WarSclerotic

(This well thought out article leaves out the same possibility that all the others do as well.  A single EMP strike, which Israel is capable of doing, would transform the Iran crises from a military one to a humanitarian one.

There’s little doubt that the Iranian people would take out the Revolutionary Guard once their military capability was neutralized.  A massive international effort would have to be made to keep Iranian civilians alive long enough to rebuild the basic infrastructure necessary to feed and provide other basic necessities in Iran.

As massive an undertaking as that would be, it pales before the consequence of a conventional war with Iran; both in terms of lives lost and economies destroyed.

I only hope the Israeli government is not as blind sighted as are these smart journalists…  Joseph Wouk)

Strike – or sit tight? – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News

By Yossi Melman

Whoever takes notice of the content and historical context of recent statements made by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu should be left with no doubt: Iran’s possession of a nuclear bomb will represent an existential threat that the State of Israel will not tolerate. He made remarks in this vein during the central ceremony at Yad Vashem marking Holocaust Remembrance Day in April 2009, a short time after he was sworn into office. “We will not allow Holocaust deniers to carry out a second Holocaust against the Jewish people,” the premier said.

Netanyahu made similar statements at the same ceremony one year later. These words should lead to one obvious conclusion: Israel will do anything in its power – including use of military force – to prevent Iran from obtaining its first nuclear weapon.

On two separate occasions within the last quarter century have Israel Air Force pilots destroyed nuclear facilities in hostile Arab countries in order to prevent those states from acquiring nuclear armaments. The first instance occurred on the Shavuot holiday 29 years ago. On June 7, 1981, a squadron of eight IAF F-16 fighter jets, accompanied by eight other F-15s, attacked the nuclear reactor built by French scientists near Baghdad. Within two minutes, the reactor was destroyed.

The assault was a classic case of preemptive attack, designed to deny the ambitious Saddam Hussein the opportunity of manufacturing a nuclear weapon. This was also the first time in history that one country destroyed a nuclear facility belonging to another country.

The leader who deserves credit for the bold decision is the late prime minister Menachem Begin, who was operating seemingly against all odds. He needed to overcome opposition from ministers in his cabinet, members of the Israel Defense Forces General Staff and senior intelligence officials – all of whom expressed concern over the Arab world’s response and possible international condemnation. Shimon Peres, who at the time was opposition leader and a figure who views himself as the founding father of Israel’s nuclear program, exerted significant efforts to thwart the plan, warning Begin that it would cause Israel to become as isolated in world public opinion as a thistle in the desert.

Acting out of a deep – almost religious – sense of conviction, Begin was not deterred by the naysayers and won approval for the attack in a cabinet vote. As someone whose very being was shaped by the Holocaust, he had often repeated the refrain, “Never again.” Never again will the Jewish people stand before an existential threat. Netanyahu’s statements are like an echo of Begin’s.

In retrospect, after the bombing in Iraq, analysts began to speak of the prime minister’s decision and his steadfast belief in preemption as “the Begin doctrine,” thereby granting it strategic significance. Experts said that essentially this worldview posits that Israel – which is believed by the entire world to possess nuclear weapons – will never permit another country in the Middle East to obtain a nuclear bomb that would threaten its security.

Yet not all are in agreement that the Begin doctrine was born of age-old fears that Israel is at risk of suffering another Holocaust. There are those who believe that this approach was motivated by other factors that have nothing to do with any link between historical context and survival instincts. These skeptics say that Israel will not allow other countries to acquire nuclear weapons simply because it seeks to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the region.

Either way, the Begin doctrine was put to another test 26 years later. In September 2007, IAF pilots successfully destroyed a nuclear reactor on the banks of the Euphrates River, in Syria. It was a facility built by that country, with financial assistance from Iran as well as expertise and know-how from North Korea. Israel’s image

A number of differences between these two attacks stand out. Prior to the Iraqi incident, Israel did not keep other countries – including the United States, whose president at the time was Ronald Reagan, one of the friendliest leaders Jerusalem has ever had in the White House – abreast of its plans. After the attack, the Israeli government officially announced that its pilots had done the deed. In Syria, the opposite is said to have occurred. Then-prime minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak notified the Americans hours before the strike took place. Since the operation, however, Israel has been vague about its role in the attack, refraining from officially claiming responsibility.

Israel’s image on the world stage is to a large extent a product of these two successful strikes. They created the impression that the IAF in particular, and the Israel Defense Forces in general, are capable of executing any order that is received from the civilian echelon. There are quite a few politicians in Israel, as well as army generals, who have become “prisoners” to this myth. In practice, however, the reality is far more complex and painful.

While the prime minister continues to speak of “Never again” and the defense minister keeps proclaiming that “all options are on the table,” behind the scenes, and in private, both the military and civilian echelons are singing a completely different tune. They grasp the enormous strategic, political, economic and military difficulties that will surely arise in the event of an attack on Iran.

One of the first to embrace a more sober view of the situation is Brig. Gen. (res. ) Relik Shafir, who until recently occupied the third-most important post in the IAF hierarchy, and who in his younger days took part in the attack on the reactor in Iraq. As far back as five years ago, Shafir let me in on the painful truth: The IAF would have great difficulty in repeating its success in Iraq if it were ordered to strike Iran.

“The Iranians have learned the lessons from the attack on the Iraqi reactor,” Shafir said. “In Iraq, the entire nuclear program was concentrated in the reactor. The Iranians on the other hand have built a number of nuclear facilities in different areas around the country. Some of them are located in eastern Iran. They have ‘hardened’ their facilities by building them underground or by placing them in bunkers. In all honesty, the IAF lacks a real strategic capability to bomb distant targets over a prolonged period of time while using the necessary level of firepower.”

Based on research studies by foreign think tanks, including the Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, most of the facilities that would apparently be targeted are already known. There is the chemical plant for uranium conversation near the city of Isfahan, the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz, another plant in Qom, and perhaps another enrichment facility whose existence has yet to be revealed.

In order for a strike to be effective, then, one would have to deal with a wide variety of targets. While the existence of these targets may be known to intelligence officials in Israel and the West, only a superpower with strategic bombing capability, like the United States, can successfully put them out of commission. Even the former IAF commander and chief of staff Dan Halutz wrote in his memoir, published last fall, that the Iranian nuclear program is a global problem, and that Israel’s prominent role at the forefront of the international effort is of little benefit to solving the problem. According to Halutz, the complexity of the Iranian question requires that other countries endeavor to find a solution.

It is not just former and current air force officers who recognize the difficult set of circumstances. An intimate knowledge of the character and behavior of most members of the national military and political echelons leads one to the conclusion that they too are well aware of the limitations of Israeli might. Netanyahu is considered to be hesitant, and someone who easily panics – traits that might well make it difficult for him to order the IDF to take action. Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi, under whose tenures Israel launched the strike on Syria, are considered cautious, responsible leaders who are aware of the enormous differences between the Syrian reactor and the Iranian facilities. What will Washington say?

More than anything, Israel’s prime consideration in any decision related to national security and existential matters has always been the position of the United States. On nearly every issue related to war and peace, Israel has in the past first tried to determine what Washington would say or do in response. Israel initiated the Six-Day War only after it was made clear to it that the U.S. would not oppose it. Israel refrained from launching a preemptive attack against Egypt in October 1973, even when it was clear that war would erupt within hours, for fear that Washington would blame it for sparking hostilities. Israel invaded Lebanon only after then-defense minister Ariel Sharon understood from statements by then-secretary of state Alexander Haig that the Reagan administration would be able to live with the move.

Hence one is likely to draw the reasonable, logical conclusion that Israel will not attack Iran as long as the Obama administration remains adamantly opposed. And, just to remove any lingering doubt, Washington has taken the trouble to dispatch all of its senior defense officials to Israel to make its position unequivocally clear: Indeed, in the last six months, Israel has hosted Vice President Joe Biden, CIA chief Leon Panetta, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Senator John Kerry, and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen. All of these men told Israel’s leaders: “Don’t do it.”

The U.S. and the European Union fear that Iran would retaliate to any strike by attacking American and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and a special adviser to President Barack Obama, told me that in his view Iran could definitely “make life hell” for U.S. troops in the region. An Israeli bombardment would sow instability in the Middle East, rally Sunni-Muslim support for Shi’ite Iran, and endanger the pro-Western regimes in Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Bahrain and all the other Arab emirates. An Israeli campaign could also move Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow, strategic waterway through which more than one-fourth of the world’s oil supplies flow. Even if the American fleet were ultimately to break through the blockade, it would still send oil prices skyrocketing to unprecedented levels – perhaps as high as $200 a barrel. This, in turn, would foment economic chaos worldwide. Arab silence

Let us assume that at some point, as a last resort, the American administration changes its mind and gives Israel the green light to carry out its strike against Iran. Will Israel’s leaders have the courage to order such an attack?

In such a scenario, there will be a number of considerations that Israel needs to take into account. The first factor is intelligence. In recent years, there has been an accelerated flow of intelligence information from Iran that has reached Western agencies. What is most striking about the data is its improving quality. More operatives have been enlisted, the methods of technological information-gathering have been refined, senior scientists and generals have been successfully enticed to defect and shed light on the Iranian nuclear program, and there has been harmonious intelligence cooperation between various agencies on the ground. These bodies are so in synch that they have even begun to jointly operate the same agents.

The West has also succeeded in foiling attempts by Iranian straw companies and front groups to purchase equipment – and, alternatively, in selling Iran faulty materials. Details of one such deal emerged in late 2008, during the trial of Iranian businessman Ali Ashtari, an electronics trader who was executed for allegedly spying for the Mossad. Ashtari was accused of selling defective material to Iran so as to “poison” its nuclear program.

Despite the considerable successes that can be credited to the Mossad and its chief, Meir Dagan, the bottom line is that the latter did not fulfill the promise he gave to his civilian superiors when he was named to his post eight years ago: that he would derail Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s efforts to build a bomb continue, albeit at a slow pace, toward its goal.

It is clear to everyone involved in the decision-making process that Israel’s only remaining option is an air force strike combined with the deployment of ground-to-ground missiles, which according to foreign sources would be fired from bases in Israel. Perhaps Israel would also utilize its three Dolphin submarines to launch the missiles.

It appears that the IAF’s capability to carry out the mission successfully is limited, particularly when compared with that of the U.S. Yet before this issue is even considered, one must wrestle with the question of which route it will choose. According to research papers published in recent years in the U.S., there are three possibilities: the southern route, which is the lengthiest, which would entail flying over Saudi Arabia; the central route, which is the shortest distance since it traverses Jordan and Iraq; and the northern route, which runs along the Syrian-Turkish seam line. Each of these options presents advantages and disadvantages that need to be carefully weighed. Planners must also take into account how these routes will affect the quantity and weight of the firearms that could be carried by warplanes (which also depends on whether the planes fly at a high or low altitude ), the logistics of mid-air refueling and, most important, the risk that these jets will be detected and will encounter hostile elements. ‘Bunker busters’

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the number of aircraft that would be able to participate in an assault. According to the same American research, Israel can dispatch no more than 120 fighter jets that would be able to complete a mission to Iran. Ostensibly the number of aircraft also dictates the quantity of armaments they will carry. This is especially significant since the U.S. is refusing to provide Israel with its most advanced, sophisticated munitions, known as “bunker busters.”

One can certainly assume that an Israeli attack on Iran will be carried out with conventional means. Any rational individual needs to understand that if Israel were to use nuclear weapons for offensive purposes rather than self-defense, it would cease to be an accepted member of the community of nations. It would be an outcast even among its supporters. Yet even if IAF jets possessed high-quality conventional arms, would they be adequate to penetrate underground bunkers? And even if the targets are destroyed, the operation’s planners should ask themselves how long it would take for Iran to rebuild them. Is it worth taking all of these risks just to delay Iran’s nuclear program for two to three years? And we have yet to address the issue of the number of pilots and planes that may not make it back from their mission, a question that also needs to be examined by those who are studying the various options.

Here is another consideration that ought to preoccupy the civilian echelon: While most Arab countries are no less concerned than Israel over the possibility that Iran will arm itself with nuclear weapons, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates would not dare express public support for an Israeli assault, let alone allow IAF warplanes to fly over their territories en route to Iran, even if they secretly hope that such a plan comes to fruition. Israel needs to take into account that the Arab regimes, which are liable to clash head-on with the rage of public opinion in their countries, will not only be forced to condemn “Israeli aggression,” but will also be compelled to take practical steps, such as severing diplomatic ties with Jerusalem.

Yet perhaps the most important consideration that the powers-that-be in Israel need to mull is Iran’s response to an attack. In retaliation, Iran would launch Shihab missiles at Israel. It possesses 100 such projectiles. Some of them will not reach their target while others will be intercepted by the Arrow missile defense system, yet a number of them can be expected to hit their intended destination. In addition, Iran will unleash its Lebanese proxy, Hezbollah, the militant group that boasts thousands of rockets and missiles that can reach most of Israel.

One should also take into account the possibility that Syria, whose missile stockpile significantly dwarfs that of Hezbollah, will also join the hostilities. It is not inconceivable that Hamas would also spring into action to aid its benefactor and patron Iran.

Iran will “awaken” its terrorist sleeper cells worldwide by giving them the green light to attack Israeli and Jewish targets abroad. While the means at Iran’s disposal do not represent an existential threat to Israel, it is highly doubtful that the public here – whose home front has in recent years demonstrated a vulnerability and unwillingness to absorb casualties that is partly spurred on by an increasingly sensationalist media – will be capable of withstanding such a campaign, even if the damage proves to be minimal.

In light of these dangers and the varying uncertainties, the most logical conclusion that can be reached is that Israel’s leadership will find it difficult to come to a final decision to bomb Iran. The significance of this is that Israel will just have to live in the shadow of the Iranian atomic bomb and all of its ramifications. Some Israelis may come to the conclusion that there is no future for them or their children under those circumstances, and thus prefer to emigrate. An Iranian nuclear weapon, after all, could induce Arab states to develop their own atomic bombs, thus ushering in a new era. The Israeli leadership would have to reconcile itself to an arms race in the Middle East.

On the other hand, can the Israeli leadership ever accept such a situation whereby the existence of the state of the Jewish people is dependent on the mercy of a leader with messianic tendencies, a man who has repeatedly claimed that Israel has no right to exist, and that it should be wiped off the map?

Given all of these factors, it is obvious that the question of “to bomb or not to bomb” that stands before the Israeli leadership is one of the most difficult issues in the state’s history. It is no less difficult than David Ben-Gurion’s decision to declare independence in May 1948.

Iran ‘may cancel uranium swap deal if UN imposes sanctions’ – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Iranian President Ahmadinejad says ‘Americans will take their wish to harm Iran to their graves.’

By Reuters

	Technicians measuring parts of Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant in this undated photo.
	Photo by: AP

Iran could cancel its agreement with Turkey and Brazil to transfer some of its uranium abroad for enrichment if the United Nations Security Council approves a new round of sanctions against it, a member of Iran’s parliament said Thursday.

Brazil and Turkey brokered a surprise deal this week under which Iran agreed to send some low-enriched uranium abroad in return for fuel rods for a medical research reactor. The first batch was due to arrive in Turkey within a month.

Such an arrangement was first suggested as a way of allowing the international community to keep track of nuclear material the West suspects Iran wants to use in nuclear weapons.

Turkey, Brazil and Iran have urged a halt to talk of further sanctions because of the deal, but critics describe it as only a tactic to avert or delay sanctions.

Despite the deal, Washington has circulated a draft sanctions resolution, agreed to by all five permanent UN Security Council members after months of negotiation.

“If [the West] issues a new resolution against Iran, we will not be committed to Tehran’s statement and dispatching fuel outside Iran will be cancelled,” prominent lawmaker Mohammad Reza Bahonar was quoted as saying by Iran’s Mehr news agency.

“Major powers along with the UN Security Council have reached consensus about Iran and it is highly probable that in the near future the fourth round of resolutions becomes operational against Iran,” Bahonar added.

The new sanctions would target Iranian banks and call for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

Iran has previously dismissed the draft resolution as lacking legitimacy and unlikely to come to pass. It says its atomic ambitions are purely non-military and refuses to suspend uranium enrichment.

“The Americans will take their wish to harm the Iranian nation to their graves,” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted as telling military officials on Thursday by state news agency IRNA.

Russia said to be seeking consensus on Iran nuclear sanctions – Haaretz Daily Newspaper | Israel News.

Obama tells Turkish PM: We’ll keep pushing for Iran sanctions; Ahmadinejad dismisses UN sanctions draft, says it lacks legitimacy.

	Turkish PM Erdogan and U.S. President Obama at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington on April 12, 2010
	Photo by: AP

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday he hoped a consensus could be reached on a draft United Nations sanctions resolution against Iran, Interfax news agency said.

Lavrov also called on Iran to send details of its proposed uranium swap to the United Nation’s nuclear agency, the IAEA, as soon as possible

UN Security Council talks on new sanctions against Iran should not interfere with talks on a new proposed fuel exchange deal with Iran, Lavrov said.

Meanwhile, the head of Russia’s state nuclear corporation told journalists on Thursday that the reactor being built by Russia at Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant is scheduled to begin operating in August, the head.

Asked by journalists when the reactor at the Bushehr plant would begin to operate, RRosatom Corp chief Sergei Kiriyenko said: “August.”

On Wednesday, U.S. President Barack Obama told Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan that Washington would keep up its push for new UN sanctions against Iran, saying Tehran’s recent actions “do not build confidence,” the White House said.

“The president stressed the international community’s continuing and fundamental concerns about Iran’s overall nuclear program,” the White House said in a statement summarizing Obama’s telephone conversation with Erdogan.

The Obama administration on Tuesday unveiled a draft resolution agreed to by all five permanent Security Council members, including China and Russia, for new sanctions on Iran.

That came a day after Turkey and Brazil brokered a nuclear fuel swap deal with Iran.

Meanwhile, Iran on Wednesday dismissed the draft UN resolution to expand sanctions, but Obama insisted Washington would press ahead and that Tehran could not be trusted.

The draft resolution, agreed to by all five permanent Security Council members after months of negotiation, targets Iranian banks and calls for inspection of vessels suspected of carrying cargo related to Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

But the proposed sanctions are far more modest than the crippling measures Obama’s administration originally pushed for, largely as a result of objections by China and Russia, which have close trading ties with Tehran.

“The draft being discussed at the United Nations Security Council has no legitimacy at all,” Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency quoted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s senior adviser Mojtaba Samareh-Hashemi as saying.

Western diplomats said the text resulted from a compromise between the United States and its three European allies, which had pushed for much tougher sanctions against Tehran, and Russia and China, which sought to dilute them.

Few of the proposed measures are new. But Western diplomats said the end result was probably the best they could have hoped for, given China’s and Russia’s determination to avoid measures that might have undermined Iran’s troubled economy.

Despite that, Obama hailed the draft plan and again called on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions.

Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said there was “no chance for a new resolution” to be approved at the Security Council. “Let’s not take this seriously,” he told reporters at a meeting in Tajikistan.

Iran rejects Western allegations its nuclear program is aimed at developing weapons. It says its atomic ambitions are limited to the peaceful generation of electricity and refuses to suspend uranium enrichment.

“A fourth round of sanctions is unlikely to change the Iranian attitude towards its nuclear program. Developing its nuclear program is a strategic decision and currently priority for the regime in Tehran,” said Nicole Stracke, an Iran expert at Gulf Research Center in Dubai.

“Therefore, the Iranian regime will divert the resources necessary to further the progress of its nuclear program.”

The decision to circulate the resolution to the Security Council on Tuesday was a rebuff to a deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey in which Iran agreed to send some enriched uranium abroad in return for fuel rods for a medical research reactor.

Iran and the two countries that brokered the swap deal urged a halt to talk of further sanctions. But the United States and its European allies regard the deal as a maneuver by Iran to delay their efforts to increase pressure on Tehran.

U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice said the fuel deal had “nothing to do” with the uranium enrichment that led to the first three rounds of sanctions on Iran and the latest draft resolution.

Erdogan, speaking by phone with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, said the Iran nuclear standoff must be solved through dialogue and diplomacy, Erdogan’s office said. Putin said Turkey’s and Brazil’s efforts opened “additional possibilities,” the statement said.

Western powers say that in addition to refusing to suspend enrichment, Iran has not opened up completely to International Atomic Energy Agency inspections.

The draft resolution “calls upon states to take appropriate measures that prohibit” the opening of new Iranian bank branches or offices abroad if there is reason to suspect they might be aiding Iran’s nuclear or missile programs.

It also calls on states “to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks, including the Central Bank of Iran” to ensure those transactions do not aid Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs.

It urges countries to be wary of dealing with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and says some members and companies it controls will be added to existing lists of individuals and firms facing asset freezes and travel bans.

The draft calls for an expansion of an existing arms embargo to include more types of heavy weapons.

The draft will likely be revised in the coming weeks.

Aside from Turkey and Brazil, council member Lebanon has made clear it would have trouble supporting sanctions against Iran. Lebanon, diplomats say, will likely abstain from a vote on the resolution because the Iranian-backed militant group Hezbollah is in its government.

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

USS Truman carrier

debkafile‘s military sources report a decision by the Obama administration to boost US military strength in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions in the short term with an extra air and naval strike forces and 6,000 Marine and sea combatants.

Carrier Strike Group 10, headed by the USS Harry S. Truman aircraft carrier, sails out of the US Navy base at Norfolk, Virginia Friday, May 21. On arrival, it will raise the number of US carriers off Iranian shores to two. Up until now, President Barack Obama kept just one aircraft carrier stationed off the coast of Iran, the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in the Arabian Sea, in pursuit of his policy of diplomatic engagement with Tehran.

For the first time, too, the US force opposite Iran will be joined by a German warship, the frigate FGS Hessen, operating under American command.
It is also the first time that Obama, since taking office 14 months ago, is sending military reinforcements to the Persian Gulf.

Our military sources have learned that the USS Truman is just the first element of the new buildup of US resources around Iran. It will take place over the next three months, reaching peak level in late July and early August. By then, the Pentagon plans to have at least 4 or 5 US aircraft carriers visible from Iranian shores.

The USS Truman’s accompanying Strike Group includes Carrier Air Wing Three (Battle Axe) – which has 7 squadrons – 4 of F/A-18 Super Hornet and F/A-18 Hornet bomber jets, as well as spy planes and early warning E-2 Hawkeyes that can operate in all weather conditions; the Electronic Attack Squadron 130 for disrupting enemy radar systems; and Squadron 7 of helicopters for anti-submarine combat (In its big naval exercise last week, Iran exhibited the Velayat 89 long-range missile for striking US aircraft carriers and Israel warships from Iranian submarines.)

Another four US warships will be making their way to the region to join the USS Truman and its Strike Group. They are the guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy and guided missile destroyers USS Winston S. Churchill, USS Oscar Austin and USS Ross.

debkafile‘s military sources disclose that the 6,000 Marines and sailors aboard the Truman Strike Group come from four months of extensive and thorough training to prepare them for anticipated missions in the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean

Editorial – Iran, the Nuclear Deal and the U.N. Security Council – NYTimes.com.

Every time it looks as if the big powers have finally run out of patience with Iran’s nuclear misdeeds, Tehran’s leaders suddenly decide they’re in the mood to compromise. And every time the big powers let up on the pressure, Tehran’s compromises turn to smoke.

It was no surprise on Monday when Iran announced it was ready to accept a deal to ship some of its nuclear fuel out of the country — similar to the deal it accepted and then rejected last year. So it is welcome news that the United States, Europe, Russia and China will press ahead with new United Nations Security Council sanctions.

The deal to exchange enriched uranium — which could, with more enrichment, be used in a weapon — for fuel rods is worth pursuing. We also are sure that there is no chance of reining in Iran’s nuclear ambitions without sustained unified pressure by the major powers.

The resolution, circulated late on Tuesday, takes aim at Iran’s financial institutions, including those supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, which runs much of the nuclear program. It would also require countries to inspect ships or aircraft into or out of Iran if there are suspicions they are carrying banned materials.

Like the three resolutions that preceded it, it is probably not tough enough to change minds in Tehran. But the fact that Russia and China — Iran’s longtime enablers — have signed on is likely to make some players in Iran’s embattled government nervous. (We know we can’t wait to hear what changed Beijing’s mind.)

Several European governments have signaled that they are ready to impose tougher bilateral sanctions after the Security Council moves, and that might unsettle Iran’s shaky political and economic system even more.

Since 2006, Tehran has defied repeated demands from the Security Council to curb its nuclear program. It continues to churn out more nuclear fuel, block international inspectors from visiting suspect nuclear sites and refuses to answer questions about possible research into weapons designs.

The 11th-hour agreement announced this week with the leaders of Brazil and Turkey was much like one reached with the big powers last fall. Iran would transfer about 2,640 pounds of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey within one month and receive — within one year — fuel rods for use in a medical research reactor.

There are big differences, however. In October, 2,640 pounds represented nearly 80 percent of Iran’s stock of enriched uranium. Now it is only about half of its supply.

The original deal was intended to measurably delay Iran’s progress toward a nuclear weapon while opening the door to serious negotiations. The current deal leaves Iran with too much fuel, puts no brakes on enrichment at a higher rate, lets Tehran take back the fuel stored in Turkey when it wants and makes no commitment to talks.

Brazil and Turkey — both currently hold seats on the Security Council — are eager to play larger international roles. And they are eager to avoid a conflict with Iran. We respect those desires. But like pretty much everyone else, they got played by Tehran.

American officials have not rejected the deal completely. They say that Iran will have to do more to slow its nuclear progress and demonstrate its interest in negotiating, rather than just manipulating the international community.

Brazil and Turkey should join the other major players and vote for the Security Council resolution. Even before that, they should go back to Tehran and press the mullahs to make a credible compromise and begin serious negotiations.

AFP: UN Iran sanctions would bar Russian missile sales.

PARIS — Proposed UN sanctions against Iran’s nuclear programme would halt Russia’s sale of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Tehran, Western diplomats told AFP on Thursday.

Moscow had already agreed the sale of the missiles, part of an air defence system that observers say would endanger Israel or the United States’ ability to carry out air strikes against Iranian targets.

But the delivery has been delayed by Western pressure, and would be forbidden outright if Washington convinces the UN Security Council — including Russia — to approve a new round of sanctions.

“The paragraph of the resolution on the ban on arms sale to Iran includes several categories of weapons, including defensive weapons,” said one diplomat.

“If it’s adopted, the resolution would include the Russian S-300s and would prevent these arms from being delivered.”

Another diplomat, also speaking on condition of anonymity, agreed.

“The supply of the S-300 would indeed be prohibited by this text, if it is adopted in its current form,” he said.

Diplomats said the text for new sanctions, designed to force Iran to abandon a nuclear programme that the West fears will lead it to build nuclear arms, had been broadly agreed.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council — Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States – are now discussing appendices to the text that will go before the full body, they said.

According to a copy of the draft, seen by AFP, the sanctions would ban the sale of tanks, armoured fighting vehicles, large calibre artillery, war planes, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile defence systems to Iran.

Iran says can destroy Israel in week – Israel News, Ynetnews.

Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff says if Israel attacks, ‘Zionists will have no longer than week to live’

Dudi Cohen

Iran: The Limits to Sanctions – Council on Foreign Relations.

May 19, 2010

Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations

Ahmadinejad and Lula expose Obama’s hapless diplomacy.

What a fiasco. That’s the first word that comes to mind watching Mahmoud Ahmadinejad raise his arms yesterday with the leaders of Turkey and Brazil to celebrate a new atomic pact that instantly made irrelevant 16 months of President Obama’s “diplomacy.” The deal is a political coup for Tehran and possibly delivers the coup de grace to the West’s half-hearted efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb.

Full credit for this debacle goes to the Obama Administration and its hapless diplomatic strategy. Last October, nine months into its engagement with Tehran, the White House concocted a plan to transfer some of Iran’s uranium stock abroad for enrichment. If the West couldn’t stop Iran’s program, the thinking was that maybe this scheme would delay it. The Iranians played coy, then refused to accept the offer.

But Mr. Obama doesn’t take no for an answer from rogue regimes, and so he kept the offer on the table. As the U.S. finally seemed ready to go to the U.N. Security Council for more sanctions, the Iranians chose yesterday to accept the deal on their own limited terms while enlisting the Brazilians and Turks as enablers and political shields. “Diplomacy emerged victorious today,” declared Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, turning Mr. Obama’s own most important foreign-policy principle against him.

The double embarrassment is that the U.S. had encouraged Lula’s diplomacy as a step toward winning his support for U.N. sanctions. Brazil is currently one of the nonpermanent, rotating members of the Security Council, and the U.S. has wanted a unanimous U.N. vote. Instead, Lula used the opening to triangulate his own diplomatic solution. In her first game of high-stakes diplomatic poker, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is leaving the table dressed only in a barrel.

So instead of the U.S. and Europe backing Iran into a corner this spring, Mr. Ahmadinejad has backed Mr. Obama into one. America’s discomfort is obvious. In its statement yesterday, the White House strained to “acknowledge the efforts” by Turkey and Brazil while noting “Iran’s repeated failure to live up to its own commitments.” The White House also sought to point out differences between yesterday’s pact and the original October agreements on uranium transfers.

Good luck drawing those distinctions with the Chinese or Russians, who will now be less likely to agree even to weak sanctions. Having played so prominent a role in last October’s talks with Iran, the U.S. can’t easily disassociate itself from something broadly in line with that framework.

Under the terms unveiled yesterday, Iran said it would send 1,200 kilograms (2,646 lbs.) of low-enriched uranium to Turkey within a month, and no more than a year later get back 120 kilograms enriched from somewhere else abroad. This makes even less sense than the flawed October deal. In the intervening seven months, Iran has kicked its enrichment activities into higher gear. Its estimated total stock has gone to 2,300 kilograms from 1,500 kilograms last autumn, and its stated enrichment goal has gone to 20% from 3.5%.

If the West accepts this deal, Iran would be allowed to keep enriching uranium in contravention of previous U.N. resolutions. Removing 1,200 kilograms will leave Iran with still enough low-enriched stock to make a bomb, and once uranium is enriched up to 20% it is technically easier to get to bomb-capable enrichment levels.

Only last week, diplomats at the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has increased the number of centrifuges it is using to enrich uranium. According to Western intelligence estimates, Iran continues to acquire key nuclear components, such as trigger mechanisms for bombs. Tehran says it wants to build additional uranium enrichment plants. The CIA recently reported that Iran tripled its stockpile of uranium last year and moved “toward self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear missiles.” Yesterday’s deal will have no impact on these illicit activities.

The deal will, however, make it nearly impossible to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program short of military action. The U.N. is certainly a dead end. After 16 months of his extended hand and after downplaying support for Iran’s democratic opposition, Mr. Obama now faces an Iran much closer to a bomb and less diplomatically isolated than when President Bush left office.

Israel will have to seriously consider its military options. Such a confrontation is far more likely thanks to the diplomatic double-cross of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Brazil’s Lula, and especially to a U.S. President whose diplomacy has succeeded mainly in persuading the world’s rogues that he lacks the determination to stop their destructive ambitions.

Al Jazeera English – Focus – Obama and the curse of moderation.

By Mark LeVine

Obama promised radical change, but pragmatism has prevailed [GALLO/GETTY]

It was meant to be a disaster, but in fact it was a gift.

Faisal Shahzad hoped to kill as many people as possible, but in instead he gave the American intelligence community a unique opportunity to understand the current strategies and tactics of the Taliban and its relationship (if any) with al-Qaeda.

More importantly, he offered the administration of Barack Obama, the US president, and indeed all Americans, an opportunity to take a hard look at the motivations of the emerging crop of militants who are attempting to bring the war against the US back to US soil.

The question is will the Obama administration look a gift horse in the mouth?

Sadly, the answer is most likely yes.

The son of a retired senior Pakistani officer with roots in the war-torn Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan, Shahzad did not mean to lay bare for the world to see the multiple fallacies at the heart of US foreign policy under Obama; but he did.

Neither, for that matter, did failed Nigerian “underwear bomber” Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who like Shahzad comes from a powerful family whose position offered him plenty of opportunity to observe the hypocrisy of his country’s ruling elite and the role of US and European powers in perpetuating it.

But the narratives of both men, from their childhood to their botched bombings, offer pointed examples of how even the most well thought out policy strategies can produce the very opposite of the intended outcome.

Specifically, they challenge the basic orientation of the Obama administration’s philosophy of governance: that moderation, compromise, and consensus are the only way to achieve meaningful policy goals.

Limited political calculus

Obama’s AfPak strategy is the result of an exhaustive policy review [GALLO/GETTY]

Indeed, it is not a coincidence that the attempted car bombing occurred as the Obama administration was coping with a far more destructive disaster – the huge oil slick caused by the blowing up and sinking of the Deepwater Horizon off-shore oil platform, which began on April 20.

So, what do they have in common?

Simply, both are products of a political calculus that does not allow for the possibility of enacting truly transformative political change, even though such changes were a core promise of the election campaign.

Instead, they see the compromise of basic principles and the continuation of immoral and counterproductive policies as the necessary price for enacting “realistic” and “achievable” programmes.

Certainly no one could accuse Obama of hasty decision-making in his Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, which was the result of one of the most exhaustive policy reviews in recent memory.

Rather, the problem rests with precisely what options were allowed “on the table” to be discussed.

No questions asked

The “war on terror” might have been retired as the official term for describing US military activities across the Muslim world, but the focus on a military surge in Afghanistan while intensifying covert military operations in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province have in fact doomed the prospects for peaceful reconciliation precisely because they exacerbate the incredibly corrupt and violent political and economic system the US helped create in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan.

Indeed, Obama’s “middle of the road” policy of greater violence – touted as a compromise between withdrawal or all out occupation – has helped radicalise increasing numbers of Pakistanis and Afghans.

What was needed was a radical shift in the other direction; ending support for corrupt and autocratic leaders, supporting freedom and democracy unequivocally, demanding more equitable distribution of national resources in client states, and a laser-like focus on what is the only legitimate reason the US has to maintain troops in Afghanistan – to capture or kill the men directly responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and nothing more.

Of course, such a shift vis-à-vis AfPak policy could not occur in a vacuum. It would have to part of a larger and even more radical shift in the orientation of US policy throughout the Middle East.

Instead, however, the incoming Obama administration publicly touted as a refreshing dose of “realpolitik” and “pragmatism” its laying aside of the Bush administration’s pro-democracy rhetoric in favour of no – or at best, few – questions asked diplomatic support for, and tens of billions of dollars in military aid or weapons sales to, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and other client states with miserable human rights records.

This policy was doomed to fail. Such pragmatism is precisely what has increased animosity towards the US, who for decades refused to walk the talk when it comes to advocating democracy, freedom and human rights in the Muslim world.

Smoke and mirrors

A year after Obama’s Cairo speech, there are few signs of ‘new beginnings’ [GALLO/GETTY]

What Obama desperately needed to do was radical, but it was and remains achievable: to build credibility through offering tangible support for the peoples rather than the leaders of the region.

He hinted at significant change in his famous Cairo speech of one year ago with his call for a “new beginning” based on “tolerance and dignity,” but his rhetoric has turned out to be just more smoke and mirrors.

Not only does his administration continue to “tolerate” dictators and systematic human rights violations, he has sought to continue and in some cases even extend policies that violate constitutional norms and/or US law.

This is evidenced most recently by the administration’s support for loosening Miranda rights for terrorism suspects and the extension of assassinations to people who merely share certain “lifestyle characteristics” of supposed anti-US rebels.

As we saw with the Bush administration, and during the Johnson administration in Vietnam, even with the best intentions once a government crosses over to the “dark side” it is almost impossible to come back to the light.

In fact, it becomes a “force multiplier” for militancy among the peoples the US is occupying – expanding the anger and hatred across a region that is already filled to the brim with both (as one friend remarked to me, you can’t kick people in the stomach and not expect them to go for your groin in return).

Simply put, as long as the US is not serious about supporting real freedom, accountability and democracy in the Middle East, animosity to and violence against the US – both there and when possible in the US – will continue.

Moreover, when the president needs to make bold moves, such as in trying to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, he will not have the credibility to demand major compromises from either side.

Good as enemy of the necessary

Obama’s moderation has not only failed as a foreign policy making principle. It has not worked domestically either.

We have now seen where then candidate Obama’s explanation that he would support off-shore drilling if it would lower energy prices gets us.

His support for mythical “clean coal” has been similarly answered by the April 5 Upper Branch Mine disaster, which killed 29 miners.

More likely, Obama believed – and continues to believe, since even now he has not withdrawn his support for off-shore drilling – that such compromises are necessary to pass meaningful climate change legislation, even if the price is the occasional disastrous spill or mining disaster whose human, environmental and economic costs overwhelm whatever savings or security is provided by the oil acquired through new drilling.

And after coal and petroleum disasters, who wants to imagine what havoc a nuclear-power related accident could wreak. Does anyone remember Three Mile Island?

Obama seems to be following the dictum not to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. But the reality is that when drastic change is needed, the good can too often be the enemy of the necessary.

Indeed, one reason why the administration still does not have the wherewithal to challenge the oil or coal industries is that while Obama has been busy offering concessions and compromises (when he should have been sending in inspectors and regulators by the dozens) the energy industry has been working to consolidate their political power.

And in doing so they have worked hand in glove with the behemoth of the US military – whose budget is larger than the rest of the world’s combined – that has clearly become the predominant voice shaping US foreign policy.

The profound consequences for domestic policy of the military’s outsized power were clear when less than a month before the Deepwater Horizon spill, Obama announced his approval for off-shore drilling during a ceremony at a Maryland military base, with a navy fighter jet behind him.

When radical is the only way

Obama ran on a platform of hope, but without real change there is little left [GALLO/GETTY]

The reality is that the changes required to reverse global warming and contemporary environmental degradation are so great that a comprehensive transformation in the basic values, culture, and economic ideology governing American – indeed, global – society is necessary in order for meaningful political reforms to be enacted.

Obama, who ran on a platform of hope and transformation, surely understands this.

He could have gone to the American people at the start of his presidency and spoken with them honestly about the need for systemic changes.

He could have led the way rhetorically and politically.

He could have begun his term by tightening regulations governing the notoriously corrupt mining and oil industries, with their incestuous relationship to the government that regulates them.

He could have put forward a plan to make solar panels mandatory across the southern US and provided subsidies and long-term low interest loans to allow homeowners to afford it. That alone would drastically reduce the need to burn carbon based fuels and the need to support corrupt and autocratic Middle Eastern, Central Asian or African governments to get it.

The president could have coupled such policies with a declaration that it will no longer be business as usual when it comes to American foreign policy, and turned off the cash and weapons pipelines to undemocratic and corrupt allies, holding all governments to one, universally accepted moral and legal standard.

Instead, as Brendan Cummings of the Centre for Biological Diversity, lamented when Obama announced his support for off-shore drilling, it was “unfortunately all too typical of what we have seen so far from President Obama – promises of change, a year of ‘deliberation,’ and ultimately, adoption of flawed and outdated Bush policies as his own”.

The words hold true for almost every area of the administration’s policy. We see it in health care reform that in order to offer insurance to more Americans has ensured a financial bonanza to insurance companies that will do little to rein in spiraling costs.

We see it in attempts at reforming the banking and finance industries that have done almost nothing to change the system that produced the current meltdown.

We even see it in the nearly complete failure of a purely humanitarian mission such as in nearby Haiti just to provide adequate emergency housing to the victims of January’s earthquake before the summer rains arrive and bring with them yet another public health disaster.

Set up to fail

Instead of challenging the oil industry, Obama has been offering concessions [GALLO/GETTY]

George Bush, the former president, and Dick Cheney, the former vice-president, understood that moderation does not bring real change (consider how easily they undid almost every progressive reform enacted under the Clinton administration).

They knew that pushing a radical agenda without compromise was the best way to force American political culture towards their preferred direction.

Moreover, they counted on the fact that after eight years of veering so sharply to the right, merely attempting to return to the centre will seem like a herculean effort, ensuring the radical changes they enacted would remain in place even under a Democratic successor.

Sixteen months into his presidency, Obama has played his part all too well.

The most frightening part of his unwillingness to recognise the fallacy of moderation is that when his policies inevitably fail, the millions of Americans who tentatively supported him, grasping the discourse of “hope” that was the centrepiece of his campaign rhetoric, will veer sharply to the right – back to the very policies that are most responsible for creating the messes that Obama is struggling to clean up.

They will nurse the emotional and political wounds gotten by placing their hopes in Obama – and for millions of white Americans, the mere act of voting for a black man, or merely allowing themselves to believe that he could make their lives better, involved a huge psychological opening – by embracing movements like the Tea Party in ever greater numbers.

American political discourse will become even more poisonous and the radical change necessary to heal the country, and the planet, will be even harder to imagine.

The specter of one of the world’s great water systems, the Gulf of Mexico, devastated for years by a completely unnecessary disaster, opens a small window of opportunity for Obama and his administration to demonstrate the tenacity and political courage that enabled his historic election 18 months ago.

If he uses this moment to begin an honest and unsettling conversation with the American people, and the world, about what is demanded of all of us to heal the interconnected wounds that stretch from the Gulf of Mexico to the Persian Gulf, he will likely find himself surrounded by allies and volunteers wherever he turns.

If he does not, those same people will likely become the agents of his presidency’s downfall.

Mark LeVine is a professor of history at UC Irvine and senior visiting researcher at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University in Sweden. His most recent books are Heavy Metal Islam (Random House) and Impossible Peace: Israel/Palestine Since 1989 (Zed Books).

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.