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DEBKAfile Exclusive Report January 9, 2011, 12:26 PM (GMT+02:00)

The heavy water plant at Arak – for the plutonium track to a bomb

Meir Dagan, when he retired as Mossad chief last week, estimated that difficulties had held back Iran’s race for a nuclear bomb until early 2014 or 2015. He did not mention the Stuxnet virus invading its systems or the untimely deaths of its nuclear scientists. He did refer to arguments in Iran’s ruling elite which had delayed the attainment of its goal, indicating that without those disputes Tehran would have acquired a nuclear capability by now – or very soon.
But most strikingly, Dagan omitted mention of the short cuts available to Iran, as noted here by debkafile‘s military, intelligence and Iranian sources:

1.  Not all Iran’s concealed nuclear facilities have been discovered by Western intelligence – not even Mossad. Given Iran’s record of concealment, it would be foolish, for instance, to ignore the possibility of a secret plant enriching uranium at full speed somewhere underground out of range of the UN nuclear watchdog’s cameras recording every centrifuge spinning at Natanz. They may still be undetected by spy satellites and unbeknownst even to the defectors and double agents willing to collaborate with the West.
A single secret facility of this kind would invalidate the current Western estimate of Iran’s stock of low-grade enriched uranium as standing at 3,000 kilos. The real amount could be 20 times or even 100 times as much, enough for three or four bombs.
2.  The same applies to the “malfunctions” undoubtedly holding up the program. No competent agency would risk guaranteeing that every last Iranian facility has been crippled or exposed to cyber invasion. The publicity surrounding Stuxnet and the deaths or defections of Iranian nuclear scientists has conveyed the impression of a nation on the point of collapse, whose every nook and cranny is wide open to the long arm of Western and Israeli spy agencies.

But who knows what really goes on in the top-secret laboratories of Shahid Beheshti University in northern Tehran, which employed the two nuclear scientists targeted for attack last month? It is there that much of the research is conducted form Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. But there is no certainty that a parallel research institution is not operating in some other dark place.

3. Iran has been known in the past to have established or transferred sensitive nuclear facilities outside the country to remove them from the sight of alien intelligence agencies and safeguard them against sabotage, like the audacious attack of Oct. 12, 2010 against a hidden Shehab-3 missile store at the Revolutionary Guards Imam Ali base in northwest Iran. The consequences of this attack were as destructive as the Stuxnet invasion.
It will be recalled that only when the Israeli Air Force struck the North Korean-built plutonium reactor at A-Zur in northern Syria in Sept. 2007 was this vital external link in Iran’s nuclear program revealed.
Tehran, Pyongyang and Damascus resumed their nuclear collaboration in early 2009, debkafile‘s sources disclose. Three or four secret military research centers are going up in Syria at this moment, which is why Damascus denies International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors access to suspect nuclear sites.
Western intelligence, including the Mossad, knows very little about Iran’s nuclear partnership with North Korea. An Iranian military nuclear mission has been discovered based permanently in Pyongyang. It was substantially expanded in recent weeks raising the suspicion in the US and Israel that a joint nuclear test is planned to take place at the North Korean testing site in the course of this year.If North Korea performed this service for Iran, Dagan’s 2015 estimate would no longer apply.

4. All the deadlines predicted for Iran’s nuclear programs are therefore problematic.

Early on in the last decade, in 2000, Western and Israeli intelligence anticipated Iran would have a nuclear bomb or warhead by 2007. That year, the timeline was pushed back to 2009 and then again to 2011. The gap has widened now to 2015. However, there is no guarantee from any quarter that the latest estimate is any more credible than the old ones and that Tehran is not capable of throwing it awry by one stealthy ruse or another – this time not for another delay but by jumping the gun.

MESS Report-Israel News – Haaretz Israeli News source..

Those exposed to outgoing Mossad chief’s Meir Dagan’s arguments will find it difficult to ignore their logic, and the assertive tone in which they were made.

By Amos Harel

The departing chief of the Mossad, Meir Dagan, signed off last week with a clear and unequivocal message to the public: The Iranian nuclear threat is far from ripe. Israel and the international community still have plenty to do to undermine it, and a military assault is not the right solution.

	Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan.
	Photo by: Tomer Appelbaum

One may assume the Israeli leadership, especially the prime minister, know Dagan’s position on the matter. But his departure allowed us, for the first time and despite the partial cover of the censor, to get a better and more detailed idea of his approach to the nuclear problem. Perhaps this was a Bibi-bypass maneuver on Dagan’s part; by making his position public, Dagan has written a warning firmly on his name. This, to a significant degree, is his legacy: The warning of the great risks of a war (twice injured, he has a close and personal knowledge of such a price ), and the understanding that before setting out on a military campaign, the leaders must use all alternative means to remove the threat.

For journalists, Dagan was almost inaccessible throughout his Mossad term. He kept mum for eight years and four months. It seems the tremendous weight of the Iranian issue and the consequences of a decision to attack made him set aside his long-term reservations about journalism.

Readers of the weekend papers would find that the publications are surprisingly well-versed in what the head of the secret service had to say. Dagan spoke “in closed discussions,” “in a round of departure talks,” “in documents leaked to Wikileaks.”

The same expressions and observations are repeated. Dagan believes war would be justified only when Israel has “a sword at its neck, literally cutting into the flesh.” Even in the worst-case scenario, Iran would not obtain nuclear weapons before 2015. The arguments against an Israeli attack are known: It would make the Iranian people rally around the regime, would make Israeli-American relations extremely difficult and could result in a war, in which the Israeli home front will be bombed by thousands of rockets and missiles from Iran, Lebanon and Gaza. The IDF would find it very difficult to achieve a decisive victory in such a war.

So what does Dagan suggest, according to those conversations documented on Wikileaks? The joint move conception, stalling the Iranian project instead of going to war. Dagan is preaching for a shared global effort that includes, alongside tightening the sanctions, stopping the purchase of parts essential for the progress of the nuclear program, encouraging the Iranian opposition, and, of course, covert operations. The very fact of a significant delay to the Iranian plan (considering Israeli intelligence originally estimated the Iranians would have the bomb by 2007 ), would seem to testify some of this is already being carried out.

Even after his retirement, Dagan’s warning will continue to echo in the forum of seven key cabinet ministers, and in the public sphere. Those exposed to his arguments will find it difficult to ignore their logic, and the assertive tone in which they were made. It now remains to be seen whether Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi and Shin Bet chief Yuval Diskin, Dagan’s partners in the realist alliance in Israel’s strategic leadership, will make a similar move when they retire – Ashkenazi in February and Diskin in May.

The positions their heirs take are even more important. What will be said by the next chief of staff, Yoav Gallant, new Mossad chief Tamir Pardo and Y, Diskin’s deputy and apparent heir? Will they maintain the united front of their predecessors? How much clout will they have with the political leadership? The answers to these questions will have more influence than any other on Israel’s strategic reality in the years ahead.

Iran’s nuclear headway : Voice of Russia.

Ali-Akbar Salehi. Photo: EPA

The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization and acting foreign minister Ali-Akbar Salehi said on Saturday that Tehran was now capable of making nuclear fuel plates and rods.

Mr. Salehi said that Tehran had built a facility in Isfahan to develop the technology required for power nuclear reactors.

Salehi also told the local media that “despite futile Western efforts” Iran had so far produced almost 40 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium to supply fuel to a research reactor in Tehran.

The statement comes ahead of the planned resumption on January 20 of the talks in Istanbul with  the six international mediators, that is Russia, China, the US, France, Britain and Germany. After a 14-month break in talks the Big Six expected the issue of  nuclear fuel supplies to Iran to dominate the agenda of the Istanbul parley, which they hoped would help restore an atmosphere of trust between the sides. Now Tehran gives everyone to understand that it no longer needs such fuel.

In Moscow analyst Georgy Mirsky sees all this as an Iranian attempt to bolster its positions ahead of the talks, though.

They can say whatever they please because there is no way we can possibly make sure it’s true or not…  I believe the message is that  “despite all your sanctions and pressure, we keep moving ahead and soon are going to have tens of thousands of centrifuges…. We have already obtained 20 percent enriched uranium and we did it all by ourselves… We now have a full cycle and we are even making fuel rods too…”

In light of this, many remain downbeat about the results of the upcoming Istanbul talks, pointing to Tehran’s persistent unwillingness to halt uranium enrichment. Earlier this week, Iran invited ambassadors from several countries, not least Russia and China, to inspect its nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak in an alleged attempt to prove “the purely peaceful nature of the Iranian atomic program”. Some experts believe, however, that the move is little more than an attempt to play both ends against the middle ahead of the Istanbul talks. Vladimir Isayev, of the Institute for Oriental Studies with the Russian Academy of Sciences, fully subscribes to the standpoint.

Tehran knows perfectly well that EU countries will reject such an invitation because the role of examining nuclear sites is up to the IAEA, not the EU, Isayev says. In any case, Iran will certainly use the EU’s reluctance to interact as a plausible pretext to go ahead with uranium enrichment, Isayev contends.

Pacifying Tehran’s nuclear ambitions is surely a tricky task, which will be high on the agenda of parleys between Iran and the P5 plus 1 group in Istanbul on January 20. Meanwhile, Israel and some Gulf nations have repeatedly warned Tehran against obtaining a nuclear weapon by 2015, which Tel Aviv cautioned may well prompt its attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. It is only to be hoped that negotiators in Istanbul will do their best to prevent this worst-case scenario from ever seeing the light of day

Are EU sanctions influencing Iran’s behavior?.

Europe¹s submissive attitude toward Iran and its nuclear weapons program must change, political analyst Diana Gregor, a leading expert in Central European policies vis-a-vis Iran told Benjamin Weinthal, The Jerusalem Post‘s correspondent in Berlin

What is your assessment of the EU’s approach toward Iran’s drive to go nuclear?

I find it important to emphasize that Europe is willingly swallowing Iran’s non-compliance, despite harsher sanctions and European businesses pulling out of Iran.

Having said that, the EU is currently considering putting an end to direct talks with Iran ­ which only emphasizes the degree of disbelief and disenchantment vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear weapons development program. The EU is at a point where it wants to see Iran “walk the walk” and not only “talk the talk.” The EU is also currently thinking of entering talks with Iran only on the condition of Iran¹s compliance with the international community¹s demands from now on. If this regulation comes into effect, it would have immediate impact on the next round of talks in Istanbul ­ if talks take place at all.

Many officials within the EU, however, are convinced that Iran is only playing for time while it keeps fooling the international community ­ a notion I agree with.

Are the EU sanctions putting enough pressure on the Iranians?

Past and current developments do not point toward a change of heart where the Iranians are concerned. And the West seems to be willing to submit to yet another round of Iran’s special brand of diplomacy, which consists of indicating openness to renew negotiations (i.e., the upcoming talks in Istanbul) and pseudo-transparency (i.e., the recently issued invitation by Iran to inspect its nuclear sites) ­ while at the same time emphasizing that there is nothing to talk about, and that Iran will not put an end to its uranium enrichment program. Iran’s negotiations are merely ways to buy more time.

For the future stability of Europe ­ a future in which Europe is not subjected to blackmail or nuclear threats ­ Iran must abolish its nuclear weapons development program; or be stopped. Inaction will not stop the Iranian regime.

Iran sanctions so far have hit the country¹s economy quite hard, but have not had an effect on the mullahs’ regime. The latest P5+1 talks in Geneva showed once again that Iran has no intention to halt its uranium enrichment program and change its nuclear ambitions.

Sanctions are supposed to isolate Iran economically. However, sanctions can only be effective if they are accurately and rigorously implemented. Only then can sanctions convince companies not to do business with Iran. The idea behind sanctions ­ to paraphrase Stuart E. Eizenstat ­ is to maximize the costs that Iran incurs due to its nuclear weapons development program by simultaneously minimizing the benefits. This is the reason why the financial sources Iran needs to keep its nuclear program running need to be eliminated.

Iran is wedded to the idea of having a nuclear capability; the Iranians do not intend to give that up.

Targeted sanctions therefore seem to offer a suitable solution, as chances for a diplomatic breakthrough remain extremely slim.

What is the status of US-EU coordination regarding sanctions?

Since President Obama took office, the US and the EU have worked cooperatively on an Iran policy.

In October 2010, the EU issued new regulations, after the fourth round of sanctions [imposed this summer], calling for restrictions on equipment and technology sales to the Iranian oil and gas industry, as well as on respective investments. However, these regulations do allow the import and export of oil and gas to Iran. The EU also allows financial transactions needed to import oil and gas to Iran.

The US, on the contrary, penalizes companies selling gasoline to Iran and has increased pressure on international companies and refineries to cancel their contracts with Iran.

There has been an agreement between the US State Department and European oil firms Total (France), Statoil (Norway), Eni (Italy) and Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands + Britain) to refuse to refuel planes that belong to Iran Air ­ they have pledged to stop investing in Iran and to not engage in any new activities with the Islamic Republic. In return, the companies are granted protection from possible US penalties for their pre-existing business ventures with Iran.

The US and EU are considering imposing new, joint sanctions before the next round of P5+1 talks scheduled for later this month in Istanbul. They agree that cooperative, joint action with regard to Iran is necessary. They believe in the effectiveness and efficiency of EU-US sanctions, rather than UN-sanctions, as UN-sanctions are often time-consuming and not always successful. None of the previously issued UN sanctions so far have been able to stop the Iranian nuclear weapons development program.

Is there a unified Iran policy among European countries? Within the EU there are different blocks: Some are pushing for Iran sanctions and their proper implementation, and others are advocating against restrictions. Some of the driving forces behind a “slack” position toward EU sanctions against Iran are the following: Sweden has distinguished itself as one of the EU nations most opposed to sanctions against Iran and has constantly worked to weaken the sanctions put into effect by the international community. After the new round of sanctions was agreed upon in June 2010, Sweden called for decreasing the severity of EU sanctions. Swedish firms are involved in Iran¹s energy sector with private companies selling equipment and spare parts to Iran’s oil industry.

Sweden¹s ambassador was among the few Western diplomats who attended [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad¹s inauguration in June 2009.

Austria: Austrian companies are earning good money in Iran, but rarely talk publicly about it. As a result of the global financial crisis, Austria’s total worldwide exports shrank by 20 percent last year. Meanwhile, the country’s exports to Iran grew! Austria has repeatedly contributed to keeping the Iranian regime from international isolation, and has not helped with steps toward destroying the economic basis of the dictatorship of the ayatollahs and the Revolutionary Guards.

Despite the UN and EU sanctions against Iran, the volume of trade between Teheran and Vienna reached 635.95 million euros in 2008. Austrian exports to the Islamic Republic, including sophisticated machinery and electronic goods, rose by almost 6% in 2009, reaching 350 million euros, while Austrian exports to the rest of the world fell by 20% due to the financial crisis.

Since 2002 trade between Austria and Iran has doubled, with military deals accounting for 11%.

Spain is a major purchaser of Iranian crude oil. According to the Spanish Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Commerce, Spain is the biggest oil importer in the European Union; in fact, within the first quarter of 2010, Spain purchased 134,607 barrels a day, with an approximate value of $11.6 billion. Spain is one of Iran¹s biggest European Union Trade partners. In 2008, trade between the two nations nearly doubled, reaching over three billion euros, according to the Iranian Chamber of Commerce. Spain is one of seven countries chosen to participate in the development of the Teheran-Mashhad railroad project, which is estimated to cost between $650.7 and $867.6 million.

There are 1,500 Spanish enterprises in Iran, mostly concerned with developing infrastructure, generation of electricity, water administration and renewable energy. Spain is the second-biggest importer of oil from Iran [within the EU], just behind Italy. From January 2010 to July 2010 Spanish exports to Iran increased 52%.

Switzerland remains one of Europe’s least compliant nations. After the EU voted to strengthen the UN sanctions, the Swiss energy giant EGL was cited as a possible sanctions violator at a US congressional hearing. The hearing cited firms active in Iran’s gas and oil sectors despite sanctions.

According to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, Iran is one of Switzerland¹s most important Middle Eastern trading partners.

Italy: Despite the diplomatic rhetoric, Rome traditionally has good business relations with Teheran, and Italy remains one of Iran¹s largest and most important trading partners in Europe, with bilateral trade totaling well over $7.5 billion a year. Italian refiners are maintaining crude oil trade with Iran at a time when other oil majors and big refiners are halting orders.

Malta, Greece and Cyprus have also opposed additional Iran sanctions.

The EU is Iran’s second largest trading partner worldwide, after China.

The difficulty of properly implementing Iran sanctions obviously lies in the many differences there are within the EU.

To date, OMV has not succumbed to pressure regarding the South Pars gas project. OMV executive board member Helmut Langanger stated that Iran is continuously pressing OMV to begin with investments, but OMV would rather wait for oil prices to recover. Furthermore, OMV has made it clear that it could still take on the role of a partner, should it decide not to become an investor.

Today, the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] constitutes a “state within a state,” thus making ever more realistic the possibility that OMV ­ should the deal come to a close ­ might have to sign agreements with the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. Since the Revolutionary Guards control the nuclear and arms program, this in turn would mean that OMV would be indirectly co-financing the Iranian nuclear program.

How should the EU deal with the Swiss state-owned energy conglomerate EGL and its refusal to terminate its 18-22 billion euro gas deal with Iran?

Switzerland does not seem to understand its responsibility to make sure Iran does not get nuclear weapons. This is a pure affront against Iran sanctions and the efforts to isolate Iran economically. The EU should call upon Switzerland to revoke the EGL deal with Iran and abide by the EU and US sanctions. Furthermore, the US should reconsider having the Swiss Foreign Ministry represent US interests in Iran. Switzerland is clearly avoiding its responsibility to international security.

The US recently implemented human rights sanctions against Iran. Why is the EU unwilling to sanction Iran in connection with human rights?

As concerns about Iran¹s quest for nuclear weapons and its regional ambitions grow, a new international trend is emerging in which Iran is sanctioned for its human rights abuses as a means to weaken the regime while strengthening the West in this nuclear face-off.

However, the official focus on human rights abuses has not gone far enough.

The true potential that lies within the EU falls short of what could actually be done to further isolate Iran. The EU has not yet decided whether it will implement human rights sanctions against Iran. Such sanctions would undermine the current regime and contribute to the West¹s nuclear standoff with Iran, while sending out the right moral signal for supporting human rights in the Islamic Republic.

What is your view of Europe¹s “critical dialogue” and “change through trade” policies toward Iran?

I am convinced that many European states, such as Switzerland, Italy and Austria, to name only a few, have succumbed to Iran¹s game of fooling the West. Dialogue, whether critical or not ­ particularly without the precondition of Iran¹s compliance with the demands of the international community ­ has not proven successful to date. The Iranians seem to dictate the pace, while the West follows suit. Things should, however, be the other way around as Iran does not abide by international rules. To “reward” the Islamic Republic with business deals and increasing trade relations seems wrong on so many levels.

Europe has a submissive attitude towards Iran and its nuclear weapons development program, and this needs to change! Critics argue that Germany is a major key to solving the Iranian nuclear and human rights crisis. How do you analyze German-Iranian relations? What happened with regard to the German hostages in Iran is symptomatic of Germany’s overall relationship with Iran. [She is referring to Marcus Hellwig and Jens Koch, two German journalists seized by the Iranian government in mid-October for interviewing family members of Sakineh Mohammad Ashtiani, an Iranian woman sentenced to death by stoning for alleged adultery.] Berlin is reluctant to impose harsh sanctions and continues to be a major trade partner of the Islamic Republic. The German economy is reacting with caution to the possible tightening of economic sanctions against Iran. Supposedly, Teheran would no longer have reason to repay its debts once the guarantees for Iran (Hermes-Bürgschaften) are further reduced, or discontinued altogether. This would include outstanding payments in the amount of approximately 5.2 billion euros; which, in the event that they are not repaid, the Federal Treasury would have to cover.

With more than 1,900 members, the Chamber of Commerce in Teheran is among Germany¹s largest foreign trade chambers.

The hostage crisis shows how much Germany is under pressure now: As long as Teheran holds the hostages, Berlin will think twice about acting against the Islamic Republic and/or jumping on Washington¹s bandwagon. The German government needs to take a tougher line and stance toward Iran.

What more can the UN Security Council do to penalize Iran?

Targeting more entities, such as IRISL, the Islamic Republic¹s Shipping Lines, and IRGC-controlled companies, as well as individuals, is vital to the global sanctions regime. With so many regimes still critical of Iran sanctions, it is of vital importance that these entities and individuals are “designated” at the UN, as this can ultimately contribute to a wider implementation of sanctions.

Of course, and unfortunately, multilateral action is very difficult to achieve. Targeting IRGC-affiliated companies is one effective strategy.

These sanctions are, however, are just reinforcements of previously issued sanctions, and not completely new ones. The good and important thing about the new set of UN-sanctions is the language, as it calls upon all states to take more stringent action against the IRGC and IRGC-affiliated entities.

In addition to focusing on IRGC-affiliated companies, the UN-sanctions are targeting [40] individuals [putting them under a travel ban and freezing their assets] and requiring countries to inspect ships or planes headed to and from Iran if they suspect banned cargo is on board.

However ­ and this is one of the weaknesses of these sanctions ­ there is no authorization to actually board ships by force at sea. In addition, Iran has proven to be very adept at obscuring its ownership of cargo vessels. Another weakness of the new sanctions is the fact that there is a non-retroactive requirement, which makes it very difficult to stop pre-existing contracts.Iran

Dr. Gregor is an Austrian-born political analyst with Réalité-EU, a NGO that mainly tracks European-Iranian economic and political relations and advocates hard-hitting sanctions against the Islamic Republic to force Iran’s government to cease building its nuclear weapons program.