WarSclerotic

MESS Report-Israel News – Haaretz Israeli News source..

Those exposed to outgoing Mossad chief’s Meir Dagan’s arguments will find it difficult to ignore their logic, and the assertive tone in which they were made.

By Amos Harel

The departing chief of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, signed off last week with a clear and unequivocal message to the public: The Iranian nuclear threat is far from ripe. Israel and the international community still have plenty to do to undermine it, and a military assault is not the right solution.

	Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan.
	Photo by: Tomer Appelbaum

One may assume the Israeli leadership, especially the prime minister, know Dagan’s position on the matter. But his departure allowed us, for the first time and despite the partial cover of the censor, to get a better and more detailed idea of his approach to the nuclear problem. Perhaps this was a Bibi-bypass maneuver on Dagan’s part; by making his position public, Dagan has written a warning firmly on his name. This, to a significant degree, is his legacy: The warning of the great risks of a war (twice injured, he has a close and personal knowledge of such a price ), and the understanding that before setting out on a military campaign, the leaders must use all alternative means to remove the threat.

For journalists, Dagan was almost inaccessible throughout his Mossad term. He kept mum for eight years and four months. It seems the tremendous weight of the Iranian issue and the consequences of a decision to attack made him set aside his long-term reservations about journalism.

Readers of the weekend papers would find that the publications are surprisingly well-versed in what the head of the secret service had to say. Dagan spoke “in closed discussions,” “in a round of departure talks,” “in documents leaked to Wikileaks.”

The same expressions and observations are repeated. Dagan believes war would be justified only when Israel has “a sword at its neck, literally cutting into the flesh.” Even in the worst-case scenario, Iran would not obtain nuclear weapons before 2015. The arguments against an Israeli attack are known: It would make the Iranian people rally around the regime, would make Israeli-American relations extremely difficult and could result in a war, in which the Israeli home front will be bombed by thousands of rockets and missiles from Iran, Lebanon and Gaza. The IDF would find it very difficult to achieve a decisive victory in such a war.

So what does Dagan suggest, according to those conversations documented on Wikileaks? The joint move conception, stalling the Iranian project instead of going to war. Dagan is preaching for a shared global effort that includes, alongside tightening the sanctions, stopping the purchase of parts essential for the progress of the nuclear program, encouraging the Iranian opposition, and, of course, covert operations. The very fact of a significant delay to the Iranian plan (considering Israeli intelligence originally estimated the Iranians would have the bomb by 2007 ), would seem to testify some of this is already being carried out.

Even after his retirement, Dagan’s warning will continue to echo in the forum of seven key cabinet ministers, and in the public sphere. Those exposed to his arguments will find it difficult to ignore their logic, and the assertive tone in which they were made. It now remains to be seen whether Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, Dagan’s partners in the realist alliance in Israel’s strategic leadership, will make a similar move when they retire – Ashkenazi in February and Diskin in May.

The positions their heirs take are even more important. What will be said by the next chief of staff, Yoav Gallant, new Mossad chief Tamir Pardo and Y, Diskin’s deputy and apparent heir? Will they maintain the united front of their predecessors? How much clout will they have with the political leadership? The answers to these questions will have more influence than any other on Israel’s strategic reality in the years ahead.

Iran’s nuclear headway : Voice of Russia.

Ali-Akbar Salehi. Photo: EPA

The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and acting foreign minister Ali-Akbar Salehi said on Saturday that Tehran was now capable of making nuclear fuel plates and rods.

Mr. Salehi said that Tehran had built a facility in Isfahan to develop the technology required for power nuclear reactors.

Salehi also told the local media that “despite futile Western efforts” Iran had so far produced almost 40 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium to supply fuel to a research reactor in Tehran.

The statement comes ahead of the planned resumption on January 20 of the talks in Istanbul with  the six international mediators, that is Russia, China, the US, France, Britain and Germany. After a 14-month break in talks the Big Six expected the issue of  nuclear fuel supplies to Iran to dominate the agenda of the Istanbul parley, which they hoped would help restore an atmosphere of trust between the sides. Now Tehran gives everyone to understand that it no longer needs such fuel.

In Moscow analyst Georgy Mirsky sees all this as an Iranian attempt to bolster its positions ahead of the talks, though.

They can say whatever they please because there is no way we can possibly make sure it’s true or not…  I believe the message is that  “despite all your sanctions and pressure, we keep moving ahead and soon are going to have tens of thousands of centrifuges…. We have already obtained 20 percent enriched uranium and we did it all by ourselves… We now have a full cycle and we are even making fuel rods too…”

In light of this, many remain downbeat about the results of the upcoming Istanbul talks, pointing to Tehran’s persistent unwillingness to halt uranium enrichment. Earlier this week, Iran invited ambassadors from several countries, not least Russia and China, to inspect its nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak in an alleged attempt to prove “the purely peaceful nature of the Iranian atomic program”. Some experts believe, however, that the move is little more than an attempt to play both ends against the middle ahead of the Istanbul talks. Vladimir Isayev, of the Institute for Oriental Studies with the Russian Academy of Sciences, fully subscribes to the standpoint.

Tehran knows perfectly well that EU countries will reject such an invitation because the role of examining nuclear sites is up to the IAEA, not the EU, Isayev says. In any case, Iran will certainly use the EU’s reluctance to interact as a plausible pretext to go ahead with uranium enrichment, Isayev contends.

Pacifying Tehran’s nuclear ambitions is surely a tricky task, which will be high on the agenda of parleys between Iran and the P5 plus 1 group in Istanbul on January 20. Meanwhile, Israel and some Gulf nations have repeatedly warned Tehran against obtaining a nuclear weapon by 2015, which Tel Aviv cautioned may well prompt its attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is only to be hoped that negotiators in Istanbul will do their best to prevent this worst-case scenario from ever seeing the light of day

Are EU sanctions influencing Iran’s behavior?.

Europe¹s submissive attitude toward Iran and its nuclear weapons program must change, political analyst Diana Gregor, a leading expert in Central European policies vis-a-vis Iran told Benjamin Weinthal, The Jerusalem Post‘s correspondent in Berlin

What is your assessment of the EU’s approach toward Iran’s drive to go nuclear?

I find it important to emphasize that Europe is willingly swallowing Iran’s non-compliance, despite harsher sanctions and European businesses pulling out of Iran.

Having said that, the EU is currently considering putting an end to direct talks with Iran ­ which only emphasizes the degree of disbelief and disenchantment vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. The EU is at a point where it wants to see Iran “walk the walk” and not only “talk the talk.” The EU is also currently thinking of entering talks with Iran only on the condition of Iran¹s compliance with the international community¹s demands from now on. If this regulation comes into effect, it would have immediate impact on the next round of talks in Istanbul ­ if talks take place at all.

Many officials within the EU, however, are convinced that Iran is only playing for time while it keeps fooling the international community ­ a notion I agree with.

Are the EU sanctions putting enough pressure on the Iranians?

Past and current developments do not point toward a change of heart where the Iranians are concerned. And the West seems to be willing to submit to yet another round of Iran’s special brand of diplomacy, which consists of indicating openness to renew negotiations (i.e., the upcoming talks in Istanbul) and pseudo-transparency (i.e., the recently issued invitation by Iran to inspect its nuclear sites) ­ while at the same time emphasizing that there is nothing to talk about, and that Iran will not put an end to its uranium enrichment program. Iran’s negotiations are merely ways to buy more time.

For the future stability of Europe ­ a future in which Europe is not subjected to blackmail or nuclear threats ­ Iran must abolish its nuclear weapons development program; or be stopped. Inaction will not stop the Iranian regime.

Iran sanctions so far have hit the country¹s economy quite hard, but have not had an effect on the mullahs’ regime. The latest P5+1 talks in Geneva showed once again that Iran has no intention to halt its uranium enrichment program and change its nuclear ambitions.

Sanctions are supposed to isolate Iran economically. However, sanctions can only be effective if they are accurately and rigorously implemented. Only then can sanctions convince companies not to do business with Iran. The idea behind sanctions ­ to paraphrase Stuart E. Eizenstat ­ is to maximize the costs that Iran incurs due to its nuclear weapons development program by simultaneously minimizing the benefits. This is the reason why the financial sources Iran needs to keep its nuclear program running need to be eliminated.

Iran is wedded to the idea of having a nuclear capability; the Iranians do not intend to give that up.

Targeted sanctions therefore seem to offer a suitable solution, as chances for a diplomatic breakthrough remain extremely slim.

What is the status of US-EU coordination regarding sanctions?

Since President Obama took office, the US and the EU have worked cooperatively on an Iran policy.

In October 2010, the EU issued new regulations, after the fourth round of sanctions [imposed this summer], calling for restrictions on equipment and technology sales to the Iranian oil and gas industry, as well as on respective investments. However, these regulations do allow the import and export of oil and gas to Iran. The EU also allows financial transactions needed to import oil and gas to Iran.

The US, on the contrary, penalizes companies selling gasoline to Iran and has increased pressure on international companies and refineries to cancel their contracts with Iran.

There has been an agreement between the US State Department and European oil firms Total (France), Statoil (Norway), Eni (Italy) and Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands + Britain) to refuse to refuel planes that belong to Iran Air ­ they have pledged to stop investing in Iran and to not engage in any new activities with the Islamic Republic. In return, the companies are granted protection from possible US penalties for their pre-existing business ventures with Iran.

The US and EU are considering imposing new, joint sanctions before the next round of P5+1 talks scheduled for later this month in Istanbul. They agree that cooperative, joint action with regard to Iran is necessary. They believe in the effectiveness and efficiency of EU-US sanctions, rather than UN-sanctions, as UN-sanctions are often time-consuming and not always successful. None of the previously issued UN sanctions so far have been able to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons development program.

Is there a unified Iran policy among European countries? Within the EU there are different blocks: Some are pushing for Iran sanctions and their proper implementation, and others are advocating against restrictions. Some of the driving forces behind a “slack” position toward EU sanctions against Iran are the following: Sweden has distinguished itself as one of the EU nations most opposed to sanctions against Iran and has constantly worked to weaken the sanctions put into effect by the international community. After the new round of sanctions was agreed upon in June 2010, Sweden called for decreasing the severity of EU sanctions. Swedish firms are involved in Iran¹s energy sector with private companies selling equipment and spare parts to Iran’s oil industry.

Sweden¹s ambassador was among the few Western diplomats who attended [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad¹s inauguration in June 2009.

Austria: Austrian companies are earning good money in Iran, but rarely talk publicly about it. As a result of the global financial crisis, Austria’s total worldwide exports shrank by 20 percent last year. Meanwhile, the country’s exports to Iran grew! Austria has repeatedly contributed to keeping the Iranian regime from international isolation, and has not helped with steps toward destroying the economic basis of the dictatorship of the ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guards.

Despite the UN and EU sanctions against Iran, the volume of trade between Teheran and Vienna reached 635.95 million euros in 2008. Austrian exports to the Islamic Republic, including sophisticated machinery and electronic goods, rose by almost 6% in 2009, reaching 350 million euros, while Austrian exports to the rest of the world fell by 20% due to the financial crisis.

Since 2002 trade between Austria and Iran has doubled, with military deals accounting for 11%.

Spain is a major purchaser of Iranian crude oil. According to the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, Spain is the biggest oil importer in the European Union; in fact, within the first quarter of 2010, Spain purchased 134,607 barrels a day, with an approximate value of $11.6 billion. Spain is one of Iran¹s biggest European Union Trade partners. In 2008, trade between the two nations nearly doubled, reaching over three billion euros, according to the Iranian Chamber of Commerce. Spain is one of seven countries chosen to participate in the development of the Teheran-Mashhad railroad project, which is estimated to cost between $650.7 and $867.6 million.

There are 1,500 Spanish enterprises in Iran, mostly concerned with developing infrastructure, generation of electricity, water administration and renewable energy. Spain is the second-biggest importer of oil from Iran [within the EU], just behind Italy. From January 2010 to July 2010 Spanish exports to Iran increased 52%.

Switzerland remains one of Europe’s least compliant nations. After the EU voted to strengthen the UN sanctions, the Swiss energy giant EGL was cited as a possible sanctions violator at a US congressional hearing. The hearing cited firms active in Iran’s gas and oil sectors despite sanctions.

According to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, Iran is one of Switzerland¹s most important Middle Eastern trading partners.

Italy: Despite the diplomatic rhetoric, Rome traditionally has good business relations with Teheran, and Italy remains one of Iran¹s largest and most important trading partners in Europe, with bilateral trade totaling well over $7.5 billion a year. Italian refiners are maintaining crude oil trade with Iran at a time when other oil majors and big refiners are halting orders.

Malta, Greece and Cyprus have also opposed additional Iran sanctions.

The EU is Iran’s second largest trading partner worldwide, after China.

The difficulty of properly implementing Iran sanctions obviously lies in the many differences there are within the EU.

To date, OMV has not succumbed to pressure regarding the South Pars gas project. OMV executive board member Helmut Langanger stated that Iran is continuously pressing OMV to begin with investments, but OMV would rather wait for oil prices to recover. Furthermore, OMV has made it clear that it could still take on the role of a partner, should it decide not to become an investor.

Today, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] constitutes a “state within a state,” thus making ever more realistic the possibility that OMV ­ should the deal come to a close ­ might have to sign agreements with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Since the Revolutionary Guards control the nuclear and arms program, this in turn would mean that OMV would be indirectly co-financing the Iranian nuclear program.

How should the EU deal with the Swiss state-owned energy conglomerate EGL and its refusal to terminate its 18-22 billion euro gas deal with Iran?

Switzerland does not seem to understand its responsibility to make sure Iran does not get nuclear weapons. This is a pure affront against Iran sanctions and the efforts to isolate Iran economically. The EU should call upon Switzerland to revoke the EGL deal with Iran and abide by the EU and US sanctions. Furthermore, the US should reconsider having the Swiss Foreign Ministry represent US interests in Iran. Switzerland is clearly avoiding its responsibility to international security.

The US recently implemented human rights sanctions against Iran. Why is the EU unwilling to sanction Iran in connection with human rights?

As concerns about Iran¹s quest for nuclear weapons and its regional ambitions grow, a new international trend is emerging in which Iran is sanctioned for its human rights abuses as a means to weaken the regime while strengthening the West in this nuclear face-off.

However, the official focus on human rights abuses has not gone far enough.

The true potential that lies within the EU falls short of what could actually be done to further isolate Iran. The EU has not yet decided whether it will implement human rights sanctions against Iran. Such sanctions would undermine the current regime and contribute to the West¹s nuclear standoff with Iran, while sending out the right moral signal for supporting human rights in the Islamic Republic.

What is your view of Europe¹s “critical dialogue” and “change through trade” policies toward Iran?

I am convinced that many European states, such as Switzerland, Italy and Austria, to name only a few, have succumbed to Iran¹s game of fooling the West. Dialogue, whether critical or not ­ particularly without the precondition of Iran¹s compliance with the demands of the international community ­ has not proven successful to date. The Iranians seem to dictate the pace, while the West follows suit. Things should, however, be the other way around as Iran does not abide by international rules. To “reward” the Islamic Republic with business deals and increasing trade relations seems wrong on so many levels.

Europe has a submissive attitude towards Iran and its nuclear weapons development program, and this needs to change! Critics argue that Germany is a major key to solving the Iranian nuclear and human rights crisis. How do you analyze German-Iranian relations? What happened with regard to the German hostages in Iran is symptomatic of Germany’s overall relationship with Iran. [She is referring to Marcus Hellwig and Jens Koch, two German journalists seized by the Iranian government in mid-October for interviewing family members of Sakineh Mohammad Ashtiani, an Iranian woman sentenced to death by stoning for alleged adultery.] Berlin is reluctant to impose harsh sanctions and continues to be a major trade partner of the Islamic Republic. The German economy is reacting with caution to the possible tightening of economic sanctions against Iran. Supposedly, Teheran would no longer have reason to repay its debts once the guarantees for Iran (Hermes-Bürgschaften) are further reduced, or discontinued altogether. This would include outstanding payments in the amount of approximately 5.2 billion euros; which, in the event that they are not repaid, the Federal Treasury would have to cover.

With more than 1,900 members, the Chamber of Commerce in Teheran is among Germany¹s largest foreign trade chambers.

The hostage crisis shows how much Germany is under pressure now: As long as Teheran holds the hostages, Berlin will think twice about acting against the Islamic Republic and/or jumping on Washington¹s bandwagon. The German government needs to take a tougher line and stance toward Iran.

What more can the UN Security Council do to penalize Iran?

Targeting more entities, such as IRISL, the Islamic Republic¹s Shipping Lines, and IRGC-controlled companies, as well as individuals, is vital to the global sanctions regime. With so many regimes still critical of Iran sanctions, it is of vital importance that these entities and individuals are “designated” at the UN, as this can ultimately contribute to a wider implementation of sanctions.

Of course, and unfortunately, multilateral action is very difficult to achieve. Targeting IRGC-affiliated companies is one effective strategy.

These sanctions are, however, are just reinforcements of previously issued sanctions, and not completely new ones. The good and important thing about the new set of UN-sanctions is the language, as it calls upon all states to take more stringent action against the IRGC and IRGC-affiliated entities.

In addition to focusing on IRGC-affiliated companies, the UN-sanctions are targeting [40] individuals [putting them under a travel ban and freezing their assets] and requiring countries to inspect ships or planes headed to and from Iran if they suspect banned cargo is on board.

However ­ and this is one of the weaknesses of these sanctions ­ there is no authorization to actually board ships by force at sea. In addition, Iran has proven to be very adept at obscuring its ownership of cargo vessels. Another weakness of the new sanctions is the fact that there is a non-retroactive requirement, which makes it very difficult to stop pre-existing contracts.Iran

Dr. Gregor is an Austrian-born political analyst with Réalité-EU, a NGO that mainly tracks European-Iranian economic and political relations and advocates hard-hitting sanctions against the Islamic Republic to force Iran’s government to cease building its nuclear weapons program.

New Israeli military technology speeds up warfare – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Sophisticated communication system that compiles battlefield information in video game-like map interface designed to knock down military’s response time

Associated Press

Intense winds scraped sand from the desert floor, clouding the view and leaving the Israeli soldiers scarcely able to see each other as they practiced blasting artillery shells at distant targets.

In a nearby armored vehicle, commanders armed with small screens could easily monitor every cannon, jeep and target involved, ordering strikes with the tap of a finger. Their weapon: a sophisticated communication system that compiles battlefield information in an easy-to-use, video game-like map interface, helping militaries make sense of the chaos of battle.

The Associated Press was given rare access to the exercise by a military eager to reclaim some of the deterrence it lost over technologically inferior Arab forces.

That deterrence has eroded in recent times, as guerrilla warfare left conventional armies – here as elsewhere – looking clumsy and vulnerable. In a monthlong war in 2006, Lebanese guerrillas with relatively simple rockets knocked out Israeli tanks, and Israel’s high-tech military was powerless to stop a barrage of primitive, unguided Katyusha rockets on northern Israel. The latest computerized gadgetry is designed to knock down the military’s response time. Troops on the ground can add new targets as soon as they spot them – like militants on foot, a rocket squad or a vehicle – to the network for commanders to see instantly and hit. Strikes that used to take 20 or more minutes to coordinate now take just seconds, said Maj. Hagai Ben-Shushan, head of the C4I section for Israel’s artillery. “It doesn’t take much, then shells are going to the target,” he said. Israel is among several nations harnessing digital and satellite technology to develop C4I systems – short for “command, control, communications, computers and intelligence” – that integrate battlefield information. The goal is to have “all the elements of a force … seeing the same tactical picture, and you can move information from one to the other completely seamlessly,” said Britain-based Giles Ebb, who studies such systems for Jane’s Information Group.

System yet to be battle-tested

C4I systems are operational in the United States, which started development in the 1990s, as well as France, Singapore, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, among other countries, Ebb said.

Israel’s version – being developed over the past decade or so – is “a little bit further down the road than some people … because they have a focus on the problem, they are constantly operationally alert, and they need to be as operationally developed as they can,” Ebb said. The army says it started using the first, basic version in 2005, but it did not include all units and functions. The latest, completed in 2009 and in training since last March, allows all forces on the ground to communicate instantaneously. “Visually, now everything is on the map, so it’s much easier to coordinate,” said the battalion commander whose men were being trained. “You can easily understand the map and the position of forces.” He spoke on condition of anonymity under military rules. On a stretch of sand near the army base at Shivta, deep in Israel’s southern Negev desert, six artillery cannons stood with their barrels aimed at targets about 4 miles (6 kilometers) away. Commanders in a nearby armored vehicle stared at two screens, watching all movement on an interactive satellite map. Pink squares marked each cannon, dotted lines of shell trajectory extended from their barrels and circles showed the expected blast radius of any shells fired. Different symbols marked other army vehicles, their locations kept up to date with GPS-like devices. All the vehicles carried similar screens, giving soldiers a realtime map of the battlefield. One soldier demonstrates how to add a new target to the map: A tap on the screen places it, then he can describe its size and character. Seeing the target, a commander can then order a strike with a few more taps, deciding who will fire and how much. The order immediately appears on those units’ screens. The system’s newest version, built by Israeli defense contractor Elbit, has yet to be battle-tested, but Israel used an earlier one in its Gaza offensive two years ago, Ben-Shushan said.

That war, launched to stop militant rocket fire on Israeli towns, killed about 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis. Four of the 10 Israeli soldiers were killed by friendly fire, but Col. Gil Maoz, head of Israel’s Digital Army program, said the technology helped to prevent other Israeli fatalities. Israel had only an early version of the system during its war with the Lebanese militia Hezbollah in 2006, which killed about 1,200 Lebanese and 160 Israelis. An Israeli investigation into the war, which was widely seen as a failure, criticized the inability of commanders to relay key information to the field. Maoz said having the system then could have lowered the Israeli death toll. Elbit spokeswoman Dalia Rosen said that what sets the Israeli system apart from others is the ease with which it allows land, naval and air forces to communicate with each other and its ability to link everyone from rank-and-file soldiers in the field to the highest commanders. She said Australia purchased Elbit communications technology for its own battle management system in a deal last year valued at $298 million. ent system in a deal last year valued at $298 million.

Iran increases stockpile of higher enriched uranium, defying UN demands – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Iran’s nuclear chief says his country now has 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent, compared to 30 kilograms in October.

By The Associated Press

Iran’s nuclear chief said his country has increased the stockpile of uranium it began enriching to higher levels last year in defiance of UN demands to halt the program.

Vice-President Ali Akbar Salehi, who is also Iran’s acting foreign minister, said Iran now has 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent.

	Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, left, gestures to chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, after unveiling of a uranium centrifuge in Tehran on April 9, 2010.
	Photo by: AP

Iran reported a stockpile of 30 kilograms in October.

Uranium enriched to 20 per cent is enough to produce fuel for a medical research reactor but far below the more than 90 per cent required to build fissile material for nuclear warheads.

A deal for the West to provide fuel for the reactor has all but fallen apart in the deadlock over Iran’s broader nuclear program.

Western powers fear Iran wants to build bombs and is not peaceful as Tehran says.

Three foreign workers wounded in mortar attack near Gaza border – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Three mortars fired from the Gaza Strip towards Israel on Saturday afternoon; two land in open territory but one strikes a populated area in a kibbutz along the Gaza border.

By Yanir Yagna and Anshel Pfeffer

Three foreign workers were injured on Saturday when a mortar fired from the Gaza Strip exploded in the Sha’ar Hanegev region.

Three mortars were fired from the Gaza Strip around 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. Two of the mortars landed in open territory but one struck a populated area in a kibbutz near the border fence, wounding three foreign workers and damaging property.

	Security fence along the Gaza Strip border
	Photo by: IDF Spokespersons’ Office

One of the foreign workers was in moderate-serious condition from shrapnel injuries to his chest. A second foreign worker was moderately wounded by shrapnel in his leg and a third was lightly wounded in the incident.

The three were transported to Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva for medical treatment.

The incident occurred a day after an Israel Defense Forces soldier was killed and four IDF troops were wounded in a friendly fire incident on the Gaza border as the soldiers engaged a group of armed militants who were apparently approaching the border to lay explosives.

End of Dagan era: Iran question resurfaces – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Mossad chief concludes eight year term with series of unprecedented achievements, list of enemies. Issue of Iranian nuclear program, Hezbollah threat now in hands of new boss Ynet reporters

After eight years at the helm, Mossad chief Meir Dagan on Thursday bid farewell from the people who accompanied him throughout his nearly decade-long tenure.

Dagan’s secretary handed him his famous pipe and a pouch of tobacco for the very last time. He embraced her and his bodyguard, and was escorted to a vehicle waiting outside.

At that very moment, the organization marked an end of an era. Dagan left behind many devoted supporters and a significant number of enemies, but even they agreed that during his tenure Dagan led the organization to operational achievements that could only be dreamt about eight years ago. Dagan focused mainly on the Iranian issue, including its nuclear program and subversion of moderate regimes in the Middle East as well as support for terror. As such, the Mossad chief placed Iran on top of the organization’s priority list – a strategy that was officially confirmed by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and reaffirmed by his successors Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu. So where does the Iranian nuclear program stand with the departure of Dagan? As early as a year-and-a-half ago the Mossad head told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Islamic Republic will not be able to obtain nuclear weapons before 2014. According to recent estimates, the completion date might be postponed by another year or two, even if western attempts to thwart the program prove futile.

The ‘Dagan method’

The Iranians deal with a significant number of internal issues, which hinder their ability to manage complex technologies. These include political pressure on Tehran, international economic sanctions and isolation, which in turn prevents them from obtaining necessary equipment for the development of the nuclear program, such as metals, computers and machines. Along with all these difficulties, documents published by whistleblower website WikiLeaks reveal that domestic ethnic and social tensions are being used in order to undermine the ayatollahs’ regime. The international pressure and high economic price Iranian citizens have to pay for the nuclear program has stirred a debate among senior officials, on whether the high cost is worthwhile compared to the benefits the government would gain from obtaining the nuclear technology. Many within Israel claim that Mossad’s action during Dagan’s days, along with mounting international pressure on Tehran would achieve much better results than a military operation.

Student protest in Iran (Archive photo: AFP)

Some also fear the steep political and economic costs such a move might inflict on Israel. Hezbollah is armed with an arsenal of rockets and missiles that surpass that of 90% of world countries.

While experts are split over whether or not a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities can cause significant damage to its nuclear program, such a strike would undoubtedly lead to a counter strike against Israel, which apart from Hezbollah may include Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and perhaps even Syria.These experts’ basic assumption is that every country that obtains nuclear warfare would have second strike capabilities, and thus be able to execute its plan sooner or later – even if attacked.

Avoid war at all cost

Jerusalem and Washington are in concurrence over the facts and intelligence estimates vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program. Though the United States does not consider the Iranian program as an immediate threat, it nonetheless comprehends Israel’s concern over its potentially devastating consequences. Will the United States attack? Experts point to very slim chances; especially due to the fact that Washington is already neck-deep in three wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan – which have taken a heavy human and financial toll on the Americans. Over the years, many different views vis-à-vis peace and war with Damascus have been attributed to Dagan by political analysts. However, what has been made clear by information leaked from government meetings during the 2nd Lebanon War, is that the Mossad chief believes Israel should avoid a war with Syria by all cost. Nevertheless, Israel should not forego its essential interests, especially those related to the imminent threat it is facing from the Iran-Hezbollah axis.

Top priority. Nuclear reactor in Bushehr (Photo: AP)

The Mossad seems to take Hezbollah, as well as Hamas, quite seriously. The Shiite terrorist organization’s ability to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, and the capability of both organizations to carry out suicide attacks, has been a cause for major concern within the Israeli intelligence community – perhaps even more so than Syria’s military might.

This is why during Dagan’s tenure, the Mossad had a key role in shaping the positions of the current prime minister, as well as its predecessor, who both refused paying the high price required in order to secure the release of captured soldier Gilad Shalit. Dagan refused to free 450 leading terrorists to the West Bank, for fear that many Israelis would eventually pay with their lives.

Minimal political damage

Significant operations attributed to the Mossad during Dagan’s term in office include the assassinations of Imad Mughniya, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, Muhammad Suleiman and Iranian nuclear scientists. Israel has never claimed responsibility for any of the aforementioned operations, but Hezbollah, Hamas and Tehran firmly insisted that the intelligence agency was behind them. The assassination of Mughniya severely curtailed Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and the organization has yet to find a worthy replacement. Instead, it splitted his responsibilities between four different group members. Al-Mabhouh’s assassination sparked an international media storm, during which Israel was accused, among other things, of passport theft – leading to diplomatic crises with some of its closest allies. However, looking back, it seems the political damage Israel sustained was fickle and minimal at most, and has not jeopardized the cooperation between Mossad and other intelligence agencies. Eight years on, Dagan can be content. So can the group of people working under his command, which he proudly mentioned at any given opportunity.

But even Dagan would admit to some of the organization’s failures: The Mossad wasn’t able to gather intelligence on the fate of missing navigator Major Ron Arad, or obtain accurate information on the whereabouts of captive soldier Gilad Shalit. It also failed to return the remains of spy Eli Cohen from Syria, and was unable to shed new light on the fate of those who went missing during the Battle of Sultan Yacoub. These will now become the responsibility of new Mossad Chief Tamir Pardo.Ron Ben-Yishai and Attila Somfalvi contributed to this report

David Ignatius – Buying time with Iran.

Sunday, January 9, 2011

The Obama administration has concluded that Iran’s nuclear program has been slowed by a combination of sanctions, sabotage and Iran’s own technical troubles. Because of the delay, U.S. officials see what one describes as “a little bit of space” before any military showdown with Iran.

Israeli officials, too, see more time on the clock. Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s deputy prime minister, noted the Iranian slowdown in a Dec. 29 interview with Israel Radio and said the West has up to three years to stop Tehran from making a bomb.

“These [Iranian] difficulties slow the timeline, of course,” said Yaalon, a former Israeli defense chief. And last Thursday, outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan told Israeli reporters that Iran couldn’t build a bomb before 2015 at the earliest, in part because of unspecified “measures that have been deployed against them.”

A senior Obama administration official gave me a similar account of Iran’s troubles. “They’re not moving as fast as we had feared a year ago,” he said.

This new assessment of Iran’s nuclear setbacks has lowered the temperature on what had been 2010’s hottest strategic issue. Last summer, Jerusalem and Washington were talking themselves into a war fever, prompted in part by a powerful article in the Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg that starkly described the likelihood of military action. This fever seems to have broken.

What’s increasingly clear is that low-key weapons – covert sabotage and economic sanctions – are accomplishing many of the benefits of military action, without the costs. It’s a devious approach – all the more so because it’s accompanied by near-constant U.S. proposals of diplomatic dialogue – but in that sense, it matches Iran’s own operating style of pursuing multiple options at once.

Officials won’t discuss the clandestine program of cyberattack and other sabotage being waged against the Iranian nuclear program. Yet we see the effects – in crashing centrifuges and reduced operations of the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz – but don’t understand the causes. That’s the way covert action is supposed to work.

The most direct confirmation that sabotage has paid off came from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said in November that the Stuxnet computer virus had damaged the Natanz operation. “They succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges with the software they had installed in electronic parts,” he said.

A fascinating (and remarkably detailed) account of the Stuxnet attack was published Dec. 22 by the Institute for Science and International Security. The study described how the virus was targeted to attack a key electronic control in the centrifuges, known as a “frequency converter,” so that the spin of the rotors was increased and slowed in a way that would cause a malfunction.

According to the ISIS report, the virus may have been introduced in early or mid 2009. By late 2009 or early 2010, the study said, Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 centrifuges – far more than normal breakage. The virus hid its electronic tracks, but an analysis by the security firm Symantec showed that the code included the term “DEADFOO7,” which could refer to the aviation term for a dead engine and also be a play on James Bond’s fictional code name.

Stuxnet was just one of what appeared to have been a series of efforts to disrupt the supply chain of the Iranian nuclear program. “Such overt and covert disruption activities have had significant effect in slowing Iran’s centrifuge program,” concluded the ISIS.

The delays in the Iranian program are important because they add strategic warning time for the West to respond to any Iranian push for a bomb. U.S. officials estimate that if Iran were to try a “break out” by enriching uranium at Natanz to the 90 percent level needed for a bomb, that move (requiring reconfiguration of the centrifuges) would be detectable – and it would take Iran one to two more years to make a bomb.

The Iranians could try what U.S. officials call a “sneak out” at a secret enrichment facility like the one they constructed near Qom. They would have to use their poorly performing (and perhaps still Stuxnet-infected) old centrifuges or an unproven new model. Alternative enrichment technologies, such as lasers or a heavy-water reactor, don’t appear feasible for Iran now, officials say. Foreign technology from Russia and other suppliers has been halted, and the Iranians can’t build the complex hardware (such as a “pressure vessel” needed for the heavy-water reactor) on their own.

The Obama administration keeps holding the door open for negotiations, and another round is scheduled this month in Istanbul. But the real news is that Tehran has technical problems – bringing sighs of relief (and a few mischievous smiles) in the West.

Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Timetable | The National Interest Blog.

Ticking clocks and threats – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

As new people take the top spots in the army and Mossad, Iran will continue to be a major focus of their concern. In addition, the possibility of Israeli military action must remain on the table.

By Amos Harel

It’s a safe assumption that outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan and outgoing Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, devoted considerable effort to thwarting the Iranian nuclear threat during their tenures. Dagan’s eight-year term ended yesterday; Ashkenazi’s four years will reach their conclusion in mid-February. There were significant developments regarding Iran during these years: breakdowns of the centrifuges, shipments that did not reach their destination, revelations of embarrassing intelligence information at critical moments – and even exploding scientists. The international media, and sometimes the Iranians themselves, attributed these events to various Western espionage agencies.

Ashkenazi and Dagan are both said to have followed a pragmatic, moderate line concerning key strategic issues that are worrisome to Israel. Despite almost unavoidable turf wars between the heads of the security branches, a well-coordinated alignment was fashioned between them, along with the head of the Shin Bet security service, Yuval Diskin (who will be concluding six years in office this May ). In the last part of their terms, the three established a strong, influential axis that was difficult to bypass on crucial decisions. The Iranian issue is now being passed on to their successors. It will occupy a high place on the agenda of the new Mossad chief, Tamir Pardo, and of the chief of staff-designate, Yoav Galant.

To date, neither Pardo nor Galant has expressed himself publicly on the subject. Galant’s image here – and, perhaps more important, as perceived by Israel’s neighbors – is one of a charismatic commander driven by a “can do” mentality. Still, it would be wrong to infer, from his relative hawkishness on Gaza, his views about a future confrontation in Lebanon or with Iran. The weight of responsibility is very different when one holds the top job.

The year ahead will see a few processes converging. In the international arena, the impact of the sanctions on Iran will increase, and the United States will grope its way out of neighboring Iraq. In Israel, along with the changes in the top ranks of the defense establishment, there might be a reshuffle of the coalition and possibly elections.

A historic mission

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saw his return to power after a 10-year break as the resumption of a historic mission to remove the nuclear threat. The impasse that has been created in negotiations with the Palestinians, combined with the feeling that Israel is now alone in dealing with Iran, contains a potential for misadventure.

Some of Netanyahu’s advisers speak contemptuously about ranking officers in the military “who don’t know how to do anything except preach peace with Syria and talk about the Iranian problem.”

It is, of course, important to create an Israeli offensive threat as a means of pressure on Iran. However, intelligence personnel in some Western countries are warning that a premature Israeli attack would terminate the possibility of diplomatic activity against Iran. In a speech he delivered two months ago in New Orleans to the General Assembly of the Jewish Federations of North America, Netanyahu called on the Americans to create a concrete threat against Iran. The reprimand followed immediately: Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated in an interview that an attack would only allow the rulers in Tehran to regroup against their opponents.

Last week, in an interview with Israel Radio, the minister of strategic affairs, Moshe Ya’alon, who is also a member of the ministerial forum of seven, said it would take three more years for Iran to acquire offensive nuclear capability. (In Ya’alon’s case, there is a considerable disparity between his hawkishness in the Palestinian context and his approach to other issues. )

Netanyahu himself has not said much in public about Iran since the embarrassment in New Orleans. But his close associate, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, addressed the issue fairly extensively this week, in a conference held by the Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University. According to Barak, “Israel’s future in the region is in the balance.” He urged a bold political strategy that would restore the initiative to Israel, though he did not elaborate on it. Iran, he said, is a threat to the world order, is striving for nuclear arms and aspires to regional hegemony.

Last summer, Barak was disdainful of the results of sanctions against Iran. This week he admitted that they “have definitely scored achievements, but there is no chance that they alone will stop the Iranian effort. Far more acute sanctions – crippling sanctions – are needed.” He reiterated his view that no option must be ruled out. That is Israeli leaders’ code for a threat to attack Iran, but it is couched in language that will not result in a scolding from Washington.

The strong impact of the relatively sharp sanctions approved by the UN Security Council last June surprised both Israel and Iran.

“The effect has been stronger than we anticipated,” an Israeli political source who has been involved with this issue for many years admits. “Everyone understands today that the sanctions are working. The leadership there is under pressure. There has been a sharp rise in the price of gasoline and domestic electricity, and within two months there will be additional increases. The impact has not yet reached its peak.”

Gary Samore, President Barack Obama’s chief adviser on the subject of weapons of mass destruction, said last month at a Washington conference that the administration is “determined to maintain and even increase pressure” if Iran does not strike a deal with the international community.

In December, following lengthy pondering of the issue, Tehran returned to the format of talks with the six powers at a meeting in Geneva. The U.S. administration understands that the resumption of the talks reflects Iran’s desire to gain time, Samore remarked. Another round of talks is expected at the end of this month in Istanbul. By renewing the discussions, the Iranians are able to release a little pressure at home, while making a good-will gesture toward the West.

Obama is currently absorbing ongoing criticism in the realm of foreign policy, from the lack of response, to the provocations by North Korea, to the stalemate on the Palestinian question. As for Iran, “We have to be truthful,” the Israeli source says. “He is far more serious than his predecessor. The president stated from the outset that he would follow a combined path of dialogue and sanctions, and that is what he has done. The measures against Iran are more acute than anything we had in the past. The administration is delivering the goods.”

Israeli Military Intelligence describes the development of the Iranian threat in terms of clocks: the project clock, the sanctions clock and the regime-change clock. But if the first clock shows the hour is 9, the two others lag far behind. The hopes that were generated by the “green revolution” – the unrest following the presidential election in Iran a year and a half ago – have been shattered.

“I am not sure that the regime of the ayatollahs will be ruling in Iran 10 years down the line,” Barak said at the Tel Aviv University conference. “On the other hand, I also cannot say that it will fall in a year or two. It is impossible to bet on the toppling of the regime as a working assumption.”

Prof. Bernard Hourcade, a French expert on Iran, who took part in the conference, told Haaretz that “the Iranian clock is not in our [the West’s] hands. Iran already achieved significant nuclear capability the moment it upgraded the quality of its uranium enrichment. The main clock is the one that is ticking within Iranian society.”

According to Hourcade, a major consideration driving President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is to preserve the hegemony of his camp in the next presidential elections, set for 2013 (Ahmadinejad himself cannot by law run for a third term ): “In order to present himself as a winner, Ahmadinejad needs an accomplishment. An agreement in which the international community recognizes Iran’s right to enrich uranium to a level at which it has no military use, and the lifting of the sanctions, could provide that accomplishment. The United States, too, is more amenable now to an arrangement along those lines, because it needs Iranian cooperation in order to leave Iraq peacefully.”

Hourcade cites a variation on the deal for the scientific research reactor in Tehran, an initiative the Iranians toyed with but which was dropped a year ago. At the same time, he admits that there is an inbuilt difficulty in trying to decode the intentions of the Iranian leadership at its diverse levels. A Western diplomat who took part in the most recent rounds of talks on a nuclear compromise says, “We know a lot less about Iran than we knew about China.”

Hourcade, a senior research fellow at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, agrees. He himself is retiring in March, and says he finds few experts of stature on Iran in the West. He used to be a welcome guest in Iran and actually lived there and managed a French institute during the first five years after the Islamic revolution. In recent years it has been intimated to him that he would not be welcome in the country. He is also not overly impressed by the quality of the information possessed by Western intelligence agencies. “They know how to blow up things, not analyze them,” he says.

The WikiLeaks documents have made clear the global situation with regard to the threat. In contrast to the situation that existed in late 2007 – when a U.S. intelligence report asserted that there was no proof of Iranian progress on nuclear weapons – the Western powers now seem to agree with the Israeli analysis of the danger, the timetable and, to some extent, the need for harsher sanctions. The documents also lifted the masks from the position of the Arab world. The Arabs view the Iranian nuclear project as a serious problem and would be happy if someone resolved it for them, preferably with the use of military force.

Paradoxically, all this leaves Israel, at the beginning of 2011, in a better place than it was before, despite the Iranians’ progress. Israel must see itself as part of a global effort to curb the nuclear danger, and not insist on making itself the bull’s-eye of Iran’s target. Israel’s response to the threat must be composed of more profound elements than simple specifications of bombing sorties: What’s needed is a combination of political initiative, preventive effort, upgraded defensive ability and a strike-back capability – but not the total subjugation of resources and initiatives to dealing with remote scenarios of a threat that Israel is unlikely to be able to cope with on its own.