WarSclerotic

Israel fears regime change in Egypt, worrying about the Muslim Brotherhood | News-Worthy Information.

News-worthy.info — Israel is watching developments in Egypt with concern. The government is standing by autocratic Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, out of fear that the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood could take power and start supplying arms to Hamas.

Israel is usually a country where politicians have an opinion on any topic, and where they are more than happy to make it public. But in recent days, Israel’s leadership has been unusually silent on a certain question. No one, it seems, is willing to make an official comment on the ongoing unrest in Egypt, where protesters have been holding anti-government rallies. It’s not because nobody in Israel is interested in the riots in the country’s southern neighbor — quite the contrary, Israeli news channels have been reporting continuously on recent events in the Arab world, from Tunisia to Lebanon.

Radio, television and newspapers have been discussing with fascination and even excitement the courage of the demonstrators in the streets of Cairo. They give the impression that they are not only celebrating the historic spectacle, but that they actually want to see democracy in Egypt.

But the Israeli government is keeping quiet. “We are closely monitoring the events, but we do not interfere in the internal affairs of a neighboring state,” was the curt answer from the Israeli Foreign Ministry to requests for comments.

So for journalists looking for quotes, it is a happy coincidence that Israel’s former Industry and Trade Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer resigned from the Israeli cabinet last week and can now freely express his opinions as a member of the opposition Labor Party. “I don’t think it is possible (for there to be a revolution in Egypt),” Ben-Eliezer told Israeli Army Radio. “I see things calming down soon.” The Iraqi-born former minister is a renowned expert on Israeli-Arab relations and is a friend of the Egyptian intelligence chief Omar Suleiman.

Ben Eliezer’s statement is consistent with the assessment of members of Israel’s intelligence community and Middle East experts, who point to the strength of Egypt’s army. In his remarks to Army Radio, Ben-Eliezer also explained Israel’s position on the protests. “Israel cannot do anything about what is happening there,” he said. “All we can do is express our support for (Egyptian President Hosni) Mubarak and hope the riots pass quietly.” He added that Egypt was Israel’s most important ally in the region.

Uneasy Peace

Egypt was the first Arab state to sign a peace treaty with Israel, in 1979, but the relationship between the neighboring countries remains delicate. Good relations are limited to government circles. The regime in Cairo suppresses attempts to establish closer links between the countries’ civil societies. The professional associations of doctors, engineers or lawyers, for example, require their members to not contribute to normalizing relations with Israel.

Even 30 years after the peace agreement, annual trade between the neighboring countries only amounts to a value of $ 150 million (€110 million). (For comparison, Israel’s trade with the European Union was worth around €20 billion in 2009.)

A recent incident involving the vice governor of the Sinai Peninsula reveals how many Egyptians think about Israel. After a shark attack on the coast, the official said that it could not be ruled out that the deadly fish had been employed by Israeli intelligence to harm the Egyptian tourism industry. After the bloody attack on a church in Alexandria on Jan. 1, a spokesman for Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood speculated that Israel could be responsible for the attack, with the intention of sowing discord between Christians and Muslims.

Indeed, it is the Muslim Brotherhood that motivates Israel to support Mubarak. It is considered the most popular political movement in Egypt, and its position regarding the peace treaty with Israel is clear: They would revoke it immediately if they came to power. “Democracy is something beautiful,” said Eli Shaked, who was Israel’s ambassador to Cairo from 2003 to 2005, in an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE. “Nevertheless, it is very much in the interests of Israel, the United States and Europe that Mubarak remains in power.”

For Israel, more is at stake than the current so-called “cold” peace with Egypt and a few tens of millions of dollars in trade. “Never before have Israel’s strategic interests been so closely aligned with those of the Sunni states as today,” says Shaked, referring to Arab countries whose populations are mainly Sunni Muslim, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The recent publication of the US diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks showed what he means: Much of the Arab world, and especially Mubarak, sees Shiite Iran and its allies, such as Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as an existential threat, just as Israel does.

Potential Serious Danger

“If regime change occurs in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood would take the helm, and that would have incalculable consequences for the region,” says Shaked. The Israeli government has noted with concern the fact that, even after 30 years of peace, Egypt’s army is still equipped and trained mainly with a possible war against Israel in mind.

A cancellation of the peace treaty would open up a new front for Israel against the 11th largest army in the world, which is equipped with modern American weapons. But what Israel fears more than a — somewhat unlikely — armed conflict with Egypt is an alliance between an Islamist regime in Cairo and Hamas, which considers itself an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Today the Egyptian army tries to stop — albeit often ineffectually — weapons smuggling from Sinai to Gaza, the main supply route for Hamas. An Egyptian regime that opened the border with Gaza for arms deliveries would pose a serious danger to Israel.

Shaked considers the West’s demands for more openness and democracy in Egypt to be a fatal mistake. “It is an illusion to believe that the dictator Mubarak could be replaced by a democracy,” he says. “Egypt is still not capable of democracy,” he adds, pointing out that the illiteracy rate is over 20 percent, to give just one example. The Muslim Brotherhood is the only real alternative, he says, which would have devastating consequences for the West. “They will not change their anti-Western attitude when they come to power. That has not happened (with Islamist movements) anywhere: neither in Sudan, Iran nor Afghanistan.”

Ultimately the choice is between a pro- and an anti-Western dictatorship, says Shaked. “It is in our interest that someone from Mubarak’s inner circle takes over his legacy, at any cost.” In the process, it is not possible to rule out massive bloodshed in the short term, he says. “It would not be the first time that riots in Egypt were brutally crushed”. (Source: Spiegel Online)

2 killed in Egyptian clashes, ElBaradei under house arrest.

At least two people were killed on Friday in mass Egyptian protests against the government.

One woman was killed in Cairo, and another man was shot to death in Suez.

The Egyptian government imposed a curfew from 6 pm to 7 am on Friday, in the cities of Cairo, Alexandria, and Suez after violent demonstrations there.

The decree was handed down by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who ordered the Egyptian army to give reinforcement to police to quell the protests, reported al-Jazeera.

Also Friday, police placed Nobel Peace laureate Mohamed ElBaradei under house arrest.

Earlier, after joining the latest round of protests, ElBaradei and his supporters were forced to hide inside a mosque while hundreds of riot police laid siege to it, firing tear gas in the streets around so no one could leave.

One of the leaders of the opposition, Ayman Nour of the “El-Ghad” movement, also sustained a head injury from a stone, said al-Jazeera.

Friday’s protests saw tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators pouring into the streets of Egypt, stoning and confronting police who fired back with rubber bullets and tear gas in the most violent and chaotic scenes yet in the challenge to President Hosni Mubarak’s 30-year rule.

Groups of thousands of protesters, some chanting “out, out, out,” gathered at different venues across Cairo, some marching toward major squares and across scenic Nile bridges. Security officials said there were protests in at least 11 of the country’s 28 provinces.

The protesters have said they are emboldened by the uprising in Tunisia, another north African Arab nation. Egypt is Washington’s closest Arab ally, but Mubarak may be losing US support. The Obama administration has publicly counseled Mubarak to introduce reforms and refrain from using violence against the protesters.

US President Barack Obama said Thursday the anti-government protests filling the streets show the frustrations of Egypt’s citizens.

“It is very important that people have mechanisms in order to express their grievances,” Obama said.

Authorities appeared to have disrupted social networking sites, used as an organizing tool by protesters, throughout the week. Those disruptions escalated overnight, when Internet and cell phone services, at least in Cairo, appeared to be largely cut off. However, the extreme measures did not prevent tens of thousands from flooding the streets.

Mubarak has not been seen publicly or heard from since the protests began Tuesday. While Mubarak may still have a chance to ride out this latest challenge, his choices are limited, and all are likely to lead to a loosening of his grip on power.

Mubarak has not said yet whether he will stand for another six-year term as president in elections this year. He has never appointed a deputy and is thought to be grooming his son Gamal to succeed him despite popular opposition. According to leaked US memos, hereditary succession also does not meet with the approval of the powerful military.

Mubarak and his government have shown no hint of concessions to the protesters who want political reform and a solution to rampant poverty, unemployment and rising food prices.

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Special Report January 28, 2011, 5:46 PM (GMT+02:00)

Rising level of violence in Cairo

Friday evening, Jan. 28, the fourth day of riotous street demonstrations against his rule, president Hosni Mubarak asked the army to take charge of security and imposed a curfew on Cairo, Alexandria and Suez until 0700 hours Saturday. A least two deaths and dozens of people were injured in the rising turbulence of clashes between security forces and the swelling ranks of protesters across the country.

Throughout the day, tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators clashed with beefed up security forces.

In Cairo, their numbers swelled to tens of thousands when Muslim worshippers poured out of the mosques, many heading for the Nile bridges and fighting to cross over to the government district and Tahrir (Liberation) Square on the other side. Security forces firing rubber bullets and tear gas, using water cannons and charging them with batons, injured hundreds but failed to halt the current. Youths climbed over elite security forces’ armored cars trying to pull the men out of the vehicles. Two police stations were torched. The protesters called for President Hosni Mubarak, his family and his ruling elite – “”the corrupt caste” – to step down. Opposition figure Mohamed ElBaradai was placed under house arrest.
In Suez, a protester died in a clash.  In central Alexandria, they set fire to government buildings. Protesters were also on the streets in Suez, Ismailia, Mansoura north of Cairo and northern Sinai. The protest movement Friday was the largest thus far, greatly enlarged by orders to Muslim worshippers to take to the streets from leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, eight of whom were promptly arrested. The demonstrations appear to be better organized and focused on specific targets, primarily security and police facilities, government buildings and offices of Hosni Mubarak’s ruling party.

Egypt protesters clash with police after prayers.

CAIRO — Thousands of Egyptian anti-government protesters clashed Friday with police in Cairo, who fired rubber bullets into the crowds and used tear gas and water cannons to disperse them. It was a major escalation in what was already the biggest challenge to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s 30 year-rule.

Police also used water cannons against Egypt’s pro-democracy leader Mohamed ElBaradei and his supporters as they joined the latest wave of protests after noon prayers. Police also used batons to beat some of ElBaradei’s supporters, who surrounded him to protect him.

A soaking wet ElBaradei was trapped inside a mosque nearly an hour after him and his supporters were water cannoned. Hundreds of riot police laid siege to the mosque, firing tear gas in the streets surrounding it so no one could leave. The tear gas canisters set several cars ablaze outside the mosque. Several people fainted and suffered burns.

Large groups of protesters, in the thousands, were gathered at at least six venues in Cairo, a city of about 18 million people. They are demanding Mubarak’s ouster.

There were smaller protests in Assiut south of Cairo and al-Arish in the Sinai peninsula. Regional television stations were reporting clashes between thousands of demonstrators and police in the Mediterranean port city of Alexandria and Minya south of Cairo.

At the upscale Mohandiseen district, at least 10,000 of people were marching toward the city center chanting “down, down with Mubarak.” The crowd later swelled to about 20,000 as they made their way through residential areas. Residents looking on from apartment block windows waved at them and whistled in support. Others waved the red, white and black Egyptian flags.

At Ramsis square in the heart of the city, thousands of protesters clashed with police as they left the al-Nur mosque after prayers. Police used tear gas and rubber bullets and some of the tear gas was fired inside the mosque where women were taking refuge.

Clusters of riot police with helmets and shields were stationed around the city, at the entrances to bridges across the Nile and other key intersections.

Near the city’s main Tahrir Square downtown, hundreds of riot police clustered together and moved in, anticipating the arrival of a large crowd of protesters. A short while later, thousands of protesters marched across a bridge over the Nile and moved toward the square, where police began firing tear gas into the crowds.

Internet and cell-phone services were disrupted across Egypt starting overnight and throughout the day as authorities used extreme measures to hamper protesters from organizing the mass rallies called after Friday prayers.

Mubarak is Washington’s closest Arab ally, but Washington has signaled that he no longer enjoys its full backing, publicly counseling him to introduce reform and refrain from using violence against the protesters. He has not been seen publicly or heard from since the protests began Tuesday.

Friday’s demonstrations were energized by the return of Nobel Peace laureate ElBaradei on Thursday night, when he said he was ready to lead the opposition toward a regime change. They also got a boost from the endorsement of the country’s biggest opposition group, the Islamic fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood.

Can the U.S. get on the right side in Egypt?.

Anti-government protesters clash with

During her first visit to Egypt as secretary of state, in March 2009, Hillary Rodham Clinton was asked whether human rights violations by the Egyptian government that had been documented by the State Department would interfere with a visit to the White House by President Hosni Mubarak. It was a good question: Mubarak had not been to Washington in five years, thanks to his clashes with the Bush administration over his political repression.

“It is not in any way connected,” Clinton replied. “I really consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family. So I hope to see him often here in Egypt and in the United States.”

Thus began what may be remembered as one of the most shortsighted and wrongheaded policies the United States has ever pursued in the Middle East. Admittedly, the bar is high. But the Obama administration’s embrace of Mubarak, even as the octogenarian strongman refused to allow the emergence of a moderate, middle-class-based, pro-democracy opposition, has helped bring the United States’ most important Arab ally to the brink of revolution. Mass popular demonstrations have rocked the country since Tuesday; Friday, when millions of Egyptians will assemble in mosques, could be fateful.

The administration’s miscalculation about Mubarak was threefold. First, it assumed that the damage done to relations by George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda” was a mistake that needed to be repaired. In fact, Bush’s push for political liberalization was widely viewed, in Egypt and in the region, as the saving grace of an otherwise bad administration.

Second, the Obama administration’s Middle East experts concluded that there was no chance of serious reform – much less revolution – under Mubarak. So they plotted at playing a “long game” of slowly nurturing grass-roots movements and promoting civil society, in preparation for the day when Egypt might be ready for real reform. In this they badly underestimated the secular opposition that was rapidly growing in the blogosphere and that months ago began rallying behind former U.N. nuclear director Mohamed ElBaradei.

Third, as an emboldened Mubarak stepped up repression, staged a blatantly rigged parliamentary election in November and began laying the groundwork to present himself for “reelection” this year, the administration chose to mute its criticism. Bland, carefully balanced statements were issued by second- and third-level spokesmen, while Clinton and Obama – who regularly ripped Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu – remained silent.

That policy continued until Tuesday, when – disastrously – Clinton called Mubarak’s government “stable” and claimed it was responding to “the legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.” Hours later, riot police attacked the thousands of demonstrators who had gathered in Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Rightly or wrongly, Egyptian opposition activists now say, Clinton and the United States are being blamed in popular opinion for that crackdown. “She is seen as having given Mubarak the green light,” one told me.

Since Tuesday the administration has been frantically trying to catch up with events and at last has begun to adjust its policy. On Wednesday, Clinton appeared before reporters to say, “We support the universal rights of the Egyptian people, including the rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.” The White House press secretary suddenly declined to endorse Mubarak, and administration briefers assured reporters that Obama had supported the reform cause all along.

Egyptians are not so easily spun, nor are they satisfied with the administration’s new stance. “This administration has been at best lukewarm towards our cause of democracy,” Saad Eddin Ibrahim, one of the most respected Egyptian opposition leaders, told me Thursday.

“Clinton’s statement on Tuesday reflected what the policy has been for two years,” Ibrahim said. “The second statement was a bit more balanced. But it is still not balanced enough for our taste. What we hope for is explicit support for the demands that are being put forward by the people in the streets.”

Those demands are coherent and eminently reasonable: Mubarak should step down and be replaced by a transitional government, headed by ElBaradei and including representatives of all pro-democracy forces. That government could then spend six months to a year rewriting the constitution, allowing political parties to freely organize and preparing for genuinely democratic elections. Given time to establish themselves, secular forces backed by Egypt’s growing middle class are likely to rise to the top in those elections – not the Islamists that Mubarak portrays as the only alternative.

Some argue that the United States has little ability to influence Egypt. This ignores the fact that Washington continues to supply the country with billions in aid and is the primary source of weapons and hard currency for the Egyptian military – the likely arbitrator in a showdown between Mubarak and the opposition. In fact, U.S. support for a peaceful transition from Mubarak’s government to a new democracy could be decisive – and it is not too late to take the right side.

Israel should focus on Mideast peace, not Iran’s nukes – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

It’s more important for Israel to focus on accelerated negotiations with the Palestinians than to play the hero against Iran.

By Yoel Marcus

defence.professionals | defpro.com.

Does the IDF really need the F-35, its high cost notwithstanding?

Assessment by Gur Laish, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)

07:04 GMT, January 28, 2011

Do the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) really need the F-35, its high cost notwithstanding? To tackle this question, the essay below first identifies the F-35’s unique features as a fifth generation fighter jet. It then examines the operational need for the F-35 through the prism of the Israel Air Force (IAF), specifically, the aircraft’s ability to complete missions successfully in today’s reality. The premise is that the ability to achieve aerial superiority is a key to effective use of the airpower: the discussion clarifies what precisely is necessary to achieve in order to enjoy aerial superiority and the effect that superiority has on how the force is used. Although a full discussion of the radical change in today’s threat and its effect on achieving aerial superiority lies beyond the scope of this essay, the growing strength of Israel’s enemies, both in theory and in practice, poses a central challenge to what once seemed assured: the IAF’s achievement of aerial superiority. The essay clarifies whether the F-35 can provide a solution to the problem and whether a sufficient response might be provided by other alternatives.

The discussion of alternatives to the F-35 is limited to options that will be available in the near future, and does not examine alternatives in the initial planning stages, whose capabilities and costs are impossible to predict. This focus is essential for an informed, concrete discussion of IAF force buildup in the IDF’s five year plan. Future alternatives cannot play a role in fighter jet contracts signed today. However, a discussion of advanced (and distant future) alternatives to the traditional understanding of aerial superiority as a key to the effective deployment of the air force is not irrelevant and may, in fact, be essential. However, it requires separate and comprehensive deliberations and should not influence present force buildup; the defense establishment would do well to engage in that debate regarding future force buildup.

The F-35 is a fifth generation fighter jet. Its unique advantages include:

a. Stealth technology / low signature, which allows the jet to deal with airborne and land-based radar and perform even in areas defended with surface-to-air missiles or advanced planes. Its edge lies in the capability to handle threats independently while flying through the operational spheres, as opposed to fourth generation planes, which are dependent on a system-wide response.
b. Network capability: The plane has information sharing and shared operational capabilities with other planes and means of combat, thereby allowing greater operational output.
c. Sensor fusion: The plane allows the pilot to deal with a large amount of information gathered by the plane itself that arrives through the network, thereby allowing for full utilization of the plane’s and the system’s capabilities.
d. The plane is built with economic considerations in mind, i.e., operation at reasonable costs (compared to advanced technologies and capabilities).

The need for the F-35 is derived from the Air Force’s missions, which are driven by the need to deter Israel’s enemies from embarking on a war and to serve as a central means of victory in the event that a war nevertheless breaks out.

THE STRATEGIC EFFECT OF THE AERIAL BALANCE OF POWER

The decision on whether or not to go to war is affected primarily by a comparison of power between the sides, with airpower being a primary factor in this equation. For example, Sadat was prepared to launch the Yom Kippur War only after he was guaranteed aerial superiority that could protect Egyptian forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal. The understanding that he would not have aerial superiority outside the range of the surface-to-air missiles was what made him curtail his goals for the war. Similarly, the absolute superiority displayed by the Israel Air Force in the First Lebanon War in attacking the surface-to-air missile batteries on the Syrian-Lebanese border and the aerial battles that followed was a significant factor in Syria’s decision not to open a second front on the Golan Heights. The fact that the Syrians managed to delay the IDF’s advance on the eastern front of Lebanon might perhaps have encouraged them to think they could deal with the IDF on the Golan Heights as well, yet they remained deterred.

The very fact that the Israel Air Force operates the most advanced planes is a deterrent in the balance of power, and thus the element of deterrence, central in Israel’s security concept, almost automatically requires the military to equip itself with the most advanced planes available. In fact, this is what Israel has always done in the past. Deterrence is especially strengthened by fifth generation planes, capable of dealing with advanced aerial defenses and fourth generation planes (such as the MiG-29, the F-15, and the F-16).

THE MEANING OF AERIAL SUPERIORITY IN WAR

In order to become an effective force in the combat theater, an air force must both attain sufficient capability of action and deny the enemy its capability of action. A situation in which an air force has effective capability of action in the sphere under discussion is called “aerial superiority.” The F-35 has been constructed in order to attain just such aerial superiority, and that is its primary asset.

Aerial superiority is not a fixed, immutable quality. Capability of action is a function of the weapon systems operated and the manner in which force is deployed. In order for the Allies (particularly the United States) to carry out the daytime attacks undertaken in World War II in Europe, they needed to be escorted by interception planes and fly in tight attack formations. The significant firepower allowed them to create local aerial superiority at the time of the attack. As long as the Luftwaffe operated effectively, this form of attack granted sufficient aerial superiority to the Americans, even at the cost of considerable numbers of downed planes and pilots. The reliance on escorts limited American operations to the maximum range of the escort planes, which was significantly less than the range of the bombers (hence the importance and the decisive effect of the long range Mustang). The British Royal Air Force chose to attack by night, thereby greatly decreasing the effectiveness of German intercepting planes and the need to deal with them, albeit at the expense of the quality of nighttime attacks. Obviously, there were tradeoffs in the use and effectiveness of force and the degree of aerial superiority. In the Yom Kippur War, the Israel Air Force found it very difficult to assist the ground forces because it did not succeed in achieving aerial superiority by attacking the missile batteries on the front.

Aerial superiority thus changes according to the nature of the action. The manner of operating the aerial force is a function of the aerial superiority it has. To ensure that the aerial force is effective, it requires sufficient aerial superiority for its operational capabilities. Consequently, the effect of new weapon systems on the need for aerial superiority is an important factor. Autonomous precision guided weapons (self-guided munitions, directed to the target without a pilot) with gliding capabilities, such as the JDAM (a GPS-guided gliding bomb), make it possible to attack targets from ranges of 20 km and up. This sharpens the question of the extent of aerial superiority needed in the classic sense of flying over the target region: on the face of it, it is possible to attack the targets from outside the region defended by missiles (standoff attack). One could theoretically say that aerial superiority is not necessary on the front because it is possible to attack targets from one’s own territory, without the need for entering missile-defended areas. However:

a. The ranges of anti-aircraft missiles are growing. It is therefore impossible to ensure that the bombs’ glide range would provide a full response to an attack.
b. The nature of the targets on the front is varied. Some are stationary, which can be easily attack by standoff attack, but others are mobile and cannot be attacked with JDAMs.
c. The number of targets is large. Moreover, any enemy that understands the attack capabilities of the Israel Air Force is increasingly scattering its targets in order to prevent devastating damage by a limited number of sorties. In addition, efforts are made to conceal the targets so that it is difficult to pinpoint them with precision (e.g., it is possible to know that a particular force is located within a said site but not precisely where in that site). The combination of these two factors requires the use of a great deal of ammunition, and at times precision is no substitute for quantity (e.g., when there is uncertainty about the exact location of the target). This combination greatly increases the cost of relying on standoff precision weapons (e.g., the JDAM, and even more so when more expensive and sophisticated weapons are at stake).
d. The greater the reliance on standoff weapons, the greater the need to remain above the target with unmanned vehicles in order to gather intelligence and locate the targets. This need intensifies further in relation to “the disappearing battlefield,” the manner the enemy chooses to overcome aerial superiority. In order to allow for longer flight times for aerial vehicles above the battlefield, a sufficient measure of aerial superiority is required, because while risks to unmanned aircrafts are acceptable, it is impossible to operate them if their attrition rate is too high.

Thus in order to operate effectively above the ground front, standoff fire alone is insufficient. A level of aerial superiority that will allow fighter plane activity above the targets is necessary, which will also enable sufficient aircraft activity at tolerable attrition levels.

From the point of view of defense, it is important to look ahead and recognize that the enemy too will have standoff capabilities (more or less effective). Therefore, it will be necessary to defend not only from the air above the battlefield but also to down the enemy’s planes while they are still in enemy airspace (standoff from their perspective). To attain this, enough aerial superiority is necessary to allow the flight of interceptors on the front. In addition, there are situations in which it is impossible to use long range air-to-air missiles and it is necessary to reach the targets themselves in order to down them. The reason may be operational, e.g., the need to identify the target by sight, or technological, e.g., the countermeans to disrupt radar missiles that require the use of heat-seeking missiles. Hence, also from a defensive viewpoint, the Air Force is required to achieve enough aerial superiority above the front.

TYPES, NUMBERS, AND DYNAMICS OF TARGETS

In addition to fighting on the front, the Air Force is required to act deep in enemy territory. Enemy rocket and surface-to-surface missile systems are stationed in and operated from the rear of its territory. The classic military infrastructures, such as airfields and concentrations of enemy reserves, are far from the front. Operations in the depth will encounter a defense system that is less dense than the one on the front (because it is impossible to concentrate defenses throughout the sphere), but there is no doubt that where the enemy has significant assets there will be aerial defense systems.

The method of operating deep in enemy territory depends on the nature of the targets. Fixed targets, such as airfields and strategic installations, may be attacked even in the absence of aerial superiority by standoff attacks (usually this involves a limited number of high quality targets). Numbers and mobility are additional factors when dealing with rocket and missile systems; as these may require being airborne in the enemy’s rear for an extended period for intelligence gathering and attack, a level of aerial superiority deep in enemy territory is necessary as well. The ability to operate in the enemy’s rear also has strategic value because attacking Israel with firepower from the rear is a central pillar in the attempt by Syria (and Hizbollah) to curtail Israel’s strategic advantage.

The F-35 would allow penetrating and operating in the depth because of its stealth capabilities. The aerial superiority the F-35 would achieve would allow effective action of other systems, such as drones and fourth generation fighter planes. The more the enemy relies on mobile, concealed rocket and missile systems in their territorial depth, so the need for continuous action in the rear increases. The F-35 would be the central component of this capability.

Accordingly, the F-35 is needed for both direct action and attainment of aerial superiority in the enemy’s depth. Sometimes Israel needs to be able to operate in enemy territory even in the absence of a wartime confrontation. Such activity cannot rely on early attacks of aerial defense systems, because the intention would usually be to carry out a surprise operation limited in time and with low chances for escalation. The ability to penetrate areas defended by missiles without having to attack them on the one hand, and with high chances of success and survivability on the other, has critical implications for the decision to carry out such an operation to begin with. Therefore, such ability has strategic importance. The F-35 is well suited to the nature of such operations (possible alternatives will be examined later in the essay).

The need to attain aerial superiority must be examined in context of how the force is used and the challenges posed by the enemy in terms of targets (their numbers and quality). The need for aerial superiority is not axiomatic. However, because the enemy adapts to improved fire capabilities, it is still necessary to have a significant level of superiority, and the ability to achieve it is the basis for attaining the Air Force’s missions in the foreseeable future. Moreover, beyond the significance in terms of how airpower is used is the strategic significance for the enemy’s willingness to continue to fight. If the enemy becomes convinced that it does not have sufficient aerial defenses, the enemy is likely to end the war.

A THREAT TO THE IAF’S ABILITY TO ATTAIN AERIAL SUPERIORITY?

The struggle between “the missile and the wing of the plane” is not new, and has in fact recurred repeatedly since the introduction of surface-toair missiles in the early 1960s. Missiles had almost no effect on the Six Day War, and the IAF attained absolute aerial superiority immediately at the start of the war. To a large extent, the War of Attrition revolved around the fight between missile systems and IAF capabilities to prevent these from being deployed along the Suez Canal sector. The War of Attrition ended with Egypt’s deployment of missiles along the Canal, which in 1973 allowed it to cross the Canal and establish itself defensively on the eastern bank.

During the Yom Kippur War, “the missile bent the wing of the plane” and the Air Force understood the need for developing missile attack capabilities. Such capabilities matured and were demonstrated in the First Lebanon War, and both sides improved their capabilities at the end of the war and immediately afterwards: the Syrians introduced SA-8 mobile missiles and the SA-5 countrywide defensive systems, while the IAF expanded its countermeasures. Over the next 25 years, Israel had absolute aerial superiority in the arena. Recent years have shown an upswing in Syrian (and Iranian) construction of aerial defensive capabilities, prompted by a number of factors:

a. The recovery of Russia (and its military industry) from the collapse of the USSR and the return of Russian industry to the forefront of technology, where it is engaged in the development and implementation of aggressive attempts to market advanced defensive systems.
b. Significant economic support for Syria by Iran, thereby allowing Syria to equip itself, following a long lapse, with imported weapon systems.
c. Syrian understanding that it must change the strategic balance of power with the Israel Air Force if it wishes to be a significant player in the region.

These strategic changes have already been reflected in purchases of defensive systems. Iran procured the SA-15 systems for advanced localized defense; Syria bought the SA-17 for defending high interest targets, such as the front. In addition, there have been contacts, which have not yet developed into signed contracts, for the purchase of the S-300 systems by both countries. This general trend and the related new challenges are slowly questioning the IAF’s previously assured capability of attaining aerial superiority.

The chief capability of the F-35 – its stealth technology – allows it to operate with much greater immunity in areas defended by surface-toair missiles. As such, it is designed to be a central factor in attacking defensive systems and in attaining the required superiority. In addition, its other features – e.g., networking, sensor fusion – turn it into an effective tool against aerial defensive missile systems. Currently the Air Force can attain sufficient aerial superiority, and means for dealing with advanced surface-to-air missiles other than the F-35 are being developed.

However, in the long term, stealth capabilities are at the forefront of future technology. The Israel Air Force must acquire stealth capabilities that will allow it to penetrate defended areas and create sufficient aerial superiority. In this context, one may look at the alternatives to the F-35 as improved versions of fourth generation planes. To the extent that these will allow fourth generation aircraft to operate effectively in areas defended with advanced surface-to-air missiles, they represent relevant alternatives. However, it is not at all clear how one improves a platform like the F-15 such that it will have stealth capabilities without going into a whole new plane development project (e.g., the F-22).

MAINTAINING THE QUALITATIVE EDGE

Russia’s renewed production and sale of high quality weapons, sales by countries in the Far East, and the economic situation in the United States and Europe makes the American (and European) need to sell advanced weapons to states in the region that are not direct enemies of Israel, e.g., Saudi Arabia, more acute than ever. In order to compete with other weapons manufacturers, the Americans must sell the most innovative systems, as with, for example, the recently publicized arms deal to sell and upgrade F-15s to Saudi Arabia. Such weapons deals affect the region both directly and indirectly: directly, in that the very sale of these weapons to the Saudis makes it easier to sell similar weapons to other countries; indirectly, because weapons such as these in Saudi hands spark an arms race among its enemies and motivates them to attain the same weapons. It also legitimizes sales, so that at the end of the process, the entire region is armed with better weapons than before.

However, maintaining Israel’s qualitative edge over the region’s armed forces of enemies and non-enemies is an important component of Israel’s security concept, and the United States is even obligated to this principle by law. When weapons that are identical and at times even superior to what Israel has are sold to other actors in the region, this challenges Israel’s qualitative edge, and the only way to maintain the gap in quality in the air is by purchasing and operating the next generation of weapon systems. Maintaining the qualitative advantage has strategic significance for deterrence and may have concrete effects in a confrontation. The regional arms race forces Israel to equip itself with the next generation of weapon systems.

RENEWAL

The need for the F-35 also stems from the much more prosaic aspect of lifespan: the IAF fleet is aging. The lifespan of planes is limited even if programs to extend it are implemented. When looking at the IAF ORBAT, the first and most important question from a budget standpoint is its size, which has operational significance determining the capability to carry out missions in a given timeframe. However, it also has a strategic impact. Benny Peled, commander of the IAF during the Yom Kippur War, was quoted as saying that one additional day of attrition would bring the Air Force to a red line, under which it would be appropriate to seek a ceasefire. Whether such a red line in fact exists is immaterial; what is important is the ORBAT’s effect on decision makers.

However, almost without any connection to the size of the ORBAT, aging and obsolescence require ongoing ORBAT renewal. As such, a purchase is required every decade. The scope of the deal relates to ORBAT size, but the very need for a fighter jet deal is a direct derivative of ORBAT age and the possibility of extending its lifespan. Once one understands the need for a purchase, it is possible to examine alternatives to the F-35. Note, though, that even if one contends that the Air Force’s ORBAT ought to be reduced in favor of the increased ORBAT of unmanned vehicles, a fighter jet deal is still a necessity.

EXAMINING THE ALTERNATIVES

Against this discussion of the primary reasons the Israel Air Force needs the F-35, it is necessary to investigate whether there are alternatives that can provide a different response to the operational needs.

• Improved F-15s and F-16s

Periodically various proposals are heard such as “F-15s with low radar return,” but these do not provide an actual response to the question of whether the improved airplane can operate independently over advanced aerial defense systems. Moreover, were it possible to come up with such an effective improvement, it would have been the first to compete for the tender that was won by the F-35, as the high cost of the latter is a burden also to the Americans and their partners – who clearly do not have a magic solution to the challenge.

• Surface-to-Surface (Or Sea-to-Surface) Missiles

The enemy’s development of firepower as well as very advanced capabilities of the Israeli military industries at times raise the need to examine alternatives to the F-35 (and perhaps even to fighter planes generally) in the form of attack capabilities by surface-to-surface missiles. This alternative seems to have the advantage in terms of durability in the face of the enemy’s firepower in that it is not dependent on air bases that are (erroneously, in my opinion) seen as vulnerable to enemy attack and in its capability of meeting the enemy’s most advanced air defense systems. This essay will not expand on this point, but the Air Force’s bases are not so vulnerable to enemy fire if it is not highly precise, primarily because since the 1960s the Air Force has been prepared to act under aerial attacks.

On the face of it, it would seem that the surface-to-surface missile provides a good solution for attacking stationary targets. The real test must include an examination of the size of the warhead and its penetration ability against the targets and also an examination of the number of targets it would be necessary to attack. However, surfaceto- surface missiles are liable to be problematic when it comes to mobile targets; even if it is possible to pinpoint the targets, the time it takes for a missile to reach the target (a few minutes) can allow the target to move and the missile to miss its mark. Updating the missile during its flight time is not impossible, but it is not simple and an updating of this kind is also limited. Large warheads are usually not required to destroy moving targets, as they are not fortified, but there is a tradeoff between the size of the warhead and the degree of uncertainty about the precise location of the target. For example, in order to attack a surface-to-air missile system, a very precise pinpointing capability is required of the radar or warhead with a very large kill radius. One may compromise on the kill radius by relying on systems with independent precision homing capabilities or with human intervention (a person receiving intelligence and directing the weapons accordingly), but these systems are themselves vulnerable to missiles, as they are quite slow.

Similar to the discussion about aerial superiority, when one examines the need to confront mobile enemy systems, unmanned aircraft are required to stay aloft in the area of the targets. Such flights may be logical if in tandem activity takes place to attain aerial superiority in the area. If the concept of aerial superiority is exchanged for use of surface-to-surface missiles, unless a supporting effort is made to attain aerial superiority to ensure the activity of the unmanned vehicles, it is not clear that it is at all possible to pinpoint the moving targets.

Finally, it is necessary to examine the numbers of targets to be attacked. Precision surface-to-surface missiles (unlike mid-range nonprecision rockets held by the thousands both by Hizbollah and Syria) are not cheap when compared to aerial weapons (not the platforms). The present discussion cannot include the actual numbers, but such a financial evaluation would conclude that it is impossible to exchange all aerial attacks for attacks by surface-to-surface missiles.

Thus, although surface-to-surface missiles can indeed serve as an effective if not important means of firepower in the IDF repertoire, it cannot serve as a complete substitute for the F-35 in particular and fighter planes in general, and therefore cannot be discussed as an alternative but only as a complement to the military’s firepower.

• Unmanned Vehicles

Some publications depict the F-35 as the last manned vehicle, and some people argue that even now it is unwise to invest in so expensive a manned airplane, and it would be more appropriate to expand the use of drones and other unmanned vehicles (UAVs). However, the term UAV includes many different types and therefore a more detailed discussion is in order. When UAVs made their modest entry into the aerial arena, the craft were cheap and used only for observation. Later development endowed them with many new capabilities, both in terms of observation and attack (most American attack activity in Afghanistan is carried out by the Predator drone equipped with Hellfire missiles). However, as capabilities improve, costs rise. While it was relatively easy to risk the cheaper models, the more expensive vehicles are also few and far between. Although their use in threatened areas does not endanger human lives, it does become impractical militarily if their rate of attrition is high (i.e., they are used up before a mission is accomplished). Moreover, if drones are weighed as an alternative to the F-35, they are also required to carry heavy weapons (or intelligence gathering equipment, for example). This means that a large platform is needed, and that is by no means inexpensive (though certainly nowhere near as costly as the F-35). For the larger UAV to be resistant to advanced defense systems (and advanced airplanes), it must have advanced technologies, be they evasive or defensive systems. As such, manning aerial vehicles does not dramatically affect the cost or the ability to operate them in the arena of interest.

This is not to say that no worthwhile operational product is possible from UAVs in general and from advanced UAVs in particular. However, inexpensive models whose attrition can be sustained are of limited capabilities; on the other hand, costly vehicles have no significant advantage as an alternative to the F-35 (beyond the fact that the latter do not yet exist). In other words, the contribution of the UAV would be in certain fields and areas; the UAV does not seem as a complete replacement for the F-35, and therefore the discussion must focus on it as a complement rather than an alternative.

It is not impossible that the future will offer a more complete solution to missions deep in enemy territory by a combination of intelligence gathering from the air, standoff capabilities, and advanced UAVs with varied fire capabilities – missiles, flights over enemy territory, and standoff fire – but these capabilities certainly do not yet exist and therefore cannot be relied on as alternatives to the F-35. There is also no guarantee that when they do develop they will in fact provide a sufficient response.

CONCLUSION

Equipping the Israel Air Force with the F-35 has strategic importance in terms of deterring the enemy from starting a war and in terms of maintaining Israel’s qualitative advantage in the arena. Effective use of the IAF in a war requires aerial superiority that allows activity for fighter jets on the front and above choice regions deep in enemy territory. Aerial superiority is required to allow the continuous operation of unmanned vehicles at a reasonable rate of attrition. In light of the development of aerial defense systems in Syria and Iran, attaining aerial superiority faces unprecedented challenges. The main features of the F-35 would allow it to operate before aerial superiority is achieved and be the primary tool for attaining it.

The regional arms race requires Israel to equip itself with the next generation of weapon systems in order to provide a response to new weapons entering the arena now and those that will be introduced in the future. An examination of alternatives in the form of surface-to-surface missiles and advanced UAVs demonstrates that despite their expected contribution they cannot serve as complete substitutes to fifth generation fighter jets. This support for the purchase of the F-35, however, should be joined by a discussion about the gamut of the response in the more distant future. It may provide solutions in other directions of force buildup.

—-
By Gur Laish, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
In INSS’ “Strategic Assessment”, Volume 13, No. 4

(The author is an expert on the Israel Air Force)

A region in ferment.

In a rather prescient speech that has particular resonance as unrest now sweeps the Middle East from Sanaa to Cairo to Beirut, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told Arab regimes earlier this month that they would have to initiate democratic reforms before it was “too late.”

Speaking at a conference on democracy in Doha, Qatar, on January 13, days before the Jasmine Revolution ousted Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and inspired similar popular uprisings across the region, Clinton blasted Arab governments for stalled political change.

“Those who cling to the status quo may be able to hold back the full impact of their countries’ problems for a little while, but not forever,” she predicted. “While some countries have made great strides in governance, in many others, people have grown tired of corrupt institutions and a stagnant political order.”

Just how tired grew increasingly apparent this week, as protesters across the region – emboldened by the Tunisian precedent, which showed that an assertion of people power could accomplish what once seemed impossible – took to the streets in demonstrations against the abject failure of corrupt authoritarian regimes to meet their citizens’ basic needs.

Rampant unemployment, skyrocketing inflation, a huge young population without much hope for the future, and the denial of elementary human rights – these sparked spontaneous mass gatherings that were impossible to put down, in part because there was no identifiable leadership that could be targeted. The grassroots character of the protests, which incorporate young and old, men and women, middle class and working class, also tends to mitigate against the use of extreme violence on the part of police and security personnel, which add to the chances of success.

IN EGYPT, the much-feared security forces were deployed, Internet was disabled and Al-Jazeera was blacked out. Yet against all odds, tens of thousands of people poured into the streets on Tuesday, in one of the largest non-anti-Western demonstrations in contemporary Egyptian history. Then they protested again on Wednesday. And on Thursday.

In Sanaa on Thursday, thousands of Yemenites protested against President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s corrupt 30-year regime. In the shadow of the world’s top oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, Yemen is struggling with soaring unemployment and dwindling oil and water reserves. Almost half its 23 million people live on $2 a day or less and a third suffer from chronic hunger.

Popular unrest has also flared in Jordan, Algeria, Libya and even in Saudi Arabia, while in Syria authorities have preemptively banned programs that allow access to Facebook Chat from cellphones, tightening already severe restrictions on the Internet in the wake of the unrest in Tunisia.

In Lebanon, supporters of the 2005 Cedar Revolution, which temporarily ended 30 years of Syrian occupation, protested against Hizbullah’s effective seizure of power. Iran and Syria, acting via their proxy Hizbullah, have imposed Najib Mikati, a business partner of Syrian President Bashar Assad, as prime minister in place of Saad Hariri.

In the short run, the regimes may well manage to survive.

Oil prices are tolerably high, security forces are loyal, foreign aid is available in abundance, elections have been manipulated and Islamists have been repressed. Nor would it necessarily serve the interests of national and regional stability for these authoritarian regimes, many of them allies of America, to be suddenly deposed.

In Tunisia, for instance, it is still unclear what sort of political leadership will fill the vacuum created by Ben Ali’s forced departure. There is a kernel of truth to the Arab dictum that 100 years of tyranny is preferable to one day of chaos, though the ongoing American and European support for “stable” Arab tyrants has now made them accessories of unpopular rulers, further undermining the West’s ability to support constructive change.

There are no shortcuts to the transition from tyranny to Western-style freedom. The overhasty imposition of quasidemocratic elections, without first laying the requisite groundwork, is demonstrably no solution. Hamas’s takeover of Gaza and Hizbullah’s rise to power in Lebanon are bitter proof of that.

Arab countries’ fundamental and, therefore, nearly intractable problem is that in most cases the institutions that form the backbone of democracy – an honest judiciary, a legislature guided by liberal ideals, strict and equal law enforcement and a free press – do not yet exist.

The turmoil sweeping this region seems to vindicate Clinton’s warning that the status quo of authoritarianism is no longer sustainable. But the question remains how to implement Clinton’s advice. Building the durable institutions that are needed to make a peaceful transition to political and economic pluralism, and thus ensuring true freedom and democracy, is not a process that happens overnight.

Clifford D. May: U.S. should heed Canada’s message to Iran | Full Comment | National Post.

National Post January 27, 2011 – 12:16 pm

Last week, Canada’s Free Thinking Film Society – love that name – was scheduled to screen Iranium, a new documentary about the regime that has ruled Iran since 1979, its drive to acquire nuclear weapons and the dangers that poses for the West. But then the Iranian embassy complained and – coincidently – threats and “suspicious letters” were received at the National Archives in Ottawa, where the event was to take place. The Archives cancelled the screening and shut the building. Archives spokeswoman Pauline Portelance explained: “We deemed the risk associated with the event was a little too high.”

Apparently, however, officials above her pay grade recognized that allowing Iranian theocrats to set the limits of free speech in Canada’s capital would run an even higher risk. It was given to Minister of Heritage James Moore to deliver a Churchillian response.”This movie will be shown, the agreement will be kept,” he said. “We will not be moving it to a different facility, we’re not bending to any pressure. People need to be kept safe, but we don’t back down to people who try to censor people by threats of violence. Canada does not accept attempts from the Iranian Embassy to dictate what films will and will not be shown in Canada.”

The Canadian screening of Iranium has now been rescheduled for early February. Will Iran’s rulers and supporters accept that decision? Or will they escalate the conflict? While we’re waiting for the answer, it’s worth recalling that the Islamic Republic has a long history of attempting to enforce its will extraterritorially. As early as 1989, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had led Iran’s revolution ten years earlier, issued a fatwa, a religious ruling, against a British subject, Salman Rushdie, because Khomeini considered Rushdie’s novel, The Satanic Verses, blasphemous. The fatwa called for Rushdie to be executed by any Muslim who could manage the task.

That might have been expected: As Iranium makes clear, Khomeini’s revolution was not just against the Shah of Iran. It was intended for export – and not only to countries in which Muslims are in the majority.

Khomeini’s ambitious goal then, and his successors’ goal now, is “world revolution,” the creation of a universal and “holy” government and the downfall of all others. “Islam is good for you,” Khomeini said. “It is good for the world.” He said this even as – in Stalinist fashion — he was executing at home and assassinating abroad not just those who opposed him but also those who might one day oppose him.

I am among those interviewed in Iranium, along with several other Foundation for Defense of Democracies experts. Also providing analysis and insight: scholar Bernard Lewis, former CIA director Jim Woolsey, Senator Jon Kyl, and former Ambassador John Bolton. But it is really Iran’s despots who tell the story.

For example, in 1980, war broke out between Iran and Iraq. Khomeini sent Iranian children on foot to clear minefields so that regular troops and tanks could pass after. How could a man of faith justify that? He was guaranteeing their entry into Paradise. Iran’s current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, finds poetry in such carnage. “No art is more beautiful,” he is seen in the film telling a group of his acolytes, “more divine and more everlasting” than “the art of martyrdom”.

Khomeini’s successor, the Supreme Leader – an audacious title — Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is candid: America is not just Iran’s enemy; America is the “enemy of Allah” and “the Great Satan.”

It is difficult for us, for Westerners, children of the Enlightenment, to believe that there are rulers of great nations who take such notions seriously. But if you watch and listen to them – not least in this documentary – it becomes clear that they do. What does that mean for policy? It means that diplomacy, outreach, engagement and carefully crafted speeches showing respect and apologizing for “grievances” will have limited utility.

Truth be told, Americans have been reaching out to Iran’s theocrats for more than 30 years. Khomeini came to power on Jimmy Carter’s watch. Carter was by no means hostile to him and his revolution. On the contrary, Carter’s U.N. ambassador, Andrew Young, called Khomeini “some kind of saint.” William Sullivan, the U.S. ambassador in Tehran, compared Khomeini to Gandhi. A State Department spokesman at that time worried about the possibility of a military coup against Khomeini, saying that would be “most dangerous for U.S. interests. It would blow away the moderates and invite the majority to unite behind a radical faction.”

In response, Khomeini and his followers, as seen in the film, chanted not only “Death to America!” but also “Death to Carter!” And, of course, less than a year after Khomeini came to power, his followers took over the U.S. embassy, which Khomeini called a “center for corruption,” holding its occupants hostage for 444 days – not exactly the kind of action Gandhi would have endorsed.

Seizing an embassy is an act of war. Carter’s response was, as Bernard Lewis characterized it, “feeble.” Khomeini was gratified to discover that, “Americans cannot do a damn thing.”

Three years later, Khomeini tested that proposition again. He dispatched the Lebanese-based Hezbollah to suicide-bomb the barracks of U.S. peacekeepers in Beirut. Not since Iwo Jim had so many U.S. Marines been killed in a single attack. In response, President Reagan committed a grave error: He did not retaliate against Hezbollah or Iran. That taught a lesson: Hit Americans and Americans will retreat. They really “cannot do a damn thing.” (And, as I write this, Hezbollah is on the verge of taking over Lebanon. The American response? So far, it would be fair to characterize it as “feeble.”)

Islamic militants throughout the world were inspired by what happened in Tehran and Beirut. What Steve Simon and Daniel Benjamin, advisors to President Clinton, would call “The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War Against America” had begun.

Iran has since collaborated with al-Qaeda and a long list of other terrorists groups – the evidence is overwhelming – while also training and equipping those fighting Americans in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The regime continues to repress its own people – dissidents, of course, but also ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals and women. As noted in the film, virgins sentenced to capital punishment are routinely raped prior to execution. This practice also is based on theology: Virgins go to Paradise, a reward enemies of the regime do not deserve.

And now Ahmadinejad and Khameini are in hot pursuit of nuclear weapons. To what end? The destruction of Israel, which Khameini has called “a cancerous tumor.” The treatment he prescribes: “remove it.” But it is not Israel alone to which scalpels are to be applied. Ahmadinejad tells a crowd: “The arrogant powers of the world must be annihilated. … The countdown of America’s sinister power has begun. … Have no doubt: Islam will conquer …all the mountaintops of the world.”

Iran’s Arab neighbors have at least as much to fear as Israel and America. As cables recently released by WikiLeaks make clear, they know that, they are looking to the U.S., and they are not reassured.

No sensible, rational person can watch this film, hear this evidence, and fail to come to the conclusion that the fanatics who rule Iran must be prevented from acquiring nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

That is the message Iranium – I like that title, too, by the way — conveys. That’s why the theocrats and their apologists don’t want you to see it. That’s why you really should.

Clifford D. May leads the Washington, D.C.-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a non-partisan policy institute dedicated exclusively to promoting pluralism, defending democratic values, and fighting the ideologies that threaten democracy.

Hezbollah’s takeover threatens Israel even more | j. the Jewish news weekly of Northern California.