WarSclerotic

Bret Stephens: What Is Happening to Turkey? – WSJ.com.\

Istanbul

Last week I asked Bernard Lewis where he thought Turkey might be going. The dean of Middle East historians speculated that in a decade the secular republic founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk might more closely resemble the Islamic Republic of Iran—even as Iran transformed itself into a secular republic.

Reading the news about Turkey from afar, it’s easy to see what Prof. Lewis means. Since coming to power in 2002, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has dramatically recast the traditional contours of Turkish foreign policy. Gone are the days when the country had a strategic partnership with Israel, involving close military ties and shared enemies in Syria and Iran and the sundry terrorist groups they sponsored. Gone are the days, too, when the U.S. could rely on Turkey as a bulwark against common enemies, be they the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

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Associated Press

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (left) and Syrian President Bashar Assad.

Today, Mr. Erdogan has excellent relations with Syrian strongman Bashar Assad, whom the prime minister affectionately calls his “brother.” He has accused Israel of “savagery” in Gaza and opened a diplomatic line to Hamas while maintaining good ties with the genocidal government of Sudan. He was among the first foreign leaders to congratulate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on his fraudulent victory in last year’s election. He has resisted intense pressure from the Obama administration to vote for a new round of Security Council sanctions on Iran, with which Turkey has a $10 billion trade relationship. And he has sabotaged efforts by his own foreign ministry to improve ties with neighboring Armenia.

The changes in foreign policy reflect the rolling revolution in Turkey’s domestic political arrangements. The military, long the pillar of Turkish secularism, is under assault by Mr. Erdogan’s Islamist-oriented government, which has recently arrested dozens of officers on suspicion of plotting a coup. Last week the Turkish parliament voted to put a referendum to the public that would, if passed, allow the government to pack the country’s top courts, another secularist pillar, with its own people. Also under assault is the media group Dogan, which last year was slapped with a multibillion dollar tax fine.

Oh, and America’s favorability rating among Turks, at around 14% according to recent polls, is plumbing an all-time low, despite Barack Obama’s presidency and his unprecedented outreach to Muslims in general and Turks in particular. In 2004, the year of Abu Ghraib, it was 30%.

All this would seem to more than justify Prof. Lewis’s alarm. So why do so many Turks, including more than a few secularists and classical liberals, seem mostly at ease with the changes Mr. Erdogan has wrought? A possible answer may be self-delusion: Liberals were also at the forefront of the Iranian revolution before being brutally swept aside by the Ayatollah Khomeini. But that isn’t quite convincing in Turkey’s case.

More plausible is Turkey’s economic transformation under the AKP’s pro-free market stewardship. Inflation, which ran to 99% in 1997, is down to single digits. Goldman Sachs anticipates 7% growth this year, which would make the country Europe’s strongest performer—if only Europe would have it as a member. Turks now look on the EU with diminished envy and growing contempt. One time arch-rival Greece mostly earns their pity.

Chief among the beneficiaries of this transformation has been the AKP’s political base: an Islamic bourgeoisie that was long shut out of the old statist arrangements between the country’s secular political and business elites. Members of this new class want to send their daughters to universities—and insist they be allowed to do so wearing headscarves. They also insist that they be ruled by the government they elected, not by the “deep state” of unelected and often self-dealing officers, judges and bureaucrats who defended the country’s secularism at the expense of its democracy and prosperity.

The paradoxical result is that, as the country has become wealthier and (in some respects) more democratic, it has also shed some of its Western trappings. Mr. Erdogan’s infatuations with his unsavory neighbors undoubtedly stems form his own instincts, ideology and ego. But it also reflects a public sentiment that no longer wants Turkey to be a stranger in its own region, particularly when it so easily can be its leader. Some Turks call this “neo-Ottomanism,” others “Turkish-Gaullism.” Whichever way, it is bound to discomfit the West.

The more serious question is how far it all will go. Some of Mr. Erdogan’s domestic power plays smack of incipient Putinism. The estrangement from Israel is far from complete, but an Israeli attack on Iran might just do the trick. And it’s hard to see why Mr. Erdogan should buck public opinion when it comes to Turkey’s alliance with the U.S. when he’s prepared to follow public opinion in so many other matters.

Most importantly, will the Erdogan brand of Islamism remain relatively modest in its social and political ambitions, or will it become aggressive and radical? It would be wrong to pretend to know the answer. It would be insane not to worry about the possibility.

Inside Hizballah’s Preparations for the Next War – TIME.

Lebanese Hizbollah members

With a startled shout from the outcrop above, the Hizballah fighter bounded down the rocky slope, cocked his AK-47 rifle in a dramatic flourish as he drew near. “What are you doing here?” he demanded, his face a mix of anger and astonishment. “This is a military zone. You should not be here.”

It turned out that the youthful militant had been guarding a small outpost created by the Shi’ite militia on a remote mountain top in south Lebanon. The location was well chosen, offering the Hizballah men commanding views over the hills and valleys of the southern Bekaa Valley, a likely battle front if a widely-anticipated — and feared — war breaks out between the Iran-backed group and Israel. (See rare pictures of Hizballah’s youth movement.)

The question of whether these rugged hills will see yet another war depends less on the likely combatants than it does on the U.S. and Iran. Hizballah is viewed as one component of Iran’s deterrence against a possible attack on its nuclear sites, should diplomatic efforts fail to resolve the standoff with the West over its enrichment of uranium. And recent conversations with Hizballah fighters reveal an organization at the peak of its military powers with an army of well-trained, disciplined, and highly motivated combatants wielding advanced weaponry, cultivating new tactics, and brimming with confidence.

“The next war is coming one hundred percent, but we don’t know when,” says Ali, a thickly-muscled university student. “We have big plans for it. God willing, you will see the end of Israel.” (See pictures of Lebanon in crisis.)

Like all Hizballah fighters interviewed for this article, Ali requested anonymity as he was not authorized to talk to the press. Although Hizballah and Israel both insist they do not want another war, neither side has disguised its preparations for that possibility. Since the end of its last bout with the Israeli military in July-August 2006, Hizballah has built new defensive lines and firing positions, the fighters say, in the hills flanking the Bekaa and along the rugged mountainous spine running up the middle of southern Lebanon.

One such position was this observation post near the town of Jezzine onto which a TIME reporter stumbled. It consisted of a couple of bunkers sunk into the hillside, an open fire place with a soot-blackened cooking pot and bags of onions and potatoes. Local residents say that at night they can hear the sound of explosions and gunfire echoing through the valleys as Hizballah trains. Israel vows that it will use far greater force in the next war and will treat the Lebanese state — in whose government Hizballah has a major role — as the enemy rather than just the Shi’ite militia, a prospect that frightens many Lebanese. But the resolve of the Hizballah combatants remains unshaken by Israeli threats. (Read “A Brief History of Hizballah.”)

“Israel is living a state of confusion because it perceives that any aggression it would launch against Lebanon would be lost,” boasted Hizballah’s deputy leader Sheikh Naim Qassem this week, adding that he does not believe a new war with Israel is on the horizon. Perhaps not, but the look in the eyes of Hizballah’s combatants suggest that not only are they fully prepared to fight one, they actually look forward to it.

“It doesn’t matter. We can always rebuild. Our dignity is more important than roofs over our heads,” says Haj Rida, a square-jawed unit commander. Such sang froid illustrates the single-minded determination of the Hizballah combatant nurtured by years of relentless religious instruction and military training. Ali, for example, was raised in an environment of Islamic piety and dedication to the cause, joining the party’s youth program at the age of 12. He eschews parties and listening to music, saying he has dedicated his life to “walking the path of the Prophet Mohammed”. (See pictures of the 2006 war in Lebanon.)

“I have my studies at university and my family, but I also have the life of jihad and preparations for the coming war,” he says. “I consider my jihad duties as something joyful. You cannot understand the joy of jihad unless you are in Hizballah.”

Acting on an internal assessment of its military performance in the 2006 war, Hizballah is seeking to improve its capabilities by developing new tactics and acquiring new weapons. They are placing particular emphasis on improved air defense systems to challenge Israel’s aerial superiority.

Reports over the past year suggest that Hizballah has received advanced Russian shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and some fighters have been trained in Syria on larger truck-mounted missile systems.

U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources say Hizballah has also augmented its arsenal with larger, longer-range rockets with guidance capabilities. Many analysts believe that in the event of another war, Hizballah plans to strike strategic targets deep inside Israel. In February, the movement’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah hinted that Hizballah now had the ability to strike targets in Tel Aviv.

Although last month’s Israeli claims that Syria had transferred Scud ballistic missiles to Hizballah remain unsubstantiated — and some military analysts are skeptical given the rocket’s size and cumbersome logistical requirements — the group is believed to have acquired Syrian-manufactured M-600 guided rockets. The M-600, a copy of an Iranian rocket, can carry a 1,100 pound warhead for a distance of 155 miles, and its guidance system allows Hizballah to target Israel’s defense ministry in Tel Aviv from hidden bases in the northern Bekaa Valley. (Read “Israel Claims Iran Weapons Intercept.”)

Hizballah’s possession of the M-600 is “just the tip of the iceberg,” Brigadier General Yossi Baidatz, Israel’s top military intelligence analyst, told a Knesset committee on Tuesday. “Hizballah currently has an arsenal of thousands of rockets of all kinds and ranges, including solid fuelled rockets, with a longer range and more accurate,” he said.

Besides seeking new weapons systems, the Shi’ite militia is also finding innovative ways to utilize older armaments, such as the guerrilla-standard RPG-7 grenade launcher and the recoilless rifle, a near obsolete anti-tank weapon. “The RPG-7 is old but still a good weapon,” says Ali. “It’s how you use them that counts. We are always studying new combat techniques.”

Israel’s heavily armored tanks are to receive a newly-developed defense system that fires mini interceptors to destroy incoming antitank missiles. Hizballah fighters, without revealing details, say they are training to overcome such sophisticated defenses by “swarming” Israeli tanks with low-tech antitank weapons.

Hizballah’s battle plans may also including infiltrating fighters across the border into Israel to carry out raids and sabotage missions — a move that would be unprecedented in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli doctrine is to fight its wars in the territory of its enemies rather than on the home front. Says Ali, “God willing, we will go into Palestine next time.”

Despite the mounting tension, Israel’s pledge — and vast capability — to inflict catastrophic damage on Lebanon and the scale of Hizballah’s arms build-up functions as a kind of mutual deterrence that has brought the usually volatile frontier its longest period of calm in 40 years.