THE DAILY STAR :: News :: Local News :: Neither Hezbollah, Israel has interest in new war.
BEIRUT: The escalating violence in Syria and renewed speculation of an imminent attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities have the potential to bring Hezbollah and Israel closer to war in 2012 than at any other time since the last one ended five years ago.
Yet despite the uncertainties surrounding a volatile and rapidly changing Middle East, as well as the feverish military preparations undertaken by both sides since 2006, neither Hezbollah nor Israel seek another conflict at this time, especially not one that promises to be the most destructive either has ever experienced.
Hezbollah is far stronger military than it was five years ago and appears determined next time to go on the offensive and wage a war without restraints, which could include missile volleys striking Israeli cities and incursions into Israel by land and sea, as hinted at on occasions by Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s secretary-general.
By comparison, Hezbollah fought in a defensive and reactive capacity in 2006, hoping to bring the war to an end as quickly as possible before too much damage was inflicted on its military infrastructure. Despite Hezbollah’s impressive performance against the Israeli military in 2006, it was not a war that the party wished to fight. Hezbollah’s secret and skillfully camouflaged military infrastructure of tunnels, bunkers and firing positions in the southern border district built over the previous six years was compromised and most subsequently abandoned. Furthermore, battlefield tactics and previously unseen weaponry (such as the Noor anti-ship missile used to disable an Israeli naval vessel) were prematurely exposed. Since then, Hezbollah has had to recruit and train fighters, redeploy its forces, build new front lines and develop fresh battle tactics to try and stay one step ahead of the Israelis.
Iran, Hezbollah’s principal backer of military buildup, views the party as a component of deterrence against the possibility of an attack by Israel or the West against its nuclear facilities. Any planner of an attack on Iran has to factor in the likely reaction of Hezbollah. Given the belief (sustained by Nasrallah’s hints) that Hezbollah has acquired missiles capable of striking specific targets in Tel Aviv, Hezbollah’s potential response to an attack on Iran is of no small consequence.
Iran has no wish to see Hezbollah fritter away its immense military resources in another unintended conflict with Israel. Hezbollah also has to respect the interests of its war-weary base of support within the Shiite community. That explains why Lebanon’s southern border is enjoying its longest period of calm since the mid 1960s with barely a shot fired in anger across the Blue Line in more than five years.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah and Israel have been engaged in an intense intelligence and technological war over the past five years, underlining just how complex the 30-year conflict between these two enemies has grown.
In December 2010, Hezbollah’s electronic warfare experts uncovered Israeli surveillance devices on the Barouk and Sannine mountains and two more similar devices in south Lebanon three months later. Earlier this month, Hezbollah uncovered an Israeli tap on a section of its fiber-optic communications network near Srifa. The equipment used appeared to be identical to a tapping device discovered near Houla in 2009. Further suspected Israeli spies have been arrested in the past 12 months. More sensationally, it was revealed in November that Hezbollah’s relentless counter-espionage unit had exposed the CIA’s spying operation against the party.
Then there is the still mysterious disappearance of an Israeli reconnaissance drone in the Ghandourieh area of south Lebanon at the end of October. The radars of the French UNIFIL battalion in Deir Kifa tracked the drone from the moment it crossed the border south of Bint Jbeil.
Its sudden and unexplained descent, “like a falling leaf,” according to one UNIFIL officer, has left the peacekeepers agog with speculation that Hezbollah may have electronically interfered with the communications link between the plane and its ground control base. Nothing was found on the ground and Hezbollah and the Israelis have remained tight-lipped.
There has been no discernible change in the pattern of Israeli drone flights since the incident, but Hezbollah watchers have known for more than a year that the party has been seeking to break into the encrypted video data feeds of Israeli drones or jam and take over their guidance systems. Also, bear in mind that this little reported mystery in the skies over south Lebanon came a month before Tehran announced that it had electronically taken control and safely landed a U.S. RQ-170 Sentinel “stealth” drone flying a reconnaissance mission over eastern Iran.
The revelation that the U.S. has been dispatching reconnaissance drones above Iran as well as several recent mysterious explosions at Iranian facilities has led to heightened speculation of a possible strike against Iran’s nuclear sites, which, in turn, has revived concerns of a renewed war between Israel and Hezbollah.
But the nature of Hezbollah’s deterrence for Iran is highly complex and is dependent on numerous dynamics. If Israel or the U.S. or a combination of the two chooses to overlook the Hezbollah factor and launch an attack on Iran then the policy of deterrence will have failed and a decision will have to be made on how to respond. But it would be simplistic to assume that the moment Iran comes under attack, Tehran would automatically instruct Hezbollah to unleash its guided missiles toward Tel Aviv. A retaliatory attack by Hezbollah would trigger the long-feared war with Israel which would wreak massive destruction upon Lebanon with no guarantees that Hezbollah would emerge victorious and its military apparatus relatively intact.
The survival of Hezbollah’s “resistance priority” primarily rests or falls on its ability to maintain its broad base of popular support. That is why Hezbollah has invested in a massive social welfare operation for the past three decades to expand its grassroots support base and why it expends so much energy on building and maintaining its precarious network of cross-confessional political alliances. Lebanese Shiites support the party because of its martial accomplishments, the welfare services it provides and the sense of empowerment and dignity it has bestowed upon a traditionally disenfranchised sector of Lebanese society. But even the party’s most ardent supporters will not welcome another destructive war with Israel for the sake of defending Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
Hezbollah’s response ultimately will depend on any number of variables, such as the scale of an attack on Iran – is it designed as a limited assault to set back the nuclear program by a few months or a year, or is it a more ambitious operation that could prove an existential threat to the Islamic Republic itself? Would Iran waste Hezbollah’s military resources in a confrontation with Israel if the attack was limited and survivable? Tehran is sensitive toward Hezbollah’s domestic realities and, after all, it has many other retaliatory options beyond exploiting its Lebanese ally.
Upheaval in Syria, however, represents another complicating factor when assessing the prospects of war in 2012.
Despite Syria’s acceptance of an Arab League proposal to end nine months of bloodshed, there is little indication that the confrontation between the regime of President Bashar Assad and the opposition will end any time soon. Indeed, it is showing every sign of worsening and turning ineluctably into an armed confrontation.
The collapse of the Assad regime would represent a serious blow for Iran and Hezbollah, depriving the former of a key ally of three decades standing and the latter of crucial strategic depth and a conduit for weapons supply. For now, the Assad regime can probably persevere given the relative weakness of the armed opposition and the evident reluctance of the international community to intervene militarily in Syria.
Iran and Hezbollah have little influence in shaping developments in Syria and can only watch and hope that the Assad regime can ultimately prevail. But if it becomes apparent that Syria’s Baathist state is heading toward collapse, it would run contrary to the pragmatic nature of Iran and Hezbollah to sacrifice their broader strategic interests in a quixotic attempt (such as attacking Israel) to prop up a clearly doomed regime. Instead, Iran will be open to exploring a relationship with whatever post-Assad administration emerges, while Hezbollah will remain for the time being the paramount political and military power in Lebanon.
However, there are at least two developments related to Syria that could lead to another war between Hezbollah and Israel. The first is if the Assad regime, recognizing that the end is nigh, opts for the “Samson option” of launching an attack on Israel, possibly firing missiles fitted with chemical warheads. Israel’s retaliation will be swift and merciless and could lead to an expanded conflict that Hezbollah may be unable to avoid.
The second potential trigger for war is if Israel decides that the collapse of the Assad regime presents a window of opportunity to launch a unilateral attack on Hezbollah. The goal would be to degrade and cripple Hezbollah’s military assets in the knowledge that, with the Assad regime gone, the party will face far greater difficulty in rebuilding its arsenal and, thus, its utility as a deterrent for Iran will have been eroded. Still, it would take a very bold Israeli prime minister to launch such a war, one which would provoke international censure, offer no guarantees of success and also probably prove to be the most devastating in terms of loss of life and material damage that Israel has experienced since 1948
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