WarSclerotic

Escalation in southern Israel.

Escalation in southern Israel: Long-range rocket barrages were launched by the PIJ, resulting in one Israeli dead, four wounded and several dozen treated for shock

Left: House in Ashqelon damaged by rocket fire (Photo by Edi Israel, reprinted courtesy of NRG). Right: Car in Ashdod damaged by rocket fire (Photo by Amir Meiri, reprinted courtesy of NRG).

Overview

1. Between October 29 and 30 there was a new round of escalation in southern Israel, during which more than 40 rockets, most of them long-range Grad rockets, and mortar shells fell in Israeli territory. They were fired by the PIJ in response to the killing of the members of a terrorist cell (including high-ranking operatives) by an Israeli Air Force attack on October 29. On October 26 the PIJ, which remained inactive during the Gilad Shalit exchange deal, fired a rocket at the Beer Tuvia region in the western Negev, about 40 kilometers (25 miles) from the Gaza Strip.

2. The rockets fell in southern Israeli cities and villages at a distance of up to 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) from the Gaza Strip (including the cities of Ashdod and Beersheba). The rocket fire killed one Israeli civilian, a Ashqelon resident, and wounded four. Several dozen civilians were treated for shock and there was extensive property damage. On the morning of October 30 a ceasefire, which was not honored by the PIJ, was brokered by Egypt.²

3. Hamas did not participate in the latest round of escalation, which was led by the PIJ. Ten PIJ terrorist operatives were reportedly killed, among them Ahmed al-Sheikh Khalil, commander of the engineering and manufacturing units. The PIJ is the second largest terrorist organization in the Gaza Strip, maintains close relations with Iran, and in the past did not hesitate to challenge Hamas. The massive support provided by Iran made it possible for the PIJ to build military capabilities, turning it into a significant military threat, especially with regard to firing rockets deep into Israeli territory, including the central region of the country.³

4. It was the first time since August 2011 (the round of escalation following the terrorist attack north of Eilat⁴) that massive barrages of long-range rockets targeted the large cities in Israel’s south. Until three weeks ago there was sporadic rocket fire, carried out primarily by the rogue terrorist organizations. During the past three weeks no rockets were fired, a quiet also respected by the PIJ, due to the release of Palestinian terrorists from Israeli jails in exchange for abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit and Hamas’ strong interest in preserving calm at the time.

The Unfolding of the Events

5. On the night of Wednesday, October 26, a Grad rocket landed in an open area between Ashdod and Gedera, a range of about 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) from the Gaza Strip. There were no casualties and no damage was done. Sirens were heard in many cities, including Rehovot, Yavneh, Nes Tziona and Ashdod (IDF Spokesman, October 26, 2011). No organization claimed responsibility for the rocket fire. The Israeli media reported that the PIJ fired the rocket.

6. In the early afternoon of October 29, in a combined IDF-Israel Security Agency operation, Israeli aircraft attacked a squad of Jerusalem Brigades (the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing) operatives, in the southern Gaza Strip near Rafah. They used technology similar to that used by the squad which fired the rocket at the Beer Tuvia region on October 26 (IDF Spokesman, October 29, 2011).

7. A Jerusalem Brigades spokesman reported that one of the five operatives killed in the attack was Ahmed Al-Sheikh Khalil (aka Abu Khader), commander of the organizations’ engineering and manufacturing units. Muhammed ‘Ashour, a high-ranking member of the engineering unit, was also killed (Jerusalem Brigades website, October 29, 2011). In response, that afternoon the PIJ began attacking southern Israel with long-range rockets. Between October 29 and 30 more than 40 rockets hit Ashdod, Ashqelon and Beersheba, and smaller population centers such as Gan Yavneh and the towns and villages in the western Negev.

8. The rocket fire killed one Israeli civilian, a resident of Ashqelon, and four suffered from minor and serious injuries. Several dozen civilians were treated for shock, and there was extensive property damage.

Five rockets fired simultaneously from a pickup truck, which according to a PIJ
spokesman was the first time the technology was used to attack Israel
(Jerusalem Brigades website, October 29, 2011)

9. Among the rocket hits were the following:

1) The first rockets hit Gan Yavneh and Ashdod (approximately 40 kilometers from the Gaza Strip). A Gan Yavneh resident was seriously wounded by shrapnel and was evacuated to a hospital. A number of buildings were damaged.

2) One of the rockets which hit Ashdod fell on a school. It landed on a classroom which is used for religious services on Friday. Fortunately was empty at the time and no one was hurt.

3) A rocket which fell on Ashdod later hit a parking lot between two residential buildings. Several vehicles were destroyed and the adjacent buildings were damaged.

The site of one of the rocket hits in Ashdod
(Photo by Amir Meiri, reprinted courtesy of NRG).

4) An hour later two rockets fell in open areas west of Beersheba. A number of rockets also fell in nearby population centers. There were no casualties.

5) At around 2000 hours two rockets fell in the city of Ashqelon. Two civilians, who were in their cars at the time, were seriously wounded by shrapnel. One of them, a 59 year-old man, Ashqelon resident, married and father of five, later died in the hospital.

The car in which the man from Ashqelon was killed
(Photo by Edi Israel, reprinted courtesy of NRG).

Left: A rocket hit in Ashqelon. Right: Security personnel near the site of one of
the rocket hits in Ashqelon (Photos by Edi Israel, reprinted courtesy of NRG).

10. Despite media reports of an Egyptian-brokered cease fire, rocket fire into Israeli territory continued into October 30. Two rockets fell in Beersheba in the morning. One rocket fell in an open area north of Ashqelon. Rockets also east of Beersheba near the Bedouin city of Rahat (east of Beersheba), as well as Ashdod and other population centers. Most of the rockets fell in open areas. Two were intercepted by the Iron Dome air defense system. Mortar shells were also fired from the Gaza Strip into the western Negev and the Erez crossing. There were no casualties and no damage was done.

IDF Responses

11. During the day and evening of October 29, Israeli aircraft attacked several terrorist targets, among them the following:

1) On the evening of October 29, a number of terrorist squads preparing to launch rockets into Israel were attacked, as well as two armed launching tripods in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, October 29, 2011).

2) On the night of October 29, six terrorist targets in the Gaza Strip were attacked, including tunnels and rocket launching positions. Other terrorist targets were attacked in the southern Gaza Strip (IDF Spokesman, October 30, 2011).

12. The attacks killed ten PIJ terrorist operatives (IDF Spokesman, October 30, 2011). The Palestinian media reported nine deaths.

13. Following the massive barrage of rockets, on October 30 the Home Front Command decided no schools would be open within a range of 40-47 kilometers (25-29 miles) from the Gaza Strip. In towns and villages around the Gaza Strip within a range of 7 kilometers (almost 4 1/2 miles), classes would be held as usual but only in specially fortified structures (IDF Spokesman, October 29, 2011).

Egyptian-Brokered Ceasefire

14. The media reported that the Egyptians made attempts to defuse the situation. According to official Egyptian sources, it was agreed that a ceasefire would go into effect at 0300 hours, October 30 (Reuters, October 30, 2011). In effect, rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory continued after 0300 hours. Quiet returned to the western Negev in the middle of the morning, but the rocket fire was renewed during the day.

15. Daud Shihab, PIJ spokesman, said that the organization favorably regarded the Egyptian efforts to achieve a ceasefire, but added that the PIJ reserved the right to respond to any future escalation (Agence France-Presse, October 30, 2011). The website of the Jerusalem Brigades, the PIJ’s military-terrorist wing, posted a notice denying that the organization had agreed to stop its rocket fire. On the other hand, a high-ranking figure told the Agence France-Presse that the PIJ would honor a lull in the fighting beginning at 0600 hours, as long as Israel did.

Israeli Appeal to the UN

16. Ron Prosor, Israel’s ambassador to the UN, sent a communiqué to the UN Secretary General and the President of the Security Council, in which he said that “Israel expects the Security Council, the Secretary General and the international community to condemn all of these attacks immediately and unequivocally.” He said that “Israel holds the Hamas terrorist organization fully responsible for all attacks emanating from Gaza” and that “The details of this attack highlight a disturbing trend. The terrorist rockets in Gaza are traveling further – and their warheads are getting larger. This is a direct result of the continuous smuggling of advanced weapons from Iran and others into the Gaza Strip“⁵ (ITIC emphasis).

PIJ Responses

17. Immediately after the Israeli Air Force attack which killed five of their operatives, high-ranking PIJ figures in the Gaza Strip and beyond threatened severe repercussions: Abu Ahmed, Jerusalem Brigades spokesman, said that the attack would not remain “unpunished” and that the organization would carry out a “worthy response” deep inside Israel (The PIJ’s Paltoday website, October 29, 2011). Ziyyad Nakhleh, deputy secretary general, said that Israel could expect a response deep within its territory within “the next few hours” (BBC, October 29, 2011).

18. In effect, the PIJ fired dozens of rockets and publicly claimed responsibility for them (Jerusalem Brigades website, October 29, 2011). The organization claimed responsibility for firing 18 Grad rockets, four 107mm rockets, six independently manufactured Al-Qassam rockets and 12 mortar shells (Jerusalem Brigades website, October 30, 2011). The organization also claimed that for the first time it had used a pickup truck to fire five rockets simultaneously (Jerusalem Brigades website, October 29, 2011).

Hamas Response

19. Hamas did not participate in the current round of escalation. High-ranking members of the movement blamed Israel for the escalation:

1) Abu Obeida, spokesman for the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas’ military-terrorist wing, said that “the Zionist enemy” would bear the responsibility for the “crime” it committed in Rafah. He said Israel had done so to stop the joy felt by the Palestinian people at the release of the prisoners. He added that the various organizations were holding consultation about how to respond (Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades website, October 29, 2011).

2) Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas spokesman, said that the objective of the escalation was to break the spirit of the Palestinian people, and that Israel was fully responsible for it (Hamas’ Palestine-info website, October 29, 2011).

¹ Initial update as of the afternoon of October 30, 2011.

² During the afternoon hours, east of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip, the Israeli Air Force prevented a squad of operatives belonging to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine from launching a rocket (Ynet, October 30, 2011). Rocket fire continued throughout the day.

³ For further information see the March 17, 2011 bulletin “Terrorism from the Gaza Strip since Operation Cast Lead Data, Type and Trends ” at http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/ipc_e169.pdf

⁴ During which 149 rockets fell in Israeli territory of the 200 which were fired from the Gaza Strip.

⁵ http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israel+and+the+UN/Issues/Letter_UNSC_escalation_rocket_fire_Gaza_27-Oct-2011.htm

China’s Iranian Gambit – By Michael Singh and Jacqueline Newmyer Deal | Foreign Policy.

Beijing is using the Islamic Republic to foil American interests in the Middle East. It’s time we wised up to this dangerous game.

BY MICHAEL SINGH, JACQUELINE NEWMYER DEAL | OCTOBER 31, 2011

The elections in Tunisia and the dramatic demise of former Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi have pushed the allegations of an Iran-sponsored plot to assassinate the Saudi envoy to Washington on U.S. soil from the headlines. But countering Iran’s efforts to develop a nuclear weapon and exploit the tumult in the Arab world for its own gain is vital to securing U.S. interests in a rapidly changing Middle East, and remains an urgent priority of U.S. diplomacy around the world.

Inevitably, efforts to isolate Iran will refocus Washington and Europe’s attention on Beijing. Past attempts to persuade China to support new measures against Tehran — or even robust enforcement of existing ones — have met with little success, in large part due to a misunderstanding of Chinese motivations. Whereas Washington tends to see Beijing as torn between conflicting priorities, Chinese strategists see the Islamic Republic as a potential partner in their strategic rivalry with the United States. Unless Beijing can be convinced that the costs of obstructing U.S. efforts on Iran outweigh the benefits of doing so, the Chinese will be of little help. Shifting China’s calculus in this manner ultimately requires that the United States develop a credible military option to neutralize Iran’s nuclear-weapons aims.

For three decades, U.S. diplomats have failed to secure real Chinese cooperation in their efforts to prevent Iran from going nuclear. Although Beijing has formally supported U.N. Security Council sanctions resolutions against Iran since 2005, it has at the same time actively undermined those measures by watering them down in council deliberations and then implementing them only weakly and unevenly. According to the Washington Post, a senior U.S. official handed over to his Chinese counterparts in October 2010 a “significant list” of Chinese firms thought to be aiding Iranian proliferation in violation of U.N. sanctions.

The effects are pernicious. Increasing Chinese trade with Iran — projected to reach $40 billion in 2011, up from $30 billion last year, according to the Chinese ambassador to Iran — eases the pressure on Tehran and provides the Iranian regime with revenue, expertise, and other resources. It also leads to howls of protest by European and Asian firms that have curtailed their business with Iran only to see it backfilled by Chinese competitors.

Chinese trade with Iran is driven in large part by Beijing’s growing need for energy imports, and its desire to secure them by participating in oil and gas exploration, development, and other “upstream” activities of its overseas energy suppliers. Indeed, from a security perspective, Iran’s geographic position is unique — it is the only Gulf supplier that China can reach by both pipelines and sea routes. This diversification of supply lines helps reassure those in Beijing who most fear a foreign interdiction campaign or blockade that would cut China off from its energy supplies.

But the Chinese-Iranian love affair is not all about oil and gas. China has also provided Iran with substantial strategic and military assistance, through official and non-official channels. China provided critical support to the development of Iran’s nuclear program during the 1980s and 1990s and emerged in the 1980s as one of Iran’s principal arms suppliers, with transfers including cruise missile and ballistic-missile capabilities. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the value of these transfers reached more than $3.6 billion during those decades.

This support has continued and, in certain areas, seems to have expanded. For instance, news reports that arms from Tehran have found their way into the hands of militants in Iraq and Afghanistan mention not only Chinese-made anti-ship cruise missiles, but also sniper rifles, armor-piercing rounds, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-aircraft missiles and guns, mines, and other components for explosive devices. In a February op-ed, retired Adm. James Lyons, a former head of U.S. Pacific Fleet, wrote of the probable transfer from China to Iran of passive radar technology that could contribute to Iran’s recently announced anti-ship ballistic-missile program. According to Iranian media outlets, the same week as Admiral Lyons’s op-ed appeared, Maj. Gen. Wang Pufeng of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences was meeting with Iran’s defense attaché in Beijing to express China’s desire for expanded military ties.

Perhaps most alarming are the continuing allegations of Chinese support for Iran’s nuclear program. Earlier this year, China moved to block the release of a U.N. report that described suspected Chinese involvement in the transfer to Iran of aluminum powder used as a solid propellant for nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Last week, China joined Russia in pressing the IAEA not to release damning information on Iranian military nuclear research. And last year, media sources covered the sale by Chinese firms of high-quality carbon fibers that would help Iran build better centrifuges.

China’s reluctance to pressure Iran is no secret in Washington. The conventional wisdom holds that Chinese policy is the result of a dilemma — Beijing, so the logic goes, is caught in a conflict between its interest in secure energy supplies and its interest in good relations with the United States and global nonproliferation. Writing in English-language outlets, Chinese foreign-policy intellectuals such as Wang Jisi have echoed this line. From the perspective of China’s Communist Party leadership, on which all Chinese scholars depend for their travel visas and permission to publish, it makes good sense to spread this notion in the hopes of eliciting more active American attempts at diplomatic persuasion or economic incentives.

This strategy has to some extent succeeded, as prescriptions for solving this “dilemma” rely heavily on carrots such as granting China official prestigious visits and greater inclusion in diplomatic deliberations. For example, Erica Downs and Suzanne Maloney argued recently in Foreign Affairs that the United States should “elevat[e] the bilateral diplomatic dialogue” and “ensure clear communication” with Beijing about sanctions.

In reality, however, such efforts by Washington appear to yield little. For years, a parade of high-level U.S. envoys — from State Department nonproliferation advisor Bob Einhorn to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to President Barack Obama himself — have trekked to Beijing on Iran-related missions, only to come up short. The truth is that it is China, not the United States, that has been reluctant to engage on Iran — Beijing has frequently declined to send high-level envoys to meetings of the so-called “P5+1” powers, choosing instead to send its nearest ambassador, or be absent entirely. China hardly seems eager for more dialogue on Iran.

The image of Beijing as a “reluctant partner” on Iran reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of China’s motivations. If China truly faced the dilemma described above, its nuclear and strategic assistance to Iran would make little sense. Rather than using its clout as one of Iran’s largest energy customers and vendors-of-last-resort to secure Iranian compliance with U.N. Security Council and nonproliferation norms, Beijing appears to fuel the very behavior that is most provocative to the United States and its allies — behavior that could destabilize the Middle East. Furthermore, other U.S. allies — Japan and South Korea, for example — have continued to obtain sizeable energy supplies from Iran while actively supporting the international sanctions regime.

The reality is that China — quite unlike Japan and South Korea — considers the United States its chief rival for influence in the Middle East and beyond. Viewed through this lens, Beijing’s policies toward Iran and the United States are not in conflict, as many analysts suggest, but are entirely compatible. The United States may see China as a key partner in isolating Iran, but China sees Iran as a potential partner in countering U.S. power.

China’s strategic thinking is laid out clearly in Chinese-language publications aimed at Beijing’s political and military elites. This literature differs significantly in tone and content from those produced for foreign consumption. For example, defense analyst Maj. Gen. Zhang Shiping, who is often described in the Chinese press as a “researcher” within China’s Academy of Military Sciences, argued in China’s Sea Power, an important 1998 book that was re-published in 2009 for the 60th anniversary of the Chinese navy, that Iran was a potentially desirable location for a Chinese military base in the Middle East.

Zhang’s sentiment has been echoed by other high-ranking Chinese military officers — including Dai Xu, an outspoken Chinese Air Force colonel and Yin Zhuo, a Chinese rear admiral — in discussions of how China can counter the perceived threat posed by democratic rivals like India and the United States and protect its interests in the face of American power projection in the Gulf and across the Pacific.

From this perspective, securing Chinese cooperation with U.S. efforts to pressure Iran is hardly the matter of a few good meetings. The cultivation of Iran’s security establishment and top-level leadership provides China with a strategically placed, regionally powerful client that can frustrate U.S. aims in a region where China seeks greater influence. For China, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons may be a negative development, but it is preferable to a reorientation toward the West.

The U.S. Treasury Department’s penalties imposed on Chinese sanctions-defying entities have sought to force Chinese firms to choose between their U.S. business and their relatively smaller trade with Iran. However, this approach has not worked because, ironically, the United States, unlike China with America, truly does face a conflict between its Iran and China policies.

Beijing has good reason to doubt that the Obama administration would ever seriously jeopardize the U.S.-Chinese economic relationship, which has grown larger despite deep disagreements over not just Iran but also Taiwan, North Korea, the East and South China Seas, Tibet, and human rights. The Obama administration’s latest sanctions on foreign entities involved in the Iranian energy sector has likewise given Chinese firms a pass.

U.S. officials, most recently Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, have asserted that sanctions have led China to suspend new energy investments in Iran. This data point does not tell the full story, however: Existing China-Iran projects continue apace, and Chinese imports of oil from Iran increased 40 percent in January to August of 2011 compared with the same period the previous year. It seems that Beijing has been able to write off any diplomatic tensions caused by its business in Iran as an inevitable — and to date, largely low-cost — feature of the U.S.-China rivalry.

Although diplomatic cajoling won’t make much headway, Washington does have ways to induce Beijing to reassess its approach to Iran. Exercising these options, however, requires taking a step that the Obama administration has so far avoided: establishing a credible military threat to Iran. CCP strategists who judge Chinese interests as being well-served by current U.S.-Iran tensions would not make the same calculation in light of a credible U.S. threat to disarm the Iranian regime. Such a scenario would threaten China’s oil supplies and increase its energy costs, and could threaten Iran’s China-friendly regime. The United States need not dismiss or downplay the very real risks that would accompany conflict with Iran, but it must persuade Beijing and Tehran alike that this option is the alternative to full compliance with international sanctions.

Making this threat credible would not be a trivial feat, especially in the context of U.S. defense budget cuts and growing Iranian military preparedness. Iran’s nuclear program is growing increasingly advanced as well as difficult to strike — as demonstrated by the revelation  in 2009 of a new enrichment facility under development underneath a mountain near Qom. On the other hand, Iran’s currently limited retaliatory options will only improve — especially given the precision strike capabilities that Iran has been developing — with Chinese assistance. Chinese strategists are careful students of U.S. military capabilities and movements, and convincing them of the credibility of the U.S. military option will be less costly now than it will be in the future.

The good news is that China’s position can be adjusted. There is no structural bond guaranteeing Beijing’s support for Tehran. The key to winning this geopolitical chess match is to recognize that China’s devotion to its own interests will trump any friendship with Iran. Only by presenting a challenge to those interests is Washington likely to divert Beijing from its current approach, which has done much to increase China’s access to energy supplies, boost its influence in a strategic region, and frustrate American ambitions in the Middle East.

Israel warns West: Window of opportunity to thwart Iran nuclear program is closing – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Envoys renew diplomatic push to counter Tehran’s nuclear ambitions in Foreign Ministry lobbying drive that began in mid-September.

By Barak Ravid

Israeli ambassadors in Western countries have been instructed to inform high-ranking politicians that the window of opportunity for imposing effective sanctions on Iran is closing, as part of a renewed diplomatic offensive aimed at using new sanctions to stop Tehran from developing a nuclear bomb.

The Foreign Ministry campaign, which began in mid-September, seeks to convince the United States, European Union member states and other Western countries to impose the sanctions immediately because Iran is continuing to develop its nuclear program.

	Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by security guards and advisers, arriving at a meeting of his Likud faction in the Knesset, October 31, 2011.
	Photo by: Tomer Appelbaum

What do you think of this diplomatic campaign? Visit Haaretz.com on Facebook and share your views.

“The significant progress that has taken place on all the components of the Iranian nuclear program should be emphasized, especially uranium enrichment,” said a classified cable sent to Israeli ambassadors in several dozen countries. “The Iranian program is military, and in light of International Atomic Energy Agency reports, there is an increased fear that the Iranians are developing a nuclear warhead for ballistic missiles.”

The ambassadors were asked to tell the equivalent of the foreign ministries and prime minister’s offices in the countries where they are serving that there isn’t much time left to stop the nuclear program through diplomatic means.

The sanctions campaign comes ahead of the planned November 8 release of an IAEA report, which is expected to reveal new details about the scope of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA is reportedly preparing to bring proof that Iran is attempting to build a nuclear bomb.

Israel and the U.S. are planning to use the report in a worldwide campaign to push for isolating Iran. Sanctions suggested by Israeli representatives in recent talks with the U.S., France, Britain and Germany include banning contact with Iran’s central bank and banning the purchase of Iranian crude oil. Israeli officials also suggested imposing additional sanctions on Iranian airlines and ships.

Israeli officials noticed last month that international interest in stopping Iran was flagging, said a senior Foreign Ministry official. “International and Israeli attention was focused on the Arab Spring, on flotillas to Gaza and on the Palestinian move in the UN,” he said.

Foreign Ministry officials were concerned that the reduced attention Iran was receiving made its pursuit of a nuclear program seem less urgent.

“There’s a feeling that even though the sanctions are harming Iran, the technological timetable is faster than the diplomatic timetable,” said another Foreign Ministry official. “Now is the time to intensify the steps against Iran. The pressure influences Iran, and the present circumstances require us to increase that pressure. The Iranians are preparing a technological infrastructure that will enable them to have a breakthrough as they head for nuclear weapons within a short time span. If Iran passes this technological threshold, the ramifications will be severe – especially in light of the weakening of regional stability following the Arab Spring.”

A few days ago, the ambassadors received another cable, directing them to highlight the alleged Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. “You should emphasize that this incident indicates the need to isolate Iran,” the cable said.

The Israeli ambassadors were also informed that Iran is boosting arms smuggling to Syria, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah.

According to Israeli intelligence information, Iran has been carrying out low-level uranium enrichment at a stable pace, despite the existing sanctions. Iranian officials have been outspoken about their interest in tripling the pace of producing uranium enriched to 20 percent, moving the centrifuges from a non-reinforced facility in the central Iranian city of Natanz to an underground enrichment facility in Qom. At the same time, Iran is continuing to build a heavy water reactor in Arak, which would enable them to produce the plutonium needed for a nuclear bomb.

One of the Foreign Ministry officials said Israel wants Western countries to impose the sanctions on their own because domestic politics and leadership changeovers in Russia and China in 2012, along with the U.S. and French presidential elections, will make it impossible to secure another UN Security Council resolution approving sanctions.

Although Israel’s latest push for sanctions is new, diplomatic efforts to thwart the Iranian nuclear program are ongoing, one of the Foreign Ministry officials said. An interministerial task force headed by Yaakov Amidror, the national security adviser, meets every few weeks to coordinate the diplomatic efforts. Other members of the task force include representatives of the foreign and defense ministries, the IDF and the Mossad.