Archive for January 8, 2011

New Israeli military technology speeds up warfare

January 8, 2011

New Israeli military technology speeds up warfare – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Sophisticated communication system that compiles battlefield information in video game-like map interface designed to knock down military’s response time

Associated Press

Published: 01.07.11, 20:29

Intense winds scraped sand from the desert floor, clouding the view and leaving the Israeli soldiers scarcely able to see each other as they practiced blasting artillery shells at distant targets.

 

In a nearby armored vehicle, commanders armed with small screens could easily monitor every cannon, jeep and target involved, ordering strikes with the tap of a finger. Their weapon: a sophisticated communication system that compiles battlefield information in an easy-to-use, video game-like map interface, helping militaries make sense of the chaos of battle.

The Associated Press was given rare access to the exercise by a military eager to reclaim some of the deterrence it lost over technologically inferior Arab forces.

That deterrence has eroded in recent times, as guerrilla warfare left conventional armies – here as elsewhere – looking clumsy and vulnerable. In a monthlong war in 2006, Lebanese guerrillas with relatively simple rockets knocked out Israeli tanks, and Israel’s high-tech military was powerless to stop a barrage of primitive, unguided Katyusha rockets on northern Israel. The latest computerized gadgetry is designed to knock down the military’s response time. Troops on the ground can add new targets as soon as they spot them – like militants on foot, a rocket squad or a vehicle – to the network for commanders to see instantly and hit. Strikes that used to take 20 or more minutes to coordinate now take just seconds, said Maj. Hagai Ben-Shushan, head of the C4I section for Israel’s artillery. “It doesn’t take much, then shells are going to the target,” he said. Israel is among several nations harnessing digital and satellite technology to develop C4I systems – short for “command, control, communications, computers and intelligence” – that integrate battlefield information. The goal is to have “all the elements of a force … seeing the same tactical picture, and you can move information from one to the other completely seamlessly,” said Britain-based Giles Ebb, who studies such systems for Jane’s Information Group.

System yet to be battle-tested

C4I systems are operational in the United States, which started development in the 1990s, as well as France, Singapore, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy, among other countries, Ebb said.

Israel’s version – being developed over the past decade or so – is “a little bit further down the road than some people … because they have a focus on the problem, they are constantly operationally alert, and they need to be as operationally developed as they can,” Ebb said. The army says it started using the first, basic version in 2005, but it did not include all units and functions. The latest, completed in 2009 and in training since last March, allows all forces on the ground to communicate instantaneously. “Visually, now everything is on the map, so it’s much easier to coordinate,” said the battalion commander whose men were being trained. “You can easily understand the map and the position of forces.” He spoke on condition of anonymity under military rules. On a stretch of sand near the army base at Shivta, deep in Israel’s southern Negev desert, six artillery cannons stood with their barrels aimed at targets about 4 miles (6 kilometers) away. Commanders in a nearby armored vehicle stared at two screens, watching all movement on an interactive satellite map. Pink squares marked each cannon, dotted lines of shell trajectory extended from their barrels and circles showed the expected blast radius of any shells fired. Different symbols marked other army vehicles, their locations kept up to date with GPS-like devices. All the vehicles carried similar screens, giving soldiers a realtime map of the battlefield. One soldier demonstrates how to add a new target to the map: A tap on the screen places it, then he can describe its size and character. Seeing the target, a commander can then order a strike with a few more taps, deciding who will fire and how much. The order immediately appears on those units’ screens. The system’s newest version, built by Israeli defense contractor Elbit, has yet to be battle-tested, but Israel used an earlier one in its Gaza offensive two years ago, Ben-Shushan said.

That war, launched to stop militant rocket fire on Israeli towns, killed about 1,400 Palestinians and 13 Israelis. Four of the 10 Israeli soldiers were killed by friendly fire, but Col. Gil Maoz, head of Israel’s Digital Army program, said the technology helped to prevent other Israeli fatalities. Israel had only an early version of the system during its war with the Lebanese militia Hezbollah in 2006, which killed about 1,200 Lebanese and 160 Israelis. An Israeli investigation into the war, which was widely seen as a failure, criticized the inability of commanders to relay key information to the field. Maoz said having the system then could have lowered the Israeli death toll. Elbit spokeswoman Dalia Rosen said that what sets the Israeli system apart from others is the ease with which it allows land, naval and air forces to communicate with each other and its ability to link everyone from rank-and-file soldiers in the field to the highest commanders. She said Australia purchased Elbit communications technology for its own battle management system in a deal last year valued at $298 million. ent system in a deal last year valued at $298 million.

Iran increases stockpile of higher enriched uranium, defying UN demands

January 8, 2011

Iran increases stockpile of higher enriched uranium, defying UN demands – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Iran’s nuclear chief says his country now has 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent, compared to 30 kilograms in October.

By The Associated Press

Iran’s nuclear chief said his country has increased the stockpile of uranium it began enriching to higher levels last year in defiance of UN demands to halt the program.

Vice-President Ali Akbar Salehi, who is also Iran’s acting foreign minister, said Iran now has 40 kilograms of uranium enriched to 20 percent.

Iran IAEA chief Ali Akbar Salehi Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, left, gestures to chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, after unveiling of a uranium centrifuge in Tehran on April 9, 2010.
Photo by: AP

Iran reported a stockpile of 30 kilograms in October.

Uranium enriched to 20 per cent is enough to produce fuel for a medical research reactor but far below the more than 90 per cent required to build fissile material for nuclear warheads.

A deal for the West to provide fuel for the reactor has all but fallen apart in the deadlock over Iran’s broader nuclear program.

Western powers fear Iran wants to build bombs and is not peaceful as Tehran says.

Three foreign workers wounded in mortar attack near Gaza border

January 8, 2011

Three foreign workers wounded in mortar attack near Gaza border – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Three mortars fired from the Gaza Strip towards Israel on Saturday afternoon; two land in open territory but one strikes a populated area in a kibbutz along the Gaza border.

By Yanir Yagna and Anshel Pfeffer

Three foreign workers were injured on Saturday when a mortar fired from the Gaza Strip exploded in the Sha’ar Hanegev region.

Three mortars were fired from the Gaza Strip around 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon. Two of the mortars landed in open territory but one struck a populated area in a kibbutz near the border fence, wounding three foreign workers and damaging property.

Security fence along the Gaza Strip border Security fence along the Gaza Strip border
Photo by: IDF Spokespersons’ Office

One of the foreign workers was in moderate-serious condition from shrapnel injuries to his chest. A second foreign worker was moderately wounded by shrapnel in his leg and a third was lightly wounded in the incident.

The three were transported to Soroka Hospital in Be’er Sheva for medical treatment.

The incident occurred a day after an Israel Defense Forces soldier was killed and four IDF troops were wounded in a friendly fire incident on the Gaza border as the soldiers engaged a group of armed militants who were apparently approaching the border to lay explosives.

End of Dagan era: Iran question resurfaces

January 8, 2011

End of Dagan era: Iran question resurfaces – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Mossad chief concludes eight year term with series of unprecedented achievements, list of enemies. Issue of Iranian nuclear program, Hezbollah threat now in hands of new boss Ynet reporters

Published: 01.07.11, 12:03

After eight years at the helm, Mossad chief Meir Dagan on Thursday bid farewell from the people who accompanied him throughout his nearly decade-long tenure.

 

Dagan’s secretary handed him his famous pipe and a pouch of tobacco for the very last time. He embraced her and his bodyguard, and was escorted to a vehicle waiting outside.

At that very moment, the organization marked an end of an era. Dagan left behind many devoted supporters and a significant number of enemies, but even they agreed that during his tenure Dagan led the organization to operational achievements that could only be dreamt about eight years ago. Dagan focused mainly on the Iranian issue, including its nuclear program and subversion of moderate regimes in the Middle East as well as support for terror. As such, the Mossad chief placed Iran on top of the organization’s priority list – a strategy that was officially confirmed by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and reaffirmed by his successors Ehud Olmert and Benjamin Netanyahu. So where does the Iranian nuclear program stand with the departure of Dagan? As early as a year-and-a-half ago the Mossad head told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the Islamic Republic will not be able to obtain nuclear weapons before 2014. According to recent estimates, the completion date might be postponed by another year or two, even if western attempts to thwart the program prove futile.

The ‘Dagan method’

The Iranians deal with a significant number of internal issues, which hinder their ability to manage complex technologies. These include political pressure on Tehran, international economic sanctions and isolation, which in turn prevents them from obtaining necessary equipment for the development of the nuclear program, such as metals, computers and machines. Along with all these difficulties, documents published by whistleblower website WikiLeaks reveal that domestic ethnic and social tensions are being used in order to undermine the ayatollahs’ regime. The international pressure and high economic price Iranian citizens have to pay for the nuclear program has stirred a debate among senior officials, on whether the high cost is worthwhile compared to the benefits the government would gain from obtaining the nuclear technology. Many within Israel claim that Mossad’s action during Dagan’s days, along with mounting international pressure on Tehran would achieve much better results than a military operation.

Student protest in Iran (Archive photo: AFP)

Some also fear the steep political and economic costs such a move might inflict on Israel. Hezbollah is armed with an arsenal of rockets and missiles that surpass that of 90% of world countries.

While experts are split over whether or not a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities can cause significant damage to its nuclear program, such a strike would undoubtedly lead to a counter strike against Israel, which apart from Hezbollah may include Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and perhaps even Syria.These experts’ basic assumption is that every country that obtains nuclear warfare would have second strike capabilities, and thus be able to execute its plan sooner or later – even if attacked.

Avoid war at all cost

Jerusalem and Washington are in concurrence over the facts and intelligence estimates vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program. Though the United States does not consider the Iranian program as an immediate threat, it nonetheless comprehends Israel’s concern over its potentially devastating consequences. Will the United States attack? Experts point to very slim chances; especially due to the fact that Washington is already neck-deep in three wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan – which have taken a heavy human and financial toll on the Americans. Over the years, many different views vis-à-vis peace and war with Damascus have been attributed to Dagan by political analysts. However, what has been made clear by information leaked from government meetings during the 2nd Lebanon War, is that the Mossad chief believes Israel should avoid a war with Syria by all cost. Nevertheless, Israel should not forego its essential interests, especially those related to the imminent threat it is facing from the Iran-Hezbollah axis.

Top priority. Nuclear reactor in Bushehr (Photo: AP)

The Mossad seems to take Hezbollah, as well as Hamas, quite seriously. The Shiite terrorist organization’s ability to inflict damage on Israel’s home front, and the capability of both organizations to carry out suicide attacks, has been a cause for major concern within the Israeli intelligence community – perhaps even more so than Syria’s military might.

This is why during Dagan’s tenure, the Mossad had a key role in shaping the positions of the current prime minister, as well as its predecessor, who both refused paying the high price required in order to secure the release of captured soldier Gilad Shalit. Dagan refused to free 450 leading terrorists to the West Bank, for fear that many Israelis would eventually pay with their lives.

Minimal political damage

Significant operations attributed to the Mossad during Dagan’s term in office include the assassinations of Imad Mughniya, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, Muhammad Suleiman and Iranian nuclear scientists. Israel has never claimed responsibility for any of the aforementioned operations, but Hezbollah, Hamas and Tehran firmly insisted that the intelligence agency was behind them. The assassination of Mughniya severely curtailed Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and the organization has yet to find a worthy replacement. Instead, it splitted his responsibilities between four different group members. Al-Mabhouh’s assassination sparked an international media storm, during which Israel was accused, among other things, of passport theft – leading to diplomatic crises with some of its closest allies. However, looking back, it seems the political damage Israel sustained was fickle and minimal at most, and has not jeopardized the cooperation between Mossad and other intelligence agencies. Eight years on, Dagan can be content. So can the group of people working under his command, which he proudly mentioned at any given opportunity.

But even Dagan would admit to some of the organization’s failures: The Mossad wasn’t able to gather intelligence on the fate of missing navigator Major Ron Arad, or obtain accurate information on the whereabouts of captive soldier Gilad Shalit. It also failed to return the remains of spy Eli Cohen from Syria, and was unable to shed new light on the fate of those who went missing during the Battle of Sultan Yacoub. These will now become the responsibility of new Mossad Chief Tamir Pardo.Ron Ben-Yishai and Attila Somfalvi contributed to this report

Wash. Post – Buying time with Iran

January 8, 2011

David Ignatius – Buying time with Iran.

Sunday, January 9, 2011

 

The Obama administration has concluded that Iran’s nuclear program has been slowed by a combination of sanctions, sabotage and Iran’s own technical troubles. Because of the delay, U.S. officials see what one describes as “a little bit of space” before any military showdown with Iran.

Israeli officials, too, see more time on the clock. Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s deputy prime minister, noted the Iranian slowdown in a Dec. 29 interview with Israel Radio and said the West has up to three years to stop Tehran from making a bomb.

“These [Iranian] difficulties slow the timeline, of course,” said Yaalon, a former Israeli defense chief. And last Thursday, outgoing Mossad chief Meir Dagan told Israeli reporters that Iran couldn’t build a bomb before 2015 at the earliest, in part because of unspecified “measures that have been deployed against them.”

A senior Obama administration official gave me a similar account of Iran’s troubles. “They’re not moving as fast as we had feared a year ago,” he said.

This new assessment of Iran’s nuclear setbacks has lowered the temperature on what had been 2010’s hottest strategic issue. Last summer, Jerusalem and Washington were talking themselves into a war fever, prompted in part by a powerful article in the Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg that starkly described the likelihood of military action. This fever seems to have broken.

What’s increasingly clear is that low-key weapons – covert sabotage and economic sanctions – are accomplishing many of the benefits of military action, without the costs. It’s a devious approach – all the more so because it’s accompanied by near-constant U.S. proposals of diplomatic dialogue – but in that sense, it matches Iran’s own operating style of pursuing multiple options at once.

Officials won’t discuss the clandestine program of cyberattack and other sabotage being waged against the Iranian nuclear program. Yet we see the effects – in crashing centrifuges and reduced operations of the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz – but don’t understand the causes. That’s the way covert action is supposed to work.

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The most direct confirmation that sabotage has paid off came from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who said in November that the Stuxnet computer virus had damaged the Natanz operation. “They succeeded in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges with the software they had installed in electronic parts,” he said.

A fascinating (and remarkably detailed) account of the Stuxnet attack was published Dec. 22 by the Institute for Science and International Security. The study described how the virus was targeted to attack a key electronic control in the centrifuges, known as a “frequency converter,” so that the spin of the rotors was increased and slowed in a way that would cause a malfunction.

According to the ISIS report, the virus may have been introduced in early or mid 2009. By late 2009 or early 2010, the study said, Iran decommissioned and replaced about 1,000 centrifuges – far more than normal breakage. The virus hid its electronic tracks, but an analysis by the security firm Symantec showed that the code included the term “DEADFOO7,” which could refer to the aviation term for a dead engine and also be a play on James Bond’s fictional code name.

Stuxnet was just one of what appeared to have been a series of efforts to disrupt the supply chain of the Iranian nuclear program. “Such overt and covert disruption activities have had significant effect in slowing Iran’s centrifuge program,” concluded the ISIS.

The delays in the Iranian program are important because they add strategic warning time for the West to respond to any Iranian push for a bomb. U.S. officials estimate that if Iran were to try a “break out” by enriching uranium at Natanz to the 90 percent level needed for a bomb, that move (requiring reconfiguration of the centrifuges) would be detectable – and it would take Iran one to two more years to make a bomb.

The Iranians could try what U.S. officials call a “sneak out” at a secret enrichment facility like the one they constructed near Qom. They would have to use their poorly performing (and perhaps still Stuxnet-infected) old centrifuges or an unproven new model. Alternative enrichment technologies, such as lasers or a heavy-water reactor, don’t appear feasible for Iran now, officials say. Foreign technology from Russia and other suppliers has been halted, and the Iranians can’t build the complex hardware (such as a “pressure vessel” needed for the heavy-water reactor) on their own.

The Obama administration keeps holding the door open for negotiations, and another round is scheduled this month in Istanbul. But the real news is that Tehran has technical problems – bringing sighs of relief (and a few mischievous smiles) in the West.

Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Timetable

January 8, 2011

Israel and the Iranian Nuclear Timetable | The National Interest Blog.

During the past ten days Israeli officials have made some remarkably reassuring statements about the status of what Israel has customarily and vehemently characterized as the overwhelming security threat of our time: Iran’s nuclear program. Before the new year Deputy Prime Minister Moshe Yaalon said that thanks to technical difficulties and sanctions, an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is probably three years away—a longer timeline than Israeli officials had been suggesting. Now retiring Mossad chief Meir Dagan says an Iranian bomb is even farther away—that Iran won’t have that capability until 2015 even if all current international efforts to constrain Iran were to stop tomorrow. If those efforts continue, says Dagan, an Iranian nuclear weapons capability will be pushed back even more.

If we accept these assessments, they are obviously good news for anyone who does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. It is also good news that such assessments are being voiced publicly by senior Israelis, because they seem to make it less likely that the possible action that has posed the greatest risk of severely damaging U.S. interests in the Middle East—an Israeli military attack on Iran—will happen anytime soon. But given the divergence between these recent pronouncements and the alarmist statements about Iran we have become accustomed to hearing from Israel, how can one explain the remarks by Yaalon and Dagan? I can think of a half dozen possible explanations.

One is that they are more or less straightforward reflections of careful, straightforward analysis by Israeli experts of the actual state of the Iranian program. Not every statement by a public official needs to be a disingenuous manipulation of the facts in pursuit of a policy objective. Sometimes we need to resist the tendency to overanalyze someone else’s motives. A corresponding U.S. experience that comes to mind was a controversial intelligence assessment in 2007 about the Iranian nuclear program, which left journalists and many others convinced that the writers of the estimate were seeking to disable the military option, even though the principal reasons that estimate came out the way it did had to do with such mundane procedural matters as whether a classified paper was prepared before it was decided to prepare an unclassified one. Dagan is an intelligence professional, and it may have been fully in that capacity that he made his valedictory remarks to journalists.

A second possible explanation is that the remarks are self-serving for both the professionals and the policymakers, in the sense that they were taking credit for slowing down the Iranian program, whether through software worms or other means. For Mossad in particular, impeding the Iranian program has been a major objective for many years. For Dagan, who has headed the intelligence agency since 2002, whatever he has managed to accomplish in sabotaging and constraining the Iranian effort is a big feather in his cap.

Third, what we are hearing may be well-reasoned thoughts from Israelis who have come to realize that resorting to military force against Iran would damage Israel’s interests along with the interests of others. And thus they are trying to take the military option off Israel’s table. To the extent this explanation is valid it would be very good news. But even if valid, such thinking is undoubtedly still outweighed by the more visceral, less well-reasoned sentiments in Israel about an Iranian bomb.

A fourth explanation is that Israeli leaders have come to realize that the alarmism and saber-rattling about Iran were having deleterious effects on Israel’s society and public confidence, and so it was necessary to tone the alarmism down. More specifically, the scare-mongering was encouraging emigration out of Israel, which is one of the very effects Israeli leaders fear will ensue if Iran actually gets a nuclear weapon.

A fifth explanation is that the Israelis were trying to show that sanctions against Iran are working and that it thus makes sense to keep them in place and even to expand them. Yaalon in particular suggested that sanctions were a major reason for the slowing of the Iranian program. The Israeli statements were in this respect a rebuttal of the periodic boasting by Iranian president Ahmadinejad about how much nuclear progress Iran supposedly has made.

The sixth possible explanation is the one that is most in line with the virtuosic manipulation of the U.S. political process that we have come to expect from Israel. It is a matter of timing. Israeli policymakers would prefer a U.S. military strike on Iran over an Israeli strike, because given U.S. capabilities it would be more operationally feasible and effective. But Israelis do not see this happening under the current U.S. administration. So they already are looking ahead to January 2013 and a hoped-for new administration that would be more to their liking and more likely to do Israel’s bidding. Israel is saving more of its rhetorical and lobbying ammunition on the Iranian nuclear issue for when it is most likely to have the desired effect, a couple of years from now. In the meantime, the toning down of the alarmism makes sense because it avoids a cry wolf effect and will heighten the impact when, at a more propitious time in the future, the alarm is cranked back up again.

Any or all of these explanations may have some validity. They are not mutually exclusive. Probably the relative importance of each of them varies from one Israeli official to another. Perhaps the first three have more explanatory power for what Dagan said, and the last three for Yaalon’s comments. Probably the sixth and final explanation best represents the thinking of the Netanyahu government.

Whatever the combination of explanations, one should not get too encouraged by whatever good news is embedded in all this, because it is ultimately just a matter of timing. Days of reckoning have been postponed, not eliminated. Israeli pressure and agitation on this issue will persist, and it will intensify some time in the future. And whatever is said about timing does nothing to address the more fundamental questions of what harm an Iranian nuclear weapon really would or would not do if ultimately is not precluded, and what harm a resort to war would do instead.