Archive for January 19, 2011

Ahmadinejad to US, Israel: ‘Stop sedition in Lebanon’

January 19, 2011

Ahmadinejad to US, Israel: ‘Stop sedition in Lebanon’.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Wednesday warned Israel, the United States, and some European countries to halt their “sedition” in Lebanon or the Lebanese people would “cut off” their hands, AFP reported.

Referring to the group of countries, Ahmadinejad said during a live speech in the city of Yazd: “You are on a rough downhill path that will take you into a deep valley and your actions show that your decline is on a fast track.”

“With these actions, you are damaging your reputation. Stop your interference. If you don’t stop your sedition (in Lebanon), then the Lebanese nation and regional countries will cut your nasty, plotting hand,” AFP quoted Ahmadinejad as saying.

Lebanon is enduring a political crisis stemming from a UN court investigating the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

Earlier Wednesday, Saudi Arabia abandoned efforts to mediate in Lebanon’s political crisis, removing a key US ally from talks to ease tensions after Hizbullah toppled the government in Beirut last week.

In an interview Wednesday with the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiya TV, Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal said the Saudi king has decided he is “withdrawing his hand” from Lebanon.

Asked about the situation in Lebanon, al-Faisal said: “It’s dangerous, particularly if it reaches separatism or the division of Lebanon. This would mean the end of Lebanon as a model of peaceful coexistence between religions and ethnicities and different factions.”

The Shi’ite group, which denies any role in Hariri’s 2005 killing, forced the collapse of Lebanon’s Western-backed government last week in a dispute over the court. The Iran-and Syria-sponsored group says the tribunal is a conspiracy by Israel and the United States.

Many fear the political crisis could lead to street protests and violence that have been the scourge of this tiny Arab country of 4 million people for years, including a devastating 1975-1990 civil war and sectarian battles between Sunnis and Shi’ites in 2008.

The Hague-based tribunal released a sealed indictment in the case on Tuesday, but its contents may not become public for weeks as Belgian judge Daniel Fransen decides whether there is enough evidence for a trial.

The indictment is the latest turn in a deepening crisis in Lebanon. Last week, ministers from Hizbullah and their allies walked out of the Cabinet when Prime Minister Sa’ad Hariri — the son of the slain leader — refused to renounce the tribunal.

Lengthy negotiations lie ahead between Lebanon’s factions as they attempt to build a new government. On Tuesday, Turkey’s foreign minister was in Beirut in a coordinated visit with Qatar’s prime minister to discuss the political crisis in Lebanon.

The officials met with Sa’ad Hariri — who is staying on as a caretaker prime minister — and, separately, with Hizbullah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah.

According to Lebanon’s power-sharing system, the president must be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni and the parliament speaker a Shi’ite. Each faith makes up about a third of Lebanon’s population of 4 million.

Collision Course?

January 19, 2011

Collision Course? | Iranian.com.

Interview with Avner Cohen

 

Collision Course?

by Fariba Amini
18-Jan-2011

Avner Cohen is a senior fellow at the Monterey Institute/ James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Washington, DC. He has done extensive research on and written about nuclear weapons including deterrence, morality and proliferation. The following is an exclusive interview with Dr. Cohen.

What prompted you to write your first book, Israel and the bomb, and now the second one, The Worst -Kept Secret?

In the early to mid 1990s, there was still no detailed historical account or a political history of Israel’s nuclear program and I felt, as more and more documents became available particularly in the United States, France and Norway, that one should write a chronicle of its history. Three elements were outlined: first, the American Israeli nuclear relationship, second the regional nuclear dynamics and, third, Israel‘s own domestic nuclear history. The second book attempts to understand how Israel created a unique nuclear posture, what I also call a nuclear “bargain” which is unlike any other country in the nuclear age. I provide some detail about the origins of the bargain that was made between PM Golda Meir and President Nixon and I try to assess it, both in terms of its implications and in today’s context.

What is Amimut?

Amimut is the Hebrew word for (nuclear) ambiguity or (nuclear) opacity. By using this word Israelis refer to the unique nuclear posture of their country. Of course, everybody knows that Israel has nuclear weapons; but Israel has never officially acknowledged it. In the broader sense, it refers to the nuclear bargain as a whole that Israel has made, beyond governmental policy, a way in which Israel has learned to live with the bomb, placing it away in an invisible place. Amimut has features of a national taboo.

You mention in your new book that in 1969, Golda Meir made a deal with Nixon behind closed doors to keep Israel’s nuclear weapons out of the limelight. Henry Kissinger was aware of it. CIA Chief Richard Helms and Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, both expressed their objections. In a letter to Secretary of State, William Rogers, Laird wrote, these “developments were not in the United States’ interests and should, if at all possible, be stopped.” President Kennedy had also been wary of Israel acquiring these weapons. Why didn’t various administrations stop Israel from acquiring them?

There was only one American President who was truly committed in his effort to stop Israel from going nuclear and this was President John F. Kennedy, but his determination was short-lived as he was assassinated in 1963. All others after him, in particular Johnson and Nixon, quietly came to agree with the notion that Israel could have the bomb. Essentially, the Johnson and Nixon administrations, even though they publicly claim to be against Israel acquiring the bomb, in reality they were not. Some would say they were ambivalent, others would say they were sympathetic. Obviously for Israel the nuclear issue was a question of life and death.

Do you think the creation of the bomb goes back to the tragedy of the Holocaust?

Yes, I do. It is the memory of the Holocaust; the vow “never again” (in relation to the Holocaust) had a very significant role in Israel’s pursuing the bomb and why Israel would not easily give it up. Having that kind of national trauma is a reason why Israel was seeking for the ultimate weapon. One can say that in order to prevent another Auschwitz, Israel felt that it has to be in a position to inflict a Hiroshima to its neighbors who vowed to destroy it.

In 2008, President Jimmy Carter estimated that Israel has 150 nuclear weapons. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research institute, Israel ranks fourth in the world in terms of its stockpile, ahead of India and Pakistan. Wouldn’t you say that, on balance, Israel is potentially more dangerous than Iran, India or Pakistan?

I myself would be reluctant to speculate how many nuclear weapons Israel actually has. The estimated numbers fluctuate between 80 to perhaps 150 or 200. I do not know the exact number and neither does anyone else outside the Israeli government. I also don’t think SIPRI knows exactly whether Israel is fourth in terms of its stockpile. I would also say the number is irrelevant when it comes to the question whether Israel is more dangerous or more cautious than the other nuclear weapons states. From my perspective, Israel has always been cautious in handling its nuclear weapons. Israel had the capability as early as 1967 and 1973 but, of course, never used it. It has never even demonstrated its capability in a public way.

Let’s talk about Iran and Israel; a few days ago it was reported that according to a cable in WikiLeaks, Ahmadinejad was in favor of a swap and that Iranians trusted the US more than the Russians. “Ahmadinejad had said ‘yes,’ that the Iranians agree to the proposal but need to manage public perception,” the message said, adding that Turkish officials consider Ahmadinejad “more flexible than others inside the Iranian government.” Why do you think the US and Iran cannot come to a compromise? Who or what is preventing it?

It is hard to say. I think the compromise negotiated in late 2009 allowed Iran much more than the resolutions of the Security Council. I must say I was very surprised that a year ago that Iran turned down the American offer. It was a generous offer which essentially would have given Iran the right to enrich even though the Security Council told Iran it should not enrich uranium. It appears that Iran turned it down for all sorts of domestic political reasons, having much to do with Ahmadinejad, the elections and so forth. But I thought it was an offer that, in my view, would have left Iran close to being able to produce the material for a bomb.

It is the role of the Institute for Intelligence and Special Operations known as “Mossad” “to collect information, analyze intelligence and perform special covert operations beyond its border.” Would you say that includes assassinating nuclear scientists in Iran?

We know from history that whenever Israel saw that WMD were acquired by its enemies it took it as a threat to its existence and hunted down those involved very vigorously. For example, Israel took direct action against German scientists who worked to develop radiological weapons in Egypt in the early 60’s. It also took action against scientists who were involved in Iraq’s WMD pursuit in the 80’s, including allegedly the assassination of Gerald Bull who was a Canadian scientist working for Iraq. Thus, I would not be surprised at all if Israel was also involved in an effort to scare and deter the scientists involved in the Iranian nuclear program. It does seem to fit the Israeli historical record and pattern in this area.

Before being elected as PM, Netanyahu said, “Against Lunatics, deterrence must be absolute, perfect, including a second strike. The crazies have to understand that if they raise their hands against us, we’ll put them back in the Stone Age.” At the same time, the Israel defense chief said in 2009 that Iran is not a nuclear threat while an ex-Mossad chief also mentioned that it is wrong to say that Iran poses a threat to Israel. Then why make Iran into this evil threat? What is Israel afraid of?

I think one has to be nuanced about it. You are right to point out that there are different views in Israel about characterizing the Iranian nuclear threat. Some refer to it as “existential threat,” while others do not like to use this phrase. Some say “Israel is strong, and nobody in the world can pose an existential threat to Israel.” For example, both Minister of Defense Ehud Barak and opposition leader Tzipi Livni avoid using the phrase “existential threat” in reference to Iran. I personally also believe that it is somewhat a misleading phrase because Israel, at the present time, is much stronger than Iran. Therefore if anybody can pose an existential threat, it is Israel to Iran and not vice versa. At the same time, virtually all Israelis agree that Iran’s nuclear program is a major security challenge to Israel. Simply put, it could end Israel’s monopoly in the region. I think it is fair to say that virtually all Israelis are concerned about such an eventuality. Furthermore, I think almost all Israelis agree that they would not rule out the possibility of military action against Iran’s nuclear program. But the degree of willingness and readiness to actually do it is quite different among various Israeli leaders. I do believe that PM Netanyahu would be more willing to take that path.

But which one is more dangerous, a nuclear Iran even under Ahmadinejad or a Pakistan which is sliding into chaos? Wouldn’t you say that Pakistan would be potentially more dangerous than Iran?

Under some circumstances it could be. It really depends on the circumstances. If Pakistan would be run by a Taliban kind of government, it is not impossible that the U.S. would take action against its nuclear program.

Both former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Barak put a number of requests to Bush during his visit to Jerusalem, which were construed as preparations for an aerial attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. When Obama became President, he sent a clear message to Netanyahu saying “don’t surprise me with Iran strike.” Do you think Israel will attack Iran while Obama is in office? What if the Republicans win in the next elections?

Evidently, President Obama is not excited about taking military action against Iran. He is clearly in favor of more negotiations. However, if Iran will truly acquire nuclear weapons and is perceived to be moving toward a much more dangerous nuclear path, I think both Democrats and Republicans will not hesitate to act. They would all seriously consider the military option. Both President Obama and Secretary Gates hinted that way. Frankly, I don’t see anybody within the U.S. government willing to accept a nuclear Iran.

Can you say with precision when Iran will become a nuclear power?

No, I cannot. I tend to think that, at the present time, Iran has not taken the decision to do so. Furthermore, Iran is not even able to enrich uranium at the weapons level. It could get them, probably, at least one to two years, but it appears that Iran has not yet decided to take that route. And then, based on the information from IAEA, it will take them many more years to build a stockpile.

Why doesn’t Israel “come out of the closet” as an American official put it and be honest about its nuclear capability?

The Israelis (and most Americans) believe that they still have many good reasons not to go public. They believe that maintaining the status-quo is better than dealing with the risks of change. In my view, however, much of this is a matter of old habit. Israel feels comfortable to live with this secret. Realistically, short of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, I do not see Israel changing its commitment to amimut.

WikiLeaks: US advised to sabotage Iran nuclear sites by German thinktank

January 19, 2011

WikiLeaks: US advised to sabotage Iran nuclear sites by German thinktank | World news | The Guardian.

The United States was advised to adopt a policy of “covert sabotage” of Iran‘s clandestine nuclear facilities, including computer hacking and “unexplained explosions”, by an influential German thinktank, a leaked US embassy cable reveals.

Volker Perthes, director of Germany’s government-funded Institute for Security and International Affairs, told US officials in Berlin that undercover operations would be “more effective than a military strike” in curtailing Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

A sophisticated computer worm, Stuxnet, infiltrated the Natanz nuclear facility last year, delaying Iran’s programme by some months. The New York Times said this week that Stuxnet was a joint US-Israeli operation.

On Monday, Iran’s top nuclear negotiator blamed the US for the cyber-attack. Saeed Jalili told NBC News an investigation had found the US was involved in the attack that apparently shut down a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges in November. “I have witnessed some documents that show [US participation],” he said.

A diplomatic cable sent by the US ambassador to Germany, Philip Murphy, in January 2010, records that Perthes said a policy of “covert sabotage (unexplained explosions, accidents, computer hacking etc) would be more effective than a military strike, whose effects in the region could be devastating”.

Perthes is a leading western expert on Iran. An earlier diplomatic cable, sent by Murphy on 14 December 2009 showed that his advice was heeded by politicians and officials – including Condoleezza Rice, the former US secretary of state.

“The majority of the guests at the table distinctly deferred to Perthes for guidance on where the Iran issue might be headed or should be headed,” Murphy wrote. “This was striking amongst such a high ranking group of people operationally involved with the Iran issue.”

In an interview with the Guardian, Perthes said the ambassador accurately reflected his view “that ‘unexplained accidents’ or ‘computer failures’ etc are certainly better than military strikes. And that military strikes – a military escalation with Iran – must be avoided.

“Compared to military action, such acts have the advantage that the leadership of a country that is affected wouldn’t need to respond – everybody can agree that there was a technical failure, no one needs to shoot or bomb. And at the same time, everybody has understood the message – about what developments are unacceptable to the other side.

“My sense at the beginning of 2010 was – without having any specific knowledge – that some countries were indeed preparing to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme by acts of sabotage, or computer hacking.”

US and Israeli officials refused to comment on their reported involvement with Stuxnet yesterday. However, the leaked cables show that more covert methods of infiltrating Iran’s nuclear programme – including powerful cyber attacks – was a proposal gaining traction inside US diplomatic circles last year.

President George Bush approved $300m (£189m) on joint covert projects aimed at Iran, understood to have included Stuxnet, before leaving office in 2009.

The chances of a military strike against Iran are now understood to be receding, in part because of the success of the Stuxnet cyberattack, but also due to the assassination last year of two Iranian nuclear scientists, which was attributed to Israel.

Stuxnet wiped out roughly a fifth of the centrifuges used to enrich uranium at Iran’s Natanz base around August last year. Security experts told the Guardian at the time that Stuxnet was “the most refined piece of malware ever discovered”, raising suspicion that it was a well-funded and potentially state-sponsored operation. According to the New York Times, the Stuxnet worm was tested at a secret Israeli bunker at Dimano, near the Negev desert.

Iran: Not So Fast with the Mission Accomplished Banner

January 19, 2011

Iran: Not So Fast with the Mission Accomplished Banner « Hot Air.

We have reached a crucial juncture in the progress of the Iranian nuclear-weapons program – and the nature and significance of that juncture are being overlooked in favor of focusing on the reported effects of the Stuxnet worm and international sanctions.

The juncture in question is defined by two factors: Iran’s mastery of the uranium-enrichment process, and her successful testing of missiles that could deliver a nuclear warhead.  Iran has produced enough low-enriched uranium (LEU) for 3-4 nuclear warheads.  The LEU requires enrichment to a higher level of purity to be used in a warhead, and Iran has already started on that process.  Enriching uranium to “medium” purity – 19.75% purity – is being done, in defiance of UN resolutions, at a separate facility co-located with the main enrichment installation at Natanz. Enrichment to a purity level of over 90% (usually given in public literature as 93.5%) is required for use in a warhead, but once the enrichment process is mastered, the leap to high-enrichment is a relatively minor step.

In the realm of delivery platforms, Iran has a missile (the Shahab-3) that can carry a nuclear warhead as far as Israel, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.  The Iranians have also made significant progress with the Sejjil missile program, which is projected to enable nuclear warhead delivery into central Europe as early as 2015.

What Iran lacks is the third factor in creating a nuclear weapon: a working warhead.  Developing the warhead requires enriched uranium to experiment with; a planned delivery platform to impose constraints on the warhead’s weight and design; and the warhead design itself.  Key to the warhead design is choosing and perfecting a detonation apparatus.  Intelligence from the last decade has suggested that Iran obtained information on a certain kind of initiator (uranium deuteride) from the A.Q. Khan network, and has had a program of work on high-explosive tests to pursue successful detonation of a nuclear device.  But the weaponization effort is, overall, the one we know the least about.

It cannot be overstressed that Iran is close to having the high-enriched uranium necessary for warhead experimentation.  This topic is also the right point at which to observe that the Stuxnet worm’s impact on uranium enrichment has been limited.  I am second to none in my admiration of the worm’s crafty design.  But it was deployed to attack the rote mechanics of a process Iran has already mastered, and ultimately, that’s what matters.  Iran has enriched uranium successfully using centrifuge cascades; Stuxnet cannot stop the Iranians from resuming that work.

Moreover, it hasn’t shut down all enrichment, nor has it even penetrated all the enrichment facilities.  This assessment from the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) clarifies that while Stuxnet apparently shut down an array in the main facility at Natanz, enrichment continued with the other equipment there through the cut-off date for the latest update (November 2010) from the IAEA inspectors. Not only did it continue, but the enrichment performed by the online arrays was becoming more efficient by the month.  The amount of LEU produced was increasing on a monthly basis, even as some components in the facility were experiencing degradation that was probably due to Stuxnet.  And rather than let Stuxnet-contaminated operation continue, the Iranians, once they were aware of the worm, suspended enrichment at the main facility.  The public has been given no reason to suppose they have lost all their centrifuge cascades to sabotage.

Meanwhile, there are no reports that centrifuge controllers in the separate facility at Natanz where higher enrichment is done – the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, or PFEP – have been penetrated by Stuxnet. Of additional significance, ISIS noted in August 2010 that the Iranians were using a procedure at the PFEP that enhances the use of the LEU it is fed from the main facility.  While ISIS is careful to clarify that this doesn’t mean more medium-enriched uranium is produced, it does mean the LEU feedstock is more fully utilized: more of its remainder is suitable for recycling in the main facility after the medium-enrichment process.  This makes the overall enrichment cycle more efficient for a given amount of uranium.

The point of mentioning this here is that performing this feat adds complexity to the process in the PFEP.  As with the increasing efficiency of the LEU production at the main facility, the Iranians are performing relatively sophisticated operations and achieving success.  There is a growing body of expertise they have acquired, which cannot be somehow taken away from them by breaking some of their equipment, any more than sabotaging the US auto industry’s manufacturing plants would degauss its corporate engineering memory.

The bottom line on the Stuxnet worm is that it attacked a process already effectively mastered.  This is not an impact to be dismissed; recovering from it will almost certainly slow down Iran’s progress toward an arsenal.  But it will not slow down Iran’s progress toward a weapon.

The apparent assassination of nuclear scientists may do that, to some extent.  The extent of the impact – from the loss of particular scientists – will depend on how many others in Iran already had much of the dead scientists’ expertise.  It may also depend on how much fresh outside assistance Iran can get, from Russia, China, Pakistan, or North Korea.

But any impact on the weaponization effort is likely to depend much more on Iran’s ability to obtain scarce materials and precision-machined components – or to perfect her own, indigenous precision-machining capabilities.  If international sanctions truly deny Iran the tools she needs to move a warhead from the design to the testing phase, that will matter to the political situation of the Middle East – at least for the short term.

Americans need to understand this:  it’s the weaponization process we can still get a high payoff from interdicting.  The UN inspection regime and the Stuxnet worm were designed to focus on uranium enrichment.  But uranium enrichment, as a process, is receding in the rearview mirror as a high-payoff target for interdiction by sanctions or sabotage.  It’s not the most important thing to interdict, nor has it been for about two years now.

Yet the UN inspectors have been admitted regularly only to the sites at which uranium is converted or enriched, and their accounting focus is on how much enriched uranium there is.  Stuxnet, for its part, was designed to attack the enrichment process.  (I’ve written on these topics previously here and here.)  Sanctions have been enforced on the basis of companies and international contacts known to have had a role in enabling the enrichment process.  More than 95% of media reports about Iran’s nuclear activities deal with uranium enrichment.  It’s the focus of almost everything we do and say, but it’s not the step at which we can effectively prevent Iran from getting the bomb.  That step, today, is weaponization.

But we have considerably less information on Iran’s weaponization effort.  Even assembling a list of the facilities in Iran where weaponization activities are in progress involves a greater level of uncertainty than making such a list for uranium enrichment or missile development.  It may be that the drastic, distasteful step of assassinating scientists was taken because, for this aspect of nuclear weapons development, Western intelligence agencies’ knowledge about facilities and complicit companies is inadequate to less lethal forms of targeting.

Complacency about Iran’s nuclear program is the very last thing called for in 2011, in spite of what Stuxnet and the most recent sanctions may have achieved.  All of Iran’s important progress has been achieved since UN sanctions were first imposed in 2006, and some key milestones have been achieved since Stuxnet was introduced in Iranian computers.  One of the most important developments is that Iran can now mill and refine her own uranium – meaning that the UN’s basis for accounting on Iran’s stockpile, which has been predicated on yellowcake left over from the 1980s, will soon be irrelevant.  And when it comes to the weaponization effort, we don’t know so much about it that we can say with certainty what the highest-payoff method of interfering in it is.

That’s why Benjamin Netanyahu refuted the policy implication of his outgoing intelligence chief’s statement last week, on the delay of Iran’s progress toward a bomb.  Fox News reported on this, but it hasn’t been given play by other US media, which have preferred to run with the “Stuxnet bought us time” theme.  But while it is very likely to have slowed some aspects of the Iranian nuclear program, Stuxnet’s assessed effects to date will have no impact on the most important aspect politically: Iran’s timeline to a bomb.

It’s conceivable that there will be future news indicating that Iran’s ability to enrich uranium has been shut down entirely.  That catastrophic a development would decisively delay Iran’s progress toward having the fissile material for a prototype weapon – i.e., making the jump from 19.75% to 90%+.  We can certainly be on the watch for such a report.  In the meantime, the focus on Stuxnet is emblematic of the popular, outdated focus on interdicting enrichment, when what needs to be interdicted is weaponization.

On eve of nuclear talks, Iran says Obama’s policy has failed

January 19, 2011

On eve of nuclear talks, Iran says Obama’s policy has failed – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Six world powers to meet Tehran envoys in Istanbul this week to resume long-suspended negotiations; Iran tells reporters in New York: Obama repeating Bush’s mistakes.

By Reuters

On the eve of nuclear talks in Turkey, Tehran’s envoy to the United Nations said on Tuesday that U.S. President Barack Obama’s policy of engaging Iran has failed and he is repeating some of the mistakes of his predecessor.

The West suspects Iran is covertly developing nuclear weapons, and wants it to halt sensitive parts of its atomic program to lay those fears to rest. Tehran says the program is meant for peaceful purposes only and refuses to freeze it.

Obama NY - AP - Sept 23, 2010 U.S. President Barack Obama speaking in New York on September 22, 2010.
Photo by: AP

The talks, set for Jan. 21-22 in Istanbul, between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, were agreed upon last month in Geneva when the two sides resumed long-suspended negotiations.

Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaee, told a group of reporters at the Iranian mission in New York that his country wanted to be treated fairly and with respect in Istanbul. He accused Obama of failing to live up to his promise to engage with Iran two years ago.

“We believe that this policy, or this intention, or this slogan, has not been successful in many areas, including engagement with Islamic countries, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Khazaee said.

“Some mistakes that during the time of President (George W.) Bush were happening, now are happening again,” he added. “We look at the results.”

Bush was reluctant to negotiate with Iran and his administration focused on isolating the Islamic Republic.

Obama administration officials say it is Iran that has rebuffed Obama’s offers of engagement by refusing to take steps to prove that its nuclear ambitions are peaceful.

European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said last week that she hoped to make progress in the talks with Iran, which will include herself, Iran’s nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and delegates from the United States, Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany.

The Iranian envoy said Iran hoped to make clear in Istanbul that it is prepared to cooperate on issues like Afghanistan, Iraq, disarmament and drug trafficking. He added that Iran was a regional power that had to be taken seriously.

“[Whether] you like it or not, Iran is a powerful player in the region,” he said. “There is no doubt about that — and with a nuclear capability, peaceful of course.”

He reiterated that Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program was not negotiable.

The United States and its coalition partners in Iraq and Afghanistan have repeatedly accused Iran of destabilizing both countries by aiding insurgents determined to drive the Western powers out of the region. Tehran denies the charges.

“We are interested in peace in the region,” Khazaee said.

He added that he hoped the Istanbul talks would establish a “roadmap for future negotiations” aimed at resolving Tehran’s nuclear stand-off with the West.

He acknowledged that the UN, EU and U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran have had an impact on the country, though he said Iranians have proven they can withstand sanctions.

“We will respond neither to political pressure nor economic sanctions,” Khazaee said.

The UN Security Council has imposed four rounds of sanctions on Tehran for refusing to suspend its nuclear enrichment program.