WarSclerotic

Iran’s Supreme Leader Warns Ahmadinejad’s Post Could Be Removed | Fox News.

TEHRAN, Iran –  In the ongoing political skirmishes among Iran’s leadership, it was the equivalent of bringing out the heavy ammunition: The country’s most powerful figure warning that the post of elected president could someday be scrapped.

Although no overhauls appear on the immediate horizon after Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s comment — he spoke only vaguely about possibilities in the “distant future” — the mere mention of eliminating Iran’s highest elected office shows the severity and scope of the power struggle between Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

For months, the ruling theocracy has been piling pressure on Ahmadinejad and arresting his allies for attempts to challenge the near-absolute authority of the cleric-ruled system that has controlled Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The blunt words by Khamenei on Sunday suggest a twofold agenda: Further tightening the lid on Ahmadinejad and showing others in the wings that Iran’s rulers are ready to take drastic measures to protect what’s theirs.

“There is bad blood,” said Mehrzad Boroujerdi, who follows Iranian affairs at Syracuse University. “Khamenei is trying to make it very clear that the system can only handle so much discord and that he holds the stronger cards.”

It also marks one of the first clear hints of the ruling clerics’ hardball strategies for parliamentary elections in March. Khamenei and his allies are expected to use their many tools, including the ability to vet and block candidates, to try to steamroll Ahmadinejad’s backers and push the president — once Khamenei’s protege — farther into the political margins.

The ruling power structure in Iran, which includes not only hard-line clerics but also the hugely influential Revolutionary Guard, appears increasingly eager to snuff out the internal bickering. It’s seen as an unwelcome distraction as the country confronts critical issues such as whether to restart nuclear negotiations with the West, complaints about its human rights record and U.S. allegations that a special unit of the Guard was linked to a plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington.

“This is not a time when Iran wants anything that will rock the boat,” said Boroujerdi.

But it’s unlikely that the political friction will cool off soon.

Hardliners still want more punishment against Ahmadinejad for actions viewed as political hubris — including a startling 10-day boycott of Cabinet meetings this spring to protest Khamenei’s choice for intelligence minister.

Dozens of Ahmadinejad’s supporters have been arrested in the backlash. So far, the crackdown has spared Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff — and in-law relation — Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, who has been denounced as the head of a “deviant current” that is perceived as questioning the system of clerical rule. Some have even claimed Mashaei employed black magic “spells” to fog Ahmadinejad’s mind.

In June, Ahmadinejad railed against his opponents — and Khamenei by extension — for launching a “politically motivated” campaign and vowed to stand by Mashaei, whose daughter is married to the president’s son.

There is nothing at the moment to suggest Khamenei would attempt to drop the presidency in favor of a prime minister picked by parliament — which would require a change of Iran’s constitution.

But it could reflect the frustrations among the ruling clerics after clashing with presidents for more than a decade: First the reformist efforts of Mohammad Khatami from 1997-2005 and then the growing ambitions of Ahmadinejad, who helped crush the reform movement but has also tried to carve out his own power base at the expense of the supreme leader. Ahmadinejad finishes his second and final term in June 2013.

Under Iran’s Islamic republic system, the president and parliament are elected. But the system is overseen by the unelected clerical hierarchy, which controls council that vet legislation and candidates for office, is in charge of the powerful judiciary and is tightly linked to the Revolutionary Guard.

“The president is elected by direct vote of the people, which is a good and effective method,” Khamenei told a gathering in the western city of Kermanshah. “But if someday, probably in the distant future, it is felt that a parliamentary system is better … there will be no problem to change the current structure.”

In theory, cutting out the elected president post would streamline the ruling clerics’ control by allowing them to weed out all but allied candidates for parliament. The lawmakers, in turn, would then presumably pick a non-confrontational prime minister.

In fact, Iran has been there before and it did not work out so smoothly.

After the Islamic Revolution, Iran’s system included a prime minister as head of government and a president — which was then seen as mostly a ceremonial position.

But the prime minister’s post was dropped in 1989 by the late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after internal bickering much like today. At that time, it was Khamenei in the presidential role quarreling over government policies with then Prime Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi — now Iran’s main opposition leader after losing to Ahmadinejad in 2009 in disputed elections that touched off Iran’s worst domestic unrest in decades.

Khamenei made no mention in his speech about the unraveling of the former system. Instead, he described the option of going back as possibly “refreshing” the political order.

“It means changing policies …. which can prevent stagnation,” he said.

Khamenei also raised no inherent objections to forming political parties in Iran, which already has dozens of factions and blocs that effectively serve as parties. His comment, however, could be a nod toward more aggressive party-style campaigning in the upcoming parliamentary races.

They include a pro-Khamenei group known as the Resistance Front that was formed over the summer. Its founder, Ruhollah Hosseinian, said its goal was to “declare war” of anyone not fully backing the supreme leader — an obvious reference to Ahmadinejad and his supporters.

“The supreme leader has fired a clear warning shot,” said William O. Beeman, a University of Minnesota professor who has written on Iranian affairs. “He is telling anyone trying to challenge the system, `Look, we are tired of this and we are willing to turn the clock back if needed.”‘

Rudaw in English….The Happening: Latest News and Multimedia about Kurdistan, Iraq and the World – Decades of Impunity Explains Iran’s Terror Plot.

Some argue that Iran’s Quds Force could not be behind the failed plan to kill the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. because they believe that the Quds Force is to skillful to fail in such an embarrassing way. The same group of people also claims that Iran has no real strategic interest in killing the Saudi ambassador in the US.

The reality is that Iran’s Quds Force is indeed well versed in killing its foes, but its skillfulness is greatly exaggerated. One of the reasons that Iran has been able to carry out assassinations and a wide range of terrorist operations all around the world – mostly through proxies – is because they have been able to do this with impunity.

During the 1980s and 90s, Iran was killing opposition figures, sometimes in a very clumsy way, all around the world and especially in Europe with impunity. We know now how different governments in Europe arrested Iranian agents involved in some of the attacks, only to release them later (in some cases even escorting the killers to airports) due to economic interests in Iran or fear of further terrorist attacks by Tehran. This brought about the belief in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard that they could continue to carry out these attacks without any repercussions.

The same line of thought is applicable to Iran’s proxy wars against Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and Israel. Iran, like any other state with expansionist objectives, will pursue its interest through means that it finds optimal. In the case of Iran, relying on proxies and terrorism has paid off. This is in major part because Iran has not been punished for using terrorism.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, Iran has done everything in its power to bring down the current regime. In 1987 Iran sent thousands Revolutionary Guard soldiers as “pilgrims” to the holy city of Mecca in order to stage violent protests. What many at the time thought were spontaneous clashes between Shi’a pilgrims and the Saudi authorities were in fact planned by the Revolutionary Guard.

In 1996, a terrorist group supported by Iran bombed the Khobar Towers, killing 19 U.S. servicemen and wounding 372. The Clinton administration and the Saudi government did not take any action against Iran. Therefore, when Iran has targeted Saudi and U.S. interests, American and Saudi inaction has emboldened Iran to continue using terrorism as an effective to further its interests.

The same goes for Israel. Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and other extremist organizations, and its attacks on different Jewish communities around the world (for example the Buenos Aires bombing of a Jewish center), have gone unpunished.

The United States has not taken any serious actions against Iran, in spite of several terrorist attacks against U.S. interests perpetuated by the clerical regime in Tehran and its proxies. It all began with the U.S. embassy hostage taking in Tehran after the revolution in 1979 and has continued with Iran killing American soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq most recently.

To clarify, Iran does not fear sanctions, attacks on its proxies (they can always find new ones), or even threats of “isolation”. Iran only fears regime change. Hence, everything else is interpreted as acceptable losses by the regime in Tehran. The only time Iran was willing to compromise with the United States was following the toppling of the Baath regime in Iraq. According to a secret proposal, Iran would end its support for terrorism, ends enrichment of uranium, and stop undermining the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. In other words, only in the face of the Bush administration’s campaign of regime change was Iran willing to accommodate U.S. demands.

Thus, as to the argument that the Quds Force is to skillful to carry out such an amateurish operation, it might seem strange now but what if the Mexican drug cartel member was not an FBI informer, well then the attack might have been successful! Similarly, arguments about the arrested Iranian-American used cars-salesman and how he does not fit the profile of someone intelligent enough or capable of carrying out such an elaborate plan is just ridiculous in light of existing knowledge about individuals used by Iran in the past to carry out assassinations. One example is Iranian agent Kazem Darabi who was one of those involved in the assassination of the Kurdish leader Dr. Sadeq Sharafkandi in Berlin 1992. Darabi worked as a grocer in Berlin and was described by many that knew him as a man of limited intelligence.

Anyone with any insight in covert military and intelligence operations know that with sufficient resources and determination many intelligence agencies in the world could probably assassinate anyone on this planet. What makes Iran’s Quds Force different is that they will continue to try to carry out outlandish operations like the one on the Saudi ambassador because they do not believe that they will face any real repercussions.