WarSclerotic

Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.

By Victor Kotsev

On the surface, the Middle East is so still it is almost unbelievable. Not that nothing is happening, on the contrary, but the comparison with just a few weeks ago is enough to raise an eyebrow. Back then, amid military maneuvers and loud threats, every other analyst (including this one, though with some caution [1] was predicting an imminent flare-up.

So far, not only has the cataclysm not happened, but the voices have quieted down somewhat. “Plainly I was wrong,” writes Bret Stephens for the Wall Street Journal, discussing his earlier prediction of an Israeli strike on Iran [2].

There is some violence in Gaza; recently, we hear a lot from Hezbollah in Lebanon, too, as the Shi’ite organization keeps getting entangled in various intrigues. There is also vague talk

// <![CDATA[//<![CDATA[
var m3_u = (location.protocol=='https:'?'https://asianmedia.com/GAAN/www/delivery/ajs.php&#039;:'http://asianmedia.com/GAAN/www/delivery/ajs.php&#039;);
var m3_r = Math.floor(Math.random()*99999999999);
if (!document.MAX_used) document.MAX_used = ',';
document.write ("”);
//]]>

about conservative pressure on US President Barack Obama and the military option against Iran being back on the table for the US administration.

An American attack on Iran “seems inexorable”, former Central Intelligence Agency chief Michael Hayden said on Sunday, but he did not give a specific time frame. Moreover, we remain to hear anything nearly as strong from a current administration official, and there are good reasons to believe that any American attack on Iran would be preceded by a very clear public relations effort. (We do hear a bit more in counter-threats from Iran, whose President Mahmud Ahmadinejad proclaimed on Tuesday that America was planning to attack two Middle East countries in the next three months, without offering any further details.)

In other words, the focus of the discussion has moved away from an imminent Israeli strike on Iran, shifting toward a possible American operation. In addition, much of what occupies the media attention in the Middle East consists of the usual rumors about the health of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the Palestinian peace process, and the tribunal into the assassination of former Lebanese premier Rafik Hariri. These, in turn, may contain important clues about where things are headed, but it’s hard to avoid the impression: business as usual.

Such a silence could mean one of two things: either there is a chance that the war clouds will blow away, or this is a deceptive calm, intended to allow an opportunity for some intense last-minute negotiations and preparations for a strike. The former seems more likely to happen by chance rather than deliberation. At this point, all the main actors have so much invested in a status quo that is, essentially, a collision course, that a backing down by any side is hardly conceivable.

For all its shows of strength, the Iranian regime appears to be feeling the pressure of sanctions and to be facing grave danger at home [3]. This is hardly a moment when Ahmadinejad can afford to back down on the foreign policy front, particularly given that an attack on his country is probably one of the very few things that can rally Iranians behind him. The Israeli government, although in a very different position, is also trapped by its own promises to halt the Iranian nuclear program.

Cracks are already visible between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman. Given how many compromises with other parts of his pre-election program he has already made, Netanyahu is no doubt haunted by the specter of his own political calamity a decade ago, when he tried to backtrack from some of his right-wing commitments and was booted out of office.

Obama also has much invested in frustrating Iran’s nuclear ambitions. With mid-term election season in full swing, he is coming under increasing domestic fire from conservatives. Moreover, key American allies in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia (and to a lesser extent Egypt) see the Iranian nuclear program as an even greater existential threat than Israel, and consequently are doing their best to spur the US administration into action. According to Israeli intelligence analysis site Debka, the Saudi king recently presented Obama with a stern ultimatum: “We cannot live with a nuclear Iran.”

It could be, nevertheless, that a collision is being avoided by chance, or by various unexpected circumstances and misunderstandings. Bret Stephens’ account of the history of the Iranian standoff, cited above, is particularly illustrative in this respect. What we have before us is an intense conflict involving a number of powerful interests, and it is good to keep in mind the following principle of history (passed down to the author by a mentor at Duke University, who in turn inherited it from his mentor, Harold Parker): “Very often, out of the conflict of wills arose a result that no one had willed.” However, that said, we would be very unwise to bank on a result nobody seems to want.

It is practically certain that intense preparations for an attack and difficult negotiations between all the major parties involved are going on as we speak. It is hard to predict the result of these, given how little reliable information on them is being made public, and this is perhaps the main reason behind the comparative silence on this issue over the past few weeks. However, it is safe to assume that all the other issues that are made public reflect in some way the course of the backstage bargaining, and it is worth taking a look at these.

For example, there is Lieberman’s Gaza disengagement plan. Ten or so days ago, the controversial Israeli foreign minister, known for his right-wing views, surprised everybody by suggesting that Israel disengage from Gaza according to all regulations of international law, that it close the land border and leave the enclave to the Europeans to police [4].

The idea was practically drowned in criticism from all sides, including Hamas [5]. Its main supporter turned out to be Lieberman’s similarly controversial deputy, Danny Ayalon, whose praise spurred Israeli journalist Doron Rosenblum to write in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz: “The more he spoke, the stronger the impression that the summary rejection and the hopelessness of the proposal were actually what led to it being embraced by him so passionately.”

The most obvious explanation for Lieberman’s announcement was that he wanted to get back at Netanyahu and to put pressure on him not to part with right-wing policies. A month ago, the prime minister went around Lieberman by sending Trade Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer to secretly negotiate the Free Gaza aid flotilla incident with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu.

When Lieberman, who at the time was advocating a hard line against Turkey, learned of this, he went ballistic. It was “extremely serious … that this was done without notifying the Foreign Ministry,” he claimed. “This goes against all norms of government and does serious harm to the trust between the foreign minister and the prime minister.”

Why exactly a Gaza disengagement plan, however much of a bluff, would be a way to get back at Netanyahu is a more curious question. The answer is that this was probably more of a warning than revenge per se. Such a plan, if proposed seriously, would disturb the Egyptians more than anybody else.

In 1967, Israel conquered Gaza from Egypt, and there is a vocal Israeli right-wing minority that advocates “the Egyptian option”: leaving Gaza to Egypt to be dealt with by Egypt’s government. Cairo, as it feels an intense internal threat from the mother organization of Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood, is none too happy with this possibility.

Consequently, such talk coming from an Israeli minister could undermine the relationship between the two countries. This, in turn, is the last thing that Netanyahu wants, particularly right after he has lost one key ally in the Middle East (Turkey). Netanyahu badly needs the support of Egypt to deal with Hamas in Gaza and, to a lesser extent, with Iran’s proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon. Lieberman, on the other hand, has little to lose (the Egyptians have spurned him, in any case).

Lieberman also could hardly have been oblivious to the peace process when making his plan known, at the very least including an element of a veiled threat against Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmoud Abbas (“we can further sever Gaza from the West Bank and your authority”).

In any case, his announcement coincided with mounting international pressure on Abbas to return to the negotiating table. Recently, the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth reported that US officials had said of Abbas, “If he wants Obama to help, then he needs to go to direct talks.”

Abbas, on his part, has continued to resist. “The entire world is asking us to go for direct negotiations,” he claimed on Sunday, “but going to negotiations without a clear reference might make them collapse from the first moment.” (By “reference” he means “that he would enter direct talks only if progress was first achieved on the future borders and security of a Palestinian state,” according to a Jerusalem Post report [6].

Netanyahu immediately slammed him. “[First] they said it was the [settlement] freeze, now it’s the borders issue,” he complained, quoted by Ha’aretz, adding that “[the PA are] stalling direct talks and relying on the Arab League for support”.

This picture is curiously flipped over, however, if we question what the relationship is between the peace talks and an attack on Iran. That depends, to a large extent, on if and how Hamas gets involved, and on what happens to Gaza.

While a successful strike on Iran would likely strengthen Abbas and the peace talks in the long term, it is just as likely that the turmoil would force a pause on this specific round of negotiations. The Palestinian leader is notoriously weak domestically; for him to backtrack on his preconditions, in the face of strong internal pressure to take a harder line, would already be a major gamble.

For him to do that and get nothing in return in the short- to mid-term would be political suicide. Thus, if he saw war was coming (or if he believed for some other reason that the negotiations would go nowhere), the best way for him to behave would be as he is behaving now.

On the northern Israeli front, too, there is tumult as Hezbollah appears to have come under duress from several sides. Firstly, there is the Hariri tribunal. “I was personally informed by Prime Minister [Saad] Hariri that the tribunal will accuse some undisciplined members [of Hezbollah],” said the organization’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah. He reacted hysterically, vowing to protect the “resistance” and calling the investigation “an Israeli project”.

Secondly, Debka reported, a Saudi initiative is afoot to “to tempt Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to phase out his support for Hezbollah in return for Saudi and Gulf recognition of his dominant role in Beirut” [7]. Nasrallah is expected to do his utmost to derail the attempt.

Thirdly, a series of incidents between Hezbollah-affiliated civilians and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeepers in the south forced Lebanese Premier Hariri to beef up the army presence there, and this led to international condemnation.

Finally, Israel recently turned up the heat on Hezbollah by circulating new accusations backed by declassified intelligence of the group’s military buildup in Lebanon [8]. While this can be interpreted as a warning rather than an aggression, it is hard to avoid the fact that Hezbollah is an important rung in Iran’s defensive strategy, and the warning might be part of the pressure on the Shi’ite organization to keep its cool in the event of an attack.

In brief, despite a deceptive calm, the Middle East is very much seething under the surface. It is hard to say what exactly will happen and when exactly it will happen, but it is reasonable to expect a flurry of developments, many of them soon.

Notes 1. Weather clears for a US strike on Iran, July 3, 2010, Asia Times Online
2. Why Hasn’t Israel Bombed Iran (Yet)?, July 20, Wall Street Journal
3. ‘Even the Regime Hates the Regime’, June 11, Foreign Policy
4. FM presents: 2nd disengagement from Gaza, July 16, Israel News
5. Hamas rejects Lieberman’s plan, July 16, Israel News
6. Abbas: ‘Entire world’ wants direct talks, July 25, Jerusalem Post
7. Hizballah raises Mideast tension to sabotage four Arab rulers’ Beirut visit Friday , July 26, DEBKAfile
8. sales, syndication and republishing.)

Fernando Espuelas: The Case for Attacking Iran’s Nukes.

Since Harry Truman led the world in recognizing the State of Israel, the United States has been its staunchest ally. Through decades of wars and near-death experiences, America has stood by Israel with military, diplomatic and financial support.

Over the last year, however, tensions have emerged between Washington and Jerusalem. Frustrated by the lack of any meaningful progress in bringing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a close, the United States has pressured Israel to stop any further development on Palestinian lands, a source of tremendous friction for Arabs on the streets and their governments trying to maintain fragile stability.

The message from the American Government has been clear: restart face-to-face negotiations with the Palestinians.

This pressure has come as a shock to the Israeli political establishment. During the George W. Bush years, American policy had tilted away from the honest-broker posture of past Republican and Democratic administrations to a noticeable pro-Israel bias.

The prospects for a lasting peace moved farther and farther into the future as Palestinians felt abandoned by the historic American referee that had guaranteed them over decades of negotiations a fair deal, while the Israeli government felt no urgency to end the conflict.

With a new administration in the White House, American policy in the region over the last year has focused on simultaneously pressuring for a final peace accord, while grappling with the other strategic flashpoint in the region: Iran.

The United States has sought to stop Iran’s illegal nuclear ambitions initially with the open hand of diplomacy, which led to more tactical delays from Tehran and further violations of existing U.N. resolutions, and now with a new round of United Nations, European Union and U.S. sanctions.

But the prospect of a nuclear Iran, an Iran determined to be the regional superpower that threatens Israel while dominating its Arab neighbors, has once again brought the U.S. and Israel into strategic confluence.

Recently President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met at the White House for private talks and a public show of solidarity. The usual vows of an unbreakable alliance where uttered for the global media.

More interesting, and unknowable outside of the top reaches of the American and Israeli governments, is what was discussed behind closed doors.

Israel has stated in the past that it will not wait indefinitely to respond – read unilateral military strike – to what it sees as Iran’s hostile intent in developing illegal nuclear weapons capability.

Israelis rightly see a nuclear Iran as an existential threat – a threat repeated over and over again by the Islamic Republic’s president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, an avowed Holocaust-denier.

The U.S. has also said that it will not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. The stage is therefore set for a confrontation with Iran.

Mounting evidence of Iranian illegal weapons nuclear development is now the overarching strategic consideration facing the United States in the region. At stake is Israel’s security, of course, but also the security of Iran’s other traditional regional rivals – the largely Arab Sunni states on its periphery.

Moreover, Iran’s provocative testing of long-range ballistic missiles is now putting NATO countries within reach of a potentially nuclear armed Iran.

Some have argued that the Cold War-era Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine would contain Iran. That is a big assumption – specially in light of the Iranian regime’s ideology.

Like fundamentalists in all religions, who are driven by a fanaticism that will supposedly get them closer to their god, the martyr tradition of the Shia is a powerful ideology that distorts traditional notions of realpolitik.

In contrast, the Soviets’ drive for world domination was largely the mission of atheists, rationalist men who calculated risks and rewards in the context of winning battles in this world – not in heaven. Mutual Assured Destruction is the ultimate rationalist argument against nuclear war. And it has worked.

The founder of the Islamic Republic famously differentiated his messianic mission from the actual nation of Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini said, “We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the world.”

In another glimpse at his world view, Khomeini said, “This regime occupying Jerusalem must vanish from the page of time.”

These are not the thoughts of a rationalist who will be deterred by concepts of mutually assured destruction or even the asymmetric risk of conflagration at the hands of the world’s superpower.

Besides funding and arming terrorist organizations Hezbollah and Hamas on Israel’s borders, Iran showed its true intent in the slaughter of Argentine Jews in a terrorist attack against a community center in Buenos Aires in 1994. Two years earlier, the Israeli Embassy in Argentina was destroyed by a car bomb. Argentine investigators have tracked the source of the attacks all the way to Tehran.

And clearly Khomeini’s ideology drives the current crop of the Islamic Republic’s leaders. They have not only threatened us and our allies with words – in fact, they have projected military power into Iraq, attacking U.S. soldiers through proxies, provided the matériel for the missiles raining on Israeli villages, and have sought advanced military technologies from Russia and North Korea.

They are at this moment arming themselves for war.

Ignoring this objective reality is as foolish as it is dangerous.

So what to do? From many corners of the Washington establishment we hear that military strikes will not be effective against Iran. The skill with which the Iranians have spread their nuclear program, the hardening of sites and the redundancy supposedly built into the system makes an attack a huge gamble.

As historian Barbara Tuchman observed, “War is the unfolding of miscalculations.” Can we be sure that a preemptive attack will deliver a sufficient blow to stop for decades, if not forever, Iran’s nuclear weapons program? No.

But we can be sure that once Iran acquires nuclear strike capability it will permanently be a significant threat to the U.S., our allies in the Middle East, Europe and beyond.

Winston Churchill’s warnings about the rising menace beyond the Rhine seem as relevant today as they did in the 1930’s: “One ought never to turn one’s back on a threatened danger and try to run away from it. If you do that, you will double the danger.”