Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.
By Victor Kotsev
TEL AVIV – “Let Obama come and take Syria,” a resident of the city of Daraa told the BBC in despair on Tuesday in reference to United States President Barack Obama. “Let Israel come and take Syria. Let the Jews come – anything is better than [Syrian President] Bashar Assad.”
Nobody acquainted with Arab rhetorical traditions would take this quote at face value, even though it speaks volumes about the post-Arab uprisings of 2011 in the Middle East, where the tall story of Israel being the source of all evil was among the greatest casualties. It also speaks volumes about the dire situation in Syria and the American predicament there.
From the point of view of the White House, it all seems to come down to leverage. “The view inside the administration is that Syria
is a particularly complicated problem because the United States does not have good relationships with either the government or the opposition and lacks the leverage to affect events in the country,” writes Josh Rogin in Foreign Policy.
In Egypt, the United States had leverage. In Libya, less so, but it felt that the stakes were low enough to put on a half-hearted (and so far vain) attempt to gain it by brute force. In Syria, it is too scared to do much and embarrassed by its former attempts to gain leverage.
The Obama administration tried very hard to obtain leverage in Syria, in fact. It even sent an ambassador there by circumventing congress in what was considered by many a dirty trick. [1] It made an effort to restart the Israeli-Syrian peace track, which can also be regarded as a way to get closer to both, and to gain additional traction with Syria. “For both Syria and Israel, the ‘secret peace talks’ between them have proven to be the best button they can press to reset their relations with Washington. The trick has always worked,” writes the website Now Lebanon.
Now, however, the administration is caught in a bind – between the conflicting interests of its allies, but also between ideological forces that govern American political thought. In a sense, it is a manifestation of what American think-tank Stratfor calls “the relation of the American Empire to the American Republic and the threat the empire poses to the republic” – [2] it juxtaposes the need for foreign policy expansion (or at least prevention of contraction) with the democratic ideal that teaches that sovereignty rests with the people, both at home and abroad.
For all his goodwill towards Assad (or addiction to non-confrontational leverage), Obama cannot simply overlook the brutal repressions – at least not while they are happening and while he is bombing Libya in order to “save civilians” from another repressive government.
Beside that, he would lose any remnant of international credibility in that arrangement of events, the American president would face a serious internal challenge from within his own power base in the Democratic Party. Tanks rolling over crowds and snipers shooting protesters are the kinds of things that the Soviet Union was once famous for, and that a sincere Democrat could not live with.
Foreign pressures are also pulling the White House in opposing directions. Saudi Arabia, which Syrian and Iranian sources have accused of stirring the unrest, seems intent on taking advantage of it to weaken Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Egypt is quietly benefiting as well. Israel and Turkey, two other close American allies, cringe at the possibility of Syria falling into anarchy, justifiably worried that the violence could spill in some form into their own territories.
The European Union is pushing for sanctions, France once again leading with calls for “strong measures”. (Surprise? At least the French show consistency.) This time, however, Russia and China took no chances and vetoed outright on Wednesday a United Nations Security Council statement condemning the crackdown. “A real threat to regional security could come from outside interference,” the Russian deputy UN ambassador, Alexander Pankin, said during the discussions, quoted by al-Jazeera.
Russia has a lot at stake in Syria – not least its only naval port in the Mediterranean, Tartus, is in Syria and Russia has been expanding and renovating it for some years now. Syria is a long-standing Russian (previously Soviet) ally in the Middle East, and a Russian weapons client. Besides, the Russians (and the Chinese) are incensed by how the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was stretched endlessly to justify operations aimed effectively at regime change in Libya, and are looking for a way to get back at the Europeans and the Americans.
According to some sources, there is also a growing domestic pressure on Russian leaders to respond more forcefully to the Arab uprisings and to assert a Russian brand of imperialist policies.
So far, the Obama administration has been threading carefully and uncertainly, in its own version of foreign policy consistency. It called for “targeted sanctions” against the Syrian regime, but stopped short of pulling out its ambassador – something that is certain to generate further domestic controversy. It also pointed a finger at Iran for helping quell the protests in a move that was probably aimed to shift some of the blame for the crackdown onto the Islamic Republic and to drive a wedge between it and whoever comes on top in Syria.
In support of this position stands the circumstance that it is unclear what exactly is going on in Syria. The situation is murky and fraught with tensions, giving rise to many conspiracy theories (some of which are at least partially true, in all likelihood). Besides the alleged Saudi, Jordanian, American or Israeli plots (depending on whom you ask), information is circulating about Iranian officers commanding Syrian troops in the crackdowns.
A source in Syria told Stratfor that “Many are still placing hope in Habibna [literally “Our Love”, a nickname for the president] to bring about enough reforms to placate the demonstrators,” even though privately they acknowledged that this would be a tall order and “major, major concessions” would be needed “quickly”. The source, however, cast doubts on the protesters as well:
Support for the protests is mixed. Many of those out in the streets are there because someone close to them was killed. Think tribal mentality: I wasn’t mad at you before but you killed my cousin/brother/friend and now I am mad. People are gathering to defend their honor … There is almost no organization inside Syria among the protesters. I asked several people and they agreed that the Muslim Brotherhood was almost non-present in the country. All that is coordinated is information being leaked out about the responses by the security forces against the protesters.
This report, although considered unconfirmed by Stratfor, resonates loosely with many other reports that are coming through the tight informational blockade on the country. It deserves noting that the opposition mastered just enough unity and organization on Wednesday to threaten to “destroy” the regime, and that some more speculative reports suggest that it has gotten hold of anti-tank missiles.
Meanwhile, as the crackdown intensifies (night raids, tank fire, snipers, gangs, to mention a few types of terror to which Syrians are subjected), the army has held its discipline and obedience to the regime remarkably, but signs of dissent have emerged in the political ranks.
According to reports, some 200 members of the ruling Ba’ath party resigned on Wednesday. Tribalism also rears its ugly head: according to the Stratfor source quoted above, “Everyone is thinking along their sect even if they aren’t open about it.” All this casts doubts on the army’s continued loyalty to the regime should the unrest continue for much longer, especially given that the majority of the soldiers are Sunni Muslims serving a minority Alawite regime.
Given that such powerful players as Russia, China, Israel and Turkey are opposed to an intervention of any form, the wait-and-see approach makes sense as short-term tactics, even though it is morally dubious and cannot replace a longer-term strategy that so far has not emerged from the White House. This approach, moreover, while it also carries dangers, has attracted a number of other followers.
For example, Egypt could expect to gain from a prolonged crisis – not least in traction with the Palestinians, whom it apparently managed to convince to reconcile on Wednesday. Hamas is shaken by the instability of its main patron, Syria – some analysts speculate it might even be looking for alternative locations for its headquarters.
It is also pulled apart by its solidarity with its kin Muslim Brotherhood movement in the country and by its own needs for protection and sponsorship against Israel. This would theoretically push it closer to Egypt’s orbit (not least now that the Muslim Brotherhood is a prominent power in Egypt as well), and would explain why it would be more accommodating to its rival Fatah.
Egypt would gain vis-a-vis Iran as well, but after Hosni Mubarak’s departure that relationship has moved away from a straight-forward enmity. Last week, Iran appointed an ambassador to Egypt after a hiatus of more than 30 years. In another report, Stratfor commented: “Establishing ties with Iran also allows Egypt to undercut Syria, which thus far is the only Arab state to have close relations with the Persian Islamist state.”
Finally, Egypt would gain with respect to Turkey (Syria is key to Turkey’s influence in the Arab world), on the one hand, and Israel and Jordan (via the Palestinians; among other things, Egypt has been seeking to renegotiate a natural gas contract with both countries).
Lebanon also must be mentioned. For it, the wait-and-see approach is the only viable option. Hezbollah, in particular, faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it is undoubtedly threatened, because Syria is crucial for resupplying it with arms from it main patron, Iran.
On the other hand, however, over the past months and years the relationship between Assad and the Lebanese militant organization has gradually soured. On several occasions, Damascus reportedly pulled it in so as to prevent it from taking over the country by force.
The Syrian regime has always seen Lebanon as “its” territory and tried to prevent any player in the country from becoming too powerful. This would explain also the alleged hesitations that Assad had when considering using Hezbollah’s help to quell the protests – this would give the militant organization an unwelcome foothold in Syria.
The Syrian crisis further intensifies a growing identity dilemma that Hezbollah faces. According to many sources, the organization is pulled apart by its Lebanese and its pro-Iranian Shi’ite identities, not least in the context of a Sunni-Shi’ite crisis emerging in the entire region. Moreover, despite its military and organizational strength, Hezbollah has not fared very well in its political ambitions. After it toppled the government of prime minister Saad Hariri (a close Saudi ally) earlier this year, it was unable to help the candidate it supported, Najib Mikati, to form a new one.
“This crisis,” writes journalist Zvi Bar’el in the Israeli daily Ha’aretz, “has put Hezbollah in an uncomfortable political position; when there is no government, there is no one on whom to exert pressure, there is no one from whom to ‘demand a price’, and there is no way to promote its political interests.”
If the Syrian crisis continues, however, and unless Hezbollah’s military strength is degraded by some sort of military campaign, exposing its weakened supply line, the organization stands to gain. It would most likely get a window of opportunity to reshape realities inside Lebanon, not so much by brute force (there are two many trigger-happy peacekeepers out there with a responsibility to protect) as by covert actions and threats.
It could also, in a more fanciful scenario, expand into Syria proper, and why not even in North Africa (from where consistent reports of its activity arrive). All this, however, would require a careful planning process and a redefinition of the organization’s core identity of a local resistance movement, which would take some time.
It is important to watch the behavior of Iran with respect to this process, as Hezbollah is an important part of Iranian deterrence vis-a-vis any potential attack, and it will invariably try to draw the militant organization closer into its orbit.
As a whole, the intensifying Syrian unrest is sending shockwaves throughout the entire Middle East and beyond. For now, most of the big players have adopted a wait-and-see policy, but it is a silence fraught with tension that is untenable beyond the short run. Meanwhile, there is a considerable risk of a regional escalation, and that Syria soaks in blood. Competent global leadership seems nowhere in sight.
Notes
1. Barack Obama appoints first US ambassador to Syria since 2005, The Daily Telegraph, December 31, 2010.
2. What Happened to the American Declaration of War?, Stratfor, March 29, 2011.
Victor Kotsev is a journalist and political analyst based in Tel Aviv.
Recent Comments