WarSclerotic

‘Stuxnet specifically targeted Iranian nuclear program’.

The German computer security expert who first reported that the Stuxnet worm was designed to attack targets in Iran said the virus specifically attacked the country’s nuclear program, in a report posted Friday.

In his analysis, Ralph Langner said Stuxnet contained two distinct “digital warheads,” specifically designed to attack military targets: Uranium enrichment plants and the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

Langner said that the portion of the worm that targeted Uranium enrichment plants manipulated the speeds of mechanical parts in the enrichment process, which would ultimately “result in cracking the rotor, thereby destroying the centrifuge.”

He said the strategic importance of such an attack is that it was able to “attack and destroy centrifuge facilities that are unknown to IAEA inspectors and the world,” saying that this was likely the main goal of the worm’s first “warhead.”

The second “warhead” targeted the Bushehr nuclear plant, according to Langner’s report. Explaining how the program was designed to work, he notes that this segment of code had no relation to the first “warhead.”

He purported that the second segment was intended to attack the external turbine controller of the Bushehr plant, a 150 foot “chunk of metal,” that could “destroy the turbine as effectively as an air strike.”

Praising the sophistication of the attack code, Langner said, “it is obvious that several years of preparation went into the design of this attack.” Describing the technological advancement it represents, he compared it to “the arrival of an F-35 fighter jet on a World War I battlefield.” He called the technology, “much superior to anything ever seen before, and to what was assumed possible.”

Editors Notes: Didn’t we used to be on the same side?.

Photo by: Ariel Jerozolimski  

By DAVID HOROVITZ
11/19/2010 12:47

Before we can even get to grips with the complexities of dealing with the Palestinians, we find ourselves head-to-head with Washington.

Earlier this month, in an op-ed for The New York Times marking the 15th anniversary of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, former US president Bill Clinton told the tie story. Again. The story, often repeated, that shows a Rabin so focused on the important things of life, so “utterly without pretense” as Clinton put it, that he never quite came to terms with this merely decorative article of clothing.

“True to form, two weeks before his assassination,” Clinton wrote of Rabin, “he arrived in Washington at a black-tie event without the black tie. We borrowed one for him, and I still smile whenever I think about straightening it for him…”

The affection with which he retells the tie story is emblematic of Clinton’s tone in all of his writings and musings on Rabin. The president quite plainly adored our late prime minister – admired him, respected him, empathized with him, regarded him as a role model. As he wrote in the Times, loved him.

There is nothing comparably affectionate in George W. Bush’s new memoir about Ariel Sharon – the prime minister with whom Clinton’s presidential successor worked for crucial periods. But there is evidence of respect, admiration and a meeting of minds.

Bush recalls his first visit to Israel in 1998, and the helicopter tour he took with Sharon – “a bull of a man… who had served in all of Israel’s wars.” Sharon’s proud, “gruff” airborne commentary that day, his familiarity with “every inch of the land,” his observation that “Here our country was only nine miles wide,” undoubtedly shaped some of the then-Texas governor’s fundamental thinking on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The tour with Sharon, which constituted his “most striking memory” of that debut trip to the Holy Land, left Bush, as he writes, “struck by Israel’s vulnerability in a hostile neighborhood.”

Tellingly, too, Bush notes, it is with Sharon he speaks by telephone immediately before his first post-September 11 cabinet meeting – “a leader who understood what it meant to fight terror.”

Recognizing the personal and professional dimensions of these relationships between recent American presidents and Israeli prime ministers serves, bitterly, to underline how strikingly the climate – and, one fears, the essence – of our bilateral ties has chilled of late. The Clinton-Rabin alliance and, albeit to a much lesser personal extent, the Bush-Sharon interaction, were true partnerships in which all manner of fundamental shared values and interests were safely assumed, and served as the basis from which heartfelt mutual concern and commitment flowed. These were leadership pairings of profound trust, and of profound benefit to both countries.

Today, there is little echo of these personal meetings of minds to be found in the relationship between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. The notion that they loathe each other is almost certainly incorrect. For a start, loathing would require a passion it is unlikely either can muster for the other.

A more reasonable assessment is that, on a personal level, they get along okay, without any of the particular respect, admiration, never mind love, of the Clinton- Rabin team.

Much more troubling, however, is the growing sense in these past few weeks that the shared interests and values that constituted the basis for those earlier, heartfelt personal relationships is crumbling. As our two leaderships have haggled (and that, unfortunately, is the only word for it) over the terms of a new settlement freeze, our alliance seems to be shriveling into a cold, adversarial contest.

In the past, guiding the American-Israel approach to peacemaking with the Palestinians was a wealth of shared goodwill and historical precedent. We were partners, trying together to find the balance of carrots and sticks, to perfect the framework, that would finally draw the immensely, sometimes violently reluctant Palestinians into reducing their maximalist demands to viable terms we all could live with.

US-Israel relations were not an uninterrupted love fest down the decades. The Clinton- Rabin connection was exceptional. Some of the leadership pairings really did take a strong dislike to each other. There were always arguments and disagreements and stark policy differences.

But implicit in the partnership, underpinning it, was recognition of the fact that the Jewish state was revived in 1948 because its leadership unhappily accepted a partition of British Mandatory Palestine that left the most resonant places in Jewish history outside our sovereign borders, while an intended Arab entity was not established because the Arab leaderships preferred to try and strangle Israel. Implicit, too, was the fact that Israel, the world’s only Jewish state and the region’s only democracy, had been forced to fight war after war for its survival in the face of implacable enemies bent on its destruction, to endure unprecedented terrorist onslaughts, and to overcome relentless attempts at economic boycott and diplomatic sanction.

It was recognized that the territory Israel’s critics now asserted lay at the heart of the conflict – territory to which Israel has an incontrovertible historic claim, and which Israel captured when forced into war – was not even held by Israel between 1948 and 1967. Rather, that very territory was the launching point of Arab efforts to destroy the country.

Also implicit in the partnership was the awareness that, while some Israeli governments are more reluctant than others to trade land for peace, no Israeli government has balked at that equation when a credible, dependable Arab peace partner made an appearance. In fact, in recent years, all Israeli governments have shown a readiness to embrace that equation even when the ostensible Palestinian peace partner has fallen some distance short of credibility and dependability.

TODAY, THOUGH, that history, those fundamentals, that peacemaking context seem at risk of being forgotten.

Negotiating with the Palestinians has proven extraordinarily frustrating these past two decades – their leadership to date has been frequently disingenuous, often murderous and serially rejectionist. But we insist on trying afresh, because we need an accommodation to retain a Jewish, democratic Israel. We do not want to have to live by the sword. We nurture the faint hope that, along with its undoubted desire for statehood, the current Palestinian leadership can yet be persuaded of the virtues of reconciliation ­ the benefits of a future, as Clinton put it in his Times op-ed, ³where cooperation triumphs over conflict.”

But now, before we can even get to grips with the complexities of negotiating with the Palestinians, we find ourselves head-to-head with Washington, locked in tense negotiating sessions where previously we were often locked in step. Instead of working together to identify areas of leverage, pressure points and incentives for the Palestinians, we are looking for those same opportunities and vulnerabilities in each other.

Last Thursday in New York, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and their respective advisory teams sat together for seven hours to try to find an agreed path toward resuming Israeli-Palestinian direct talks. The very fact of this marathon session, the news that our two sides had worked intensively for seven hours, was deemed by most analysts to be a good thing, evidence of substantive progress.

At the risk of stating the blindingly obvious, what seems to have been overlooked here is that these were negotiations between Israel and the United States, not Israel and the Palestinians. These were negotiations, that is, between two parties that, until not very long ago, used to sit on the same side of the table – ­ figuring out how best to entice the recalcitrant Palestinians toward peace. Now we are sitting across the table from each other. And the Palestinians, the people who used to be on the other side of the table, the people who walked out of the direct talks two months ago ­ just as they have ultimately walked away from every serious Israeli peace offer ­ are not even in the room. They are proceeding sedately toward statehood, with growing confidence that they can attain independence without the necessity of reconciliation.

MEANWHILE, FOR all the presumed wisdom of the various interlocutors, the ideas that are emerging from this alarming new Israel-American negotiating construct sound frankly ridiculous.

The “incentives” America is said to be offering Israel include the promise of a one-year US veto on Palestinian unilateralist actions toward statehood in the UN Security Council. Why on earth would that constitute an incentive? Why would the US, our partner, ever want to sanction a unilateral process that by definition resolves none of the core issues in dispute between us and the Palestinians?

Similarly, we are reportedly being promised various security guarantees that would reduce the military risk to Israel posed by a Palestinian state? Again, why would these be offered as an incentive, when surely it is a profound American interest that its sole dependable ally in this vicious region be secure?

Why, for that matter, would our prime minister be seeking to extract more and better such “incentives” ­ to compel the administration into explicitly committing itself to all kinds of pledges and actions which, until now, we reasonably assumed would be forthcoming anyway should the need arise.

And why are these and other gifts, gestures, promises and guarantees being offered in the first place? In the service of an attempted 90-day freeze on settlement expansion, a second one-time-only freeze after the previous 10-month moratorium predictably failed to enable the finalizing of a peace accord. Does anybody honestly anticipate, after 17 years of Palestinian duplicity and evasion, that three months will yield a deal?

Worse, if nobody actually harbors any such expectation, and the ³best² we can hope for, as is being hinted, is major progress on just one core issue, that of the borders between Israel and “Palestine,” why is that deemed potentially beneficial either? For surely, central to any viable accord is the refinement of the “land for peace” equation into the more specific “land for refugees” bargain.

If Israel is to ultimately partner the Palestinians to sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza, abandoning our hold on Judea and Samaria, then the Palestinians’ side of the deal must be to abandon their demand for a “right of return” for their refugees and descendants to Israel. They will have to give up on the dream of overwhelming the Jewish state by weight of numbers, and belatedly integrate all their people into their new country, just as we integrated all of our scattered people into ours. A deal on borders alone would see Israel making its most wrenching concession, without the vital quid pro quo of the Palestinians making theirs.

IN A healthy American-Israel relationship, the type that plainly prevailed until not too long ago, the US would not have turned the settlement issue into what it has become, an appallingly counterproductive precondition for Palestinian consent to so much as talk to us. The US would have recognized that Israel has already dismantled the settlements in Gaza and a handful in northern Samaria, and has presented a series of peace proposals that would involve dismantling most of the settlements elsewhere in the West Bank.

In a healthy American-Israel relationship, the US would not have calculatedly inflated the unfortunate Ramat Shlomo dispute into a full-scale public bust up, complete with scorching denunciation of Israel by Hillary Clinton, who publicly described the dismally timed announcement of the building plans, during Vice President Biden’s visit in March, as “insulting” and whose spokesman went so far as to declare in her name that it sent “a deeply negative signal about Israel’s approach to the bilateral relationship.”

This public humbling of Israel told the Arab world that our alliance was far from the oft-asserted unshakeable and unbreakable, thus fueling our enemies’ hopes that Israel can yet be fatally weakened, and it undermined Israelis’ vital faith in the US as our ultra-dependable guarantor when we calculate the risks we dare take for peace.

In a healthy American-Israeli relationship, our prime minister would volunteer an open-ended freeze on the expansion of settlements outside those areas we anticipate retaining under a permanent accord. This would underline to the Palestinians and the international community Israel’s genuine commitment to compromise and potentially ease the negotiating process. It would also demonstrate pragmatic self-interest. For why would the prime minister want to allocate further resources, and mislead more Israelis into making their homes, in areas where his declared support for Palestinian statehood will necessitate an eventual withdrawal?

In a healthy American-Israeli relationship, that freeze, freely offered, without demands for spurious “incentives,” would be welcomed effusively by Washington, accurately presented as evidence of Israel¹s fierce imperative to reach an accommodation. It would be utilized to help ensure the US-supported and US-financed Palestinian leadership not only came to the negotiating table, but stayed there until it internalized its obligation to accept the legitimacy of the Jewish state’s existence and to champion conciliatory positions to its public.

As things stand, Palestinians are all too often imbibing, including via the PA’s own media, an unmodified message of Israel as a nation born in sin, whose soldiers indiscriminately attack its people. Israel is depicted as a transient entity that is illegitimate within any borders, no matter how constricted. Our towns and cities are frequently misrepresented on PA television as Palestinian towns and cities. We are portrayed as a nation that, according to Na’aman Shahrour ­ the guest speaker at this month’s PA Ministry of Culture political conference in Tulkarm, held on the 93rd anniversary of the “cursed” Balfour Declaration ­ was created so that Britain and Europe could be “rid of this burden called the Jews… even at the expense of a different nation.” In such an atmosphere, no peace effort can take hold.

In a healthy American-Israeli relationship, finally, we would be working, on the same side of the table, to ensure that nothing distracted us from our critical joint focus on thwarting the would-be nuclear Iran. Here, too, it would worryingly seem, our red lines are being drawn in very different places.

Of all the dire potential consequences of our shifting partnership ­ of the sorry drift since the days when an American president was working with an Israeli prime minister he loved, in a climate of instinctive cooperation ­ there is none more dangerous than a dilution of the shared imperative to thwart Teheran’s opportunistic, ruthless and genocidal regime.

Worm in Iran Can Wreck Nuclear Centrifuges – NYTimes.com.

Experts dissecting the computer worm suspected of being aimed at Iran’s nuclear program have determined that it was precisely calibrated in a way that could send nuclear centrifuges wildly out of control.

Their conclusion, while not definitive, begins to clear some of the fog around the Stuxnet worm, a malicious program detected earlier this year on computers, primarily in Iran but also India, Indonesia and other countries.

The paternity of the worm is still in dispute, but in recent weeks officials from Israel have broken into wide smiles when asked whether Israel was behind the attack, or knew who was. American officials have suggested it originated abroad.

The new forensic work narrows the range of targets and deciphers the worm’s plan of attack. Computer analysts say Stuxnet does its damage by making quick changes in the rotational speed of motors, shifting them rapidly up and down.

Changing the speed “sabotages the normal operation of the industrial control process,” Eric Chien, a researcher at the computer security company Symantec, wrote in a blog post.

Those fluctuations, nuclear analysts said in response to the report, are a recipe for disaster among the thousands of centrifuges spinning in Iran to enrich uranium, which can fuel reactors or bombs. Rapid changes can cause them to blow apart. Reports issued by international inspectors reveal that Iran has experienced many problems keeping its centrifuges running, with hundreds removed from active service since summer 2009.

“We don’t see direct confirmation” that the attack was meant to slow Iran’s nuclear work, David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that tracks nuclear proliferation, said in an interview Thursday. “But it sure is a plausible interpretation of the available facts.”

Intelligence officials have said they believe that a series of covert programs are responsible for at least some of that decline. So when Iran reported earlier this year that it was battling the Stuxnet worm, many experts immediately suspected that it was a state-sponsored cyberattack.

Until last week, analysts had said only that Stuxnet was designed to infect certain kinds of Siemens equipment used in a wide variety of industrial sites around the world.

But a study released Friday by Mr. Chien, Nicolas Falliere and Liam O. Murchu at Symantec, concluded that the program’s real target was to take over frequency converters, a type of power supply that changes its output frequency to control the speed of a motor.

The worm’s code was found to attack converters made by two companies, Fararo Paya in Iran and Vacon in Finland. A separate study conducted by the Department of Homeland Security confirmed that finding, a senior government official said in an interview on Thursday.

Then, on Wednesday, Mr. Albright and a colleague, Andrea Stricker, released a report saying that when the worm ramped up the frequency of the electrical current supplying the centrifuges, they would spin faster and faster. The worm eventually makes the current hit 1,410 Hertz, or cycles per second — just enough, they reported, to send the centrifuges flying apart.

In a spooky flourish, Mr. Albright said in the interview, the worm ends the attack with a command to restore the current to the perfect operating frequency for the centrifuges — which, by that time, would presumably be destroyed.

“It’s striking how close it is to the standard value,” he said.

The computer analysis, his Wednesday report concluded, “makes a legitimate case that Stuxnet could indeed disrupt or destroy” Iranian centrifuge plants.

The latest evidence does not prove Iran was the target, and there have been no confirmed reports of industrial damage linked to Stuxnet. Converters are used to control a number of different machines, including lathes, saws and turbines, and they can be found in gas pipelines and chemical plants. But converters are also essential for nuclear centrifuges.

On Wednesday, the chief of the Department of Homeland Security’s cybersecurity center in Virginia, Sean McGurk, told a Senate committee that the worm was a “game changer” because of the skill with which it was composed and the care with which it was geared toward attacking specific types of equipment.

Meanwhile, the search for other clues in the Stuxnet program continues — and so do the theories about its origins.

Ralph Langner, a German expert in industrial control systems who has examined the program and who was the first to suggest that the Stuxnet worm may have been aimed at Iran, noted in late September that a file inside the code was named “Myrtus.” That could be read as an allusion to Esther, and he and others speculated it was a reference to the Book of Esther, the Old Testament tale in which the Jews pre-empt a Persian plot to destroy them.

Writing on his Web site last week, Mr. Langner noted that a number of the data modules inside the program contained the date “Sept. 24, 2001,” clearly long before the program was written. He wrote that he believed the date was a message from the authors of the program, but did not know what it might mean.

Last month, researchers at Symantec also speculated that a string of numbers found in the program — 19790509 — while seeming random, might actually be significant. They speculated that it might refer to May 9, 1979, the day that Jewish-Iranian businessman Habib Elghanian was executed in Iran after being convicted of spying for Israel.

Interpreting what the clues might mean is a fascinating exercise for computer experts and conspiracy theorists, but it could also be a way to mislead investigators.

Indeed, according to one investigator, the creation date of the data modules might instead suggest that the original attack code in Stuxnet was written long before the program was actually distributed.

According to Tom Parker, a computer security specialist at Securicon LLC, a security consulting firm based in Washington, the Stuxnet payload appeared to have been written by a team of highly skilled programmers, while the “dropper” program that delivered the program reflected an amateur level of expertise. He said the fact that Stuxnet was detected and had spread widely in a number of countries was an indicator that it was a failed operation.

“The end target is going to be able to know they were the target, and the attacker won’t be able to use this technique again,” he said.

Above the Fray: The US and Iran at a pivotal crossroad.

Photo by: Associated Press  

By ALON BEN-MEIR
11/19/2010 12:24

The Obama administration must choose a new strategy from a set of imperfect options.

Two years into the Obama administration, the US has made important progress in tightening sanctions against the Iranian regime, but more must be done to alter its nuclear ambitions. Despite the new sanctions, Iran has continued to gain influence in Iraq and Afghanistan and stir unrest in Lebanon, strengthening its armed forces while advancing its uranium enrichment efforts.

Today, it is unlikely that Iran views the US, preoccupied with withdrawing from the region and addressing its languishing economy, as a genuine threat to its nuclear aspirations. The US must establish a successful Iran policy that underlines the importance of international engagement efforts, while outlining clear consequences for Iran’s continued defiance.

Although the new set of sanctions is hurting the Iranian economy, it is far from crippling. Despite new sanctions targeting the energy sector – including harsh financial controls on new investments – Iran is still able to sell considerable amounts of oil, most notably to China, Turkey and India.

Even as sanctions force Iran to make unpopular cuts in oil and other subsidies, which could potentially stir unrest, it has shown its ruthlessness in quelling domestic dissension. The violent measures taken during the domestic upheaval surrounding the disputed presidential elections in May 2009 illustrated that the government will not easily change course and will do whatever it takes to keep its grip on power.

As Iran works to limit the impact of international sanctions, it is preparing for the possibility of a military confrontation while working to undermine US interests across the region. Although there is in place an effective ban on arms sales to Iran, Teheran has undertaken to modernize its military force, including upgrading its domestic weapons systems, such as its surface-to-air missiles, in an attempt to build a modicum of deterrence capability in the event that Israel or the United States decide to attack its nuclear plants.

Iran is most interested in keeping the US occupied in regional conflicts to gain more time to further advance its nuclear program while inhibiting the Obama administration from threatening it militarily. Indeed, it knows that the American public is sickened by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and would not support a third war in the Middle East, unless the US is facing an imminent threat. Precisely to avoid even the perception of imminent threat, Iran has no intention to openly provoke the US.

Without a credible threat of military action – and with successful efforts to limit the impact of new sanctions – Iran has also grown accustomed to the US talking tough, but doing little. The recent WikiLeaks documents have illustrated that Iranian forces have played a considerable role in stirring violence in Iraq – even battling US forces directly – without a meaningful US response. This illustrates that the “talk tough, do little” approach has been in place for successive White House administrations, though the situation is clearly direr today. Regardless of the Obama administration’s determination, foreign and domestic constraints are keeping the US from advancing the military threat, and its credibility is significantly diminished.

Recognizing this, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu enhanced his rhetoric in support of a military strike during his recent visit to the US. Thereby, he stoked fears that should the US not take action, Israel could heighten matters with a strike of its own.

THE OBAMA administration must unfortunately choose a new strategy among a set of imperfect and unpleasant options. Indeed none of these options, in and of itself, would necessarily resolve Iran’s nuclear impasse, but the cumulative impact of some elements of these options could force Iran to change course.

First, there are those who suggest that the US could allow Iran to maintain a nuclear enrichment program under a strict monitoring system structured with the support of the international community. This option recognizes that maintaining a nuclear program on its soil is a source of national pride and will remain such regardless of who is in power. It, however, assumes that Iran has no intention of pursuing nuclear weapons, and that it is better to enable it to have a nuclear program under strict observation than to continue dangerous gamesmanship while indicating that the US is not interested in regime change.

Those who support this option invoke what President Barack Obama stated in Cairo when he said that “any nation – including Iran – should have the right to access peaceful nuclear power if it complies with its responsibilities under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That commitment is at the core of the treaty, and it must be kept for all who fully abide by it.”

However, Iran has shown no willingness to open up to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The new Republican-led Congress will not likely support such a move. And without a doubt, Israel would vehemently reject this idea, as it is convinced that Iran is pursuing a nuclear arsenal and cannot be trusted to abandon its weapons program. The question is whether Obama will be able to persuade all sides that this is in fact a workable formula.

Second, other circles suggest the US could heed Netanyahu’s call to enhance the credibility of the military option. The US should begin to prepare contingency plans, and could undertake regular joint military maneuvers with Israel and separately with other Gulf states, which would signal to Iran the seriousness of the military option.

Third, the US could consider small-scale retaliations against some Iranian assets that are working to undermine its interests, whether in Afghanistan or Iraq. This argument suggests that without signaling to Iran that it cannot attack US interests with impunity, its bad behavior will only intensify. It is questionable that the Obama administration is prepared to go this route.

Fourth, those who favor continued negotiations agree that when the negotiations resume, the US should give them a limited time frame – perhaps no more than four months. The Iranians must know they cannot play for time anymore. The US should utilize Turkey as a direct interlocutor and work to rebuild trust with it regarding negotiations with Iran. The nuclear swap deal brokered by Turkey and Brazil did not go as far as the P5+1 and especially the US expected, and Turkey’s subsequent opposition to sanctions at the UN has left US-Turkey ties further frayed.

Finally, there are those who counsel patience. They argue that Iran is experiencing many difficulties and its nuclear program is advancing far more slowly than what was previously thought. They suggest that its efforts have been impeded by a combination of elements, including foreign sabotage of its nuclear computer programs, inability to import nuclear technology, a restive public resulting from the post-election political crisis, international pressure and internal discord between the various centers of power about the overall direction the country is heading.

FOR THESE reasons, I join those who counsel patience provided that the Obama administration continues to focus on making the sanctions increasingly more effective, indeed crippling. In addition, the US should steadily increase external and internal pressure by helping the Green Movement and other groups like the Arabs, Kurds and Baluch, while refraining from engaging Iran in negotiation.

This option may well be worth testing, provided the US fully coordinates its strategy with Israel. If the Obama administration does not demonstrate that it has every intention of stopping Iran by any means – including the military option – and if Israel concludes that Iran is about to reach a breakout capacity, it is likely to act with or without American consent.

Obama should not make the mistake of taking Netanyahu’s government or any other government for granted. No defense cabinet would put party politics above national security. Whether Likud, Labor, Kadima or others are involved, they share the same sentiments regarding national security, especially with respect to the Iranian threat.

If the Obama administration is serious about keeping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, it must demonstrate it by incorporating certain elements of the various options outlined. Nevertheless, the road ahead will be difficult and treacherous. Iran believes the US is not willing to traverse that path. Convincing it of the contrary will be essential to diminish the likelihood of the military option while keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Islamic Republic.

Gaza militants fire long-range Grad rocket into western Negev – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Firing comes amid growing violence in Gaza, as Israeli forces assassinated 2 Army of Islam Gaza militant leaders in two separate occasions in recent weeks.

Gaza militants fired at a long-range Grad rocket into the western Negev early Friday, Army Radio reported, following a night-long barrage of Qassam rockets fired from the coastal enclave.

	A Grad-type Katyusha rocket
	Photo by: Albert Denkberg

No injuries or damages were reported.

The rocket exploded north of the Israeli town of Ofakim, with security forces struggling to pinpoint the exact location due to heavy morning fog.

The launch joined at least two earlier Qassam-rocket firings into western Negev, with no injuries or damages being reported; a third Qassam launch was reported a few hours following the firing of the Grad-type Katyusha.

The attacks comes amid growing violence in Gaza, as Israeli forces struck Army of Islam militant leaders in two separate occasions in recent weeks.

The firing of the Russian-invented Grad-type Katyusha, which has a longer range than the more makeshift Qassam rocket that has been fired by the thousands at Negev towns and villages, comes amid two recent hits of top Gaza militants by Israeli forces.

Mohammed Nimnim and Islam Yassin, killed in Israel Defense Forces air strikes on November 3 and 17, were Gazan leaders of the Army of Islam, a Palestinian Islamist group inspired by al-Qaida. Israel accused them of having planned to attack Israelis in the Egyptian Sinai.

On Thursday, a recording released by declared Al-Qaida affiliates warned the “aggressor Jews” they will not be safe from rockets and other attacks until they “leave the land of Palestine” in wake of recent attacks.

The recording, which was quoted on Army Radio, ends by invoking “al Quds”, Arabic for Jerusalem. The speaker’s reference to rockets suggests links with Palestinians in Gaza, where this has been a favorite mode of attack against Israel.

Mullen: Iran policy limited for now to sanctions, engagement | JTA – Jewish & Israel News.

November 18, 2010

WASHINGTON (JTA) — The U.S. focus on “dialogue, engagement and sanctions” in dealing with Iran is the right focus for now and military force remains an option “in the future,” the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff said.

Adm. Mike Mullen, meeting at the Pentagon Wednesday with his Israeli counterpart Gabi Ashkenazi, was asked about demands by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that the United States make a “credible military threat” against Iran to get it to stand down from its suspected nuclear weapons program.

“Right now the focus is on dialogue and engagement and sanctions,” he said. “The sanctions are actually taking a fairly significant bite, and that’s the current path. We’ve all been pretty clear here that all options remain on the table, including military options, and will — and will remain on the table in the future.”

Ashkenazi agreed: “We still have some time to watch it and see what will be the final outcome,” he said of the sanctions.

Ashkenazi, who was received with an honor guard, planned to call in his meeting with Mullen for a tightening of the sanctions, sources in his entourage said, as well as to raise Israeli fears that Lebanon may implode in violence once a United Nations report on the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri is released.

The report, expected to be released soon, is likely to blame Hezbollah for the killing. Such a conclusion would escalate international pressure on Lebanon to make arrests and Ashkenazi is concerned that this could trigger a Hezbollah takeover of the country.

Medvedev to Iran: Nuclear ambitions must be peaceful.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev told his Iranian counterpart Mahmoud Ahmadinejad Thursday that it is important for Iran to have a peaceful nuclear program, reported AFP.

“The conversation was of a completely open nature. Neither ourselves, nor our colleague avoided unpleasant questions,” Medvedev’s top foreign policy aide Sergei Prikhodko said after Medvedev’s first meeting with Ahmadinejad since relations between their two countries broke down.

“The president (Medvedev) spoke of the importance of the continuation of a peaceful Iranian nuclear program,” Prikhodko was as saying as saying by Russian news sources.

The two leaders meet on the sidelines of a regional summit in Baku, Azerbaijan.

Once a supporter of Iran, Russia canceled a missile deal with Iran, and has backed international sanctions against the country’s controversial nuclear program.

Iran successfully tests own S-300 missile defense system.

Iran has designed and successfully tested an air defense system with the capabilities of Russia’s S-300 system, PressTV reported on Thursday.

“We have developed the system by upgrading systems like S-200 and we have tested it successfully using all our potential and experience in the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, the Army and the Defense Ministry,” Brigadier General Mohammad Hassan Mansourian told the Iranian television station.

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Mansourian added that details about the long-range missile defense systems will be revealed soon.

Russia had canceled a deal to sell the S-300 system to Iran in September, due to sanctions.

Also on Thursday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that embargoes are ineffectual and the West should drop its aggressive approach if talks on Teheran’s nuclear program are to be successful.

Ahmadinejad said Thursday at a Caspian Sea summit in Azerbaijan that Iran is ready to return to six-party talks on its atomic energy program.

He added that the West “must reject its exploitative approach” toward Iran if any breakthroughs are to be made, and that “Iran won’t be scared by embargoes.”

On Wednesday,  the Iranian Foreign Ministry slammed Western powers for trying to block Iran-Russia cooperation, AFP reported.

“We cannot allow far away countries to prevent our cooperation and strategic partnership,” Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast in a Wednesday interview with Russia Today.

“We have longstanding relations with Russia and we hope to cooperate in the long-term with this country,” he said. “Our countries have an enormous potential for political, economic and technological cooperation.”

Ahmadinejad and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev are expected to meet on Thursday.

Also on Wednesday, in a press conference in Azerbaijan, Ahmadinejad said his country does not need a nuclear bomb,  PressTV reported.

“The Iranian nation does not need a nuclear bomb to defend itself, as Iran’s nuclear bomb is its bravery and national honor,” Ahmadinejad said to a crowd of Iranians residing in the neighboring country.

He reportedly added that “nuclear bombs belong to those countries that are backward in a historical sense, and the Iranian nation has no use for it.”

He also said that, despite Western opposition, “today there are 6,000 centrifuges performing nuclear enrichment” in Iran, and that his response to sanctions is “to access pinnacles of growth and progress one by one.”

Ahmadinejad warns West: Stop threatening Iran – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Ahmadinejad says ‘no embargo can change the Iranian people’; U.S. army chief: Sanctions are working against Iran’s nuclear ambition.

By News Agencies

World powers should stop threatening Iran if they want to achieve results at talks on Tehran’s nuclear program, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Thursday.

Speaking at a news conference during a visit to Azerbaijan, he gave no indication whether talks tentatively scheduled for next month between Iran and six world powers – Russia, the United States, Britain, France, China and Germany – would go ahead.

	Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, November 10, 2010.
	Photo by: AP

“If they want to achieve positive results they should stop thinking as aggressors. There are those among them who think as aggressors, and they think they can achieve positive results by putting pressure on us and threatening us,” he said.

“They should change the old methods, otherwise the results will be the same. No embargoes can change the Iranian people,” Ahmadinejad added.

Both sides have expressed readiness to meet for talks on Dec. 5 but have not agreed on a venue, and Ahmadinejad has signaled that at least some of Iran’s activities are off limits.

He said Iran had offered to hold the meeting in Istanbul, and the six powers had suggested Geneva.

The West suspects Iran wants to build atomic weapons but Tehran says its nuclear program is designed purely for generating electricity.

The Iranian leader’s remarks came a day after Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs Adm. Michael Mullen said that anctions were taking a toll on the Islamic Republic’s attempt to achieve nuclear capabilities.

Following a meeting with Israel Defense Forces chief Gabi Askenazi on Wednesday, Mullen also said that the U.S. was nevertheless “weighing all the options” with regard to Iran’s contentious nuclear program.

On Tuesday, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said he saw little choice but to pursue a political strategy that includes sanctions, reiterating his concerns that a military strike would only delay Iranian nuclear capabilities by two or three years.

Speaking to reporters in a joint press conference at the Pentagon on Wednesday, both Mullen and Ashkenazi stressed the need to maintain the diplomatic and economic tract in trying to sway Iran away from its contention nuclear program, with the U.S. army chief saying that “right now the focus is on dialogue and engagement and sanctions.”

“The sanctions are actually taking a fairly significant bite, and that’s the current path,” Mullen said, adding there was a “body of evidence that indicates that the sanctions are taking their toll much more rapidly than some had anticipated, more deeply.”

The IDF chief, echoing Mullen’s remarks, said that, “as far as the sanctions, I think we fully support the current path and also the assessment whether they are effective or not.”

“The real question here: Is it sufficient enough to persuade, I would say, the Iranians to change the course of action in terms of the nuclear program, and that has to be determined,” Ashkenazi said.

The IDF chief added that he felt more time was needed  “to watch it and see what will be the final outcome,” adding that as a “whole, it’s a — it’s a serious effort, and we appreciate the American leading in putting it in place and to continue with this pressure.”

Referring to the possible consequences of Iran achieving nuclear arms capability, Mullen said he thought “Iran is on a path to achieve nuclear capability and that that would be a disaster for the region, incredibly destabilizing,” adding, however, that he felt the diplomatic tract was the right mode of operation.

“We’ve all been pretty clear here that all options remain on the table, including military options, and will — and will remain on the table in the future,” the U.S. army chief said, adding: “All of that said, I think the current focus is the right focus, but it’s something we never take our eye off in terms of the continuing evolution of where Iran is going.”

“I look forward to a day when Iran is actually a responsible country making a positive and constructive difference in the region, which is not what they do right now,” Mullen added.

Ashkenazi, in turn, also referred to recent reports claiming U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration had pledged to deliver 20 more advanced F-35 fighters as an incentive to a possible settlement freeze, saying that while he did “want to go into politics about the political side of it, but definitely the fourth- generation fighter is important to the Israeli air force.”

“As you probably know, we recommend the government already to acquire the first squadron, and we discuss it with the administration. And that’s already decided, and we are going on,” Ashkenazi said.

“About the extra 20, definitely we’ll be more than happy to get them. As I understand – that’s the latest information I have on this issue – it’s still a negotiation between the Israeli government and the administration. I don’t know the final decision,” he added.

Here’s why Israel must not attack Iran now – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

In any attack plan of any country there is a risk that the pilots, and particularly the leaders above them, will become enthralled by the plan, without considering all the implications.

By Amos Harel

Dr. Olli Heinonen, former deputy secretary general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, presented a relatively optimistic forecast regarding the Iranian nuclear danger when speaking with Haaretz last month. Iran’s centrifuges, he told Yossi Melman, are not working well; some of them are defective. Only about 3,000 are working properly, and Iran will need many more to enrich uranium to a level that will allow it to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

	The reactor building of the Bushehr nuclear power plant is seen, just outside the southern city of Bushehr, Iran, Saturday, Aug. 21, 2010
	Photo by: AP

Intentionally or not, Heinonen provided a significant argument against an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites in the near future. Heinonen is talking about a critical period of more than a year, during which diplomatic efforts can still see the program halted. A host of international media reports about computer worms and mysterious explosions of Iranian nuclear sites and missiles, responsibility for which has been attributed to various intelligence agencies in the West, could attest to even more time available before a violent clash becomes inevitable.

The scenario presented by Jeffrey Goldberg in The Atlantic, depicting in detail a possible Israeli attack, naturally made waves worldwide and in Israel. But along with the limited progress of the Iranian nuclear program, other considerations must be taken into account. The main one involves the implications of an Israeli military move. The immediate outcome of such a move would be a missile war with Iran and its proxies in the region, Hezbollah and Hamas, into which Syria might be swept.

A plan that might seem impressive on a screen before the seven senior cabinet members who meet might deliver much less than promised in practice. The danger is that Israel will obtain only a short-term delay of the Iranian bomb, but will get involved in a prolonged war.

Another important consideration involves the response of the United States. Relations between U.S. President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are terrible. Just awful. Obama is angry at Netanyahu because the latter did not accede in time to his pressure and agree to another construction freeze (a gesture he might agree to now ), and because of the actions of Netanyahu’s supporters in Washington that helped Obama’s opponents in Congress.

After the mid-term elections, the time will come to settle the score. It seems that Netanyahu’s hard-line supporters forget Israel’s great dependence on the United States.

What is true in ordinary times is even more true in wartime. Israel needs the Americans: for an “air corridor” for an attack, for surveillance and missile defense, for diplomatic support and an airlift of weapons and spare parts.

It is not surprising that the administration last week rejected Netanyahu’s demand that the Americans highlight the military option against Iran. Obama’s predecessor George W. Bush wrote in his memoir that he turned down Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s request that the United States and not Israel attack the Syrian nuclear facility in 2007. At this time it is hard to imagine that a hypothetical Israeli notice of a planned attack on Iran would get even a yellow light from Obama.

The security establishment has probably invested a fortune and a huge number of man-hours over the Iranian threat. The army must plan for the worst-case scenario, lest it come about. The extensive coverage worldwide of the preparations for a possible attack help deter Iran. In any attack plan of any country there is a risk that the pilots, and particularly the leaders above them, will become enthralled by the plan, without considering all the implications. A wise man once described the overemphasis on the Iranian issue as “idolatry.”

The Netanyahu government is at a diplomatic dead end; partly by its own fault and partly by the fault of its neighbors. Syria did not meet Israel’s expectation that a diplomatic agreement would include a break between it and Iran and that Damascus would cease stirring the pot in Lebanon. The Palestinian Authority leadership now has more sympathy and understanding than does the Israeli government in the capitals of Europe and the United States. That is trouble that Israel must find a way to get out of, but not by pressing the accelerator toward Iran.