WarSclerotic

via A Special Place in Hell-Israel News – Haaretz Israeli News source..

Israel has freed 13,509 prisoners in order to win the release of a total of 16 soldiers. An average of well over 800 for each one. But this is the price.

By Bradley Burston

Keeping a promise can entail a terrible choice. Which is why Israelis’ outpouring of support for a prisoner exchange for Gilad Shalit deserves profound admiration, even wonder.

In driving their leaders to accept the deal, in supporting Benjamin Netanyahu for having assented to it, Israelis by the millions are gambling their very lives, and those of their loved ones. And all just to keep a promise.

Netanyahu Shalit

Aviva and Noam Shalit with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his wife, Sara.

Photo by: Avi Ohayon

On the face of it, the exchange is preposterous, in some ways, borderline suicidal. On the face of it, agreeing with Hamas to the release of more than a thousand Palestinian prisoners, many of them to this day proud of having committed heinous murders of innocent people in premeditated acts of terrorism, makes little sense.

Israelis know that the exchange will bolster the recently flagging popularity of Hamas, in particular its more militant figures. It could seriously undermine Palestinian moderates, foster a return of large-scale terrorism, and deal a telling blow to the Palestinian Authority, in the process eroding the security of Israelis on both sides of the Green Line.

The deal to bring Gilad Shalit back to his family is painful to Israelis bereaved by terror. It is, by any measure, chillingly dangerous.

And it was the right thing to do.

The deal is a remnant of an Israel which is fast disappearing. It is a remnant of a particular brand of quiet, exceptional courage. It is an expression of a national character that goes generally ignored in a media environment which prizes the extreme over the honorable. It is evidence of a people true to values which time and sectarian agendas may appear to have diluted and erased.

The deal for Gilad Shalit is a remnant of a promised land that – to those everyday people who donate their very youth, their very lives, in order to defend it – still believes it important to keep its promises.

The first of those promises is a simple one. When they draft you and process you and inoculate you and arm you and begin to use you, they spell it out, to you and your family both: If you are lost on the field of battle, we will get you back. Whatever it takes.

Whatever it takes. Even if it takes much too much.

The list of the terrorists being released is unendurable. The numbers are beyond understanding. Until you consider that this is how it’s always been.

In Israel’s nine prisoner exchanges with Arab enemies, dating back to the first, 54 years ago, Israel has freed 13,509 prisoners in order to win the release of a total of 16 soldiers. An average of well over 800 for each one. This is the price.

It is said that the people on the list for the current deal have been directly responsible for the deaths of 599 Israelis. Had Israelis waited longer for a deal, however, Gilad Shalit might well have made it 600.

On Tuesday morning, Israelis by the millions, heard a sentence that allowed them, at long last, to begin to breathe again: Gilad Shalit is no longer in Hamas hands.

There is something still extraordinary about the core of these people, the Israelis. In the summer, when hundreds of thousands marched in the streets for social justice, they roared their endorsement of a deal such as this to free Gilad Shalit.

In perhaps the most exceptional expressions of support, even some of those most personally and deeply wounded by the terrorists to be freed, have come out in support.

“From the standpoint of a mother, I’m in favor of the price that’s been paid in order to bring Gilad Shalit home,” Sarit Golumbek, who lost her son Zvi 10 years ago in the bombing of the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem, told Yedioth Ahronoth last week. “My heart is with the Shalit family.”

There is no understanding what Sarit Golumbek has been through. There is no understanding what Israelis as a people have just done, in keeping that kind of promise, displaying this depth of compassion, taking this kind of risk, to bring home one of their own. Someone they never knew until it was too late.

But Israel being what it is, many, many of them came to know the Shalit family personally, on their walks the length and breadth of Israel, or in the tent by the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem, the protest tent that was their home until the news came that their son was finally to be freed.

Bravo for the people who brought Gilad home. Bravo for these people, these Israelis, who held a part of their breath for five years and five months, waiting for news of someone they did not know, but who could just as easily have been their own.

Bravo, as well, for Benjamin Netanyahu. He did what the people of Israel wanted. That is his job. He did not do the bidding of a raucous, vicious minority. He took courage in a courageous people. That is why he is there.

He did the right thing.

Navy seeks $100m. to protect new gas rigs – JPost – Defense.

    The government is considering a plan to allocate $100 million to the Navy to enable it to purchase new ships which it will require to effectively protect future Israeli gas rigs in the Mediterranean Sea.

Under consideration is the possibility that the funds will be partially provided by the companies developing the gas fields off Israel’s coast, which are estimated to contain billions of barrels of natural gas.

Israel’s discovery of large natural gas fields off its coast has raised tensions with Lebanon which claims that some of the fields are in its sovereign waters.

In early July, the cabinet approved the demarcation of Israel’s northern maritime border with Lebanon, which sets the economic rights in offshore territories that have become lucrative with the recent discoveries of vast natural-gas resources.

Israel’s concern is that Hezbollah and Hamas will try to attack the Israeli gas rigs at sea in explosive-laden ships, or with anti-ship missiles. Iran has also recently announced plans to deploy warships in the Mediterranean.

While the Navy is traditionally responsible for defending Israel’s coast and its sea-based natural resources, it has told the government that it does not have enough ships and platforms to effectively defend future oil rigs. Some government officials had raised the possibility of hiring private security contractors to protect the fields, but the plan was rejected by the Defense Ministry. The plan under consideration could see the procurement of new ships.

The Shalit deal through foreign eyes – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Foreign media also taking interest in impending release of captive soldier Gilad Shalit; tries to explain motives behind Israel’s approval of lopsided deal

Gili Gurel

defence.professionals | defpro.com.

Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Capabilities

07:32 GMT, October 18, 2011 Iran’s foiled assassination plot against Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the US, Adel al-Jubeir, raises questions about Iran’s judgment and which elements within the regime are in control of the country’s decision-making process. If successful, such an act could have lead the country into diplomatic isolation or war. This lack of judgment on Iran’s part is especially worrying for the US, Israel, and Iran’s Arab neighbors, given the likely military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program. A nuclear conflict with Iran would have potentially devastating regional and global consequences. Iran’s nuclear program and the implications thereof must be considered in the context of these recent events.

The tone and content of Iranian military competition with the US continues to move in a hardline direction, and has only been reinforced by the recent assassination plot. Iran’s accelerated research and development into its ballistic missile and nuclear programs have been accompanied by increasingly defiant statements from the regime. These developments reflect Iran’s stated goals of building a deterrent capacity, establishing its capability to “close the Gulf,” and decisively influencing the political, religious, and social environment of the region to the likely end of asserting itself as the dominant regional power.

Although the Iranian regime often affirms peaceful regional intentions, a net assessment of its push to expand the aforementioned capabilities, repeated assertions that the Gulf is “Persian,” threats to “close the Gulf,” and menacing rhetoric concerning Israel signify Iran’s intentions to vigorously compete with the US and other regional actors.

The Burke Chair at CSIS has developed a two-part net assessment of these developments, and how they affect the US and Arab states. It examines their ramifications for the strategic landscape in the Gulf region, and potential US, Israeli, and other regional responses to Iran’s burgeoning efforts to compete strategically in the Gulf.

WEB ADDRESS FOR NEW BRIEFINGS

The second of these two briefings is now available. It has the following title and web address:

• “Iran’s Accelerating Military Competition with the US and Arab States – Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Capabilities” can be downloaded at: http://goo.gl/iLTWF (PDF 4.59MB, 102 pages)

The first part has been released previously and has the following title and web address:

• “Iran’s Accelerating Military Competition with the US and Arab States: Part One” can be viewed at http://goo.gl/WHEIC

MOVING TOWARDS A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY

Although Iran’s nuclear program has seen significant recent progress, the IAEA’s knowledge of Iranian nuclear developments and access to the country’s nuclear sites continues to diminish. Areas in which the IAEA has noted Iran’s lack of cooperation include the possible military dimensions of the country’s nuclear program, R&D into centrifuge development, enrichment activities, and access to sites such as the Heavy Water Production Plant. As of May 2011, examples of activities of concern regarding which the IAEA requires clarification include the following:

• Neutron generator and associated diagnostics: experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride to produce a short burst of neutrons.

• Uranium conversion and metallurgy: producing uranium metal from fluoride compounds and its manufacture into components relevant to a nuclear device.

• High explosives manufacture and testing: developing, manufacturing and testing of explosive components suitable for the initiation of high explosives in a converging spherical geometry.

• Exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonator studies, particularly involving applications necessitating high simultaneity: possible nuclear significance of the use of EBW detonators.

• Multipoint explosive initiation and hemispherical detonation studies involving highly instrumented experiments: integrating EBW detonators in the development of a system to initiate hemispherical high explosive charges and conducting full scale experiments, work which may have benefitted from the assistance of foreign expertise.

• High voltage firing equipment and instrumentation for explosives testing over long distances and possibly underground: conducting tests to confirm that high voltage firing equipment is suitable for the reliable firing of EBW detonators over long distances.

• Missile re-entry vehicle redesign activities for a new payload assessed as being nuclear in nature: conducting design work and modelling studies involving the removal of the conventional high explosive payload from the warhead of the Shahab-3 missile and replacing it with a spherical nuclear payload.1

This list of concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program provides examples of key areas of potential nuclear weapons development in which Iran has provided little, if any, cooperation. Iranian lack of cooperation regarding such matters provides a strong indication that the country is moving forward with R&D into nuclear weapons development, despite claims to the contrary.

THE DEVELOPING REGIONAL NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND PROSPECTS FOR WAR

Given the likely military dimension of Iran’s nuclear program, an assessment of potential preventative or preemptive US or Israeli strikes on the country’s nuclear facilities as well as possible Iranian responses to such an attack must be considered. Israeli options for such a strike include the following courses of action:

• A conventional strike using Israeli air power, which could take any one of three routes (northern, central, or southern), all of which would involve traversing unfriendly air space to reach targets in Iran.

• A low yield nuclear strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, employing either ballistic missiles or nuclear-armed strike aircraft.

Given the extensive US assets in the Gulf region, the US would have the option to carry out numerous strikes on Iran’s facilities using more aircraft than Israel has available to do so. Such an attack would most likely include F-16C/F-15E strike aircraft, F-22’s, F-18’s of the US 5th Fleet, and B2 bombers based out of Diego Garcia. Given the greater number and flexibility of US forces as well as their closer proximity to Iran, the US is much better positioned to carry out such a strike.

If such a strike were to occur, Iran could potentially respond in the following ways:

• Withdraw from the NPT and increase its long-term resolve to develop a nuclear deterrent program.

• Immediate retaliation using its ballistic missiles on Israel. Multiple launches of Shahab?3 including the possibility of CBR warheads against Tel Aviv, Israeli military and civilian centers, and Israeli suspected nuclear weapons sites.

• Use proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Hamas to attack Israel proper with suicide bombings, covert CBR attacks, and rocket attacks from southern Lebanon.

• Launch asymmetric attacks against American interests and allies in the Arabian Gulf.

• Target US and Western shipping in the Gulf, and possibly attempt to interrupt the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz.

THE ISRAELI-IRANIAN NUCLEAR-MISSILE BALANCE

However nightmarish the prospect of an Israeli-Iranian nuclear exchange may be, Israel’s nuclear capabilities and the potential militarization of Iran’s nuclear program make the assessment of such a scenario a necessity. While Iran does not yet possess a nuclear weapon, potential delivery systems include ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strike aircraft. While Israel’s means for delivery are similar, its aircraft and missiles are more advanced than their Iranian equivalents.

Despite Israel’s advantage in weapons technology, one nuclear detonation on Israeli territory could prove to be an existential threat to the country given its size. With its greater size and population, Iran would be better poised to survive an Israeli nuclear strike on its population centers. It must be noted, however, that that the greater metropolitan area of Tehran is home to some 15 million people, which constitutes 20% of Iran’s population. Furthermore, 45% of large Iranian industrial firms are located in Tehran, as is 50% of all Iranian industry. As such, any nuclear strike on Tehran would have disastrous consequences for the Iranian state.

THE US-IRANIAN NUCLEAR-MISSILE BALANCE

The US-Iranian balance is more complex. Assuming a dispersed, mature Iranian nuclear force, Iran would most likely leverage these forces against the US’ conventional superiority. In addition to US forces and installations in the Gulf, Iran could potentially threaten the US allies in the region, Europe, Israel, and oil export capabilities. Any Iranian nuclear strike would, however, be limited in nature so as not to garner massive nuclear retaliation.

In the event of an Iranian nuclear missile launch, US satellite surveillance could potentially allow for preemptive damage limitation. In such a confrontation, the US would have a clear advantage in that it possesses a massive conventional and nuclear reserve strike capability in addition to stealth aircraft and precision guided munitions, which could be used as weapons of mass effectiveness to strike at Iran’s critical infrastructure and leadership.

THE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WILD CARDS

Although Iranian chemical and biological capabilities are not often discussed or scrutinized, Iran’s pharmaceutical and chemical production base make the existence of such programs possible, if not probable. As chemical weapons can be produced in the same facilities that manufacture pesticides and industrial chemicals, the existence of an Iranian chemical arsenal cannot be ruled out.

In addition to traditional agents in biological warfare such as anthrax, plague, and smallpox, Iran could possess genetically engineered pathogens (“designer diseases”) for weaponization, among others.

Although ballistic missiles and cluster munitions constitute likely means for delivering chemical and biological weapons, they could also potentially be delivered via non-state actors so as to limit the risk of retaliation, bypass defenses, and maintain a level of plausible deniability.

—-
By Anthony H. Cordesman
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

The Day – Iran nuke effort suffers setbacks | News from southeastern Connecticut.

By JOBY WARRICK The Washington Post

Publication: The Day

A History of Violence – Does anyone still doubt Iran is a terrorist state? | Security Debrief.

U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s announcement on Oct. 11 that a dual U.S.-Iranian citizen and a commander in Iran’s Quds Force, the special-operations unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), had been charged in New York for their alleged roles in a plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, represents a brazen escalation in Iran’s struggle for regional dominance. But Iran’s willingness to use brutal means to achieve its foreign-policy goals is nothing new: Since the creation of the Islamic Republic, U.S. intelligence agencies have repeatedly identified terrorism as one of the regime’s signature calling cards.

The timing of this plot suggests Iran feels itself under increasing pressure, both from the international community (led by the United States) and from the regional alliance of Sunni states in the region (led by Saudi Arabia). Intriguingly, the plot seems to have been launched shortly after the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain against Shiite protesters, to which Iran objected loudly but was unable to affect.

The plot developed quickly over just a few months, starting this spring and culminating with the arrest of Manssor Arbabsiar, the Iranian-American man, in September. According to a Justice Department news release, Arbabsiar told a Drug Enforcement Administration confidential source (CS-1) posing as an associate of an international drug cartel that “his associates in Iran had discussed a number of violent missions for CS-1 and his associates to perform, including the murder of the Ambassador.” Later, after Arbabsiar was arrested and confessed to his role in the plots, he reportedly called Gholam Shakuri, the member of the Quds Force who was also indicted, at the direction of law enforcement. Shakuri again confirmed that the plot should go forward and as soon as possible. “Just do it quickly. It’s late,” he said.

The fact that Iran plotted attacks in the United States is surprising, and not only because Iranian agents have traditionally carried out such attacks in Europe, South America, or the Middle East. One might assume Iran would behave more cautiously at a time when it has come under increasing international pressure over its rumored pursuit of nuclear weapons, its suppression of human rights at home, and its support of terrorism abroad. Indeed, the U.S. government designated the Quds Force as a terrorist group in 2007 for providing material support to the Taliban, Iraqi Shiite militants, and other terrorist organizations. Most counterterrorism experts expected that future acts of Iranian terrorism would occur in places like Europe where Iranian agents have long targeted dissidents, and not in the United States, where carrying out an attack would risk a U.S. military reprisal.

Iran’s use of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, however, goes back as far as the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Writing in 1986, the CIA assessed in a now declassified report titled “Iranian Support for International Terrorism” that while Iran’s support for terrorism was meant to further its national interest, it also stemmed from the clerical regime’s perception “that it has a religious duty to export its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant struggle against the perceived oppressor states.”

In the early 1990s, these interests dictated an increase in operational activities in the Gulf. Shiite extremist violence was primarily the consequence of Iran’s geopolitical calculus and its continued enmity toward Sunni Gulf states. To that end, the CIA noted, Iran not only supported and sometimes directed Hezbollah operations but also “smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia and conducted terrorist operations against Kuwaiti targets.” As tensions in the region persisted, the CIA assessed in 1992 that “for now, Iran will sponsor easily deniable attacks on US targets and allow Hizballah to retaliate for [Hezbollah leader Abbas] Musawi’s assassination.”

A 1989 CIA report highlights several factors that made Iran more likely to take increased risks in support of terrorism — factors that faded somewhat after the mid-1990s but that are now coming back with a vengeance. The first was the dominance of radical elements within the clerical leadership, which translated into significant Iranian hostility toward the West. Then as now, there was little chance more pragmatic leaders would come to the fore. Furthermore, igniting tensions abroad could shift popular attention away from domestic problems, while asymmetrical warfare provided Tehran with a potent weapon at a time when its military and economy were weak.

Underlying Iranian grievances with the West exacerbated these tensions in the late 1980s in much the same way that they have today. In the late 1980s, Iranian anger was fed by the accidental 1988 downing of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes, as well as anger over the publication of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, deemed by Iran to be offensive to Islam. Now, the Iranian authorities’ anger is fed by increasing U.S. and European sanctions, plus Tehran’s conviction that the West is pursuing a “soft overthrow” of the Islamic Republic by use of modern communications to whip up protests. Tehran thinks that the West caused the 2009 protests in Iran and is behind the protests shaking Syria now.
Iran’s competition for regional dominance with the United States and Saudi Arabia is also at least as contentious as it was in the late 1980s and 1990s. Iran is under increasing international diplomatic and economic sanctions, for which it holds both Saudi Arabia and the United States responsible — and for good reason. From the Stuxnet virus to the assassination of Iranian scientists and the defection of Iranian agents, Iran feels increasingly targeted by Western intelligence services.

A few weeks ago, a Western intelligence official and I were mulling over the string of attempted attacks by Hezbollah operatives targeting Israeli interests over the past three years. From Azerbaijan to Turkey and from Cyprus to Egypt, terrorist operations by Iran’s terrorist proxy, often operating jointly with members of the Quds Force, have been foiled time and again. But while attacks in the past were widely seen as acts of revenge for the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah’s Imad Mughniyeh, an attack today, this official mused, could just as likely be an Iranian-driven plot in retaliation for the sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program. And Iran, he noted, attributes these setbacks to Israel and the United States.

All the evidence available suggests this assassination attempt was a high-level IRGC plot, though authorities have been careful to describe it as “directed by elements of the Iranian government” and not more than that. It is, however, noteworthy that the Treasury Department designated IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani as a global terrorist on Oct. 11 because, as commander of the force, he “oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in this plot.”
Despite Iran’s apparent attempt to mask its role in the plot by employing a team of assassins from Mexico tied to a violent drug cartel, the indictment — as well as the parallel Treasury Department designations of several senior Quds Force officers as specially designated global terrorists — exposes Iran for the terrorist state it is. It is too early to tell what the consequences of Iran’s assassination plot may be, but there should be no doubt the plot lays bare the myth that sufficient carrots — from offers of dialogue to requests for an emergency hotline to reduce naval tensions in the Gulf — can induce the regime in Tehran to abandon its support for terrorism, part with its nuclear weapons program, or respect human rights.

US Begins Huge Military Maneuvers Aimed at Iran.

by Paul Joseph Watson
Global Research, October 18, 2011

 

Paul Joseph Watson is a frequent contributor to Global Research.  Global Research Articles by Paul Joseph Watson

Schalit reunites with parents, PM… JPost – Diplomacy & Politics.

! …קמה טוב שבאתה הביתה

Mixed emotions on Schalit deal – JPost – Opinion – Editorials.

    As we anxiously await the release of Gilad Schalit, national sentiments are mixed.

Feelings fluctuate from joy at the prospect that Schalit will finally be free after more than five long years of captivity, to trepidation that the release will lead to more terrorism and violence.

There is an irresistible desire to celebrate Gilad’s imminent freedom with the Schalit family, and appreciate their emotional stamina and stubborn refusal to give up, which after so long finally seems to be paying off.

But at the same time, one cannot help but empathize with, for instance, the Roth family, whose daughter Malka was murdered along with 14 others in the August 2001 Sbarro Pizzeria suicide bombing in Jerusalem.

Arnold and Frimet Roth, Malka’s parents, are understandably outraged by the planned release of Ahlam Tamimi, 31, who drove the suicide bomber to Sbarro. Accordingly, they have launched a grassroots campaign to remove her from the list of prisoners slated to be freed.

Particularly maddening is the fact that Tamimi and many others on the list not only feel no remorse, they are actually proud of what they did and would do it again.

Israelis’ mixed feelings over the deal are reflected in recent public opinion surveys. True, a strong majority of Israelis favor freeing Schalit, even if it means the release of over a 1,000 terrorists, many of whom are murderers of Israelis, and alleged Palestinian collaborators.

The pollster Dahaf found in a survey, with a margin of error of 4.4 percentage points, conducted Sunday for Yediot Aharonot that 79 percent of Israelis support the prisoner exchange deal. And tellingly, a higher percentage of women back the deal – 86% compared to 74% among men.

However, as Dahaf’s Mina Zemach pointed out in an interview with Army Radio Monday, cognitive dissonance explains at least part of the support.

Respondents were, after all, asked to give their opinion on a done deal. Surveys conducted before the cabinet approved the prisoner exchange deal showed lower levels of support, according to Zemach.

What’s more, while the most common feeling among respondents was joy, many also reported they were worried, nervous and angry as well as proud.

Half said they are concerned about the security situation after the terrorists are released.

And though Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had hoped for a unanimous vote in the cabinet, three ministers opposed the deal – Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, National Infrastructure Minister Uzi Landau and Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe Ya’alon.

Still, it is doubtful any of them would have voted against the deal if doing so would have prevented Schalit’s release. Aware that their vote would not change the outcome, these ministers were undoubtedly expressing a real concern over the potential dangers to which all Israelis will be exposed. This is the price we all will be paying for Schalit’s release.

This collective willingness to expose ourselves to the risk of a future terrorist attack, if necessary, to secure Schalit’s release speaks volumes about Israelis’ strong sense that we are all in this Zionist project together, in good times and in bad.

It’s not that we are insensitive to the feelings of past terrorist victims’ families and loved ones. Nor are we unaware that many, even most, of those who will be released will return to violent terrorism – and that by paying a ratio of 1 to 1,027 we are encouraging future kidnappings.

It’s just that none of these potential future dangers seems to be able to trump the fact that right now an IDF soldier’s life is being saved.

Pleasantries from president won’t change Iran – Your Houston News: Opinion.

An alleged Iranian plan to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the U.S. — perhaps by setting off a bomb in a Washington restaurant — seems to offer more evidence of Iran’s intentions.

This case suggests at least two possibilities: Iran intends to use whatever means are available to attack its enemies, and that it may not fear significant retaliation from the U.S.

As a candidate and early in his presidency, Barack Obama had expressed the hope that talks with Iran could be fruitful. But some regimes are so hell-bent on their ambitions, and driven by their hatreds, and have so little regard for their enemies’ will or courage, that they do not respond to peaceful gestures as less daredevil governments might.

It is clear that Iran has set its sights on terror against the U.S. and its allies, perhaps on a massive scale. Iran has armed its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan to kill American soldiers; equipped Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon with missiles to facilitate attacks on Israel; rushed to develop nuclear weapons (slowed by a U.S.-Israeli cyber-attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities last year) and missile technology that might be used to attack Israel and the West, and forged close ties with Venezuela, run by anti-American strongman Hugo Chávez.

And now, two men linked to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, the force propping up the ruling mullahs, have been charged with a plot to target a U.S. ally on our soil and, perhaps, kill many of our citizens. Such a plot would have had to come from the highest levels.

What to do? Our military is overextended, working on wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. (Though, of course, dire threats to national security, as in World War II and the Cold War, could elicit a much more powerful response — including paying higher taxes, of all things.)

If the U.S. has more leverage to punish Iran economically, that should be done. We can make more of an effort to promote democracy in Iran. After all, much of the population, especially the young, detests its leaders. We should redouble our efforts to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons.

We shouldn’t delude ourselves into thinking that Iran will change its behavior in response to pleasant words.

— The Providence (R.I.) Journal