Archive for March 15, 2012

Retired IDF General Calls for Operation in Gaza

March 15, 2012

Retired IDF General Calls for Operation in Gaza – Defense/Security – News – Israel National News.

Gen. Tzvi Fogel: The terrorists have missiles with a much longer range. We need a leader to decide on an operation in Gaza.
By Elad Benari

First Publish: 3/15/2012, 7:13 AM

 

IDF Tank Near Gaza

IDF Tank Near Gaza
Flash 90

Retired Gen. Tzvi Fogel, former head of Southern Command, was not optimistic on Wednesday that the ceasefire in southern Israel will last, saying that even if it does, Israel will ultimately have to act in Gaza.

Speaking to Arutz Sheva, Fogel reminded that the Gaza-based terrorist organizations have not yet made use of all the missiles in their possession, noting that the terrorists own missiles with a range that could put millions of Israelis at risk.

“We’ve warned many times that as long as the smuggling from Sinai into Gaza continues, more and more parts of Israel will enter the range of the rockets and missiles,” he said.

Fogel added that in the latest round of fighting, it was not in Hamas’ interest to enter a major confrontation with Israel.

“The conflict which currently exists in Gaza is between Hamas and the other organizations, such as the Popular Resistance Committees and the Islamic Jihad, that tried to drag us to places in which we do not want to be,” he explained. “In the last round of fighting, Hamas was interested in reducing the flames, because right now it has no interest in fighting with Israel. It was the two other organizations that tried to drag the whole region into chaos.”

Fogel said that despite the tolerance of Israel’s citizens in the face of the rocket threat, and the success of the Iron Dome anti-missile system in intercepting the rockets, Israel needs to do more.

“Today everyone understands that unless we initiate a determined and courageous operation designed to dismantle the weapons and the threat from Gaza, we will not solve the problem,” he said. “Unfortunately, only some Israelis will be able to celebrate Independence Day this year, and the rest will continue to be under the threat of rockets.”

He reiterated, “They say there are now a million people threatened by the missiles, and I say that there are more than a million. They have rockets and missiles that haven’t been used yet, and they can reach cities even north of Ashdod.”

“We need to make sure there are no weapons in Gaza,” Fogel said. “Southern Command has prepared plans to make it happen. The question is whether we’ll have a leader with enough courage to make the decision to act in Gaza, fighting on land and not just from the air.”

Finally, Fogel said, “We have to remember that Iron Dome is only successful 85 percent of the time. The terrorist organizations know this as well, so I suggest not relying only on missile interception, but to try to make sure they do not have such missiles. Gaza is not Lebanon, it is a small region 45 kilometers by 45 kilometers, and we can do it.”

Earlier on Wednesday, the current head of Southern Command said he isn’t sure how long the ‘cease-fire’ with Gaza’s terror groups will last.

“There are many different organizations in Gaza and there is no one body that has full control,” Maj.-Gen. Tal Russo told reporters.

“The IDF is following the events and is preparing for all possibilities,” Russo said. “If the silence is broken we have many tools to respond with, and in the last round we did not use them all”, Russo emphasized.

Despite reports that Egypt had brokered a ceasefire between Israel and the Gaza-based terror groups,late Monday night, terrorists continued to fire rockets and missiles into Israel throughout the day on Tuesday.

Just hours after Russo spoke to reporters while touring schools in Israel’s south, the Iron Dome anti-missile system intercepted a Be’er Sheva bound Grad missile.

Iranian activist says regime change could resolve nuclear standoff

March 15, 2012

Iranian activist says regime change could resolve nuclear standoff – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

The Iranian political activist Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi sees a third option, beyond to bomb or not to bomb: U.S. and Israeli aid for the opposition.

By Natasha Mozgovaya

With the barrage of speeches and debates in Washington recently over who should or should not bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities, I can’t stop wondering what Iranians themselves think about this thoughtful debate. For an Israeli journalist to quote friends in Iran is probably being a bad friend, but Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi, an Iranian activist living in the United States, feels insulted that neither American nor Israeli leaders have bothered to talk to those who have a real stake in Iran’s future.

“No one in Iran wants to get bombed,” she says. “By going to war, the situation will not be solved. It’s addressing the symptoms, not the cause, and we must respond to this in a long-term fashion, not patchwork that will spring another asinine leak in 30 years. The regime can be brought down, and we have begged and begged and begged for some assistance for us to do it ourselves, and we sure can but seems like it’s the idiocy of the people who cannot think outside the box – starting with Obama, who is forcing Israel’s hand, so now the story has become asinine diplomacy or war. And we don’t need either,” Zand-Bonazzi says.

Iran protests - AP Iran protests in 2009.
Photo by: AP

Her suggestion? The one former Israeli Mossad chief Meir Dagan hinted at in his interview to the CBS news show “60 Minutes,” broadcast in the United States on Sunday – to assist the Iranian opposition. “I applaud Meir Dagan, though I wouldn’t quite call the Iranian regime ‘rational’, she says, referring to a comment he made in the interview.

Wouldn’t it hurt the Iranian opposition to receive any aid from the United States or Israel?

“Heck no”, she says. “How much more could we be hurt?! Whether we have funding or not, they’ll accuse of being puppets anyhow. So what the heck!”

I couldn’t resist reminding Zand-Bonazzi that the Iranian opposition in the United States is notorious for its infighting.

“Every opposition – the Russian, Jewish, Chinese, Cuban – in all countries, attack each other,” she shrugs. “Many serious people do not fight. If we disagree, we have learned to go to our corners, take time to rethink and come back at it from another angle. To paint an entire opposition with one judgmental brushstroke is not only unfair, it’s simply untrue. We have every connection inside Iran. We want to speak for ourselves. The time has come for Iranians to take a stand for the self-determination of our movement, which is the only way to get out of this peacefully. We know the absolute weaknesses of that regime. How they fight. Who fights among them. What is said. How they are sabotaging each other. How to quicken the sabotage between them. They are at each other’s throats inside that regime. And we have all the means at our disposal to see that all the way to the end.”

What did she think about the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recent speech to AIPAC in Washington (dubbed “the duck speech,” for his comment about Iran’s nuclear program: “If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck,” then it’s “a nuclear duck. And it’s time the world started calling a duck a duck.” )

“There’s nothing more to say to Mr. Netanyahu,” Zand-Bonazzi says. “He has made up his mind and a huge number of people who could have given him better advice did not. Though he’s a person who sees things for what they are, his solutions are not as blanket obvious. Sometimes things require a little more intricacy.”

Red lines

On the pessimists’ side, this week at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said he doubts a deal with Iran can be reached, because “Iran has crossed many red lines in the past 10 years – and we’ve watched them doing that.” He argued for taking action.

Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, suggested looking for positive hints in remarks by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who recently said nuclear weapons are a “sin.” This could give the regime an opportunity to step back from its nuclear program without losing face, Kahl said.

And there was this question from someone in the audience – presumably, someone who did not attend last week’s AIPAC conference: “How exactly will Iran’s nuclear bomb directly threaten the United States?”

Well, according to a new poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, the question is very relevant to the U.S. public. Only one in four Americans favors an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear program. Seven in 10 (69 percent ) favor the United States and other major powers continuing to pursue negotiations with Iran – with rare bipartisan support (58 percent of the Republicans and 79 percent of the Democrats ). Furthermore, three in four say the United States should primarily act through the UN Security Council, rather than acting by itself.

Only 25 percent favor the United States providing military forces in the event Israel attacks Iran, Iran retaliates against Israel and Israel requests U.S. aid; even among Republicans, only 41 percent would support such aid.

More than half of respondents – 54 percent – said the United States would support Israel publicly if it attacked Iran. Only 14 percent said the United States should encourage an Israeli attack.

Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, summarized the results as saying Americans do not believe a preventive military strike will produce much benefit. (Only 18 percent believe that it would delay Iran’s abilities to develop a nuclear weapon by more than five years; 20 percent said a strike would delay the program by one to two years; 22 percent think it will actually accelerate the program development; 31 percent said a strike would strengthen Iran’s government and 42 percent believe it would weaken the regime in Tehran. )

Fair enough: These responses are quite consistent with what Israelis think about the potential effectiveness of a strike, with one slight difference: For Israelis, their lives might be at stake. For Americans, it’s more pain at the gas pump. Which, if you ask President Barack Obama as he faces reelection is not an issue to be taken lightly.

While we’re on the election: The press might scream about Rick Santorum’s electability problems, but he continues to defy the opinion polls and the skeptics. In some sense he already won, by forcing Americans to discuss issues that seemed well off the radar this season: faith, family, values, contraceptives, principles and the like. One doesn’t have to be Jewish to feel slightly uncomfortable about the “Jesus candidate” – plenty of words have been written about what he is not. And his success probably says more about the U.S. public than about the former U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania himself. But the more serious Santorum’s promise to turn the Republican primary into a two-man race becomes, the more the Jewish community will have to abandon its attempts to treat him as a marginal figure.

High noon in Washington

March 15, 2012

High noon in Washington – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

The much-hyped showdown between Barack Obama and Benjamin Netanyahu left the big guns holstered but with Iran still in both men’s long-range sights.

By Avi Issacharoff and Amos Harel

WASHINGTON, D.C. – An eve-of-war atmosphere is presently far more pervasive in Washington than in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. The United States is just starting to emerge from the so-called Great Recession – its worst economic downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The Americans are concerned that an attack on Iran will immediately send the already high price of oil skyrocketing, and plunge their economy into a downward spiral.

The contestants for the Republican Party’s nomination as presidential candidate, who are looking for the Jewish vote, have made Iran a central issue in the primary campaign, which was supposed to have focused wholly on the economy and domestic affairs. President Barack Obama has been dragged into the debate in their wake.

Obama, Netanyahu - GPO - March 2012 Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with U.S. President Barack Obama this week. An Israeli attack on Iran remained on the agenda.
Photo by: GPO

Meanwhile, the Atlantic magazine this month inaugurated a new project, a kind of “doomsday clock”: Each week, a team of international experts will be asked to determine how close Israel or the United States is to attacking Iran in the year ahead.

In any event, it’s possible that not much has actually changed with regard to an attack. True, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who went through a difficult rehab period in the effort to shake his addiction to Holocaust imagery, reverted to a comparison between Auschwitz and the Iranian threat in his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference this week. But rhetoric aside, Netanyahu has not yet shackled himself to a commitment to attack.

It’s more probable that the basic logic remains valid: Anyone who talks so much (after once again asking his cabinet ministers to seal their lips ) is not yet ready to attack. Nor has there been a substantive change in the approach of the Obama administration. The essential element here is the two-part message being sent by the administration: a powerful embrace of Israel combined with more sharply worded threats to attack Iran in the future, but with an equally sharp message that an attack at this time will not serve the interests of the two countries.

The topic of a possible Israeli attack stayed on the agenda this week. There is also the possibility of an American strike after the presidential election in November – which is undoubtedly something Netanyahu desires. The question is whether the way to achieve this goal is by means of provocative bear hugs with the president’s Republican rivals, when the polls are indicating that Obama is likely to be reelected. As the Republican hopefuls floated empty threats against Iran, Senate Republican leader Mitch McConnell raised the bar in his AIPAC conference speech, by calling for bipartisan legislation that would obligate the United States to bomb Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons. Overall, the Senate and the House are more hawkish than the White House on the Iran issue.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta responded to the Republicans the next day with a tough speech that seemed to come straight out of a Western. “In this town it’s easy to talk tough. Acting tough is a hell of a lot more important,” he said, promising U.S. military action in Iran if needed.

Most fascinating of all was the U.S. president’s speech to the pro-Israel lobby. After an unusual attack on television commentator Liz Cheney (daughter of former vice-president Dick Cheney ), who also spoke at AIPAC, and in the face of demonstrative hostility from part of the audience – Obama asserted that he should be judged by his actions, not by his declarations. He then rattled off a long list of sanctions against Iran, imposed after the inaction of the Bush administration.

According to leaks from senior sources in the administration, the president will consider seriously Israel’s request to supply it with two crucial elements for an attack on Iran: more refueling tankers and GBU-28 bunker-busting bombs. If Israel is still in need of these munitions, one may say, how are we to construe its tough talk about being ready and able to mount an attack on its own? David Makovsky, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, says the U.S. military establishment has reservations about an Israeli attack, with many doubting that the Israeli armed forces have the capability to execute such a complicated mission.

In a meeting with White House correspondents on Tuesday, Obama explained at length why Israel should not launch an attack at this time. Israel has the right to decide how to defend itself, he said, but a premature attack would have serious consequences, both for Israel and the United States. A window of opportunity still exists for making decisions – an assessment that is shared by the Israeli intelligence community.

Obama noted that negotiations between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, are about to resume. Their aim is to come up with a diplomatic arrangement for suspension of the nuclear project. The tough conditions that Netanyahu laid down for the Iranians (closure of the subterranean site at Fordo, stopping uranium enrichment and transferring high-grade enriched uranium abroad ) will not be adopted by the international community as so-called threshold demands.

Obama’s administration will now pull out all the stops in an effort to prevent an Israeli attack in the months ahead. If awarding the Presidential Medal of Freedom to President Shimon Peres this week will not be enough to restrain Israel for a time (some Washington wags said it would have been smarter to bestow the honor on Sara Netanyahu ), Obama might also consider making his first presidential visit to Israel early this summer.

When it comes to Iran, Obama has both time and responsibility. The diplomatic door to Iran is still open, he told reporters. He also reminded them that he, as commander-in-chief, knows the terrible cost of war, from corresponding with families who lost loved ones in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Knockout victory

The drums of war from Washington partially drowned out the noise from the major story at the beginning of the week: the state comptroller’s draft report on the so-called Harpaz affair, in which a forged document attempted to discredit the campaign of potential IDF chief of staff Yoav Galant. An in-depth gathering of details from the draft – which was not made public in full – turns up a far sharper picture than the one initially painted in the media.

A few weeks ago, we wrote in these pages that Defense Minister Ehud Barak was likely to emerge from the report as the victor in his battle against former chief of staff Gabi Ashkenazi, but that it would be a victory on points. That was also the impression readers got from the headlines on Monday morning.

The media reported – based on leaks from both sides – that, according to the report, Ashkenazi’s bureau collected material to besmirch Barak and his aides. Some media outlets balanced this picture by noting Barak’s insensitive and abusive attitude toward Ashkenazi. Others deliberately wrapped the report in a thick fog, so that it was hard to understand who was being singled out as bearing principal blame in the scandal.

But conversations with a number of people who are well-informed about the report, some of them not connected to one side or the other, reveals a very different bottom line: They say that, according to State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss, Barak wins not on points but by a knockout. Lindenstrauss attacks Barak on issues of courtesy and procedure, but reserves the great bulk of his criticism for Ashkenazi and his close aide Col. Erez Weiner.

The draft report attributes numerous failures, of both an ethical character and in the realm of military authority, to the chief of staff’s bureau. Ashkenazi and his aide were wrong to develop ties with Lt. Col. (res. ) Boaz Harpaz, who admitted to forging the document; did not break off the relationship when they should have; mishandled the document from the moment they came into possession of it; and took a bizarrely long time to provide a full and reliable account of events after the document was publicized by Channel 2 News.

According to the draft, Weiner suffered an “eclipse of values,” and by his actions undermined the spirit of the IDF and the Basic Law on the Army, which stipulates subordination and loyalty to the political branch. As the state comptroller does not draw a distinction between the steps taken by the chief of staff and by his aide, but emphasizes that Ashkenazi was aware of at least some of Weiner’s actions – the implication is that many of the allegations are aimed also at the former chief of staff.

It is hard to understand how Ashkenazi, who was one of Israel’s best chiefs of staff in recent decades, stumbled in this way.

The first leak of the draft report, which came exactly an hour after the report was made available to those involved, claimed that a “war atmosphere” existed between the offices of Barak and Ashkenazi. However, in his report, Lindenstrauss quotes Weiner, who uses the war atmosphere as an excuse for what he and Harpaz did. The quote is meant to describe Weiner’s mental state, not the objective situation. The chief of staff’s aide feels that his bureau is at war with the minister’s bureau. And a la guerre comme a la guerre – all is fair in love and war.

What comes through clearly from the report is the obsessive behavior of Ashkenazi and his aides toward the defense minister. For example, the report cites an emotional exchange between the chief of staff and the minister’s advisers, after Barak’s office released a photograph in which Ashkenazi looks tired and drawn during a visit to Northern Command headquarters. By contrast, Barak is seen conversing with the then-GOC Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot. The chief of staff’s bureau presented the incident as incontrovertible proof of malicious behavior by Barak. The state comptroller found that a very similar photograph was posted on the website of the IDF Spokesman’s Office.

The draft report also indicates that Weiner, with his superior’s knowledge, utilized Harpaz as an agent in Barak’s bureau. This went on intensively for half a year. Harpaz, a former intelligence officer, provides the chief of staff’s aide with amazing access to information, worldwide ties and complex intrigues. Neither Weiner nor Ashkenazi put a stop to the flow of ideas and proposals from Harpaz’s fertile mind, though the state comptroller found no evidence that Harpaz even knew Barak’s aides.

One of the questions that the Weiner and Harpaz tried to probe was whether a request for defense aid from the U.S. administration was meant to further Barak’s alleged economic interests. They also tried, in vain, to find connections between the minister’s chief of staff, Yoni Koren, and the New Israel Fund. They even tried to find out about the number of miles Barak’s wife had accumulated in the Frequent Flyer program.

No less serious are the state comptroller’s comments about the partial information that the former chief of staff and his aide provided about the extent of their connections with Harpaz. Lying was apparently the preferred option, even in petty matters. The tape recordings in the state comptroller’s possession document a consultation by Ashkenazi’s aides, who are looking for a way to have their boss evade a female journalist who is trying to meet with him. The solution: They will refer the matter to Barak’s office, on the assumption that Barak will refuse to authorize the interview. However, Barak surprises them by authorizing it and the aides have to come up with another excuse.

These stories are troubling for two reasons: because of the inability of the chief of staff’s bureau to distinguish the permissible from the impermissible in relations with the political echelon, and because of the vast energy that was devoted to all this by one of the busiest and most important bureaus in the country.

In case anyone was still wondering: according to the state comptroller, the fundamental debate between Barak and Ashkenazi over whether to attack Iran had nothing to do with the bad blood between them.

Gabi’s town

By an odd coincidence, on Monday the city of Or Yehuda named a street after Gabi Ashkenazi. A square in the city was already dedicated to him more than a year ago. In 2010, the IDF Spokesman’s Unit “adopted” Or Akiva. Even though the usual practice is for a city to adopt a unit (Ramat Gan has adopted the Paratroopers, Afula has adopted the Kfir Brigade ), when it comes to a “brand” like the IDF Spokesman, the opposite turns out to be the case.

The dedication ceremony provided Ashkenazi with an ideal platform from which to offer his measured public response to the report: a festive occasion, children playing in the background, no questions. The city spokesman sent invitations to the event not only to local reporters, but also to the military and legal correspondents.

As with Ashkenazi’s decision to visit Jerusalem’s Mahane Yehuda market with the General Staff forum at the height of the confrontation with Defense Minister Barak, his political winks seem to lack a certain subtlety. It might have been expected that he would be ultra-cautious in the public arena. In the meantime, we have seen the opposite.

Let’s hope that Or Yehuda still has some ammo left for after the publication of the state comptroller’s final report. Maybe then it will be possible to name the whole city for Ashkenazi.

Report: Iran officials told Assad to focus on Israel to divert attention from Syria crisis

March 15, 2012

Report: Iran officials told Assad to focus on Israel to divert attention from Syria crisis – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Emails said to have been intercepted by Syria opposition and released by the Guardian show advisers indicated Syrian President should verbally attack Israel, center on Palestinian cause in a planned speech.

By Haaretz

Syrian President Bashar Assad was advised by Iranian officials to divert attention toward Israel and the Palestinian cause in an effort to deflect criticism of his brutal crackdown, emails said to have been intercepted by Syrian opposition and released by the U.K.’s the Guardian indicated on Wednesday.

Bashar Assad and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Syria President Bashar Assad and Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
Photo by: AP

According to the Guardian, the messages were said to have been intercepted by the opposition’s Supreme Council of the Revolution between June of 2011 and February 2012, and include missives from Assad’s private account as well as that belonging to his wife, Asma.

One email sent in December 31 indicated that Assad’s aides advised the Syrian president on the contents on an upcoming speech following “consultations with a good number of people in addition to the media and political adviser for the Iranian ambassador.”

In the composed memorandum, Assad was advised to stress the issue of Muslim identity through the use of Koran quotes, as well as centering on what the email called “Syria’s principles,” which included: “Resistance”; “Hostility to Israel, the first enemy of the Muslims”; and “Protection of Palestinian people’s rights (real prayers should be in the direction of Jerusalem).”

“Maybe here the president can reiterate his stance by condemning forcefully the recent Israeli practices and policies to Judaise Al-Quds (Jerusalem),” the email added, saying that Assad should use “powerful and violent” language in his opposition to Israel.

“Here the subject of Israel comes up and it becomes necessary to put stress on the particular merits of the president by linking the foreign pressures on Syria, which differs in its toughness and content to other countries in crisis, with the geographical proximity to Israel and the position of the people and the regime towards Israel,” the memo stated.

Culminating the email’s section on Israel, the adviser said Assad should make “a clear distinction between the west’s ambitions and people’s demands and that the west and Israel are exploiting part of the Syrian people without their knowledge to break Syria, but the president has a great confidence in the patriotism of the entire Syrian people.”

The emails released by the Guardian also indicated that the Syria leader received advice from noted Lebanese businessman Hussein Mortada, known for his links to the Iran. In one message, Mortada advised Assad to stop blaming al-Qaida for opposition attacks

“It is not out of our interest to say that al-Qaida organization is behind the operation because this claim will [indemnify] the U.S. administration and Syrian opposition,” Mortada was quoted as saying, adding “I have received contacts from Iran and Hezbollah in my role as director of many Iranian-Lebanese channels and they directed me to not mention that al-Qaida is behind the operation. It is a blatant tactical media mistake.”

Another correspondence of note was between Assad’s wife Asma and the daughter of the emir of Qatar, Hamid bin Khalifa al-Thani, in which the Qatari noblewoman both advised Assad to step down as well as indicated that Qatar may be able to present the Syrian leader’s family with asylum.

“My father regards President Bashar as a friend, despite the current tensions – he always gave him genuine advice,” she was cited by the Guardian as writing, saying that the “opportunity for real change and development was lost a long time ago. Nevertheless, one opportunity closes, others open up – and I hope it’s not too late for reflection and coming out of the state of denial.”

A later email seemed more direct, saying that: “Just been following the latest developments in Syria … in all honesty – looking at the tide of history and the escalation of recent events – we’ve seen two results – leaders stepping down and getting political asylum or leaders being brutally attacked. I honestly think this is a good opportunity to leave and re-start a normal life.”

“I only pray that you will convince the president to take this an opportunity to exit without having to face charges. The region needs to stabilise, but not more than you need peace of mind. I am sure you have many places to turn to, including Doha.”

Moreover, Assad communicated with Khaled al-Ahmed, who is believed to have been tasked with providing advice on Homs and Idlib. According to the emails, Ahmed told Assad that “a trusted source who met with leaders of groups in Baba Amr today said that a big shipment of weapons is coming from Libya and will arrive at the shores of one of the neighbouring states within three days, to be smuggled to Syria.”

Ahmed further stated that he had been told that European journalists had entered Baba Amr “by crossing the Lebanese borders illegally.” According to Ahmed, one of the journalists was French and the other was German.

Iron Dome won’t save Israel

March 15, 2012

Iron Dome won’t save Israel – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Missile defense technology, however impressive, is still defensive. The south will be saved by offense, not defense – by preemptive strikes, not ex post facto interceptions.

By Israel Harel

Our leaders declare that “We’ve taught them a lesson.” True. For many years now, the terrorist leaders are saying to themselves, we’ve disrupted life in southern Israel – and recently, on the outskirts of central Israel as well. Yet despite having one of the world’s best-equipped armies, Israel is incapable of stopping us. The Zionist army, which in the past was noted for its courage and originality, has lost both courage and originality. It is pinning its faith, and exhausting its budget, on expensive interceptor missiles to use against our primitive rockets.

The terrorist leaders watch television and conclude that the Zionist state’s southern residents are depressed and disappointed. What has been is what will be, the terrorists hear them saying.

After the latest round, too, the Israeli government will continue to accept the ongoing, almost daily launching of mortar shells and Qassam rockets. (“If the firing continues,” warned the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff after the latest truce was announced, “we’ll respond just as we responded previously.” ) And when the army spokesman once again declares, “There were no casualties and no damage,” he signals that Israel will continue to contain itself (after all, “containment” is their strategy, not seizing the offensive and winning ) in the face of the nonstop assaults on its sovereignty, the disruption of its citizens’ lives and the destruction of their sense of security.

The Israelis know quite well, say the terrorists, that only a ground operations could end our rockets. But ground operations entail soldier casualties, and for Israelis avoiding soldier casualties takes precedence over freeing mothers and fathers from having to fear for their young children, for their property and for their dignity. And so, in the long run we will wear them down.

Missile defense technology, however impressive it may be, is still defensive. The south will be saved by offense, not defense – by preemptive strikes, not by ex post facto interceptions. By the audacity of its statesmen, commanders and soldiers, not by awe at the accuracy of the Iron Dome antimissile batteries. As long as technology assists the fighters, it’s a blessing. But when it replaces them, the result is more than a dozen years of enduring injury to life, property, morale and deterrence.

Who needs tanks and planes, the terrorist leaders say to themselves, when every explosive-filled pipe sends hundreds of thousands of Zionists into bomb shelters and causes them to use up the stock of expensive Iron Dome missiles in which they place their faith?

Terrorist leaders in the south, like Hezbollah in the north, reached these conclusions – which they have tested over and over – many years ago. In every round, just as we did this week, we have opted for “containment” rather than victory. The prime minister, defense minister, chief of staff, generals, mayors and party leaders who declared that we won this last round are misled and misleading.

A significant blow to the terrorists’ infrastructure and leadership cannot be delivered using drones. The rockets must be detroyed before they are launched. Only ground operations can achieve victory – and even then, only on condition they aren’t stopped almost as soon as they begin, as Operation Cast Lead was in 2009.

The IDF, which has failed in recent years to grant residents of Israel true relief from the terror of rockets, must return to the sources of the spirit, daring, sense of mission and uniqueness that guided it in its first decades. Iron Dome won’t save us, and breathtaking surgical strikes won’t defeat terror. Only the daring and resourcefulness of the soldier who seizes the offensive (along with the daring of those who send him into battle ), the soldier who seeks engagement with the enemy and makes every effort to locate the rocket stores and destroy them, is capable – with sophisticated technology in the supporting role of providing protection and direction – of actually winning the battle.

Iran threatens N. Israel with bombardment from Lebanon

March 15, 2012

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report March 14, 2012, 10:29 PM (GMT+02:00)

 

Ali Akbar Javanfekr, Ahmadinejad’s spokesman

Tehran has begun capitalizing on its allies” two perceived victories: Bashar Assad’s success in seizing Idlib from rebel hands and the Palestinian Jihad Islami’s triumphal missile assault from Gaza.

The Iranians are now moving forward with plans to match the Palestinian assault on southern Israeli with an offensive on the north from Lebanon. This is reported by debkafile’s exclusive sources in the wake of a visit paid by high-ranking Iranian and Hizballah officials Wednesday morning, March 14, to the Lebanese-Israeli border region opposite Metulah, Israel’s northernmost town at the tip of the Galilee Panhandle.

The Iranian group, led by Ali Akbar Javanfekr, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s spokesman, arrived in a heavily guarded convoy at the Fatma outpost opposite Metulah for its rendezvous with Hizballah military intelligence officers.
Once there, they kept moving around near the Lebanese-Israeli border fence. At times, they came up close and  examined the Israel Defense Forces’ ongoing work for fortifying the border fence and upgrading it from a boundary marker to a military barrier able to withstand terrorist incursions into the Galilee panhandle.
The Iranian visitor, Javanfekr, commented in the hearing of our sources: “The Zionists can build any wall they like, whether of concrete, iron or plastic, but we and Hizballah will knock it down, like Israel itself.”

He pitched his voice loudly enough to carry across the border.
His words were taken by top Israeli commanders as a blunt threat of a missile offensive on similar lines to the Gaza confrontation – only this time instead of Jihad Islami in Gaza, Hizballah would be entrusted with shooting missiles from Lebanon.
Word of this threat spurred Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to sharpen his tone in his speech to the Knesset later Wednesday and declare, “We shall strike Iran even if our American friends object.”

He was further irked by a decision by US President Barack Obama and visiting British premier David Cameron, reported by debkafile’s Washington sources, to intensify their efforts for holding Israel back from striking Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Netanyahu therefore stressed once again that Israel would decide for itself the best way to pre-empt a nuclear Iran.
No sooner were his comments broadcast, when Washington announced that Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro would be traveling to Israel forthwith.  He will no doubt try and clarify how far Netanyahu really means to go

Nuclear War in Iran: Six questions to consider about whether and how it might happen.

March 15, 2012

Nuclear War in Iran: Six questions to consider about whether and how it might happen. – Slate Magazine.

The emotional factors, and the scientific ones.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Benjamin Netanyahu.

(Left) Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (Right) Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyah.

Rodrigo Buendia/AFP/Getty Images; Gali Tibbon/AFP/Getty Images.

Not long ago an editor at a respected scientific journal contacted me. He wanted to know if I could expand—scientifically—upon the scenarios I sketched out in my recent book, assessing the likelihood of nuclear war in the Middle East. The book began with an account of a 2007 Israeli raid on a nuclear reactor being built in a remote corner of Syria. A hushed-up rehearsal, perhaps, for a future raid on Iran.

In these conjectural sketches I had adumbrated the possibility that by the Law of Unintended Consequences, an attack by Israel (or by Iran) could lead to a cascade of ever more grave developments, ranging from a regional nuclear war to, potentially, a global one. New, perhaps unanswerable questions have emerged in the interim as tension over Iran’s (and Israel’s) intentions have escalated. And they are certainly worth examining, but are they soluble by science?

The science journal editor seemed to think so. He felt we could use science to predict the outcomes of various scenarios, and he seemed to have a likely result in mind already: that war was so irrational it was near impossible. First, we’d calculate the amount of uranium the Iranians had already enriched to 20 percent U-235, the bomb-making uranium isotope that needs to be separated by high-tech centrifuges from the more plentiful, less dangerous, U-238. Twenty percent enrichment has been allowed for some “peaceful purposes” under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which Iran (but not Israel) has signed. Iran claims “medical research” has been the only aim of their nuclear enrichment activities. But it is a critical step toward making bomb-ready nuclear material.

Then, we’d calculate how much bomb-grade fuel would be produced if Iran’s uranium were further enriched to 90 percent U-235, the standard for nuclear weapons, which would allow us to determine how many bombs, of what kiloton or megaton explosive potential, Iran could build in the shelter of their “zone of immunity” from Israeli attack.

“Zone of immunity” is Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak’s term for bomb-making facilities buried so deep they’d be theoretically impossible to target and destroy with Israeli conventional weaponry. The editor seemed convinced that the 265 feet of mountainous rock shielding the once-secret Iranian nuclear processing facilities at Fordow near the Holy City of Qom would afford such immunity.

All this assumes of course the unlikely probability we would find reliable figures to start from. But, assuming that, next we’d calculate the explosive power of Israeli “bunker buster” bombs and decide (scientifically!) whether they would be enough to destroy the secret nuclear fuel enrichment facilities at Fordow, Parchin, and other locales, the ones the Iranians refuse to let the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors see. We could then demonstrate—scientifically!—that an Israeli attack would not be able to destroy enough nuclear material and bomb-making technology to prevent Iran from continuing to make a bomb they’d be even more likely want to use sooner or later.

QED, the Israelis would see our analysis (or have made the same analysis already) and we would save the world with science! Or something. Oh, and as for those putative Iranian nukes: no problemo, the mullahs would be deterred or contained by the threat of retaliation after they destroyed the Israelis.

If only it were that easy.

The assumption in this scenario is that the Israelis would see no alternative but to accept the inevitability of possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of an apocalyptically minded group of theocrats which has recurrently threatened to annihilate them. That the emotional memory of the Holocaust and the horrific consequences of the failure to take threats of annihilation seriously in the ’30s would not dispose them to act, no matter what “science” suggested about their ability to deter the threat. And that the Israelis—who surprised the world with techno-feats beyond public knowledge in its attacks on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 and the secret Syrian reactor building in 2007, and who have been war gaming Iran for more than a decade—didn’t have an as-yet-undisclosed capacity or strategy in place.

The scenario also ignores the fact that, given its history, Israel might decide even an incomplete attack that didn’t succeed in utterly destroying Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity, but drastically slowed Iranian progress would be preferable to sitting tight and doing nothing. And it assumes that Israel—faced with annihilation—would not use its nuclear weaponry in some fashion, that it would rely on conventional weapons, rather than using a nuclear cruise missile potentially launched from a submarine to turn the mountain now sheltering Iranian nuclear facilities into dust.

This is an instance where the emotional factor—the influence of tragic history and memory—trumps pure science in evaluating possible scenarios in this probably insoluble situation.

“Probably insoluble.” You’re not supposed to say that! There’s always a solution once everyone sees reason, right? “Solutionism” is a term I first saw used by Jeffrey Goldberg to describe the Pollyanna-like American predisposition to believe there’s a solution to every problem, including the ones in the Middle East. The mantra of the solutionists recently has been that even if Iran gets the bomb, it’s no big deal: The Iranians would be deterred or “contained” by fear of retaliation, of “obliteration” as Hillary Clinton put it, because it’s only rational to act that way. But this faith in rationality and self-preservation fails to take into account the frequent irrationality of faith. For example, an influential faction of the mullahs running the Iranian theocracy are reportedly adherents of the apocalyptic strain of Shiite theology which believes a world conflagration is a pre-condition for the return of the Hidden Imam and the salvific End of Days. Which means some Iranian leaders might in fact welcome nuclear chaos, even if it results in national martyrdom. Solutionists who believe in Cold War-style nuclear deterrence in the Middle East neglect the differences. Deterrence worked during the Cold War when there was a bipolar standoff between just two nuclear powers, both of whom were comparatively rational (or interested in self-preservation at least).

Many neglect to take into account the third nuclear power in the region: Pakistan. Its estimated 90 nuclear warheads are either one coup away from Taliban control or up on sale in the “nuclear bazaar” that many believe Pakistan’s bomb maker A.Q. Khan never stopped operating despite his “detention.”

Solutionists who put their faith in deterrence neglect the chilling statement by Iranian Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani suggesting that a nuclear conflict would not be overly troubling, because “the application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.” Behind the sinister euphemisms is a grotesque calculation. The “application of an atomic bomb” means dropping one on Israel. “Leaving nothing in Israel” can only be interpreted as leaving no people alive. A second holocaust courtesy of the Holocaust deniers. And an Israeli nuclear retaliation would “just produce damages in the Muslim world.” Damages! Israel is said to have some 200 nuclear warheads and an invulnerable retaliatory capacity (stashed in undetectable submarines). Just “damages” in the Muslim world might mean deaths in the tens of millions.

These are, ultimately, the stakes we can expect in a regional nuclear war—and it should never be forgotten that an attack on a facility that contains nuclear fuel turns each target into a nuclear “dirty bomb,” however deeply buried, one whose long term consequences are still unknown.

Can science predict—or influence—outcomes in the Middle East? After some consideration of his well-meaning offer, I told the science journal’s editor I didn’t think I could accept the assignment, because there were so many immeasurable emotional factors involved in the Iran-Israel nuclear situation. In some ways, lamentable or not, science is a distraction, a false refuge from the ominous emotional undercurrents more likely to be crucial to history. Science is a variety of solutionism.

As a non-solutionist I have no good answers to the dire questions we face. But I have sought to separate out six of the key unanswered questions that will decide the outcome and which still offer no easy or comforting answers.

 Q. Would President Obama ever take military action against Iran and its nuclear facilities?

A. Recently I was at a dinner with a writer who had just interviewed Obama. And when I asked him this question, he said he was absolutely convinced that Obama would be willing to order a strike. But not because of Israel. Or the Israel lobby. Rather, because of his longtime grounding in the thinking of the anti-nuclear proliferation movement.

It sounds unlikely at first, but it makes a certain kind of sense: Obama wrote a seminar paper at Columbia about the nuclear freeze movement, after all. He probably won the Nobel Prize because of his speech calling for the abolition of all nuclear weapons (remember that?) and, this reporter suspects, he believes that Iranian possession of a nuclear weapon will mean a Middle East arms race. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Sudan, Egypt, even the Emirates will want them, while Israel already has a couple hundred nuclear warheads, and Pakistan around a hundred. Sooner or later, this proliferating arms race will lead to regional (or even global) nuclear war.

I still can’t decide if I can visualize Obama ordering a reluctant military to start another war for the sake of nonproliferation. It sounds counterintuitive, does it not, but it now seems that Iranian nuclear capability to build a bomb—not even the actual “breakout” race to assemble it—is a “red line” for the president. Maybe the attack he’s alluding to with his “all options are on the table” rhetoric will start and end such a war. I’ve come to the tragic conclusion that the world will not really move to ban nuclear weapons until it gets another taste of their sinister sting, another preview of the Armageddon they promise in the form of a “small” nuclear war. Obama has said he doesn’t want a “temporary” solution—but more likely it would be a war that would never end, in terms of consequences.

Q. How do the feelings of the Iranian populace factor in?

A. This is an emotional aspect of the situation I have rarely seen discussed in debates over whether Iran shoud be “allowed to have the bomb.” I thought of the term “Cuba Syndrome” when I read an otherwise unsurprising op-ed in the Times by Dennis Ross in which the veteran Mideast diplomat, among other things, declared Iran “must not have nuclear weapons.” There was something in his imperious tone that made me feel that if I were an Iranian person on the street—not some apocalyptic-minded mullah, perhaps even a participant in the Green Revolution—-hearing this, I would feel my sense of dignity denigrated. It made me think of Cuba, whose people have endured a half century of privations and immiseration because of U.S sanctions and yet have clung to an oppressive police state regime. Why? Because of emotion, the emotion of dignity. Because they didn’t want to be told who should rule them by the United States and be forced to act subserviently. These things are often more important to people than new American cars.

The connection: Iran would likely continue its bomb program even if a raid left its current facilities in smoking ruins. If only because of the Cuba Syndrome. Even if it took another half century, they would get one nuclear weapon built, or buy one from North Korea or Pakistan. And Israel—which has been called a “one-bomb state,” in the sense that a one-megaton bomb airburst over Tel Aviv would annihilate the country—will never escape that shadow.

Q. Why did Hezbollah’s Sheikh Nasrallah say last month he would sit and think if Israel attacked Iran?

A. Sheikh Nasrallah is the head of Hezbollah, the Iranian-sponsored anti-Israel terrorist group—so designated by the State Department—now virtually ruling Lebanon. Hezbollah has become less popular lately because the Lebanese people believe that if Israel were to attack Iran it would first strike Hezbollah’s rocket concentrations in Lebanon, to pre-emptively ward off counterstrikes in support of Iran, and the battered country would suffer again.

So Sheikh Nasrallah was essentially quoted saying “not so fast” on that pre-empt. He claimed that if Israel attacked Iran, he wouldn’t immediately smite the attacker.

Instead he said, uncharacteristically mildly, that “on that day” he and the other Hezbollah leaders would “sit, think and decide what we will do” before acting.

It was a ground-breaking moment: a less-than-belligerent statement from one of the most bloody-minded terrorist leaders, Nasrallah. Was he worried about Israeli power or was it, as someone suggested to me, another question of dignity; that for strategic if not humanitarian reasons he would not sacrifice his people or his country to slaughter for the sake of some Iranian enterprise. They weren’t just puppets.

Q. What about those Israeli submarines? Are they nuclear-armed? Would they go so far to use such nukes?

A. Almost everyone ignores the subs in this discussion. The BBC recently ran a map that purported to show the difficulty of an Israeli fighter bomber attack on Iran. Refueling problems, overflight problems, return-flight problems, and the like. What was surprising about the map was there was no submarine icon drawn on it in the waters around Iran. A submarine-launched cruise missile would be a far more efficient—though catastrophic—way of attacking that mountain at Fordow which is sheltering the key bomb-making capacity—uranium enrichment. And there have been reports of Israeli possession of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles.

Most people, including myself, express horror at the idea of Israel launching a nuclear attack, but the Israeli military ethicist Moshe Halbetal told me, unofficially, that he felt that the emotional memory of the Holocaust would be a strategic factor in the decision of whether to go nuclear first in the face of an existential threat. Go nuclear if the aim was to target weapons and military installations, not people, though he recognized noncombatants would die.

Israel has at least three “Dolphin”-class subs in service, each capable, according to some reports, of launching nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. Two or possibly three are being built in the German shipyard at Kiel, the new ones believed to be ballistic-missile long-range capable. Subs are Israel’s prime second-strike capability. Questions have been raised about their refueling capacity, surfacing, and basing, especially now that—given the transition of power in Egypt—the Suez Canal may no longer be a reliable link. (The last public transit of Suez by an Israeli craft was in 2010, before the Arab Spring uprising.) Are they still out there? Their use could make all the difference.

According to one of my sources, “It’s been reported (but not substantiated) that there was a test of a sub-fired nuclear-capable cruise missile that hit a target 900 miles away: Haifa [Israel’s official sub base] is about 620 miles from the Iranian border.”

Make of that what you will. The capability looks to be there. Is there the will? Is there the emotion?

Q. What did Grand Ayatollah Khamenei mean when he called “nuclear weapons a grave sin” earlier this year?

This seems to me to be an underappreciated development, although I’ve been told he has said it before. But to choose this moment to say it? Perhaps the grand leader of Iran is preparing to back down from the nuke project (and to submit to the humiliating international inspections that would follow, since no one would trust their word alone anymore). Or perhaps he plans to claim there never was one because Iran would never commit the “grave sin” Israel has committed.

Or perhaps he is using some kind of sophistry to keep up the denial: “a grave sin,” but sometimes when those who possess sinful means threaten to use them, you must descend to their level.

Who can read what’s in his heart? And yet what’s in his heart may determine the future of the planet.

Q. Why should we trust any intelligence on the subject?

A. We shouldn’t. We shouldn’t trust anything, especially anything coming from the U.S. intelligence community, which is now caught in a 12-year cycle of overreacting emotionally to its past mistakes (and as a result skewing its estimates politically), and which has basically gotten everything wrong on the most urgent questions.

It failed to prevent 9/11 because it underestimated intelligence that might have made it possible to stop its perpetrators. It then overestimated the threat of WMDs in Iraq for an undetermined mixture of political and bureaucratic reasons. It then proceeded to swing the pendulum the other way on Iran in the now notorious 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which allowed the world to believe grievously understated Iranian aims with regard to its nuclear program. And now, if you believe the International Atomic Energy Agency, U.S. intelligence continues to underestimate Iranian intentions and capabilities. Intentions and capabilities of course are the province of emotion. Often, as much as intelligence.

The story of the 2007 NIE deserves recapitulating because its misconstrual by the media, enabled, it seems, by nameless bureaucrats in the intelligence realm who made either an inadvertent or a deliberate error, has helped exacerbate the crisis we face now.

World opinion on the need to do anything about the Iranian bomb program relaxed after the 2007 NIE on Iran came out. Its press release concluded that Iran had halted its “nuclear weapons program,” though was “keeping its options open” for some unspecified future.

But as intelligence chiefs later strenuously made clear (most explicitly in a 2008 background briefing for national security reporters whose transcript I reprint in my book), the NIE’s classified contents claimed only that the Iranians abandoned one aspect of their nuclear program, not the whole program. (The three aspects of a nuclear weapons program are: obtaining the bomb-grade uranium or plutonium fuel; finding a way to fit it into an implosion triggered device for your warhead; and, finally, building a ballistic missile to deliver it long distances.)

And so the world lost five years before the International Atomic Energy Agency refuted the mistaken press release language by accusing Iran of continuing an enrichment pace that could only have military goals—and now it’s too late. Think what could have been accomplished if we put the tough sanctions we have now in place five years ago, when it might have meant something.

In fact, the actual text of the 2007 NIE (as opposed to its press release—the ignoramus or malefactor who wrote it hasn’t been identified, nor have his motives) claimed that the only aspect the Iranians had stopped was their warhead work, and that it had continued the enrichment of uranium fuel that would bring it closer to a bomb. And when you think about it, the other two aspects are the least necessary, because a compact warhead is not a prerequisite if you’re thinking truck bomb or container ship rather than missile.

The only thing absolutely necessary for destructive capacity is bomb-grade nuclear fuel. I know from personal communications with the national security reporters for the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal that they—and many journalists—are aware of the 2007 NIE’s misconstrual. I heard the head of the U.S. intelligence community, Mike McConnell, discuss it at a dinner I attended in 2008. But there are still some reporters, pundits, and bloggers who cling to the 2007 press release language in their Pollyannaish world.

And now the denialists inside and outside the intelligence community have retreated to saying that Iran “hasn’t made the decision” to produce a bomb yet. Weasel words that could well mean they have acquired all the components necessary, they just haven’t given the order for final assembly—which could be a matter of weeks.

And thus the world lost its last slim chance—those five years in which sanctions and other means might have made a difference. It’s too late now. I know this will sound emotional, but face it: There are no solutions, at least none I see. No good solutions.

Only the potential for a final solution.

Why Saudia Arabia will want a nuke if Iran gets one

March 15, 2012

May: Why Saudia Arabia will want a nuke if Iran gets one | ScrippsNews.

Fareed Zakaria is wearing his “I’m perplexed” face. On his weekly CNN program, he is noting that Saudi Arabia did not go nuclear in response to “Israel’s buildup of a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.” So why, he asks the camera, would the Saudis do so in response to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons?

The camera did not answer, so I will: The Saudis are not fools. They know Israel poses no threat to them. They know, too, that those who rule the Islamic Republic of Iran seek to establish hegemony over the Middle East and lead a global Islamist Ascendency.

A nuclear-armed Iran would challenge the Saudi clan’s claim to be the rightful guardian of Mecca and Medina and would embolden Arabia’s Shia minority. It would threaten the independence of small states in the region, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain among them. It would dominate Iraq (where its influence has been growing as American forces have withdrawn) and Afghanistan (from which American forces soon will withdraw).

So if the Iranians get nukes, the Saudis can be expected to acquire them not long after. Other states may follow suit. The chance of a nuclear device finding its way into terrorist hands would increase substantially — as President Barack Obama has pointed out.

“But,” Zakaria asks in his most recent Time magazine column, “would a country that has labored for decades to pursue a nuclear program and suffered huge sanctions and costs to do so then turn around and give the fruits of its efforts to a gang of militants?”

The obvious answer is yes — if that gang of militants were planning to kill people Iran’s rulers want killed. That’s what it means to be a sponsor of terrorism, and Iran has been the world leader in this field for a long time. To take just two instances: Iran was implicated in Hezbollah’s bombing of the U.S. Marines barracks in 1983 and al-Qaeda’s bombing of American embassies in Africa in 1998.

Zakaria asserts that “the evidence is ambiguous” as to whether Iran’s rulers “have decided” to develop nuclear weapons — despite the fact that Yukiya Amano, who heads the International Atomic Energy Agency, said last week that “Iran has engaged in activities relevant to the development of nuclear explosive devices.” (Also despite the fact that there are few good reasons to bury non-nuclear facilities inside mountains and prevent IAEA inspectors from having a look at them.)

In the same column, Zakaria asserts that Iran is being told to “surrender.” Now he’s got me perplexed: Why is asking Iran’s rulers not to develop a weapon they have not decided to develop a demand for “surrender”?

Zakaria’s commentaries omit any mention of the stated intentions of Iran’s theocrats. Is that because quoting them would make it apparent this crisis has been caused by them — not by what Zakaria calls a sudden attack of “war fever” whipped up by those addressing the AIPAC conference earlier this month?

Iran’s rulers for years have threatened Israelis with genocide. In the chilling words of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Israel is “a cancerous tumor” that “will be removed.” That Iran now appears close to acquiring the nuclear scalpel to perform such surgery makes the problem urgent for Israelis. But it should not be their responsibility alone. That becomes clear when you consider the broader goal declared by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad:

We are in the process of an historical war between the World of Arrogance and the Islamic world. Is it possible for us to witness a world without America and Zionism? You had best know that this slogan and this goal are attainable, and surely can be achieved.

Both Ahmadinejad and Khameini are disciples of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who more than three decades ago founded the Islamic Republic, conceived as the first modern jihadi state. He, too, had a fondness for medical metaphors, as in his theological justification for the slaughter of non-Muslims:

To allow the infidels to stay alive means to let them do more corrupting. (To kill them) is a surgical operation commanded by Allah the Creator.

Once upon a time, one could harbor the hope that moderates or at least pragmatists would come to power in Iran without another revolution. But that has proven to be a fairy tale — as Zakaria and other leading lights of the foreign policy establishment would grasp were they not so willfully determined to remain perplexed about the threat that Iran’s theocrats pose.

(Clifford D. May is president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on national security and foreign policy. Email: cliff(at)defenddemocracy.org.)

‘Israel will protect itself even if America objects’

March 15, 2012

‘Israel will protect itself even … JPost – Diplomacy & Politics.

03/14/2012 22:35
PM Netanyahu says ‘Gaza is Iran,’ blames Gaza withdrawal for enabling Tehran to set up a forward “terrorist base.”

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu in the Knesset By REUTERS/Ronen Zvulun

Saying publicly in the Knesset what he had only said privately to congressional leaders in Washington last week, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu stressed on Wednesday that Israel would act to defend itself even if the US objected.

“Israel has never left its fate in the hands of others, not even in the hands of our best friends,” he said in a speech that focused on the Iranian threat and drew a direct line from Tehran to the events earlier this week in Gaza. He also blamed the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip for leading to Iran’s establishment of a “forward” terrorist base there.

Netanyahu cited legendary US secretary of state George Marshall as telling David Ben-Gurion in 1948 not to declare a state, and reminded the Knesset that US president Lyndon Johnson not only advised Israel against preemptive military action in 1967, but warned that “if you act alone, you will be alone.”

Likewise, he said, former prime minister Menachem Begin knew when he decided to attack the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 that he was going against US wishes and would come under sharp international criticism.

“But he fulfilled his obligation and acted,” said Netanyahu, possibly preparing the public for the prospect of Israeli military action even over US objections.

The prime minister said that a nuclear Iran would pose an “existential threat” to Israel, and that while he would prefer it if Iran voluntarily abandoned its nuclear ambitions, he had an “obligation” to retain Israel’s “independent ability” to defend itself.

After five days of fighting in the South that replaced Iran as the major issue on the country’s agenda for a short while, Netanyahu’s speech put the attention back on the Iranian dilemma.

He scoffed at those who argued that an accord with the Palestinians would solve the Iranian problem.

“As if an agreement with Abu Mazen [PA President Mahmoud Abbas] would stop the [Iranian] centrifuges,” he said. “Anyone who wants to believe that may do so, but he is burying his head in the sand.”

What Netanyahu did not say was that US President Barack Obama linked the Palestinian issue to Iran in the early days of his presidency, something that created tension between Washington and Jerusalem. Now, however, the administration has divorced the two issues.

“The dominant element driving the events in Gaza is not the Palestinian issue,” he said. “The dominant element driving the events in Gaza is Iran. Gaza is Iran.”

The prime minister said that Gaza’s missiles, money, terrorist training and terrorist infrastructure all came from Iran.

“Who is giving the orders?” he asked.

“Iran. Gaza is Iran’s forward position.”

Netanyahu said that Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah in Lebanon all worked under Iran’s umbrella.

“Now imagine if that umbrella turns nuclear? Imagine that behind the terrorist organizations is a state calling for our destruction that is armed with a nuclear bomb.”

He declared that he was not willing to live with that scenario, and that “every responsible leader understands that it is forbidden to let that happen.”

The prime minister, referring to opposition leader Tzipi Livni’s comments that he was sowing panic, said those same words had been hurled at him in 2005 when he predicted that as a result of the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, missiles would be fired from there at Beersheba, Ashkelon and Ashdod.

“They said then we were sowing panic,” he said. “They said the unilateral withdrawal would bring a breakthrough on the road to peace. Nu, what breakthrough? What road? What peace?” Every time Israel left territory, he continued, Iran moved in.

“We left Lebanon, Iran came in. We left Gaza, Iran came in. There are those suggesting we do the same thing in Judea and Samaria,” he declared. “Iran would go in there as well. I don’t believe there is anyone who doesn’t understand that it is forbidden to repeat the same mistake a third time.”

Israel’s enemies, he stated, needed to understand that in the final analysis, Israel would not suffer an Iranian base in Gaza.

“Sooner or later,” he said, “the Iranian terrorist base in Gaza will be uprooted.”

Iranian activist says regime change could resolve nuclear standoff

March 15, 2012

Iranian activist says regime change could resolve nuclear standoff – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

The Iranian political activist Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi sees a third option, beyond to bomb or not to bomb: U.S. and Israeli aid for the opposition.

By Natasha Mozgovaya

With the barrage of speeches and debates in Washington recently over who should or should not bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities, I can’t stop wondering what Iranians themselves think about this thoughtful debate. For an Israeli journalist to quote friends in Iran is probably being a bad friend, but Banafsheh Zand-Bonazzi, an Iranian activist living in the United States, feels insulted that neither American nor Israeli leaders have bothered to talk to those who have a real stake in Iran’s future.

“No one in Iran wants to get bombed,” she says. “By going to war, the situation will not be solved. It’s addressing the symptoms, not the cause, and we must respond to this in a long-term fashion, not patchwork that will spring another asinine leak in 30 years. The regime can be brought down, and we have begged and begged and begged for some assistance for us to do it ourselves, and we sure can but seems like it’s the idiocy of the people who cannot think outside the box – starting with Obama, who is forcing Israel’s hand, so now the story has become asinine diplomacy or war. And we don’t need either,” Zand-Bonazzi says.

Iran protests - AP Iran protests in 2009.
Photo by: AP

Her suggestion? The one former Israeli Mossad chief Meir Dagan hinted at in his interview to the CBS news show “60 Minutes,” broadcast in the United States on Sunday – to assist the Iranian opposition. “I applaud Meir Dagan, though I wouldn’t quite call the Iranian regime ‘rational’, she says, referring to a comment he made in the interview.

Wouldn’t it hurt the Iranian opposition to receive any aid from the United States or Israel?

“Heck no”, she says. “How much more could we be hurt?! Whether we have funding or not, they’ll accuse of being puppets anyhow. So what the heck!”

I couldn’t resist reminding Zand-Bonazzi that the Iranian opposition in the United States is notorious for its infighting.

“Every opposition – the Russian, Jewish, Chinese, Cuban – in all countries, attack each other,” she shrugs. “Many serious people do not fight. If we disagree, we have learned to go to our corners, take time to rethink and come back at it from another angle. To paint an entire opposition with one judgmental brushstroke is not only unfair, it’s simply untrue. We have every connection inside Iran. We want to speak for ourselves. The time has come for Iranians to take a stand for the self-determination of our movement, which is the only way to get out of this peacefully. We know the absolute weaknesses of that regime. How they fight. Who fights among them. What is said. How they are sabotaging each other. How to quicken the sabotage between them. They are at each other’s throats inside that regime. And we have all the means at our disposal to see that all the way to the end.”

What did she think about the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recent speech to AIPAC in Washington (dubbed “the duck speech,” for his comment about Iran’s nuclear program: “If it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck,” then it’s “a nuclear duck. And it’s time the world started calling a duck a duck.” )

“There’s nothing more to say to Mr. Netanyahu,” Zand-Bonazzi says. “He has made up his mind and a huge number of people who could have given him better advice did not. Though he’s a person who sees things for what they are, his solutions are not as blanket obvious. Sometimes things require a little more intricacy.”

Red lines

On the pessimists’ side, this week at Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies Dr. Matthew Kroenig, Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, said he doubts a deal with Iran can be reached, because “Iran has crossed many red lines in the past 10 years – and we’ve watched them doing that.” He argued for taking action.

Dr. Colin Kahl, senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, suggested looking for positive hints in remarks by Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who recently said nuclear weapons are a “sin.” This could give the regime an opportunity to step back from its nuclear program without losing face, Kahl said.

And there was this question from someone in the audience – presumably, someone who did not attend last week’s AIPAC conference: “How exactly will Iran’s nuclear bomb directly threaten the United States?”

Well, according to a new poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes and the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, the question is very relevant to the U.S. public. Only one in four Americans favors an Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear program. Seven in 10 (69 percent ) favor the United States and other major powers continuing to pursue negotiations with Iran – with rare bipartisan support (58 percent of the Republicans and 79 percent of the Democrats ). Furthermore, three in four say the United States should primarily act through the UN Security Council, rather than acting by itself.

Only 25 percent favor the United States providing military forces in the event Israel attacks Iran, Iran retaliates against Israel and Israel requests U.S. aid; even among Republicans, only 41 percent would support such aid.

More than half of respondents – 54 percent – said the United States would support Israel publicly if it attacked Iran. Only 14 percent said the United States should encourage an Israeli attack.

Steven Kull, director of the Program on International Policy Attitudes, summarized the results as saying Americans do not believe a preventive military strike will produce much benefit. (Only 18 percent believe that it would delay Iran’s abilities to develop a nuclear weapon by more than five years; 20 percent said a strike would delay the program by one to two years; 22 percent think it will actually accelerate the program development; 31 percent said a strike would strengthen Iran’s government and 42 percent believe it would weaken the regime in Tehran. )

Fair enough: These responses are quite consistent with what Israelis think about the potential effectiveness of a strike, with one slight difference: For Israelis, their lives might be at stake. For Americans, it’s more pain at the gas pump. Which, if you ask President Barack Obama as he faces reelection is not an issue to be taken lightly.

While we’re on the election: The press might scream about Rick Santorum’s electability problems, but he continues to defy the opinion polls and the skeptics. In some sense he already won, by forcing Americans to discuss issues that seemed well off the radar this season: faith, family, values, contraceptives, principles and the like. One doesn’t have to be Jewish to feel slightly uncomfortable about the “Jesus candidate” – plenty of words have been written about what he is not. And his success probably says more about the U.S. public than about the former U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania himself. But the more serious Santorum’s promise to turn the Republican primary into a two-man race becomes, the more the Jewish community will have to abandon its attempts to treat him as a marginal figure.