Archive for September 28, 2010

Reuters AlertNet – EXCLUSIVE-Cyber takes centre stage in Israel’s war strategy

September 28, 2010

Reuters AlertNet – EXCLUSIVE-Cyber takes centre stage in Israel’s war strategy.

28 Sep 2010 12:37:52 GMT
Source: Reuters
* Iran’s Stuxnet worm has fingers pointing at Israel * Israelis seen weighing “deniable” tactics against foe By Dan Williams JERUSALEM, Sept 28 (Reuters)
– Cyber warfare has quietly grown into a central pillar of Israel’s strategic planning, with a new military intelligence unit set up to incorporate high-tech hacking tactics, Israeli security sources said on Tuesday.
Israel’s pursuit of options for sabotaging the core computers of foes like Iran, along with mechanisms to protect its own sensitive systems, were unveiled last year by the military intelligence chief, Major-General Amos Yadlin.
The government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has since set cyber warfare as a national priority, “up there with missile shields and preparing the homefront to withstand a future missile war”, a senior source said on condition of anonymity. Disclosures that a sophisticated computer worm, Stuxnet, was uncovered at the Bushehr atomic reactor and may have burrowed deeper into Iran’s nuclear programme prompted foreign experts to suggest the Israelis were responsible.
Israel has declined to comment on any specific operations. Analysts say cyber capabilities offer it a stealthy alternative to the air strikes that it has long been expected to launch against Iran but which would face enormous operational hurdles as well as the risk of triggering regional war.
According to security sources, over the last two years the military intelligence branch, which specialises in wiretaps, satellite imaging and other electronic espionage, has set up a dedicated cyber warfare unit staffed by conscripts and officers. They would not say how much of the unit’s work is offensive, but noted that Israeli cyber defences are primarily the responsibility of the domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet.
DENIABILITY
In any event, fending off or inflicting damage to sensitive digital networks are interconnected disciplines. Israeli high-tech firms, world leaders in information security, often employ veterans of military computing units. Security sources said Israel awoke to the potential of cyber warfare in the late 1990s, when the Shin Bet hacked into a fuel depot to test security measures and then realised the system could be reprogrammed to crash or even cause explosions.
Israel’s defence priorities suggest it may be shying away from open confrontation with the Iranians, whose nuclear facilities are distant, numerous, dispersed and well-fortified. Even were its warplanes to manage a successful sortie, Israel would almost certainly suffer retaliatory Iranian missile salvoes worse than the short-range rocket attacks of Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas in the 2006 and 2009 wars. There would be a wider diplomatic reckoning:
World powers are in no rush to see another Middle East conflagration, especially while sanctions are still being pursued against an Iranian nuclear programme which Tehran insists is peaceful.
An Israeli security source said Defence Ministry planners were still debating the relative merits of cyber warfare. “It’s deniable, and it’s potent, but the damage it delivers is very hard to track and quantify,” the source said. “When you send in the jets — the target is there, and then it’s gone.” (Editing by Jon Boyle)

How Stuxnet computer worm works

September 28, 2010

Vodpod videos no longer available.

How Stuxnet computer worm works, posted with vodpod

How the stuxnet worm works.

September 28, 2010

Wary of naked force, Israel eyes cyberwar on Iran – Israel News, Ynetnews

September 28, 2010

Wary of naked force, Israel eyes cyberwar on Iran – Israel News, Ynetnews.

(Published over a year ago, this piece leaves no doubt in my mind that Israel is behind the Stuxnet worm than has damaged Iran’s nuclear program.  It is also one of the only mentions I’ve found of the possibility of Israel’s using an EMP bomb on Iran.)

Decade-old cyberwarfare project seen as new vanguard of Israel’s efforts to block Tehran’s nuclear ambitions; American expert says ‘malicious software’ could be inserted to corrupt, commandeer or crash the controls of sensitive sites like uranium enrichment plants

Reuters

Published: 07.07.09, 18:43 / Israel News
In the late 1990s, a computer specialist from Israel’s Shin Bet internal security service hacked into the mainframe of the Pi Glilot fuel depot north of Tel Aviv.It was meant to be a routine test of safeguards at the strategic site. But it also tipped off the Israelis to the potential such hi-tech infiltrations offered for real sabotage. 

“Once inside the Pi Glilot system, we suddenly realized that, aside from accessing secret data, we could also set off deliberate explosions, just by programming a re-route of the pipelines,” said a veteran of the Shin Bet drill.

So began a cyberwarfare project which, a decade on, is seen by independent experts as the likely new vanguard of Israel’s efforts to foil the nuclear ambitions of its arch-foe Iran.

The appeal of cyber attacks was boosted, Israeli sources say, by the limited feasibility of conventional air strikes on the distant and fortified Iranian atomic facilities, and by US reluctance to countenance another open war in the Middle East.

“We came to the conclusion that, for our purposes, a key Iranian vulnerability is in its on-line information,” said one recently retired Israeli security cabinet member, using a generic term for digital networks. “We have acted accordingly.”

Cyberwarfare teams nestle deep within Israel’s spy agencies, which have rich experience in traditional sabotage techniques and are cloaked in official secrecy and censorship.

They can draw on the know-how of Israeli commercial firms that are among the world’s hi-tech leaders and whose staff are often veterans of elite military intelligence computer units.

“To judge by my interaction with Israeli experts in various international forums, Israel can definitely be assumed to have advanced cyber-attack capabilities,” said Scott Borg, director of the US Cyber Consequences Unit, which advises various Washington agencies on cyber security.

Technolytics Institute, an American consultancy, last year rated Israel the sixth-biggest “cyber warfare threat,” after China, Russia, Iran, France and “extremist/terrorist groups.”

The United States is in the process of setting up a “Cyber Command” to oversee Pentagon operations, though officials have described its mandate as protective, rather than offensive.

Asked to speculate about how Israel might target Iran, Borg said malware — a commonly used abbreviation for “malicious software” — could be inserted to corrupt, commandeer or crash the controls of sensitive sites like uranium enrichment plants.

‘Cyberwar clandestine and deniable’

Such attacks could be immediate, he said. Or they might be latent, with the malware loitering unseen and awaiting an external trigger, or pre-set to strike automatically when the infected facility reaches a more critical level of activity.

As Iran’s nuclear assets would probably be isolated from outside computers, hackers would be unable to access them directly, Borg said. Israeli agents would have to conceal the malware in software used by the Iranians or discreetly plant it on portable hardware brought in, unknowingly, by technicians.

“A contaminated USB stick would be enough,” Borg said.

Ali Ashtari, an Iranian businessman executed as an Israeli spy last year, was convicted of supplying tainted communications equipment for one of Iran’s secret military projects.

Iranian media quoted a security official as saying that Ashtari’s actions “led to the defeat of the project with irreversible damage.” Israel declined all comment on the case.

“Cyberwar has the advantage of being clandestine and deniable,” Borg said, noting Israel’s considerations in the face of an Iranian nuclear program that Tehran insists is peaceful.

“But its effectiveness is hard to gauge, because the targeted network can often conceal the extent of damage or even fake the symptoms of damage. Military strikes, by contrast, have an instantly quantifiable physical effect.”

 

 

Israel may be open to a more overt strain of cyberwarfare.

Tony Skinner of Jane’s Defense Weekly cited Israeli sources as saying that Israel’s 2007 bombing of an alleged atomic reactor in Syria was preceded by a cyber attack which neutralized ground radars and anti-aircraft batteries.

“State of War,” a 2006 book by New York Times reporter James Risen, recounted a short-lived plan by the CIA and its Israeli counterpart Mossad to fry the power lines of an Iranian nuclear facility using a smuggled electromagnetic-pulse (EMP) device.

A massive, nation-wide EMP attack on Iran could be effected by detonating a nuclear device at atmospheric height. But while Israel is assumed to have the region’s only atomic arms, most experts believe they would be used only in a war of last resort.

Israel Shows Electronic Prowess

September 28, 2010

Israel Shows Electronic Prowess.

By David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Amy Butler

The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming from Syria during Israel’s September attack; and—although there was no direct American help in destroying a nuclear reactor—there was some advice provided beforehand, military and aerospace industry officials tell Aviation Week & Space Technology.

That surveillance is providing clues about how Israeli aircraft managed to slip past Syrian air defenses to bomb the site at Dayr az-Zawr. The main attack was preceded by an engagement with a single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the Turkish border. It was assaulted with what appears to be a combination of electronic attack and precision bombs to enable the Israeli force to enter and exit Syrian airspace. Almost immediately, the entire Syrian radar system went off the air for a period of time that included the raid, say U.S. intelligence analysts.

There was “no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities,” says a U.S. electronic warfare specialist.

Elements of the attack included some brute-force jamming, which is still an important element of attacking air defenses, U.S. analysts say. Also, Syrian air defenses are still centralized and dependent on dedicated HF and VHF communications, which made them vulnerable. The analysts don’t believe any part of Syria’s electrical grid was shut down. They do contend that network penetration involved both remote air-to-ground electronic attack and penetration through computer-to-computer links.

“There also were some higher-level, nontactical penetrations, either direct or as diversions and spoofs, of the Syrian command-and-control capability, done through network attack,” says an intelligence specialist.

These observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking capability is an operational part of the Israel Defense Forces’ arsenal of digital weapons.

Despite being hobbled by the restrictions of secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli military and government officials confirm that network invasion, information warfare and electronic attack are part of Israel’s defense capabilities.

They’ve been embraced operationally by key military units, but their development, use and the techniques employed are still a mystery even to other defense and government organizations. It remains “a shadowy world,” says an Israeli air force general. Israel is not alone in recent demonstrations of network warfare. Syria and Hezbollah showed some basic expertise during the Lebanon conflict last year.

“Offensive and defensive network warfare is one of the most interesting new areas,” says Pinchas Buchris, director general of the Israeli defense ministry. “I can only say we’re following the [network attack] technology with great care. I doubted this [technology] five years ago. But we did it. Now everything has changed.

“You need this kind of capability,” he says. “You’re not being responsible if you’re not dealing with it. And, if you can build this kind of capability, the sky’s the limit [for sophisticated intelligence gathering and clandestine operations].”

So far, the most sophisticated example of nonkinetic warfare is the penetration of Syrian air defenses by Israeli aircraft on Sept. 6 to bomb a site—analyzed as a nascent nuclear facility—without being engaged or even detected. Commercial satellite pictures of the target on the Euphrates (about 90 mi. from the Iraq border) taken before and after the raid show that a large building (the suspected reactor building) in the center of the site has disappeared and the ground has been bulldozed flat.

The incident is attracting attention because “the Syrians have an extensive air defense system that they’ve been building for decades—since the [1967] Six-Day War,” says an Israeli defense planning official. “It may be the largest in the world.”

That ability of nonstealthy Israeli aircraft to penetrate without interference rests in part on technology, carried on board modified aircraft, that allowed specialists to hack into Syria’s networked air defense system, said U.S. military and industry officials in the attack’s aftermath. Network raiders can conduct their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump from network to network until they are into the target’s communications loop. “Whether the network is wireless or wired doesn’t matter anymore,” says a U.S. industry specialist (AW&ST Nov. 5, p. 32; Oct. 8, p. 28; Feb. 19, p. 31). Now development of the technology in Israel is being confirmed.

“The raid on Syria was a strategic signal, not a threat,” says a retired senior military official who flew combat in the region for decades. “This [raid] was about what we perceived are their capabilities [for developing weapons of mass destruction] and about deterrence more than creating damage.”

He contends that Syrian procedures even contributed to the successful bombing raid.

“Part of the vulnerability of the Syrian facility was that they kept it so secret that there weren’t enough air defenses assigned to it,” the official contends.

Israel’s capabilities are similar to the “Suter” network-invasion capability that was developed by the U.S. using the EC-130 Compass Call electronic attack aircraft to shoot data streams, laced with sophisticated algorithms, into enemy antennas. The passive, RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft then monitored enemy signals to ensure the data streams were having the intended effect on the target sensors. Israel duplicated the capability when it fielded its two new Gulfstream G550 special missions aircraft designs. Both were modified by Israel Aerospace Industries’ Elta Div. in time for the 2006 Lebanon war. The ground surveillance radar version can provide data streams from large active, electronically scanned array radars, while the intelligence version provided the signals surveillance and analyses.

Buchris contends that it’s not manpower and technology that limits development, but constructing systems (that can put invasive data streams into enemy networks and then monitor the results) and making them operational.

The new G550 radar and electronic surveillance aircraft, for example, are still “in the process of being integrated into the intelligence system,” the planning official agrees. “The name of the game is balance of systems, intelligence, training, communications and forces. It has to be conducted like an orchestra. If one instrument is out of tune, it doesn’t sound right.”

The special mission aircraft were used during the war with good results, but military officials expect better future exploitation as they are plugged into the Israel Defense Forces’ network. Another handicap in developing Israel’s network attack capabilities is that they haven’t directly enlisted the research potential of their universities as the Pentagon has done in the U.S.

“I know that in the U.S., universities are involved in these kinds of issues,” Buchris says. “But in Israel, we are not. It’s totally different. How the Israeli system works, you can’t share with anybody. I don’t want to go into the issues [of technology development, personnel training and who runs the organization]. It’s very interesting. It’s very sensitive. Any such capabilities are top secret.”

That secrecy is causing Israel problems. Compartmentalization means that those who know about the new capabilities aren’t allowed to tout their usefulness. Yet at least low-key publicity is needed to ensure government funding for additional development and acceptance of their operational use.

“Now I have to find a way to explain these capabilities to other people so that they understand,” Buchris says.

Israeli officials won’t address the raid on Syria directly.

“We want to ease feelings with Syria,” says Tzachi Hanegbi, chairman of the Israeli parliament’s foreign affairs and defense committee. “We don’t want them to feel humiliated.” Moreover, Israeli analysts aren’t really sure who to blame. “No one really knows whether President [Basher al-] Assad is the one who calls the shots. It may be senior army generals or other figures with influence. We don’t want a confrontation.

“It’s sensitive enough that the Army made an unprecedented decision to change an important exercise in the Golan Heights to another site,” Hanegbi says. “And, it was equally unusual for them to announce it. That’s a symptom of the atmosphere.”

Israeli officials reject any suggestion that the Syrian and Iranian nuclear programs were or are linked in any way.

“I don’t think Iran knew anything about what Syria was doing,” says a long-serving member of the Israeli parliament with insight into military affairs. “I don’t think they would have told the Iranians. They didn’t need Iranian assistance because they had help from the North Koreans.”

However, John Bolton, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, disagrees. “I’d be very surprised if the Syrians were to engage at least without Iranian acquiescence,” he says. And, “it may be beyond that,” he tells Aviation Week. Since Syria alone lacks both the funding and expertise for a nuclear weapons program, it would logically turn to Pyongyang for technology and oil-rich Tehran for funding, he says.

Moreover, Bolton says the use of network attack is a clever move by the Israelis. He contends that it will serve as a deterrent for Iran. Or, at the very least, it sends a message that even the advanced, Russian-built air defense systems won’t protect Iran’s nuclear activities.

“I think it is very telling, obviously, in its potential impact on Iran since they’ve been supplied by the Russians with air defense equipment as well,” Bolton says. He describes the Syrian facility as a “clone” of North Korea’s primary nuclear plant in Yongbyon, and it share the same dimensions. The roof was covered with materials to mask it, apparently unsuccessfully, from overhead collection. Prior to his work at the U.N., Bolton was undersecretary of State for arms control during 2002 when construction of the Syrian site was said to have begun.

An indication of North Korea’s involvement in the Syrian facility was a condemnation of the raid issued by the government there. “This was an almost automatic response,” he says. “It is not because North Korea and Syria share a common border. To me, it was an inadvertent tipoff from North Koreans that they had involvement with that facility.”

Israeli analysts closely watch foreign aid to Syria and that country’s support of Hezbollah during last year’s fighting in Lebanon and Israel. Of key interest was a signals and communications intercept operation that was run by the Syrian military. The intelligence products on location, makeup and intent of Israeli operations—much of it obtained from cell phone intercepts—were passed to Hezbollah.

In this case, they point to the involvement of Chinese and Russian advisory groups operating in Syria.

“When you’re talking about selling high-tech systems, they need support and staffing,” says a senior Israeli government official. “You can’t just talk about an air defense system. You also have to talk about communications, networking and intelligence gathering,” which includes the skills of communications and signals intelligence gathering and analysis.

“I can tell you that now, when I go into a [ministry] meeting, I have to take the battery out of my cell phone,” the government official says. “We’re aware of [traffic intercept during the Lebanon fighting]. There’s also the issue that in the north of Israel you have very large Arab communities. Most wouldn’t be involved, but you’re talking about a half-million people up on the border. That means there are people with the ability to watch and pass on information.”

The Hunt for the Kill Switch

September 28, 2010

IEEE Spectrum: The Hunt for the Kill Switch.

Are chip makers building electronic trapdoors in key military hardware? The Pentagon is making its biggest effort yet to find out

Photo: James Archer/AnatomyBlue

Last September, Israeli jets bombed a suspected nuclear installation in northeastern Syria. Among the many mysteries still surrounding that strike was the failure of a Syrian radar–supposedly state-of-the-art–to warn the Syrian military of the incoming assault. It wasn’t long before military and technology bloggers concluded that this was an incident of electronic warfare–and not just any kind.

Post after post speculated that the commercial off-the-shelf microprocessors in the Syrian radar might have been purposely fabricated with a hidden ”backdoor” inside. By sending a preprogrammed code to those chips, an unknown antagonist had disrupted the chips’ function and temporarily blocked the radar.

That same basic scenario is cropping up more frequently lately, and not just in the Middle East, where conspiracy theories abound. According to a U.S. defense contractor who spoke on condition of anonymity, a ”European chip maker” recently built into its microprocessors a kill switch that could be accessed remotely. French defense contractors have used the chips in military equipment, the contractor told IEEE Spectrum. If in the future the equipment fell into hostile hands, ”the French wanted a way to disable that circuit,” he said. Spectrum could not confirm this account independently, but spirited discussion about it among researchers and another defense contractor last summer at a military research conference reveals a lot about the fever dreams plaguing the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).

Feeding those dreams is the Pentagon’s realization that it no longer controls who manufactures the components that go into its increasingly complex systems. A single plane like the DOD’s next generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, can contain an ”insane number” of chips, says one semiconductor expert familiar with that aircraft’s design. Estimates from other sources put the total at several hundred to more than a thousand. And tracing a part back to its source is not always straightforward. The dwindling of domestic chip and electronics manufacturing in the United States, combined with the phenomenal growth of suppliers in countries like China, has only deepened the U.S. military’s concern.

Recognizing this enormous vulnerability, the DOD recently launched its most ambitious program yet to verify the integrity of the electronics that will underpin future additions to its arsenal. In December, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Pentagon’s R&D wing, released details about a three-year initiative it calls the Trust in Integrated Circuits program. The findings from the program could give the military–and defense contractors who make sensitive microelectronics like the weapons systems for the F-35–a guaranteed method of determining whether their chips have been compromised. In January, the Trust program started its prequalifying rounds by sending to three contractors four identical versions of a chip that contained unspecified malicious circuitry. The teams have until the end of this month to ferret out as many of the devious insertions as they can.

Vetting a chip with a hidden agenda can’t be all that tough, right? Wrong. Although commercial chip makers routinely and exhaustively test chips with hundreds of millions of logic gates, they can’t afford to inspect everything. So instead they focus on how well the chip performs specific functions. For a microprocessor destined for use in a cellphone, for instance, the chip maker will check to see whether all the phone’s various functions work. Any extraneous circuitry that doesn’t interfere with the chip’s normal functions won’t show up in these tests.

”You don’t check for the infinite possible things that are not specified,” says electrical engineering professor Ruby Lee, a cryptography expert at Princeton. ”You could check the obvious possibilities, but can you test for every unspecified function?”

Nor can chip makers afford to test every chip. From a batch of thousands, technicians select a single chip for physical inspection, assuming that the manufacturing process has yielded essentially identical devices. They then laboriously grind away a thin layer of the chip, put the chip into a scanning electron microscope, and then take a picture of it, repeating the process until every layer of the chip has been imaged. Even here, spotting a tiny discrepancy amid a chip’s many layers and millions or billions of transistors is a fantastically difficult task, and the chip is destroyed in the process.

But the military can’t really work that way. For ICs destined for mission-critical systems, you’d ideally want to test every chip without destroying it.

The upshot is that the Trust program’s challenge is enormous. ”We can all do with more verification,” says Samsung’s Victoria Coleman, who helped create the Cyber Trust initiative to secure congressional support for cybersecurity. ”My advice to [DARPA director] Tony Tether was ’trust but verify.’ That’s all you can do.”

Semiconductor offshoring dates back to the 1960s, when U.S. chip makers began moving the labor-intensive assembly and testing stages to Singapore, Taiwan, and other countries with educated workforces and relatively inexpensive labor.

Today only Intel and a few other companies still design and manufacture all their own chips in their own fabrication plants. Other chip designers–including LSI Corp. and most recently Sony–have gone ”fabless,” outsourcing their manufacturing to offshore facilities known as foundries. In doing so, they avoid the huge expense of building a state-of-the-art fab, which in 2007 cost as much as US $2 billion to $4 billion.

Well into the 1970s, the U.S. military’s status as one of the largest consumers of integrated circuits gave it some control over the industry’s production and manufacturing, so the offshoring trend didn’t pose a big problem. The Pentagon could always find a domestic fab and pay a little more to make highly classified and mission-critical chips. The DOD also maintained its own chip-making plant at Fort Meade, near Washington, D.C., until the early 1980s, when costs became prohibitive.

But these days, the U.S. military consumes only about 1 percent of the world’s integrated circuits. ”Now,” says Coleman, ”all they can do is buy stuff.” Nearly every military system today contains some commercial hardware. It’s a pretty sure bet that the National Security Agency doesn’t fabricate its encryption chips in China. But no entity, no matter how well funded, can afford to manufacture its own safe version of every chip in every piece of equipment.

The Pentagon is now caught in a bind. It likes the cheap, cutting-edge devices emerging from commercial foundries and the regular leaps in IC performance the commercial sector is known for. But with those improvements comes the potential for sabotage. ”The economy is globalized, but defense is not globalized,” says Coleman. ”How do you reconcile the two?”

In 2004, the Defense Department created the Trusted Foundries Program to try to ensure an unbroken supply of secure microchips for the government. DOD inspectors have now certified certain commercial chip plants, such as IBM’s Burlington, Vt., facility, as trusted foundries. These plants are then contracted to supply a set number of chips to the Pentagon each year. But Coleman argues that the program blesses a process, not a product. And, she says, the Defense Department’s assumption that onshore assembly is more secure than offshore reveals a blind spot. ”Why can’t people put something bad into the chips made right here?” she says.

Three years ago, the prestigious Defense Science Board, which advises the DOD on science and technology developments, warned in a report that the continuing shift to overseas chip fabrication would expose the Pentagon’s most mission-critical integrated circuits to sabotage. The board was especially alarmed that no existing tests could detect such compromised chips, which led to the formation of the DARPA Trust in IC program.

Where might such an attack originate? U.S. officials invariably mention China and Russia. Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration who is now a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, wouldn’t get that specific but did offer some clues. Each year, secure government computer networks weather thousands of attacks over the Internet. ”Some of that probing has come from places where a lot of our electronics are being manufactured,” Flamm says. ”And if you’re a responsible defense person, you would be stupid not to look at some of the stuff they’re assembling, to see how else they might try to enter the network.”

John Randall, a semiconductor expert at Zyvex Corp., in Richardson, Texas, elaborates that any malefactor who can penetrate government security can find out what chips are being ordered by the Defense Department and then target them for sabotage. ”If they can access the chip designs and add the modifications,” Randall says, ”then the chips could be manufactured correctly anywhere and still contain the unwanted circuitry.”

So what’s the best way to kill a chip? No one agrees on the most likely scenario, and in fact, there seem to be as many potential avenues of attack as there are people working on the problem. But the threats most often mentioned fall into two categories: a kill switch or a backdoor.

A kill switch is any manipulation of the chip’s software or hardware that would cause the chip to die outright–to shut off an F-35’s missile-launching electronics, for example. A backdoor, by contrast, lets outsiders gain access to the system through code or hardware to disable or enable a specific function. Because this method works without shutting down the whole chip, users remain unaware of the intrusion. An enemy could use it to bypass battlefield radio encryption, for instance.

Depending on the adversary’s degree of sophistication, a kill switch might be controlled to go off at a set time, under certain circumstances, or at random. As an example of the latter, Stanford electrical engineering professor Fabian Pease muses, ”I’d nick the [chip’s] copper wiring.” The fault, almost impossible to detect, would make the chip fail early, due to electromigration: as current flowed through the wire, eventually the metal atoms would migrate and form voids, and the wire would break. ”If the chip goes into a defense satellite, where it’s supposed to work for 15 years but fails after six months, you have a very expensive, inoperative satellite,” Pease says.

But other experts counter that such ideas ignore economic realities. ”First and foremost, [the foundries] want to make sure their chips work,” says Coleman. ”If a company develops a reputation for making chips that fail early, that company suffers more than anyone else.”

A kill switch built to be triggered at will, as was allegedly incorporated into the European microprocessors, would be more difficult and expensive to pull off, but it’s also the more likely threat, says David Adler, a consulting professor of electrical engineering at Stanford, who was previously funded by DARPA to develop chip-testing hardware in an unrelated project.

To create a controlled kill switch, you’d need to add extra logic to a microprocessor, which you could do either during manufacturing or during the chip’s design phase. A saboteur could substitute one of the masks used to imprint the pattern of wires and transistors onto the semiconductor wafer, Adler suggests, so that the pattern for just one microchip is different from the rest. ”You’re printing pictures from a negative,” he says. ”If you change the mask, you can add extra transistors.”

Or the extra circuits could be added to the design itself. Chip circuitry these days tends to be created in software modules, which can come from anywhere, notes Dean Collins, deputy director of DARPA’s Microsystems Technology Office and program manager for the Trust in IC initiative. Programmers ”browse many sources on the Internet for a component,” he says. ”They’ll find a good one made by somebody in Romania, and they’ll put that in their design.” Up to two dozen different software tools may be used to design the chip, and the origin of that software is not always clear, he adds. ”That creates two dozen entry points for malicious code.”

Collins notes that many defense contractors rely heavily on field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)–a kind of generic chip that can be customized through software. While a ready-made FPGA can be bought for $500, an application-specific IC, or ASIC, can cost anywhere from $4 million to $50 million. ”If you make a mistake on an FPGA, hey, you just reprogram it,” says Collins. ”That’s the good news. The bad news is that if you put the FPGA in a military system, someone else can reprogram it.”

Almost all FPGAs are now made at foundries outside the United States, about 80 percent of them in Taiwan. Defense contractors have no good way of guaranteeing that these economical chips haven’t been tampered with. Building a kill switch into an FPGA could mean embedding as few as 1000 transistors within its many hundreds of millions. ”You could do a lot of very interesting things with those extra transistors,” Collins says.

The rogue additions would be nearly impossible to spot. Say those 1000 transistors are programmed to respond to a specific 512-bit sequence of numbers. To discover the code using software testing, you might have to cycle through every possible numerical combination of 512-bit sequences. That’s 13.4 × 10153 combinations. (For perspective, the universe has existed for about 4 × 1017 seconds.) And that’s just for the 512-bit number–the actual number of bits in the code would almost certainly be unknown. So you’d have to apply the same calculations to all possible 1024-bit numbers, and maybe even 2048-bit numbers, says Tim Holman, a research associate professor of electrical engineering at Vanderbilt University, in Nashville. ”There just isn’t enough time in the universe.”

Those extra transistors could create a kill switch or a backdoor in any chip, not just an FPGA. Holman sketches a possible scenario: suppose those added transistors find their way into a networking chip used in the routers connecting the computers in your home, your workplace, banks, and military bases with the Internet. The chip functions perfectly until it receives that 512-bit sequence, which could be transmitted from anywhere in the world. The sequence prompts the router to hang up. Thinking it was the usual kind of bug, tech support would reset the router, but on restart the chip would again immediately hang up, preventing the router from connecting to the outside world. Meanwhile, the same thing would be happening to similarly configured routers the world over.

The router scenario also illustrates that the nation’s security and economic well-being depend on shoring up not just military chips but also commercial chips. An adversary who succeeded in embedding a kill switch in every commercial router could devastate national security without ever targeting the Defense Department directly.

A kill switch or backdoor built into an encryption chip could have even more disastrous consequences. Today encoding and decoding classified messages is done completely by integrated circuit–no more Enigma machine with its levers and wheels. Most advanced encryption schemes rely on the difficulty that computers have in factoring numbers containing hundreds of digits; discovering a 512-bit type of encryption would take some machines up to 149 million years. Encryption that uses the same code or key to encrypt and decrypt information–as is often true–could easily be compromised by a kill switch or a backdoor. No matter what precautions are taken at the programming level to safeguard that key, one extra block of transistors could undo any amount of cryptography, says John East, CEO of Actel Corp., in Mountain View, Calif., which supplies military FPGAs.

”Let’s say I can make changes to an insecure FPGA’s hardware,” says East. ”I could easily put a little timer into the circuit. The timer could be programmed with a single command: ’Three weeks after you get your configuration, forget it.’ If the FPGA were to forget its configuration information, the entire security mechanism would be disabled.”

Alternately, a kill switch might be programmed to simply shut down encryption chips in military radios; instead of scrambling the signals they transmit, the radios would send their messages in the clear, for anybody to pick up. ”Just like we figured out how the Enigma machine worked in World War II,” says Stanford’s Adler, ”one of our adversaries could in principle figure out how our electronic Enigma machines work and use that information to decode our classified communications.”

Chip alteration can even be done after the device has been manufactured and packaged, provided the design data are available, notes Chad Rue, an engineer with FEI, based in Hillsboro, Ore., which makes specialized equipment for chip editing (albeit for legitimate reasons). FEI’s circuit-editing tools have been around for 20 years, Rue says, and yet ”chip designers are still surprised when they hear what they can do.”

Skilled circuit editing requires electrical engineering know-how, the blueprints of the chip, and a $2 million refrigerator-size piece of equipment called a focused-ion-beam etching machine, or FIB. A FIB shoots a stream of ions at precise areas on the chip, mechanically milling away tiny amounts of material. FIB lab workers refer to the process as microsurgery, with the beam acting like a tiny scalpel. ”You can remove material, cut a metal line, and make new connections,” says Rue. The process can take from hours to several days. But the results can be astonishing: a knowledgeable technician can edit the chip’s design just as easily as if he were taking ”an eraser and a pencil to it,” says Adler.

Semiconductor companies typically do circuit editing when they’re designing and debugging prototypes. Designers can make changes to any level of the chip’s wiring, not just the top. ”It’s not uncommon to dig through eight different layers to get to the intended target,” says Rue.The only thing you can’t do with a FIB is add extra transistors. ”But we can reroute signals to the transistors that are already there,” he says. That’s significant because chips commonly contain large blocks of unused circuitry, leftovers from previous versions of the design. ”They’re just along for the ride,” Rue says. He thinks it would be possible to use a FIB to rewire a chip to make use of these latent structures. To do so, an adversary would need a tremendous amount of skill with digital circuitry and access to the original design data. Some experts find the idea too impractical to worry about. But an adversary with unlimited funds and time–exactly what the Defense Science Board warned of–could potentially pull it off, Rue says.

In short, the potential for tinkering with an integrated circuit is almost limitless, notes Princeton’s Lee. ”The hardware design process has many steps,” she says. ”At each step, you could do something that would make a particular part of the IC fail.”

Clearly, the companies participating in the Trust in IC program have their work cut out for them. As Collins sees it, the result has to be a completely new chip-verification method. He’s divided up the Trust participants into teams: one group to create the test chips from scratch; another to come up with malicious insertions; three more groups, which he calls ”performers,” to actually hunt for the errant circuits; and a final group to judge the results.

To fabricate the test chips, Collins chose the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He picked MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory to engineer whatever sneaky insertions they could devise, and he tapped Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, in Laurel, Md., to come up with a way to compare and assess the performers’ results.

The three performers are Raytheon, Luna Innovations, and Xradia. None of the teams would speak on the record, but their specialties offer some clues to their approach. Xradia, in Concord, Calif., builds nondestructive X-ray microscopes used widely in the semiconductor industry, so it may be looking at a new method of inspecting chips based on soft X-ray tomography, Stanford’s Pease suggests. Soft X-rays are powerful enough to penetrate the chip but not strong enough to do irreversible damage.

Luna Innovations, in Roanoke, Va., specializes in creating antitamper features for FPGAs. Princeton’s Lee suggests that Luna’s approach may involve narrowing down the number of possible unspecified functions. ”There are ways to determine where such hardware would be inserted,” she says. ”Where could they gather the most information? Where would they be least likely to be noticed? That is what they’re looking for.” She compares chip security to a barricaded home. The front door and windows might offer vaultlike protection, but there might be an unknown window in the basement. The Luna researchers, she speculates, may be looking for the on-chip equivalent of the basement window.

Raytheon, of Waltham, Mass., has expertise in hardware and logic testing, says Collins. He believes the company will use a more complex version of a technique called Boolean equivalence checking to analyze what types of inputs will generate certain outputs. Normally, applying specific inputs to a circuit will result in specific, predictable outputs, just as hitting a light switch should always cause the light to turn off. ”Now look at that process in reverse,” says Collins. Given a certain output (the lights go out), engineers can reconstruct what made it happen (someone hit a switch). Collins says this could help avoid cycling through infinite combinations of inputs to find a single fatal response.

In January, the performers were given a set of four test chips, each containing an unknown (to them) number of malicious insertions. Along with a thorough description of the chips, Collins says, ”we told them precisely what the circuits were supposed to be.”

Each team’s success will be gauged by the number of malicious insertions it can spot. The goal is a 90 percent detection rate, says Collins, with a minimum of false positives. The teams will also have to contend with red herrings: to trip them up, the test set includes fully functioning, uncompromised chips. By the end of this month, the performers will report back to DARPA. After Johns Hopkins has tallied the results, the teams will get a second set of test chips, which they’ll have to analyze by the end of the year. Any performer that doesn’t pass muster will be cut from the program, while the methods developed by the successful ones will be developed further. By the program’s end in 2010, Collins hopes to have a scientifically verifiable method to categorically authenticate a circuit. ”There’s not going to be a DARPA seal of approval on them,” says Collins, but both the Army and the Air Force have already expressed interest in adopting whatever technology emerges.

Meanwhile, other countries appear to be awakening to the chip threat. At a January hearing, a U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs addressed Pakistan’s ongoing refusal to let the United States help it secure its nuclear arsenal with American technology. Pakistan remains reluctant to allow such intervention, citing fears that the United States would use the opportunity to cripple its weapons with–what else?–a kill switch.

To Probe Further

For a comprehensive look into the failure of the Syrian radar, see “Cyber-Combat’s First Shot,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 26 November 2007 by David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall, and Amy Butler.

The DARPA Trust in Integrated Circuits Program is described in greater detail on DARPA’s Web site: http://www.darpa.mil/MTO/solicitations/baa07-24/Industry_Day_Brief_Final.pdf.

An interesting take on the remote-kill-switch debate is in Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak’s ”Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention and Digital Rights Management.” Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design 2007 (5–8 November 2007).

A February 2005 Defense Science Board report, ”Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply,” arguably sparked the DARPA program. You can download it free of charge at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf.

Three years ago, the prestigious Defense Science Board, which advises the DOD on science and technology developments, warned in a report that the continuing shift to overseas chip fabrication would expose the Pentagon’s most mission-critical integrated circuits to sabotage. The board was especially alarmed that no existing tests could detect such compromised chips, which led to the formation of the DARPA Trust in IC program.

Where might such an attack originate? U.S. officials invariably mention China and Russia. Kenneth Flamm, a technology expert at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration who is now a professor at the University of Texas at Austin, wouldn’t get that specific but did offer some clues. Each year, secure government computer networks weather thousands of attacks over the Internet. ”Some of that probing has come from places where a lot of our electronics are being manufactured,” Flamm says. ”And if you’re a responsible defense person, you would be stupid not to look at some of the stuff they’re assembling, to see how else they might try to enter the network.”

John Randall, a semiconductor expert at Zyvex Corp., in Richardson, Texas, elaborates that any malefactor who can penetrate government security can find out what chips are being ordered by the Defense Department and then target them for sabotage. ”If they can access the chip designs and add the modifications,” Randall says, ”then the chips could be manufactured correctly anywhere and still contain the unwanted circuitry.”

So what’s the best way to kill a chip? No one agrees on the most likely scenario, and in fact, there seem to be as many potential avenues of attack as there are people working on the problem. But the threats most often mentioned fall into two categories: a kill switch or a backdoor.

A kill switch is any manipulation of the chip’s software or hardware that would cause the chip to die outright–to shut off an F-35’s missile-launching electronics, for example. A backdoor, by contrast, lets outsiders gain access to the system through code or hardware to disable or enable a specific function. Because this method works without shutting down the whole chip, users remain unaware of the intrusion. An enemy could use it to bypass battlefield radio encryption, for instance.

Depending on the adversary’s degree of sophistication, a kill switch might be controlled to go off at a set time, under certain circumstances, or at random. As an example of the latter, Stanford electrical engineering professor Fabian Pease muses, ”I’d nick the [chip’s] copper wiring.” The fault, almost impossible to detect, would make the chip fail early, due to electromigration: as current flowed through the wire, eventually the metal atoms would migrate and form voids, and the wire would break. ”If the chip goes into a defense satellite, where it’s supposed to work for 15 years but fails after six months, you have a very expensive, inoperative satellite,” Pease says.

But other experts counter that such ideas ignore economic realities. ”First and foremost, [the foundries] want to make sure their chips work,” says Coleman. ”If a company develops a reputation for making chips that fail early, that company suffers more than anyone else.”

A kill switch built to be triggered at will, as was allegedly incorporated into the European microprocessors, would be more difficult and expensive to pull off, but it’s also the more likely threat, says David Adler, a consulting professor of electrical engineering at Stanford, who was previously funded by DARPA to develop chip-testing hardware in an unrelated project.

To create a controlled kill switch, you’d need to add extra logic to a microprocessor, which you could do either during manufacturing or during the chip’s design phase. A saboteur could substitute one of the masks used to imprint the pattern of wires and transistors onto the semiconductor wafer, Adler suggests, so that the pattern for just one microchip is different from the rest. ”You’re printing pictures from a negative,” he says. ”If you change the mask, you can add extra transistors.”

Or the extra circuits could be added to the design itself. Chip circuitry these days tends to be created in software modules, which can come from anywhere, notes Dean Collins, deputy director of DARPA’s Microsystems Technology Office and program manager for the Trust in IC initiative. Programmers ”browse many sources on the Internet for a component,” he says. ”They’ll find a good one made by somebody in Romania, and they’ll put that in their design.” Up to two dozen different software tools may be used to design the chip, and the origin of that software is not always clear, he adds. ”That creates two dozen entry points for malicious code.”

Collins notes that many defense contractors rely heavily on field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)–a kind of generic chip that can be customized through software. While a ready-made FPGA can be bought for $500, an application-specific IC, or ASIC, can cost anywhere from $4 million to $50 million. ”If you make a mistake on an FPGA, hey, you just reprogram it,” says Collins. ”That’s the good news. The bad news is that if you put the FPGA in a military system, someone else can reprogram it.”

Almost all FPGAs are now made at foundries outside the United States, about 80 percent of them in Taiwan. Defense contractors have no good way of guaranteeing that these economical chips haven’t been tampered with. Building a kill switch into an FPGA could mean embedding as few as 1000 transistors within its many hundreds of millions. ”You could do a lot of very interesting things with those extra transistors,” Collins says.

The rogue additions would be nearly impossible to spot. Say those 1000 transistors are programmed to respond to a specific 512-bit sequence of numbers. To discover the code using software testing, you might have to cycle through every possible numerical combination of 512-bit sequences. That’s 13.4 × 10153 combinations. (For perspective, the universe has existed for about 4 × 1017 seconds.) And that’s just for the 512-bit number–the actual number of bits in the code would almost certainly be unknown. So you’d have to apply the same calculations to all possible 1024-bit numbers, and maybe even 2048-bit numbers, says Tim Holman, a research associate professor of electrical engineering at Vanderbilt University, in Nashville. ”There just isn’t enough time in the universe.”

Those extra transistors could create a kill switch or a backdoor in any chip, not just an FPGA. Holman sketches a possible scenario: suppose those added transistors find their way into a networking chip used in the routers connecting the computers in your home, your workplace, banks, and military bases with the Internet. The chip functions perfectly until it receives that 512-bit sequence, which could be transmitted from anywhere in the world. The sequence prompts the router to hang up. Thinking it was the usual kind of bug, tech support would reset the router, but on restart the chip would again immediately hang up, preventing the router from connecting to the outside world. Meanwhile, the same thing would be happening to similarly configured routers the world over.

The router scenario also illustrates that the nation’s security and economic well-being depend on shoring up not just military chips but also commercial chips. An adversary who succeeded in embedding a kill switch in every commercial router could devastate national security without ever targeting the Defense Department directly.

A kill switch or backdoor built into an encryption chip could have even more disastrous consequences. Today encoding and decoding classified messages is done completely by integrated circuit–no more Enigma machine with its levers and wheels. Most advanced encryption schemes rely on the difficulty that computers have in factoring numbers containing hundreds of digits; discovering a 512-bit type of encryption would take some machines up to 149 million years. Encryption that uses the same code or key to encrypt and decrypt information–as is often true–could easily be compromised by a kill switch or a backdoor. No matter what precautions are taken at the programming level to safeguard that key, one extra block of transistors could undo any amount of cryptography, says John East, CEO of Actel Corp., in Mountain View, Calif., which supplies military FPGAs.

”Let’s say I can make changes to an insecure FPGA’s hardware,” says East. ”I could easily put a little timer into the circuit. The timer could be programmed with a single command: ’Three weeks after you get your configuration, forget it.’ If the FPGA were to forget its configuration information, the entire security mechanism would be disabled.”

Alternately, a kill switch might be programmed to simply shut down encryption chips in military radios; instead of scrambling the signals they transmit, the radios would send their messages in the clear, for anybody to pick up. ”Just like we figured out how the Enigma machine worked in World War II,” says Stanford’s Adler, ”one of our adversaries could in principle figure out how our electronic Enigma machines work and use that information to decode our classified communications.”

Chip alteration can even be done after the device has been manufactured and packaged, provided the design data are available, notes Chad Rue, an engineer with FEI, based in Hillsboro, Ore., which makes specialized equipment for chip editing (albeit for legitimate reasons). FEI’s circuit-editing tools have been around for 20 years, Rue says, and yet ”chip designers are still surprised when they hear what they can do.”

Skilled circuit editing requires electrical engineering know-how, the blueprints of the chip, and a $2 million refrigerator-size piece of equipment called a focused-ion-beam etching machine, or FIB. A FIB shoots a stream of ions at precise areas on the chip, mechanically milling away tiny amounts of material. FIB lab workers refer to the process as microsurgery, with the beam acting like a tiny scalpel. ”You can remove material, cut a metal line, and make new connections,” says Rue. The process can take from hours to several days. But the results can be astonishing: a knowledgeable technician can edit the chip’s design just as easily as if he were taking ”an eraser and a pencil to it,” says Adler.

Semiconductor companies typically do circuit editing when they’re designing and debugging prototypes. Designers can make changes to any level of the chip’s wiring, not just the top. ”It’s not uncommon to dig through eight different layers to get to the intended target,” says Rue.The only thing you can’t do with a FIB is add extra transistors. ”But we can reroute signals to the transistors that are already there,” he says. That’s significant because chips commonly contain large blocks of unused circuitry, leftovers from previous versions of the design. ”They’re just along for the ride,” Rue says. He thinks it would be possible to use a FIB to rewire a chip to make use of these latent structures. To do so, an adversary would need a tremendous amount of skill with digital circuitry and access to the original design data. Some experts find the idea too impractical to worry about. But an adversary with unlimited funds and time–exactly what the Defense Science Board warned of–could potentially pull it off, Rue says.

In short, the potential for tinkering with an integrated circuit is almost limitless, notes Princeton’s Lee. ”The hardware design process has many steps,” she says. ”At each step, you could do something that would make a particular part of the IC fail.”

Clearly, the companies participating in the Trust in IC program have their work cut out for them. As Collins sees it, the result has to be a completely new chip-verification method. He’s divided up the Trust participants into teams: one group to create the test chips from scratch; another to come up with malicious insertions; three more groups, which he calls ”performers,” to actually hunt for the errant circuits; and a final group to judge the results.

To fabricate the test chips, Collins chose the Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He picked MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory to engineer whatever sneaky insertions they could devise, and he tapped Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, in Laurel, Md., to come up with a way to compare and assess the performers’ results.

The three performers are Raytheon, Luna Innovations, and Xradia. None of the teams would speak on the record, but their specialties offer some clues to their approach. Xradia, in Concord, Calif., builds nondestructive X-ray microscopes used widely in the semiconductor industry, so it may be looking at a new method of inspecting chips based on soft X-ray tomography, Stanford’s Pease suggests. Soft X-rays are powerful enough to penetrate the chip but not strong enough to do irreversible damage.

Luna Innovations, in Roanoke, Va., specializes in creating antitamper features for FPGAs. Princeton’s Lee suggests that Luna’s approach may involve narrowing down the number of possible unspecified functions. ”There are ways to determine where such hardware would be inserted,” she says. ”Where could they gather the most information? Where would they be least likely to be noticed? That is what they’re looking for.” She compares chip security to a barricaded home. The front door and windows might offer vaultlike protection, but there might be an unknown window in the basement. The Luna researchers, she speculates, may be looking for the on-chip equivalent of the basement window.

Raytheon, of Waltham, Mass., has expertise in hardware and logic testing, says Collins. He believes the company will use a more complex version of a technique called Boolean equivalence checking to analyze what types of inputs will generate certain outputs. Normally, applying specific inputs to a circuit will result in specific, predictable outputs, just as hitting a light switch should always cause the light to turn off. ”Now look at that process in reverse,” says Collins. Given a certain output (the lights go out), engineers can reconstruct what made it happen (someone hit a switch). Collins says this could help avoid cycling through infinite combinations of inputs to find a single fatal response.

In January, the performers were given a set of four test chips, each containing an unknown (to them) number of malicious insertions. Along with a thorough description of the chips, Collins says, ”we told them precisely what the circuits were supposed to be.”

Each team’s success will be gauged by the number of malicious insertions it can spot. The goal is a 90 percent detection rate, says Collins, with a minimum of false positives. The teams will also have to contend with red herrings: to trip them up, the test set includes fully functioning, uncompromised chips. By the end of this month, the performers will report back to DARPA. After Johns Hopkins has tallied the results, the teams will get a second set of test chips, which they’ll have to analyze by the end of the year. Any performer that doesn’t pass muster will be cut from the program, while the methods developed by the successful ones will be developed further. By the program’s end in 2010, Collins hopes to have a scientifically verifiable method to categorically authenticate a circuit. ”There’s not going to be a DARPA seal of approval on them,” says Collins, but both the Army and the Air Force have already expressed interest in adopting whatever technology emerges.

Meanwhile, other countries appear to be awakening to the chip threat. At a January hearing, a U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs addressed Pakistan’s ongoing refusal to let the United States help it secure its nuclear arsenal with American technology. Pakistan remains reluctant to allow such intervention, citing fears that the United States would use the opportunity to cripple its weapons with–what else?–a kill switch.

To Probe Further

For a comprehensive look into the failure of the Syrian radar, see “Cyber-Combat’s First Shot,” Aviation Week & Space Technology , 26 November 2007 by David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall, and Amy Butler.

The DARPA Trust in Integrated Circuits Program is described in greater detail on DARPA’s Web site: http://www.darpa.mil/MTO/solicitations/baa07-24/Industry_Day_Brief_Final.pdf.

An interesting take on the remote-kill-switch debate is in Y. Alkabani, F. Koushanfar, and M. Potkonjak’s ”Remote Activation of ICs for Piracy Prevention and Digital Rights Management.” Proceedings of the IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design 2007 (5–8 November 2007).

A February 2005 Defense Science Board report, ”Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply,” arguably sparked the DARPA program. You can download it free of charge at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf.

Cyber attack on Iran expands: Tehran threatens long-term war in reprisal

September 28, 2010

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

DEBKAfile Exclusive Report September 27, 2010, 6:13 PM (GMT+02:00)

Stuxnet spreads to Bushehr and personal computers

Iran admitted Monday, Sept. 27 it was under full-scale cyber terror attack. The official IRNA news agency quoted Hamid Alipour, deputy head of Iran’s government Information Technology Company, as saying that the Stuxnet computer worm “is mutating and wreaking further havoc on computerized industrial equipment.”

Stuxnet was no normal worm, he said: “The attack is still ongoing and new versions of this virus are spreading.”

Revolutionary Guards deputy commander Hossein Salami declared his force had all the defensive structures for fighting a long-term war against “the biggest and most powerful enemies” and was ready to defend the revolution with more advanced weapons than the past.  He stressed that defense systems have been designed for all points of the country, and a special plan devised for the Bushehr nuclear power plant. debkafile‘s military sources report that this indicates that the plant – and probably other nuclear facilities too – had been infected, although Iranian officials have insisted it has not, only the personal computers of its staff.

The Stuxnet spy worm has been created in line with the West’s electronic warfare against Iran,” said Mahmoud Liayi, secretary of the information technology council of the Industries Minister.

As for the origin of the Stuxnet attack, Hamid Alipour said: The hackers who enjoy “huge investments” from a series of foreign countries or organizations, designed the worm, which has affected at least 30,000 Iranian addresses, to exploit five different security vulnerabilities. This confirmed the impressions of Western experts that Stuxnet invaded Iran’s Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems through “zero-day” access.

Alipour added the malware, the first known worm to target large-scale systems and industrial complexes control systems, is also a serious threat to personal computers.

debkafile‘s Iranian and intelligence sources report that these statements are preparing the ground for Tehran to go beyond condemning the states or intelligence bodies alleged to have sponsored the cyber attack on Iranian infrastructure and military industries and retaliate against them militarily. Iran is acting in the role of victim of unprovoked, full-scale, cyber terror aggression.

IRAN: Speculation on Israeli involvement in malware computer attack | Los Angeles Times

September 28, 2010

IRAN: Speculation on Israeli involvement in malware computer attack | Babylon & Beyond | Los Angeles Times.

It took Iran several months since the reports that it was hardest hit by the computer worm known as Stuxnet but recently authorities conceded that about 30,000 IP addresses had been infected with the malware. The worm affected computers of staff at the Bushehr nuclear plant as well as Internet service providers, but officials say major systems at the plant have not been damaged.

Specialists say the malware of unprecedented expertise was custom-made to target and control particular industrial automation software and manipulate it from remote locations. It uses the Internet to spread, but the worm isn’t Internet-based, suggesting “patient zero” was infected physically — presumably by a USB device. Used for espionage or sabotage, the software infects a computer immediately but can remain latent until activated. At any given moment, there are millions of “zombie  computers” around the world awaiting activation, not unlike the way spy agencies use sleeper cells or agents, writes Guy Grimland (in Hebrew) of TheMarker.

When news of Stuxnet broke in July, Symantec blogged that it didn’t know who unleashed the worm, but listed several theories, considered who was more or less likely to be behind the attack, and said the attack clearly was not the job of an amateur hack. Among the possible culprits were a “lone wolf”; a disgruntled employee; commercial competition; state-sponsored espionage; those with nationalistic, political and religious motivations; and terrorism, which was “within the realm of possibility” in a case that read “as if it were the latest Hollywood blockbuster.”

Now, as experts’ analyses of the worm are being published and as it becomes clearer that computers associated with Iran’s controversial nuclear program were affected, it is also becoming clearer that Stuxnet is about sabotage, not espionage, and it’s way bigger than was apparent. Computer technicians thought they could root out the virus in a month or two, senior Iranian information technology official Hamid Alipur was quoted as saying, but attacks keep coming and new versions of it continue to mutate and spread, hampering cleanup.

Gerry Egan, a top Symantec executive, told CNN that the high level of design and specialized knowledge associated with worm was not something “the average hacker at home or in a garage” would have access to.

The sophistication behind Stuxnet combined with Iran’s nuclear facility as an apparent target is spawning much speculation.

The theory among experts is that this “took the resources of a nation-state to create a piece of malware so sophisticated,” Richard Falkenrath of Chertoff Group told Bloomberg this week. It is theoretically possible that the U.S. did this, he said, noting that this was a remote possibility. A more likely creator, he said, was Israel.

Did Unit 8200, the Israeli army’s technology intelligence branch, plant the worm in Iran? The catchy headline in TheMarker (in Hebrew) asked the same question many others are asking but offered no answer. “We’ll probably never know,” the story says.

About a year before Stuxnet was discovered (experts believe it took about six months to write the complex code), reports emerged of Israel’s turning to cyber warfare to foil Iran’s nuclear program. In late 2009, Amos Yadlin, commander of Israeli military intelligence, said the ability to collect information and launch cyber-attacks gives small countries — and terror groups and even individuals — power to inflict serious damage unlimited by range. And military intelligence is said to have become a combat arm like an air force or navy.

Concerns about attacks are spreading. This year the U.S. announced Cybercom, a new command to synchronize responses to cyber-threats to military systems. Next month, by the way, has been declared National Cybersecurity Awareness Month.

In the early 2000s, Israel established a central body for defending computer systems involving defense as well as strategic national infrastructure, including water, energy and banking. Most responsibility is entrusted to Shin Bet, Israel’s general security service.

— Batsheva Sobelman in Jerusalem

Iran´s main nuclear powerplant ‘Bushehr’ targeted by the ‘Stuxnet’ computer worm

September 28, 2010

Could Iran retaliate for apparent cyber attack?

September 28, 2010

Could Iran retaliate for apparent cyber attack? – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Security experts believe Tehran will be reeling from effects of Stuxnet computer worm for a while, but warn it may try to strike back and ‘set in motion a deadly game that catalyses a nuclear program’

Reuters

Iran has limited capacity to retaliate in kind to an apparent cyber attack that infected computers at its sole nuclear power plant, analysts say, but some worry it could seek to hit back by other means.

Security experts say they believe the release of the Stuxnet computer worm may have been a state-backed attack on Iran’s nuclear program, most likely originating in the United States or Israel. But they say the truth may never be known.

Cyber Attack
Iran: Computer worm didn’t cause serious damage / News agencies
Tehran officials say Stuxnet computer virus infected 30,000 computers in Islamic Republic. Computer experts estimate worm originates from US, Israel, UK France or Germany
Full story

Little information is available on how much damage, if any, Iran’s nuclear and wider infrastructure has suffered from Stuxnet — and Tehran will probably never share the full details. Officials said on Sunday the worm had hit staff computers at the Bushehr nuclear power plant but had not affected major systems there.

Some analysts believe Iran may be suffering wider sabotage aimed at slowing down its nuclear ambitions, and point to unexplained technical problems that have cut the number of working centrifuges in its uranium enrichment program.

In the short term, intelligence experts believe Tehran’s priority will be trying to identify the source of the attack and examining how the worm was uploaded onto its systems. “The Iranian internal security and counterintelligence departments will need to nail down the culprits first, then work out how to turn the tables,” said Fred Burton, a former US counterintelligence expert who is now vice president of political risk consultancy Stratfor.

Deniable response

But finding reliable evidence identifying which country or group was responsible might well prove impossible, increasing the probability of a more unofficial and deniable reaction.

Some analysts suggest Iran might like to retaliate with a cyber attack against Israel or the West – although there are question marks over its capability to do so.

“I don’t think we can expect much in the way of retaliatory cyber attacks,” said regional analyst Jessica Ashooh. “The Iranians simply don’t have the technical capacity to do anything similar to properly protected systems – as evidenced by the very hard time they are having controlling and quarantining this attack.”

Nevertheless, experts say Iran has made improving its cyber espionage capability a priority – and will probably aim to grow these resources further in the years to come.

The risk, some worry, is that Iran might be tempted to either intensify its own nuclear program or target the West’s own nuclear installations in return.

“How prepared are we all for this and could this set in motion a deadly game that catalyses a nuclear program no one intended to engage in?” said Mark Fitt, managing director of N49 Intelligence, a firm that advises businesses in the Middle East.

In terms of a more conventional response, Iran could potentially act through proxies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza, as well as insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“They can… use networks in Afghanistan and the Gulf to strike back using unconventional `stealth tactics’ and asymmetric methods,” said Fitt.

Whatever happens, analysts say the Stuxnet attack is an early insight into the form state conflict may take in the 21st century.

“It’s by no means a one-off – I think we’ll see much more of this,” said Ian Bremmer, president of political risk consultancy Eurasia Group.