be razed to their foundations. Even then, there is a danger that some planes will be shot down, God forbid, and then we’ll have another Ron Arad affair (the navigator was lost over Lebanon in 1986 ). But there’s no arguing with (historic ) success: the price is worth it.

Even the strongest supporters of an attack – whose numbers, scarily, are increasing – admit there is no chance that Iran will sit idly by, and that an Israeli attack will be countered by a ferocious response. Missiles from the east, the north and perhaps also the south, including against Tel Aviv, will paralyze the country. It could go on for a long time.

Defense Minister Ehud Barak promised a maximum of 500 dead. Perhaps he underestimated, perhaps not, but it is unlikely that Israel is hardened enough to take such a number of casualties in a short time. Blood, bereavement and a stalled economy, all at once. Israelis will be killed, tourists will stay away, the national mood will be one of despair and fear.

But even that is not enough. The Iranians, a people with the memory of Methuselah, will neither forgive nor forget. An Israeli success will be perceived, of course, as much more serious than all the “Satanic Verses” furor. If Salman Rushdie has been living in fear of Iran for almost 25 years, the terror of the fatwah it will issue against Israelis will be greater and persist for much longer. Once again, Hebrew will not be heard beyond the threshold of Ben-Gurion International Airport. Careful, the Iranian avengers are everywhere.

An Iran that has been bombarded and defeated will be a vengeful Iran, and its revenge will be served both hot and cold. First will come the missiles on Israel, then years of terror attacks worldwide. All of that, we recall, is if Israel scores a dizzying success. A global rise in oil prices, also an immediate and unavoidable outcome of success, will bring one of two things to the White House: a furious Democratic president; or an ignorant, right-wing Republican president, neither of which is good for Israel. Europe will also be angry, as will – it almost goes without saying – Russia and China.

But back to Iran. It will redevelop its nuclear potential quickly. It will need about two years to do so, according to even the most ardent supporters of an attack. Its know-how can never be bombed and its motivation will soar, stronger than death, greater than it is now. The Iranian people will unite even more around its leadership, and its hatred for Israel will burn ever brighter.

Still, we gained two years; two hard years for Israel. And what would happen after that? Another bombardment? Another success? Meanwhile, there will be a few small comforts: “Many things will be destroyed and many will weep, but the demagogues will be silenced,” the poet Aharon Shabtai wrote in an article in the Hebrew edition of Haaretz (March 16 ). Shabtai was referring to the possibility of failure, but also to the one case of true success – the assumption that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak will not survive politically.

Prime ministers and defense ministers do not usually survive mass casualties. That was the case after the failed Yom Kippur War and the successful first Lebanon war. People will not forget the damage of success when it comes to those two, and they will be forced off the stage, even if they are drunk with victory at first.

Perhaps Israeli megalomania will also be reined in. Having learned from the experience of the Six-Day War, maybe more Israelis will understand that even military success can end in tears, weeping that will last for generations. Having learned from wars about which we had a choice, wars that were intended to achieve regional control, perhaps more Israelis will understand that the way to strengthen Israel’s standing in the region is not through bombardment. “And we will sober up, once again be human beings who wield pencils,” as Shabtai put it. Our only comfort then, in the imagined success that could soon be upon us, is that it will be only slightly less arduous than its horrific opposite.

* A personal note: In my article “Living in Bamba Land” (March 15 ), I stated that MK Zahava Gal-On made no mention on her Facebook page of events in the south and in Gaza. I was not aware that Gal-On was in mourning last week following the death of her mother. I extend my condolences and an apology to Gal-On.

Obama Executive Order: Peacetime Martial Law

March 18, 2012

Israpundit » Blog Archive » Obama Executive Order: Peacetime Martial Law.

 

This Executive Order was posted on the WhiteHouse.gov  web site on Friday, March 16, 2012, under the name National Defense Resources Preparedness.  In a nutshell, it’s the blueprint for Peacetime Martial Law and it gives the president the power to take just about anything deemed necessary for “National Defense”, whatever they decide that is.    It’s peacetime, because as the title of the order says, it’s for “Preparedness”.  A copy of the entire order follows the end of this story.

Under this order the heads of these cabinet level positions; Agriculture, Energy, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Defense and Commerce can take food, livestock, fertilizer, farm equipment, all forms of energy, water resources, all forms of civil transporation (meaning any vehicles, boats, planes),  and any other materials, including construction materials from wherever they are available.  This is probably why the government has been visiting farms with GPS devices, so they know exactly where to go when they turn this one on.

Specifically, the government is allowed to allocate materials, services, and facilities as deemed necessary or appropriate.  They decide what necessary or appropriate means.

What happens if the government decides it needs all these things to be prepared, even if there is no war?   You likely won’t be able to walk into a store to purchase virtually anything because it will all be requisitioned, “rationed” and controlled by the government.  Construction materials, food like meat, butter and sugar, anything imported, parts, tires and fuel for vehicles, clothing, etc. will likely become unobtainable, or at least very scarce.  How many things are even made here in the USA any more?

WWII era gas ration cards via Old Chester PA.  You couldn’t go on vacation without a “vacation pass”.

Under this new Executive Order, cabinet heads are authorized to loan money, offer loan guarantees and even subsidize payments at above market rates (no bid contracts?) for whatever they need.   This could make Solyndra or Halliburton look like Junior Achievement. Which reminds me, I remembered when my buddy ran out of cash travelling in Europe, she used www.XN–LNA-PENGAR-15A.BIZ to get a loan to get back to her country.   Nothing like a war will generate these kinds of huge profits for the corporate “partners” and you can bet the bankers and contractors are already lining up for this one — because under this order no war is even required!

Here’s where you can find the Executive Order: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/16/executive-ord…

‘SWIFT sanctions may convince Iran to abandon nukes’

March 18, 2012

‘SWIFT sanctions may convince Ir… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

By JPOST.COM STAFF AND REUTERS
03/18/2012 09:52
Vice Premier Silvan Shalom says that the cumulative impact of the oil and SWIFT sanctions may soon reach the point of convincing the Iranian regime that it can only survive by abandoning its push for nuclear weapons.

Silvan Shalom on Iran By AMMAR AWAD / REUTERS

Vice Premier Silvan Shalom said on Sunday that Israel is satisfied with SWIFT’s decision to halt Iran’s ability to use its electronic fund transfer system to make international transfers. He estimated that within a few weeks, the impact on the Iranian economy would become apparent.

SWIFT is the world’s largest electronic payment system and on Saturday implemented its decision to cut off 30 Iranian banks blacklisted by EU supported economic sanctions. By SWIFT’s own admission, the move is “extraordinary” and “unprecedented”.

Shalom, in an interview with Army Radio, said that the decision is likely to prove decisive in the struggle against Iran’s [nuclear] arms race. “Iran is progressing with its nuclear weapons program in order to safeguard the regime’s rule. But the moment that the sanctions become this severe, first with oil and now with [money] transfers, perhaps we will get to a point where they will understand that only abandoning the [nuclear weapons] program will allow the regime to survive,” said Shalom.

He added that in today’s world, “We already don’t do transfers using documents. Everything is done by international [electronic] transfers. What will they do now? Carry around suitcases with gold?”

Iran is frustrated and again it is reiterating that it has no desire to build a nuclear bomb.

“I think they know pretty well, I think the United States intelligence services and the West know that we are not after building nuclear weapons,” said Mohammad Javad Larijani, Secretary General of Iran’s High Council on Human Rights.

On the other hand, the US is cheering the EU’s move. Under Secretary of Treasury David Cohen said, “The decision reflects the growing international consensus that substantially increased pressure is needed to convince the Iranian regime to address the international community’s concerns about its illicit nuclear activities.”

The move will hurt Iran’s all-important oil industry by complicating its ability to make and receive payments. It will also affect Iranian citizens by making it difficult for them to receive any money from relatives living abroad.

Iran threatens Hormuz and world oil supply after trade links cutoff

March 18, 2012

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report March 18, 2012, 9:11 AM (GMT+02:00)

Saudi Ras Tanura oil export terminal

Former Intelligence Minister Ali Falahian, Iran’s senior spokesman on sanctions, said Sunday, March 18,  that if the US and Europe think they can ignore international law to promote their interests, they should know that Iran will respond in kind everywhere it can. “I suggest that the West take seriously our threat to close the Strait of Hormuz,” he said in Tehran’s first response to the SWIFT decision to sever ties with Iranian banks to enforce European sanctions on its nuclear program.
A large fleet of 4 US and French nuclear aircraft carriers and eight minesweepers and mine-hunting helicopters have piled up on both sides of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 17 percent of the world’s daily oil supply passes,  and Israeli naval vessels have deployed in the Red Sea.

debkafile’s military and intelligence sources estimate Tehran will make good on its threats by trying to drop sea mines in the strategic strait and/or the approaches to the huge Saudi Ras Tanura oil export terminal. A small explosion by an unknown hand hit a major Saudi pipeline between Awamiya and Safwa on March 1. The damage was not great because the saboteurs used a small quantity of explosive but it appeared to be the work of professionals.
While Saudi officials denied the incident, photos of a large fire appeared on the Internet. Gulf oil sources suspect that it was a warning from Tehran of the hazards facing the world’s largest oil exporter.

The SWIFT cutoff of ties with Iranian banks has gone a long way toward isolating Iran from global commerce. It will affect Iranian oil sales to its biggest customers in the Far East, China and Japan, as well as India. The economic noose tightening around its neck is bound to produce a response from Iran, it is estimated in Washington and European capitals. The US-led European sanctions on Iranian oil world trade were boosted in recent weeks by the United Arab Emirates which stopped handling Iranian rials, further reducing its ability to trade and obtain hard currency.
After its foremost ally, Bashar Assad, proved his ability to survive largely with the help of abundant Iranian help, Tehran is unlikely to let this achievement be marred by a US and European economic stranglehold. The ordinary Iranian may care about his government’s international standing but he cares a lot more about the fast depreciating value of the money in his pocket and his financial assets.
Anticipating that Iran may kick back hard against the tough penalties building up against its nuclear program, three US aircraft carriers are standing by in the Persian Gulf – The USS Abraham Lincoln, the USS Carl Vinson and the USS Enterprise together with the French Charles de Gaulle and their strike groups.

Thursday, US Navy Chief Adm. Jonathan Greenert said he was doubling the American minesweeping fleet in the Persian Gulf by adding another four vessels as well as mine-hunting helicopters to bolter Persian Gulf security and keep the Strait of Hormuz open to international traffic.

France, Britain, Holland and Germany have also deployed minesweepers in these strategic Gulf waters.
Tuesday, March 13, two Israeli missile corvettes, the INS Lahav and INS Yafo, crossed the Suez Canal on their way to the Red Sea accompanied by the French Imidisi supply ship.

The vast naval buildup of powerful warships confirms that the United States, Europe and Israel are braced for harsh Iranian retaliation across more than one part of the Middle East for the crippling sanctions now taking hold.

Iran Intelligence Crisis Showed Difficulty of Assessing Nuclear Data – NYTimes.com

March 18, 2012

Iran Intelligence Crisis Showed Difficulty of Assessing Nuclear Data – NYTimes.com.

WASHINGTON — While American spy agencies have believed that the Iranians halted efforts to build a nuclear bomb back in 2003, the difficulty in assessing the government’s ambitions was evident two years ago, when what appeared to be alarming new intelligence emerged, according to current and former United States officials.

 

Intercepted communications of Iranian officials discussing their nuclear program raised concerns that the country’s leaders had decided to revive efforts to develop a weapon, intelligence officials said.

 

That, along with a stream of other information, set off an intensive review and delayed publication of the 2010 National Intelligence Estimate, a classified report reflecting the consensus of analysts from 16 agencies. But in the end, they deemed the intercepts and other evidence unpersuasive, and they stuck to their longstanding conclusion.

 

The intelligence crisis that erupted in 2010, which has not been previously disclosed, only underscores how central that assessment has become to matters of war and peace.

 

Today, as suspicions about Iran’s nuclear ambitions have provoked tough sanctions and threats of military confrontation, top administration officials have said that Iran still has not decided to pursue a weapon, reflecting the intelligence community’s secret analysis. But if that assessment changes, it could lift a brake set by President Obama, who has not ruled out military options as a last resort to prevent Iran gaining nuclear arms.

 

Publicly and privately, American intelligence officials express confidence in the spy agencies’ assertions. Still, some acknowledge significant intelligence gaps in understanding the intentions of Iran’s leaders and whether they would approve the crucial steps toward engineering a bomb, the most covert aspect of one of the most difficult intelligence collection targets in the world.

 

Much of what analysts sift through are shards of information that are ambiguous or incomplete, sometimes not up to date, and that typically offer more insight about what the Iranians are not doing than evidence of what they are up to.

 

As a result, officials caution that they cannot offer certainty. “I’d say that I have about 75 percent confidence in the assessment that they haven’t restarted the program,” said one former senior intelligence official.

 

Another former intelligence official said: “Iran is the hardest intelligence target there is. It is harder by far than North Korea.

 

“In large part, that’s because their system is so confusing,” he said, which “has the effect of making it difficult to determine who speaks authoritatively on what.”

 

And, he added, “We’re not on the ground, and not having our people on the ground to catch nuance is a problem.”

 

Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes, but American intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency have picked up evidence in recent years that some Iranian research activities that may be weapons-related have continued since 2003, officials said. That information has not been significant enough for the spy agencies to alter their view that the weapons program has not been restarted.

 

Mossad, Israel’s intelligence service, agrees with the American intelligence assessments, even while Israeli political leaders have been pushing for quick, aggressive action to block Iran from becoming what they describe as an existential threat to the Jewish state.

 

“Their people ask very hard questions, but Mossad does not disagree with the U.S. on the weapons program,” said one former senior American intelligence official, who, like others for this article, would speak only on the condition of anonymity about classified information. “There is not a lot of dispute between the U.S. and Israeli intelligence communities on the facts.”

 

In trying to evaluate the potential perils of Iran’s nuclear program, the United States’ spy agencies have spent years trying to track its efforts to enrich uranium and develop missile technology, and watching for any move toward weaponization — designing and building a bomb.

 

Hunting for signs of the resumption of a weapons program is more difficult than monitoring enrichment and missile-building activities, both of which require large investments in plants, equipment and related infrastructure. American intelligence officials said that the conversations of only a dozen or so top Iranian officials and scientists would be worth monitoring in order to determine whether the weapons program had been restarted, because decision-making on nuclear matters is so highly compartmentalized in Iran.

 

“Reactors are easier to track than enrichment facilities, but obviously anything that involves a lot of construction is easier to track than scientific and intellectual work,” said Jeffrey T. Richelson, the author of “Spying on the Bomb,” a history of American nuclear intelligence. “At certain stages, it is very hard to track the weapons work unless someone is blabbing and their communications can be intercepted.”

 

The extent of the evidence the spy agencies have collected is unclear because most of their findings are classified, but intelligence officials say they have been throwing everything they have at the Iranian program.

 

While the National Security Agency eavesdrops on telephone conversations of Iranian officials and conducts other forms of electronic surveillance, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency analyzes radar imagery and digital images of nuclear sites. Outside analysts believe high-tech drones prowl overhead; one came down late last year deep inside Iranian territory, though American officials said they lost control of it in Afghanistan.

 

Meanwhile, clandestine ground sensors, which can detect electromagnetic signals or radioactive emissions that could be linked to covert nuclear activity, are placed near suspect Iranian facilities. The United States also relies heavily on information gathered by inspectors with the International Atomic Energy Agency who visit some of Iran’s nuclear-related facilities.

 

But collecting independent human intelligence — recruiting spies — has been by far the most difficult task for American intelligence. Some operational lapses — and the lack of an embassy as a base of operations ever since the hostage crisis three decades ago — have frequently left the C.I.A. virtually blind on the ground in Iran, according to former intelligence officials.

 

In 2004, for example, the C.I.A. put a whole network of Iranian agents in jeopardy after a technological mistake by an agency officer, according to former intelligence officials.

 

In 2005, a presidential commission that reviewed the prewar failures of the intelligence on Iraq’s supposed weapons programs faulted American intelligence on Iran, saying it included little valuable information from spies.

 

More recently, the C.I.A. suffered a setback in efforts to question Iranian exiles and recruit nuclear scientists. Two years ago, agency officials had to sort through the wreckage of the strange case of Shahram Amiri, an Iranian scientist who apparently defected to the United States in 2009 and then returned to Iran in 2010 after claiming he had been abducted by the C.I.A.

 

His case is eerily similar to that of Vitaly Yurchenko, a K.G.B. officer who defected to the United States in 1985 and went back to the Soviet Union later that year, claiming he had been drugged and kidnapped by the C.I.A.

 

Like Mr. Yurchenko, Mr. Amiri’s case has provoked debate within the agency about whether he was a genuine defector, and whether any of the information he provided could be trusted.

 

The United States and Israel share intelligence on Iran, American officials said. For its spying efforts, Israel relies in part on an Iranian exile group that is labeled a terrorist organization by the United States, the Mujahedeen Khalq, or M.E.K., which is based in Iraq. The Israelis have also developed close ties in the semiautonomous region of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, and they are believed to use Kurdish agents who can move back and forth across the border into Iran.

 

American intelligence officials, however, are wary of relying on information from an opposition group like the M.E.K., particularly after their experience in Iraq of relying on flawed information provided by the Iraqi National Congress, an exile group run by Ahmad Chalabi.

 

“I’m very suspicious of anything that the M.E.K. provides,” said David A. Kay, who led the C.I.A.’s fruitless effort to find weapons program in Iraq. “We all dealt with the Chalabis of the world once.”

 

Just as in 2010, new evidence about the Iranian nuclear program delayed the National Intelligence Estimate in 2007, the last previous assessment. Current and former American officials say that a draft version of the assessment had been completed when the United States began to collect surprising intelligence suggesting that Iran had suspended its weapons program and disbanded its weapons team four years earlier.

 

The draft version had concluded that the Iranians were still trying to build a bomb, the same finding of a 2005 assessment. But as they scrutinized the new intelligence from several sources, including intercepted communications in which Iranian officials were heard complaining to one another about stopping the program, the American intelligence officials decided they had to change course, officials said. While enrichment activities continued, the evidence that Iran had halted its weapons program in 2003 at the direction of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was too strong to ignore, they said.

 

One former senior official characterized the information as very persuasive. “I had high confidence in it,” he said. “There was tremendous evidence that the program had been halted.”

 

And today, despite criticism of that assessment from some outside observers and hawkish politicians, American intelligence analysts still believe that the Iranians have not gotten the go-ahead from Ayatollah Khamenei to revive the program.

“That assessment,” said one American official, “holds up really well.”

‘US, Israel agree Iran abandoned nuclear bomb’

March 18, 2012

‘US, Israel agree Iran abandoned… JPost – Iranian Threat – News.

By JPOST.COM STAFF
03/18/2012 07:52
US intelligence officials say US has difficulty gathering evidence on the ground in Iran, ‘New York Times’ reports.

Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor
By Raheb Homavandi / Reuters
US and Israeli intelligence agencies mostly agree that Iran has not restarted its development of a nuclear bomb, the New York Times reported on Saturday.

According to the report, the assessment among top US officials is that Iran has not yet decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, a conclusion which was established based on intelligence analyses.

Israel – while seeing an existential threat in Iran’s possible pursuit of a nuclear bomb – mostly agrees with those assessments, a US intelligence official speaking on the condition of anonymity told the Times.

“Their people ask very hard questions, but Mossad does not disagree with the US on the weapons program,” the Times quoted the official as saying.

Still, the report notes that the US has had difficulty formulating a complete picture of Iran’s nuclear agenda, which intelligence officials said is due to the inability of the CIA to work effectively on the ground in Iran.

The US has been “virtually blind on the ground” in Iran since the hostage crisis over three decades forced the US to shutter its embassy in Tehran.

The available evidence the US has gathered is often outdated and incomplete, and provides more information about what Iran is not doing, the Times reported.

Recruiting spies has been particularly problematic, with the report noting a 2004 technical mistake that put a network of Iranian agents in jeopardy, and the doubtful testimony of an Iranian scientist who defected to the US, only to return to Iran claiming he was abducted by the CIA.

While the US and Israel share information on Iran, the US is reticent to accept intelligence Israel has gathered from the Iranian exile group the Mujahedeen Khalq (MEK), which the US considers a terrorist organization.

That hesitation stems from US experience in dealing with an Iraqi exile group, the Iraqi National Congress, which provided faulty intelligence on Iraq’s weapons program that led to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The US prefers a method of wire tapping of Iranian officials, which helped the US in its 2005 assessment that Iran had abandoned its nuclear program in 2003.

While Iran maintains that its nuclear program is for civilian purposes, and has indicated willingness to engage with the international community over its nuclear program, US President Barack Obama warned last week that the window for diplomacy is closing.

US intelligence officials concluded that the evidence that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had called off the nuclear program was “too hard to ignore,” a conclusion that still “holds up really well,” according to the report.

Iron Dome – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

March 18, 2012

Iron Dome – Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Iron Dome

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
  (Redirected from Iron dome)
Jump to: navigation, search
Iron Dome
Iron Dome near Sderot.jpg
“Iron Dome” launcher deployed next to Sderot, Israel (June 2011)
Type Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar
Place of origin  Israel
Service history
In service 2011–present
Used by  Israel
Wars Gaza–Israel conflict (2011, 2012)
Production history
Designer Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
Designed 2005–present
Manufacturer Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
Unit cost US$40,000 per missilesystem cost: 50,000,000 $
Produced 2011–present
Specifications
Weight 90 kg (200 lb)[1]
Length 3 m (9.8 ft)[1]
Diameter 160 mm (6.3 in)[1]

Detonation
mechanism
Proximity fuze[2]

Launch
platform
Three launchers, each carrying 20 interceptors.[1]

The radar of the Iron Dome

“Iron Dome” system intercepting ‘Grad’ rocket (January 2010 testings)

Iron Dome (Hebrew: כיפת ברזל‎) is a mobile air defense system[2] in development by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems[1] designed to intercept and destroy short-range rockets and artillery shells fired from distances of 4 to 70 kilometers away whose trajectory would take them to a populated area, in all weather conditions.[3][4] The system, created as a defensive countermeasure to the rocket threat against Israel’s civilian population on its northern and southern borders, uses technology first used in Rafael’s SPYDER system. Iron Dome was declared operational and initially deployed on 27 March 2011 near Beersheba.[5] On 7 April 2011, the system successfully intercepted a Grad rocket launched from Gaza for the first time.[6] On 10 March 2012, The Jerusalem Post reported that the system shot down 90% of rockets launched from Gaza it fired at (rockets which will land in unpopulated areas are ignored).[4]

Contents

 [hide

[edit] Background

During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, approximately 4,000 Hezbollah-fired rockets (the great majority of which were short-range Katyusha rockets) landed in northern Israel, including on Haifa, the country’s third largest city. The massive rocket barrage killed 44 Israeli civilians[7] and caused some 250,000 Israeli citizens to evacuate and relocate to other parts of Israel while an estimated 1,000,000 Israelis were confined in or near shelters during the conflict.[8]

To the south, more than 4,000 rockets and 4,000 mortar bombs were fired into Israel from Gaza between 2000 and 2008, principally by Hamas. Almost all of the rockets fired were Qassams launched by 122 mm Grad launchers smuggled into the Gaza Strip, giving longer range than other launch methods. Nearly 1,000,000 Israelis living in the south are within rocket range, posing a serious security threat to the country and its citizens.[9]

In February 2007, Defense Minister Amir Peretz selected Iron Dome as Israel’s defensive solution to this short-range rocket threat.[10] Since then, the US$210 million system has been developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems working jointly with the Israel Defense Forces.[11]

[edit] Specifications

The system is designed to counter short-range rockets and 155 mm artillery shells with a range of up to 70 kilometers. According to its manufacturer, Iron Dome will operate day and night, under adverse weather conditions, and can respond to multiple threats simultaneously.[12]

Iron Dome has three central components:[11][12]

  • Detection & Tracking Radar: the radar system is built by Elta, an Israeli defense company
  • Battle Management & Weapon Control (BMC): the control center is built by mPrest Systems, an Israeli software company, for Rafael
  • Missile Firing Unit: the unit launches the Tamir interceptor missile, equipped with electro-optic sensors and several steering fins for high maneuverability. The missile is built by Rafael.

The system’s radar detects the rocket’s launch and tracks its trajectory. Then, the BMC calculates the expected hit point according to the reported data, and uses this information to determine whether the target constitutes a threat to a designated area; only in this case an interceptor missile is fired to detonate the rocket before it reaches the expected impact area.[11]

[edit] Funding

The funding and development of the Iron Dome system was provided and undertaken solely by Israel.[13] In May 2010, the White House announced that U.S. President Barack Obama would seek $205 million from U.S. Congress in his 2011 budget, to spur the production and deployment of additional Iron Dome batteries. White House spokesman Tommy Vietor stated, “The president recognizes the threat missiles and rockets fired by Hamas and Hezbollah pose to Israelis, and has therefore decided to seek funding from Congress to support the production of Israel’s short range rocket defense system called Iron Dome.” This would be the first direct U.S. investment in the project.[13] Such financial assistance could expedite the completion of the defensive system, which has long been delayed by budgetary shortfalls.[14] A few days later, on 20 May 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the funding in a 410–4 vote.[15] The bill, the United States-Israel Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act (H.R. 5327), was sponsored by Representative Glenn C. Nye of Virginia.[16] This money was expected to be included in the 2011 budget. Once the money is received in 2011, it will still take a further 18 months before the additional batteries are delivered to the air force.[17]

On 9 May 2011, Haaretz published that Defense Ministry director general Maj. Gen. (res.) Udi Shani said that Israel plans to invest nearly $1 billion in the coming years for the development and production of Iron Dome batteries. “We are no longer approaching this in terms of initial operational capabilities but are defining the final target for absorbing the systems, in terms of schedule and funds. We are talking about [having] 10–15 Iron Dome batteries. We will invest nearly $1 billion on this. This is the goal, in addition to the $205 million that the U.S. government has authorized,” Shani said.[18]

[edit] Development

[edit] Design

In 2007 Israel commissioned the development of Iron Dome, choosing Israeli contractor Rafael over the American giant Lockheed Martin. Israeli company mPrest Systems was put in charge of programming the core of Iron Dome’s battle management system. Iron Dome went from the drawing board to combat readiness within less than four years, a remarkably short period of time for a weapons system designed from scratch, according to military experts.[19]

There was no system like this, anywhere in the world, in terms of capabilities, speed, accuracy. We felt like a start-up

—Eyal Ron, a manager at mPrest[19]

[edit] Testing

  • July 2008: the Tamir interceptor missile underwent successful testing.[20]
  • March 2009: Israel successfully tested the missile defense system, though without yet actually intercepting an actual projectile.[21]
  • July 2009: the system successfully intercepted a number of rockets mimicking Qassam and short-range Katyusha rockets in a Defense Ministry test.[22]
  • August 2009: the IDF completed the establishment of a new battalion that will operate the Iron Dome system. The battalion is a part of the Israel Air Force‘s Air Defense Division. The system was to be first be deployed along the Gaza border and then along the border with Lebanon. The system was slated to start operating in mid-2010.[23]
  • January 2010: Iron Dome successfully intercepted multiple rocket barrages mimicking Qassams and Katyushas. Defense Ministry Director-General Pinhas Buchris stated that the system would ultimately “transform” security for the residents of southern and northern Israel.[24]
  • July 2010: The system successfully intercepted multiple rocket barrages mimicking Qassams and Katyushas. During the test, Iron Dome successfully distinguished rockets which were threats from those that would not land in designated areas and did not need to be intercepted.[25]
  • March 2011: Iron Dome was declared operational by the IDF, and Defense Minister Ehud Barak authorized deployment.[26][27]

During the first stage of Iron Dome’s operational duty, the Israeli Air Force included many soldiers from Sderot, citing high motivation among the city’s pre-army youth to be part of the project.[28] The 947th “Marksmen” Stinger Battalion of the Israeli Air Defense Network was chosen as the first unit to become familiar with and operate Iron Dome.[29]

[edit] Deployment

The Iron Dome system began operating in early 2011,[27] initially deployed at air force bases in southern Israel. It was designated to be set up in other areas, such as the town of Sderot, during significant escalations along the Gaza border.[30]

On 19 July 2010, Israel’s Defense Ministry announced that the system was ready for operational deployment in November. The system was to be initially placed at Sderot, near the Gaza Strip.[31]

In March 2011, the Israeli military said that the first deployed system, near Beer Sheva, was operational. In April, another system was deployed near Ashkelon.

On 7 April 2011, after deployment as an “operational experiment” on 3 April, the Iron Dome system in the area of Ashkelon successfully intercepted a Grad rocket fired at the city, the first time a short-range rocket fired from Gaza had been intercepted. According to reports from the area, the interception could be seen in Israeli towns near northern Gaza.[6] Immediately afterwards an IAF aircraft successfully attacked the squad that had fired the rocket. Later that day the IDF stressed that the system, though operational, was still under evaluation.[32] On 8 April the system successfully intercepted another four rockets.[33]

On 12 April, the IDF announced it would accelerate the introduction of a third Iron Dome battery. According to Haaretz, IDF officials indicated that the security establishment intended to ensure that the third battery would become available in six months, instead of the expected 18 months. According to the new plan, launchers from existing systems would be combined with other components that had already been manufactured in order to speed up the battery’s production. In that way, the first operational Iron Dome battalion would come into being within six months, with batteries that could be deployed in the south or in other arenas.[34]

Also according to Haaretz, the IDF was to finalize its long-term Iron Dome acquisition program — nicknamed “Halamish” — within a few months (from April 2011), which would indicate the final number of systems to be introduced into the military. Israel Air Force officials estimated the number of Iron Dome systems needed to cover threatened areas at thirteen.[34] According to Meir Elran, a scholar at the Institute of National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, Israel would need a total of 20 batteries to provide adequate defense for its borders with Gaza and Lebanon. Such a deployment would require financial assistance from the United States, but he said that even in the original limited form, officially designated a trial period, the system was important.[19]

On 5 August 2011 the IDF redeployed the Iron Dome system near Ashkelon following days of heightened rocket fire from Gaza into Israel. The deployment came a day after Ashkelon mayor Benny Vaknin sent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak a letter asking them to redeploy the system.[35]

On 18 August 2011 four rockets were fired from Gaza at Ashkelon. The system determined that two were a threat and intercepted them, ignoring the other two which were directed at non-populated areas. No injuries or damage were reported. Defense officials said that Iron Dome would be re-deployed in Beersheba.[36]

On 20 August 2011, while engaging with a volley of seven rockets fired almost simultaneously at Be’er Sheva from Gaza, one was not intercepted by the defense system, exploding in a residential area and killing Yossi Shushan. Brig. Gen. Doron Gavish, commander of the IAF’s Air Defense Corps, said on the following day that “we said in advance that this wasn’t a hermetic system,” adding that the air defense units were learning on the fly and improving the performance of Iron Dome while operating it. “This is the first system of its kind anywhere in the world; it is in its first operational test; and we’ve already intercepted a large number of rockets targeting Israeli communities, saving many civilian lives,” Gavish said.[37]

On 21 August 2011 Ynetnews reported that the success of the Iron Dome system against Gazan rocket fire had southern city mayors battling over the right to be the next to have it deployed in their area. The IDF stressed that “no system can offer airtight protection” and that the system positioned in Ashkelon was incapable of extending its defense to Ashdod, but this did not stop the mayors from pressuring the Defense Ministry and the IDF to position Iron Dome batteries within their city limits. Ashdod, Ofakim, Netivot, Beersheba and Ashkelon have all pursued the system, but the IDF had only two batteries available.[38]

Also according to the report, Rafael was set to deliver a third battery no later than October 2011[dated info]. The defense establishment had decided to cover Beersheba and Ashkelon first, as they have a tangible risk of rocket fire. Three additional Iron Dome batteries are set to be supplied throughout 2012, at which time the IDF will be able to offer other southern communities better protection. Israel’s north and center would have to remain unprotected.[38]

On the same day, The Jerusalem Post reported that Defense Minister Ehud Barak announced that a third Iron Dome battery would be installed in the region “within weeks”, and estimated that nine more batteries would be positioned within the next two years.[39] In attacks shortly before, the Iron Dome system had successfully intercepted about 85% of the rockets[clarification needed] launched at Israel from Gaza.[40]

On 23 August 2011 Globes reported that Rafael would invest tens of millions of shekels in the following months to open a second production line for the Iron Dome’s Tamir interceptor missiles. Future operational needs, as well as the plan to build two more Iron Dome batteries by the end of the year, necessitated the increase of missile production.[41]

On 31 August 2011 the IAF deployed a third Iron Dome battery outside Ashdod, two days[42] after Defense Minister Ehud Barak said that it would take an additional 10 days for it to be delivered. Barak praised the IDF Chief of Staff Benny Gantz, the IAF Air Defense Division and the security establishment for beating the deadline and beginning the deployment before the opening of the school year.[43][44] On 1 December 2011 Brig. Gen. Gavish said that a fourth battery of the system would be deployed in the “coming months”. He spoke to the Jerusalem Post ahead of the Air Defense Division’s largest-ever draft of soldiers needed to fill the ranks of its increasing number of units and battalions. “The numbers will continue to grow and another battery will become operational in the beginning of the year,” he said.[45] On 8 December, “outstanding” officer Capt. Roytal Ozen began to command the battery’s unit in preparation for its deployment, the first woman to be in charge of the system.[46]

On 6 December 2011 Matan Vilnai, the Israeli Minister of Home Front Defense, said that the Defense Ministry is considering a permanent deployment of an Iron Dome battery in the Haifa Port to protect the oil refineries there against future Hezbollah rocket attacks. “The continued work of the oil refineries is critical for the Israeli economy during a time of war,” he said. During the Second Lebanon War in 2006, a number of Katyusha rockets struck Haifa but did not hit the refineries. A direct hit on one of the refineries may cause numerous casualties as a result of leakage of dangerous chemical substances. The port is also the site of a chemical terminal that includes containers of ammonia and ethylene gas.[47][48]

On 30 December 2011 the Jerusalem Post reported that a performance analysis it had obtained shows that Iron Dome was successful in downing rockets from Gaza 75% of the times it fired. It said two interceptors are usually fired at each rocket. In April 2011, for example, the system succeeded in intercepting 8 of 10 rockets; in August 22 of 28, and in October 3 of 9. Following the October violence, the IDF conducted an inquiry into the Iron Dome’s performance and discovered that a radar failure caused some of the interceptors to miss their targets, a problem since corrected. An officer told the Post that “seventy-five percent is impressive, but we would still like to see it perform better.”[49]

On 10 March 2012 the “Jerusalem Post” reported that the performance of Iron Dome has improved to over 90%, as it had successfully shot down a total of 27 rockets over the cities of Ashdod, Ashkelon, Beersheba. The system correctly ignored rockets heading towards unpopulated fields. [50]

[edit] Response by Palestinian militants

Iron Dome launcher deployed near Ashkelon

On 22 August 2011 Haaretz reported that according to Israeli security sources Palestinian militants had changed their rocket-launch tactics in an attempt to evade the two Iron Dome batteries deployed in southern Israel. The new tactics included aiming more frequently at areas beyond the Iron Dome protection range. After the Palestinian launch teams realized that the systems deployed in the previous two weeks around Ashkelon and Be’er Sheva provided near-perfect protection from rockets, they began firing more frequently at Ashdod and Ofakim. When they did aim at Be’er Sheva on 21 August, they did not fire one or two rockets, as in the past, but rather a volley of seven rockets almost simultaneously. Iron Dome intercepted five of them successfully, but one penetrated the defense system, exploding in a residential area and killing a man.[37]

[edit] 2011 Supreme Court decision

On 8 August 2011 the Israeli High Court of Justice rejected a petition asking that the government be ordered to deploy the system in Gaza border communities. In rejecting the petition, Supreme Court President Dorit Beinisch and Justices Salim Joubran and Uzi Fogelman ruled that in balancing all relevant considerations including budgets, changing security realities and operational matters, the government’s decision not to deploy the Iron Dome in the area was reasonable. The panel of justices also said that the court had no reason to intervene in operational decisions regarding where to deploy the Iron Dome system. “We believe the [government] will make the necessary decisions in accordance with the time and place requirements,” they said.[51]

In its petition, the Eshkol Regional Council argued that the government should be ordered to deploy the Iron Dome to protect communities between 4.5 and 7 kilometers from Gaza from rocket fire. Government-funded rocket-roof protection is in place for homes in communities within 4.5 km of Gaza, but not for structures further from the border.[51]

The state said that the High Court should not intervene in the “military decision” regarding how and where to deploy the anti-rocket system. It also argued that if the court were to order it to deploy Iron Dome in a specific area, budgetary limitations would result in other communities not receiving protection, particularly as the range of Palestinian rockets had grown in recent years and therefore it was not possible to deploy Iron Dome to protect every community.[51]

[edit] December 2011 accident

On 26 December 2011 an accident occurred during a maintenance drill involving one of the systems. While loading missiles into a launcher vehicle from a bunker at the Air Defense Network’s school near kibbutz Mashabei Sadeh in the Negev,[52] Twenty Tamir interceptors fell from a height of four meters near soldiers and officers without detonating, causing no injury, but making them unserviceable.[53][54] Ynetnews reported that the soldiers were never in danger because the interceptor missiles are equipped with a security mechanism that prevents premature explosions. The IDF Spokesperson’s Unit said that the Air Force commander, Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan, appointed a committee to examine the accident and ordered an immediate stop to all Air Defense Network maintenance work until a preliminary investigation was concluded.[54] It also said that during the following week actions would be taken to “improve skills and safety awareness”.[53][52] A security official told Reshet Bet that the failure was twofold in that that the soldiers and their commander deviated from severely strict safety protocols, and 20 costly interceptors were lost.[53] Walla! website reported that the soldiers made a mistake in loading the missiles and they fell backwards. The website calculated the damage at a million USD (at $50,000 per missile), and reported that the missiles were transferred back to Rafael to determine whether they could be repaired.[52]

On 1 January 2012 two soldiers were sentenced to punishment by the school’s commanding officer following an inquiry into their conduct regarding the incident. The lieutenant in charge of the loading crew was given 21 days in military prison, while the sergeant in charge of the technician crew was given 14 days.[55]

[edit] March 2012 intensive attacks

After the IDF killing by rocket fire of Zohair al-Qaisi, the secretary general of the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC), in Gaza on 9 March 2012,[56] over 300 rockets were fired on Israel, 165 had fallen in Israeli territory.[57] The Iron Dome has successfully intercepted at least 56 rockets out of 73 directed at densely populated regions.[58]

[edit] Foreign sales

  •  NATO — On 10 March 2010, The Jerusalem Post reported that the Israeli Ministry of Defense was in talks with a number of European countries about the possible sale of the system in order to protect NATO forces deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.[59]
  •  South Korea — During a visit to Israel in the summer of 2011, Kwon Oh-bong, vice commissioner of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration in Seoul, expressed interest in purchasing the system in order to counter the threat posed by North Korean artillery, rockets, and missiles.[60]
  •  United States — On 16 August 2011, Raytheon Company announced that it had teamed with Rafael in order to lead marketing in the United States for the Iron Dome system. “Iron Dome complements other Raytheon weapons that provide intercept capabilities to the US Army’s Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar initiative at forward operating bases,” said Mike Booen, vice president of Raytheon Missile Systems’ Advanced Security and Directed Energy Systems product line. “Iron Dome can be seamlessly integrated with Raytheon’s C-RAM systems to complete the layered defense.”[61]
On 10 November 2011 the Jerusalem Post reported that the US Army had expressed interest in acquiring the system, to be deployed outside forward bases in Iraq and Afghanistan that could potentially be targeted by Katyusha rockets. The US military had discovered 107 mm Katyushas in Iraq in the past.[62] On 1 December 2011 the Jerusalem Post reported that the US Army would decide in January 2012[dated info] whether it would purchase the system. Yossi Druker, head of Rafael’s Air-to-Air Directorate, said that the initial deal is valued at $100 million, but could reach several hundred million dollars over a number of years.[63]

[edit] Criticism

In 2010, Iron Dome was criticized by Reuven Pedatzur, a military analyst, former fighter pilot and professor of political science at Tel Aviv University[64] for costing too much compared to the cost of a Qassam rocket, so that launching very large numbers of Qassams could essentially attack Israel’s financial means.[65] The estimated cost of each Tamir interceptor missile is US$35,000–50,000[11] whereas a crudely manufactured Qassam rocket costs around $800.[66] Rafael responded that the cost issue was exaggerated since Iron Dome intercepts only rockets determined to constitute a threat, and that the lives saved and the strategic impact are worth the cost.[67]

Iron Dome has been criticized as ineffective in countering the Qassam threat for the southern city of Sderot, given the short distance and flight time between the much-attacked city and the rocket launching pads in the Gaza Strip.[65][68] Other anti-rocket systems, such as the Nautilus laser defense system, were argued to be more effective. From 1995 to 2005 the United States and Israel jointly developed Nautilus but scrapped the system after concluding it was not feasible, having spent $600 million. The US Navy continued R&D on the system. American defense company Northrop Grumman proposed developing a more advanced prototype of Nautilus, Skyguard.[68] Skyguard would use laser beams to intercept rockets, with each beam discharge costing an estimated $1,000–$2,000. With an investment of $180 million, Northrop Grumman claims it could possibly deploy the system within 18 months. Israeli defense officials have rejected the proposal, citing the extended timeline and additional costs. Officials also insist that with recent improvements to Iron Dome, the system is fully able to intercept Qassams.[68][69]

[edit] See also

[edit] References

  1. ^ a b c d e Ben-David, Alon (18 March 2008). “Iron Dome advances to meet Qassam threat”. Jane’s. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  2. ^ a b “Iron Dome Air Defense Missile System, Israel”. army-technology.com. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  3. ^ Sharp, Jeremy M. (16 September 2010). “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel”. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  4. ^ a b Katz, Yaakov (10 March 2012). “Iron Dome ups its interception rate to over 90%”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 10 March 2012.
  5. ^ “Israel deploys ‘Iron Dome’ rocket shield”. Al Jazeera English. 27 March 2011. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  6. ^ a b Pfeffer, Anshel; Yanir Yagna (7 April 2011). “Iron Dome successfully intercepts Gaza rocket for first time”. Haaretz. Retrieved 7 April 2011.
  7. ^ “Israel-Hizbullah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties”. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 21 August 2009.
  8. ^ Rubin, Uzi (June 2007). “The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War”. The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 15 August 2009.
  9. ^ “Summary of rocket fire and mortar shelling in 2008”. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. 1 January 2009. Retrieved 21 August 2009.
  10. ^ “Defense Minister selects Rafael anti-missile defense system”. Haaretz. 4 February 2007. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
  11. ^ a b c d “Israel successfully tests “Iron Dome” rocket & artillery shell defence system”. defpro.com. 27 March 2009. Retrieved 4 August 2009.
  12. ^ a b “Iron Dome: Defense System Against Short Range Artillery Rockets”. Rafael Advanced Defense Systems. Retrieved 6 August 2009.
  13. ^ a b Entous, Adam; Caren Bohan (13 May 2010). “Obama seeks $205 million for Israel rocket shield”. Reuters.
  14. ^ Amos Harel (13 May 2010). “Iron Dome defense system gets new backer: Barack Obama”. Haaretz.
  15. ^ JPost.com staff and Hilary Leila Krieger (21 May 2010). “US approves $205m. for Iron Dome”. The Jerusalem Post.
  16. ^ “United States-Israel Missile Defense Cooperation and Support Act”. Library of Congress. Retrieved 21 May 2010.
  17. ^ Katz, Yaakov; JPost.com Staff (04/10/2011). “IDF conditionally ceases air strikes on Hamas targets”. The Jerusalem Post.
  18. ^ Harel, Amos (9 May 2011). “Israel to invest $1 billion in Iron Dome missile defense system”. Haaretz. Retrieved 9 May 2011.
  19. ^ a b c “New Israeli anti-missile system sees success in Gaza, altering war against rockets”. The Washington Post. Associated Press. 10 April 2011. Retrieved 13 April 2011.
  20. ^ “Israeli arms company successfully tests Iron Dome anti-Qassam missile”. Haaretz. 7 July 2008. Retrieved 27 July 2009.
  21. ^ “Israel successfully tests anti-rocket system”. The Guardian. 27 March 2009. Retrieved 24 August 2009.
  22. ^ “Iron Dome system successful in tests”. The Jerusalem Post. 16 July 2009. Retrieved 27 July 2009.
  23. ^ “IDF moves one step closer to getting Iron Dome”. The Jerusalem Post. 23 August 2009. Retrieved 24 August 2009.
  24. ^ “Israel to deploy Gaza rocket interceptor by June”. The Jerusalem Post. 6 January 2010. Retrieved 7 January 2010.
  25. ^ Katz, Yaakov, “Iron Dome Successfully Intercepts Kassam, Katyusha Barrages”, The Jerusalem Post, July 15, 2010, p. 2.
  26. ^ “Vilnai: Israel has strategic reason not to use Iron Dome”. The Jerusalem Post. 24 March 2011. Retrieved 25 March 2011.
  27. ^ a b “Barak confirms: ‘Iron Dome’ to be deployed within days”. The Jerusalem Post. 25 March 2011. Retrieved 25 March 2011.
  28. ^ Sarusi, Neta (21 August 2009). “Boulevards (Sderot) of Defense”. Bamahane (3001): p. 12. (Hebrew)
  29. ^ Sarusi, Neta (16 October 2009). “”The Marksmen” Don an Iron Dome”. Bamahane (3008): p. 18. (Hebrew)
  30. ^ Harel, Amos (3 February 2010). “IDF: No plans to deploy anti-missile system in Sderot”. Haaretz. Retrieved 3 February 2010.
  31. ^ Associated Press, “Israel: Anti-Rocket System Is Ready For Deployment”, The New York Times, 20 July 2010.
  32. ^ “”Iron Dome” Intercepts Rocket From Gaza”. IDF Blog. Israel Defense Forces. 7 April 2011. Retrieved 7 April 2011.
  33. ^ Issacharoff, Avi (8 April 2010). “IDF strikes kill nine in Gaza as barrage of mortars hits Israel”. Haaretz. Retrieved 8 April 2010.
  34. ^ a b Yagna, Yanir; Anshel Pfeffer (12 April 2011). “Israel speeds up third Iron Dome battery in wake of Gaza attacks”. Haaretz. Retrieved 12 April 2011.
  35. ^ Harel, Amos; Avi Issacharoff (5 August 2011). “IDF redeploys Iron Dome as rocket fire from Gaza increases”. Haaretz. Retrieved 5 August 2011.
  36. ^ Curiel, Ilana; Shmulik Hadad; Abigail Looshi (18 August 2011). “Iron Dome intercepts 2 rockets fired at Israel”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  37. ^ a b Pfeffer, Anshel (22 August 2011). “Israeli defense sources: Gaza terror groups change tactics to avoid Iron Dome system”. Haaretz. Retrieved 22 August 2011.
  38. ^ a b Yehoshua, Yossi (21 August 2011). “Municipalities ‘battle’ over Iron Dome”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 21 August 2011.
  39. ^ JPost.com Staff (21 August 2011). “Barak: IDF won’t tolerate rocket attacks from Gaza”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 21 August 2011.
  40. ^ Lake, Eli, “Missile Defense Scores Political Hits”, The Washington Times, 30 August 2011, p. 9.
  41. ^ Azoulai, Yuval (23 August 2011). “Rafael to double Iron Dome production”. Globes. Retrieved 25 August 2011.
  42. ^ Katz, Yaakov (30 August 2011). “Third Iron Dome battery to be deployed near Ashdod”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 1 September 2011.
  43. ^ Katz, Yaakov (31 August 2011). “IAF deploys third Iron Dome battery outside Ashdod”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 1 September 2011.
  44. ^ Hadad, Shmulik (31 August 2011). “Iron Dome system deployed in Ashdod”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 1 September 2011.
  45. ^ Katz, Yaakov (1 December 2011). “IAF chief: 4th Iron Dome battery to be deployed soon”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 4 December 2011.
  46. ^ Buhbut, Amir (8 December 2011). “שילוב נשים בצה”ל: קצינה תפקד על סוללת כיפת ברזל [Integration of women in the IDF: female officer to command on an Iron Dome battery]” (in Hebrew). Walla!. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
  47. ^ Katz, Yaakov (6 December 2011). “Defense Ministry mulls permanent Haifa Iron Dome”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
  48. ^ Zitun, Yoav (6 December 2011). “Gov’t mulling Iron Dome system in Haifa”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 6 December 2011.
  49. ^ Katz, Yaakov (30 December 2011). “Iron Dome successful in downing 75% of rockets”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 1 January 2012.
  50. ^ Katz, Yaakov. “Iron Dome ups its interception rate to over 90%”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 12 March 2012.
  51. ^ a b c Paraszczuk, Joanna (9 August 2011). “Petition rejected to deploy Iron Dome near border towns”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 10 August 2011.
  52. ^ a b c Amir Buhbut; Walla News Staff (29 December 2011). “בשל רשלנות: נזק של מיליון דולר למערכת כיפת ברזל [Due to negligence: million dollar damage to Iron Dome system]” (in Hebrew). Walla!. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
  53. ^ a b c Menashe, Carmela (29 December 2011). “תקלה חמורה ב”כיפת ברזל” [Serious malfunction at “Iron Dome”]” (in Hebrew). Kol Yisrael Radio website. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
  54. ^ a b Ben-Yishai, Ron (29 December 2011). “Iron Dome missiles damaged”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 29 December 2011.
  55. ^ Ziton, Yoav (2 January 2012). “נפילת טילי כיפת ברזל: עונשי מחבוש לקצין ולנגדת [Fall of Iron Dome missiles: Mahbosh sentence for officer and NCO]” (in Hebrew). Ynetnews. Retrieved 2 January 2012.
  56. ^ Haaretz: IDF strike in Gaza kills leader of Popular Resistance Committees
  57. ^ http://www.idf.il/1086-15196-EN/Dover.aspx
  58. ^ http://www.idf.il/1086-15253-EN/Dover.aspx
  59. ^ Katz, Yaakov (10 March 2010). “NATO forces interested in Iron Dome”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  60. ^ Etsion, Udi (19 June 2011). “S. Korea eyes Iron Dome system”. Ynetnews. Retrieved 19 August 2011.
  61. ^ “Raytheon Teams with Rafael to Market Iron Dome Weapon System” (Press release). Raytheon Company. 16 August 2011. Retrieved 19 August 2011.
  62. ^ Katz, Yaakov (10 November 2011). “US may purchase Iron Dome batteries”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 16 November 2011.
  63. ^ Katz, Yaakov (1 December 2011). “US may buy Iron Dome to defend ME bases”. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 4 December 2011.
  64. ^ Fox, Stuart (30 March 2011). “Iron Dome: Israel Deploys Unique, Controversial Missile System”. msnbc.com. Retrieved 18 August 2011.
  65. ^ a b “Iron Dome does not answer threats”. The Jerusalem Post. 9 May 2010. Retrieved 26 May 2010.
  66. ^ “What are Qassam Rockets?”. Jewish Policy Center. Retrieved 9 August 2009. “The raw materials for one rocket can cost up to $800.”
  67. ^ “Iron Dome rocket defense system will be operational by 2010”. Haaretz. 10 April 2009. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  68. ^ a b c “Israel to offer Iron Dome system to US”. The Jerusalem Post. 13 March 2008. Retrieved 9 August 2009.
  69. ^ “Iron Dome system found to be helpless against Qassams”. Haaretz. 22 February 2008. Retrieved 9 August 2009.

[edit] External links

In Iran Standoff, Netanyahu Could Be Bluffing: Jeffrey Goldberg – Bloomberg

March 18, 2012

In Iran Standoff, Netanyahu Could Be Bluffing: Jeffrey Goldberg – Bloomberg.

Whenever I’m in the Middle East, I find myself, sometimes within hours of arrival, more susceptible to the appeal of elaborate conspiracy theories.

Perhaps it’s the air, or the (lack of) water, but what sounds outlandish in the U.S. doesn’t seem nearly so far-fetched here. I’m not referring to conspiracy theories drawn from the swamps of Sept. 11 delusion-mongering, or from the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” or, alternatively, from the “Protocols of the Lunatics Who Believe Barack Obama Is a Muslim.”

I’m talking about the belief, advanced to me by a former senior Israeli military official, and echoed by other non-insane people, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is bluffing: He has never had any intention of launching air and missile strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, and is working behind the scenes with Obama to stop Iran through sanctions.

In this interpretation, what Netanyahu has been doing — for the past 15 years, in and out of office — is creating conditions in which U.S., Western and Arab leaders believe that they must deny Iran its dream of nuclear weapons or else suffer the chaotic fallout of a precipitous, paranoia-driven Israeli attack.

An Attractive Theory

The theory has its attractions. For one, Israel hasn’t yet attacked Iran, though its leaders, going back to Yitzhak Rabin, have all stressed the danger an Iranian nuclear program would pose to Israel’s existence. For at least the past two years, experts have argued that an Israeli strike is highly likely, yet it hasn’t happened.

Another attraction has to do with the personality of the man himself: Netanyahu is much better at talking than doing. Despite his reputation in some circles as a trigger-happy extremist, Netanyahu has, when compared with his recent predecessors, only sparingly used force against foes such as Hezbollah and Hamas. What he does deploy, daily, are words — huge gusts of words infused with drama and portents of catastrophe.

His speech on March 5 to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee convention in Washington is a case in point. Before an audience of 13,000, mainly Jews attuned to threats against their people, Netanyahu drew a direct line between Auschwitz in 1944 and Iran’s nuclear facilities today. If indeed the Iranian nuclear program is a physical manifestation of the Auschwitz spirit, then shouldn’t Netanyahu have ordered airstrikes from the stage? Yet he didn’t.

The former Israeli military official I spoke with Sunday in Tel Aviv suggested three possible explanations for Netanyahu’s lack of action: 1) He is paralyzed and won’t act, no matter what he believes the threat to be; 2) He fears he would risk a serious rupture in his country’s alliance with the U.S. if he attacked Iran unilaterally; and 3) It’s all part of a game, one he has tacitly engineered with Obama.

I remain fairly confident that Netanyahu means it when he says that Israel would strike Iran to prevent it from going nuclear, but this third option is an interesting one, mainly because the game — a sustained Israeli bluff — would seem to be working so well.

Obama and Netanyahu don’t like each other very much. When I asked Obama if he and Netanyahu are friends, he said, in essence, “Well, we’re all so busy with our jobs.” It certainly seems clear from the outside that the two men don’t have a trusting relationship.

Extraordinary Accomplishment

But they have accomplished something extraordinary together over the past two years. The sanctions Obama has placed on Iran are some of the toughest ever placed on any country. Even some hardliners now believe that they just might force a change in Iran’s nuclear calculus. And how has Obama convinced the world that these sanctions are necessary? By pointing to Netanyahu and saying, “If you don’t cooperate with me on sanctions, this guy is going to blow up the Middle East.”

Obama’s good-cop routine is then aided immeasurably by the world’s willingness to believe that Netanyahu is the bad cop.

No one fully understands the dynamic between Obama and Netanyahu, apart from the men themselves. And no one, maybe not even their closest advisers, knows what they said to each other when they met alone March 5 in the White House. I recognize the suggestion that the two men are deliberately tag-teaming Iran is a bit much to swallow, and I recognize, too, that believing Netanyahu never intends to attack Iran by himself is dangerous.

But, if true, Netanyahu is proving himself to be an adept poker player. Obama told me in an interview that, “as president of the United States, I don’t bluff.” Whether Netanyahu bluffs is perhaps the more important question.

(Jeffrey Goldberg is a Bloomberg View columnist and a national correspondent for The Atlantic. The opinions expressed are his own.)

To contact the author of this column: Jeffrey Goldberg at goldberg.atlantic@gmail.com.

To contact the editor responsible for this column: Timothy Lavin at tlavin1@bloomberg.net.

Iran rebukes Azeri envoy over terror plot

March 18, 2012

Iran rebukes Azeri envoy over terror plot – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Azeri ambassador summoned to Iranian Foreign Ministry following arrest of 22 suspects allegedly connected to Revolutionary Guards: ‘Zionist agents attempt to incriminate Iran’

Dudi Cohen

Azeri Ambassador to Iran Avanshir Akhundov was summoned to Iranian Foreign Ministry offices on Saturday for a reprimand over the Azeris’ arrestof 22 people allegedly hired by Iran to carry out terrorist attacks against US and Israeli embassies. The suspects were trained in Iran by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards, an Azeri announcement said.

According to a report by Iran’s IRNA news agency, it was suggested in the meeting that agents of the Zionist regime were trying to incriminate Iranians. “It was regretted that Azerbaijan is taking part in this affair,” the report stated.

Azeri authorities announced this week that 22 Azeri citizens, trained in Iran and suspected of plotting to attack Israeli and US embassies and companies had been arrested. It was suggested the suspects had links with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

According to the Azeri National Security Ministry, the suspects were recruited in 1999 and trained in military bases near Tehran. “They trained with weapons and explosives, and learned methods of infiltrating secured buildings,” the statement said.

According to the allegations, the suspects provided Iran with specific addresses of embassies and foreign organizations in Azerbaijan. The ministry also revealed that at the time of their arrest, they were caught with weapons, ammunition, explosives and spy equipment.

Azerbaijan, a Shiite Muslim state with strong ties with Israel, was marked in the past as a prominent location for Iran and Hezbollah attempts to hit Israeli targets. A plot to assassinate the Israeli ambassador Michael Lotem and other Israeli targets was foiled in January.

During his visit to Tehran last week, Azeri Defense Minister Safar Abiyev promised his country will not allow an attack on Iran from its territory.

The Azeri ambassador noted that his country wants to strengthen ties with Iran, and promised to pass Iran’s reservation to his government, according to reports.

News agencies contributed to this report

Syria training Hezbollah to use antiaircraft guns

March 18, 2012

Syria training Hezbollah to use antiaircraft guns – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

IDF officers believe that Hezbollah use of advanced antiaircraft missiles could jeopardize Israeli aerial supremacy.

By Gili Cohen

Syria has been arming and training Hezbollah fighters in the use of advanced antiaircraft weapons in recent months, Israel Defense Forces sources have told Haaretz. A senior officer in the Northern Command says hundreds of fighters were taught to use surface-to-air missiles in Syria and Iran.

IDF officers are worried by two developments involving Syria and Hezbollah that could change the balance of power in the region. The first is the transfer of huge quantities of surface-to-air missiles; the second, the transfer of chemical and biological weapons.

Hezbollah youth holding Katyushas near Nasrallah portrait Young Hezbollah supporters holding mock ups of Katyusha rockets in front of a portrait of group leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah.
Photo by: AP

IDF officers believe that Hezbollah use of advanced antiaircraft missiles could jeopardize Israeli aerial supremacy. “The potential of escalation in Lebanon is huge, and Hezbollah continues to strengthen with regard to long-range weaponry and potential ‘surprises’ on the battlefield,” the senior officer said. “We will have to find answers to the transfer of antiaircraft weaponry, and chemical and biological weapons. It could be a cause to change Israel’s retaliation policy,” he added.

According to past, unverified, reports, Israel has considered on several occasions attacking convoys of weaponry from Syria to Lebanon. The senior officer says the Iranian involvement in Lebanon has transformed from a “fingerprint” to “a huge handprint.”

The IDF points to a “regular transfer” of weapons from Syria to Hezbollah that began even before the rebellion against President Bashar Assad’s government. Still, since Assad lost complete control, the weapon transfers have increased, and include drones and shore-to-ship missiles. “The more Assad loses his grip, the transfers will increase,” the officer explained. “We’re troubled by the transfer of strategic components from Syria to Lebanon, and if that happens, it might be cause for a more active response,” he added.

According to IDF estimates, three Syrian battalions are in charge of operating SA-17s – relatively long-range advanced Russian antiaircraft missiles. The Air Force has already altered part of its activity on the northern border for fear of surface-to-air missiles. Syria also has a huge arsenal of long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The IDF is certain that Hezbollah, too, has hundreds of long-range missiles, including, among others, M600 missiles and Scud missiles.

Two months ago, Haaretz published the defense officials’ fear that chemical weapons have reached Hezbollah. A senior officer in the General Staff estimated that Assad’s regime would fall by the end of the year, and that these weapons would be kept by the regime until its fall, or be transferred to Hezbollah.

Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, head of plans and policy directorate, and the designated commander of the Air Force, has already said: “Our main worry is huge caches of chemical and biological weapons, and strategic abilities that still arrive in Syria, mostly from Eastern Europe.”