WarSclerotic

DEBKAfile, Political Analysis, Espionage, Terrorism, Security.

The Watchword of His Secret PPD Is “Prevention”

President Barack Obama

“Prevention” rather than “containment” was the watchword of the secret Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) on Iran, which President Barack Obama signed in the second week of April, White House circles familiar with its contents have told DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s sources.
But by affixing his signature to this directive and endorsing this course, Obama did not put an end to the internal debate n the administration and the military and intelligence communities over its content. They are not clear about the meaning of “prevention.” Does it mean preventing Iran developing and acquiring a working nuclear weapon? Or preventing Iran crossing the threshold from the accumulation of the parts and materials for assembling the bomb by holding the tangible threat of American or Israel attack over its head for crossing that threshold?
The object of “prevention” is therefore no more than a punctuation mark before the next stage of the jostling over America’s policy for Iran. When circles close to the president are asked how it should work, their reply comes in two parts.
Part One, they say, will be the imposition of tough American-European sanctions against the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, their affiliates and elements active in the IRGC-supervised nuclear program.
Vice President Joe Biden got it almost right Thursday, April 22, when he said: “I expect new UN sanctions on Iran by late April or early May.”

US sanctions first, UN sanctions next

(Biden also dismissed the notion that Israel might attack the Islamic Republic before first allowing sanctions to take their course. A comment relating to a Middle East war this summer is addressed in another article in this issue.)
Sources in the White House say that the vice president should have said US sanctions, since a UN Security Council sanctions resolution is not expected by the most optimistic Washington sources to become feasible before August or September. They believe there is a good chance that by then, Moscow and also Beijing will come aboard. In fact, Tuesday, April 27, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev made his most condemnatory and unequivocal comment yet by any Russian about the need to impose penalties on Tehran:
“Iran so far does not show proper understanding or behave responsibly enough,” he said. “This is all sad of course. Therefore, if this situation continues, we exclude nothing – and sanctions as well,” Medvedev told the Danish Broadcasting Corporation ahead of his official visit to Denmark.
Another encouraging sign for Washington came from the remarks of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad himself. On Monday, April 26, he attacked the veto prerogative held by the five permanent members of the Security Council as “oppressing and destroying the true nature of mankind and…satanic tools.” Washington took this to mean that Iran’s leaders already know Beijing will not wield its veto on their behalf to block new sanctions.

What if sanctions don’t work – even with Moscow and Beijing aboard?

Not only is China slipping away from Tehran but, according to our Washington and Gulf sources, the most important West European powers have given the nod to new American sanctions and all the Gulf and Arab states, barring Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, have quietly promised to cooperate in their implementation. Even the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a large part of whose economy relies on trade with Iran, has agreed to pull its weight.
Our Middle Eastern sources reveal that Washington took advantage this week of a trip to Beijing this week by the Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas to relay a message to the Chinese leadership on behalf of all the main Arab rulers: They asked him to convey a clear message that preventing Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is not just a vital Western or Israeli interest, but is shared equally by the Arabs and the Palestinians.
Part One of the Obama administration’s strategy of prevention is therefore directed at holding Iran back from the critical stage from which it can develop a nuclear weapon.
Part Two supposedly scripts a What Next? scenario, should this objective fail and Iran’s leaders defy sanctions and international opprobrium to order the masters of their nuclear program to cross the threshold and start assembling nuclear bombs and warheads in earnest.
On this eventuality, the president’s close advisers break down into three factions:

Group No. 1: A second PPD is needed

National Security Advisor General James Jones, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General James Cartwright lead the group which holds that this situation would call for a follow-up PPD to be signed by the president and determine whether he is prepared to accept a nuclear-armed Iran or abort it by military action. They argue that a choice between the two options was not laid out in the April PPD, which was only a step towards that decision without going all the way.

Group No. 2: Obama has decided to attack

Aside from White House Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, this group is composed almost entirely of influential people outside the administration who are very close to the president, including statesmen, former military personnel, personal friends who influence the president’s important political decisions, and some regular golfing companions.
This group says no new Presidential Policy Directive is necessary because Obama has already made up his mind about what to do if Iran develops a nuke, without however confiding in any of his close circle: He will attack. “I have no doubt, that when the moment of reckoning arrives, the president will order an attack on Iran,” one of these close associates told DEBKA-Net-Weekly‘s sources in Washington this week.
Tehran appears to have come to the same conclusion.
Tuesday, April 27, the influential Washington Web site Politico published a piece by Flynt Leverett & Hillary Mann Leverett, who reputedly run a private American lobby on behalf of Iran, under the title “The Slippery Slope to Strikes on Iran.”
This was the farthest Politico was prepared to go to signal that President Obama’s policy is heading towards a single destination – a strike on Iran.

Group No. 3: No more time to play around

This group includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Deputy National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and senior NSC Central Region Director Dennis Ross. They share the view that the president has not yet made up his mind how to handle Iran’s assembly of a nuclear weapon, but are pressing him to decide right now. They say time is running out for the necessary preparations in the event US military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities is decided on. If American and other Western intelligence evaluations are correct, Iran may be in a position to build a nuclear weapon by August or September, should it choose to do so. That time frame is too close for any delay in making preparations.
The pullback of American troops from Iraq on schedule and the start of endgame negotiations for winding down the Afghan war would free up US military resources for any necessary attacks on Iran. But Tehran is fully aware of the pressures on the White House and is adjusting its own tactics and momentum to making sure that by the time Washington’s hands are free for action, it will have missed the “prevention” boat.
Certain US military and diplomatic steps are nevertheless in hand, accelerated by Tehran’s military plans to beat the US and Israel to the military draw. Both are outlined in the next articles.

Newsmax – PrintTemplate.

By: Jim Meyers

Vodpod videos no longer available.

The Barack Obama administration is demonstrating a “fundamental misreading” of Iran and its nuclear ambitions by not pushing for stronger sanctions, Sen. John McCain says in an interview with Newsmax.TV.

The Islamic Republic could be within a year of developing a nuclear weapon. Why then is Obama not pushing to make sanctions stronger and setting a deadline for Iranian cooperation, the Arizona Republican was asked.

“I don’t know,” he concedes. “There’s been this continuous outreach to the Islamic Republic of Iran. We have pending sanctions in the Congress that obviously the administration is holding up.

“They continue to chase this illusion that the Chinese and Russians will cooperate with us on meaningful sanctions. They haven’t. They won’t.

“It’s a fundamental misreading of the nature of the Iranian regime. We have to speak out on behalf of the human rights of the Iranian people, and understand that this regime is bent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.”

McCain adds that Israel is faced with “two terribly difficult choices” regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

“One is to allow the Iranians to continue and thereby proliferate the Middle East with nuclear weapons, and sooner or later a terrorist organization will get a nuclear weapon. Second, to attack unilaterally, and that of course brings the whole world down on them.

“If we could act on really tough sanctions, I think there is still an opportunity” Israel won’t have to face those choices.

Iran rivalry behind Cairo’s Hizbullah tension.

Congress moves ahead on sanctions.

Legislators weigh White House reservations over banning Iranian gas.

Ahmadinejad likely to get US visa.

“We have certain responsibilities as UN’s host,” says State Dept.

WASHINGTON – Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is on track to receive a US visa to attend next week’s UN meeting on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, though it is very unlikely that US officials would meet with him or other members of his delegation.

“The visas for the Iranian delegation are still being processed,” US State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said Thursday, referring to applications made this week.

Ahmadinejad and other Iranians have been given visas to attend UN meetings several times in the past, and Crowley noted earlier that “we have certain responsibilities as the host of the UN. Any foreign official who’s coming to the UN for official business is normally granted a visa.”

While US officials expect that the visa arrangements will be made in time for the Iranians to participate at the conference opening next Monday, they indicated that the venue would not be used to further the administration’s engagement strategy with Iran.

After representatives of the countries met earlier this year and brokered a compromise on the Iranian nuclear program that never came to fruition, the US has not met with Iranians and top officials have said the approach didn’t work.

In terms of the upcoming NPT meeting, which will stretch over many days, Crowley said Thursday that “a face-to-face meeting between a US diplomat and an Iranian diplomat is highly unlikely.”

Israel’s best intentions may not be enough to avert war in Lebanon – Haaretz – Israel News.

Yesterday, Lebanon marked five years since the last Syrian troops left the country. Next month, it will mark 10 years since Israel withdrew from south Lebanon. But despite these important anniversaries of events that ostensibly bolstered Lebanon’s independence, the Lebanese are apprehensive.

Not a day has passed in recent weeks without a Lebanese or foreign Arab media outlet bringing up the fear that Israel intends to launch a war against Hezbollah this summer. Yesterday, Barak Ravid reported here that Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit left Beirut with the impression that Lebanon was in “complete panic” over the prospect of an Israeli attack.

Damascus is also tense: The Syrians have raised and lowered their alert level several times recently, thinking Israel might attack. The Syrian moves were prompted mostly by statements from Israeli officials, including Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Likud MK Yossi Peled, a former GOC Northern Command. But the tension on that side of the Israel-Syria-Lebanon triangle has eased a bit recently.

To put it bluntly, Israel’s main challenge is that it’s very difficult to calm a paranoiac. The Arab world’s approach to Israel is fraught with suspicion, and any attempt to alleviate it tends to have the opposite effect.

The starkest example yet came in the summer of 2007. Israel and Syria both raised their alert levels and expanded military exercises. Jerusalem said it had no intention of attacking, Military Intelligence said it feared a war might break out because of a “miscalculation.”

The rest is history: The Israel Air Force (so foreign reports say) bombed a nuclear facility in Syria. And the paranoid became convinced they really were after him – even though this time, Damascus decided not to respond.

An analysis of the current situation, including through conversations with senior Israel Defense Forces officers, indicates that this time, Arab anxiety is somewhat exaggerated, although the possibility of war this summer still exists. Exploring the interests of the various parties doesn’t lead to the conclusion that anyone has much interest in a conflict in the near future.

Despite reports of the delivery of Scud missiles from Syria to Hezbollah, Israel decided not to attack the arms convoys. The threat that concerns Israel most is the Iranian one, where any progress still awaits a sanctions resolution by the UN Security Council.

Syria certainly has no wish to start a war. And Hezbollah, though it recently finished repairing the damage it sustained in 2006, will need to think twice before starting a new conflict and once again being blamed for the destruction Israel would wreak on Lebanon.

The Lebanese remember only too well how Hezbollah dragged them into an unnecessary war four years ago. Websites affiliated with the former standard bearer of the anti-Syrian camp, the March 14 Alliance, warn that Hezbollah will once again spark a conflict with Israel for the sake of foreign countries.

But even the Iranians, who frequently get the blame for ramping up tensions in the region, don’t seem to desire an immediate conflagration – at least not while the international community is still stuttering on the sanctions issue and allowing them to advance their nuclear program.

So what can go wrong? There’s still the issue of Hezbollah’s rearmament. The Scuds, it turns out, were not Israel’s point of no return, but a delivery of more accurate rockets to Hezbollah might well elicit an entirely different reaction. This is what lies behind the recent warnings by Aboul Gheit, Lieberman and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who this week said Hezbollah has a missile arsenal bigger than that of most countries.

The other possibility concerns Hezbollah’s quest to avenge the assassination of senior operative Imad Mughniyeh. If Hezbollah scores a massive success – like blowing up an Israeli embassy, downing an Israeli plane or assassinating a senior official – the IDF would have to respond, and it will respond in Lebanon. From there, the situation could escalate to a new war on the northern front.

Posted by Avi Issacharoff on April 30, 2010

Hezbollah: Israel should be wary of war against Lebanon – Haaretz – Israel News.
Israel would be taking a big risk if it decided to open war on Lebanon or on any of the other countries in the Middle East, Hezbollah chief Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah said Thursday, advising Israeli politicians and generals to stay cautious regarding such a possibility.

Speaking to a Kuwait-based news channel, Nasrallah, referring to recent tensions between Israel and its neighbors to the north, said that “any war started by Israel against Lebanon or anywhere in the region would be taking a very dangerous risk on its part.”

“That kind of war would change every parameter in the Middle East,” the Hezbollah chief said, adding that his organization was not “frightened by the threat or by Israel’s psychological warfare.”

The Hezbollah added that he knew that “Israeli politicians and generals, past and present, are very worried and very cautious and we would like them to stay that way,” saying that “the blood of Imad Mughniyeh would haunt them everywhere.”

The militant organization has vowed vengeance against Israel ever since Mughniyeh’s 2008 assassination, which it blames on Israel.

“I cannot say that it is close. Myself and brothers in Hezbollah see that all this intimidation does not hide behind it a war. On the contrary, if there was silence and quietness, then everyone must be vigilant,” Nasrallah said.

“But when you see all this American and Israeli noise, this means they want to use this noise to achieve political, psychological and certain security advantages without resorting to the step of war,” Nasrallah added.

Referring to an alleged long-range surface-to-surface- missile deal, reported by Israel to have taken place between Syria and Hezbollah, Nasrallah said that the “Israeli allegations on the transfer of Scud missiles from Syria to Hezbollah, in spite of Syrian denials and the quiet from the organization only strengthens Lebanon’s confidence in itself and in the ability of the resistance to defend Lebanon.”

“My comments from a month ago speaking of how we will reach anywhere in Israel are supported in the eyes of the Lebanese and Arab peoples when Israel and the United States discuss the transfer of Scud missiles from Syria to Hezbollah,” Nasrallah said.

On whether such a deal took place, the Hezbollah leader said: “Today it’s Scuds, yesterday other kinds of rockets … the aim is one, and that is to intimidate Lebanon, to intimidate Syria and to put pressure on Lebanon, Syria, the resistance movement and the Lebanese and Syrian people,” Nasrallah said.

“Regardless of whether Syria gave Hezbollah this type of rockets … of course Syria denied, and Hezbollah as usual does not comment.

FOXNews.com – Clinton Warns Iran, Syria on U.S. Commitment to Israel.

ISSA & BURTON & MILLER: Nuclear-armed mullahs are not an option – Washington Times.

By Reps. Darrell Issa, Dan Burton and Jeff Miller

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seems hell-bent on enriching uranium and developingthe other complex components and specialized parts necessary to deliver and detonate a nuclear weapon. President Obama’s policy in response is far from clear-cut.

We recognize that any assessment of the secret activities of a closed society like Iran is both difficult and necessarily tentative. Even with a well-honed intelligence network, it is impossible to understand the precise status and contours of the Iranian nuclear enterprise. Although some public accounts have indicated that intelligence agencies believe the Iranian bomb quest has been set back by sabotage and the defection of essential individuals, the inherent limitations of intelligence collection and analysis means that these assessments may be wrong. Iran may be even closer to producing a nuclear weapon than the intelligence community believes.

Only Mr. Ahmadinejad and his cronies know for certain.

What we do know, however, is that Iran continues to conduct military exercises in the Persian Gulf to showcase the regime’s ability to threaten a vital transit route for the region’s petroleum exports. America’s dangerous dependence on foreign oil means that Iran’s hostile behavior poses a national security threat. And while the threat from Iran’s conventional weapons is serious, the threat to this strategic waterway from a nuclear-armed Iran would be a thousand times worse.

The United States must always be prepared for the possibility of a “strategic surprise.” Yet given this administration’s national security failures, we have little assurance that the president is equipped to handle an Iranian crisis.

Regrettably, it is increasingly apparent that the president’s “outstretched hand” to the Islamist regime in Iran has failed, while his continual scolding of Israel appears to have further emboldened Mr. Ahmadinejad’s hostilities toward this important regional ally. Furthermore, the administration’s enthrallment with multilateral postulation about the benefit of aggressive global sanctions has accomplished nothing to mitigate the prospect that radicalized Muslims around the world might obtain nuclear weapons.

Some have suggested that the administration has tacitly accepted the development of an Iranian bomb. These analysts argue that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s speculation about a U.S. regional nuclear umbrella, in addition to the administration’s plans to place missile defenses in Eastern Europe andthedispatchof other anti-missile weapons to the Mideast, indicate that the president is resigned to Iran’s eventual acquisition of atomic arms.

The risk of Iranian nuclear weapons, surprise or not, is deeply troubling. So are the reports that the administration has conceded this eventuality.

First, “containing” a nuclear-equipped Iran as the United States did the Soviet Union during the Cold War would require an explicit commitment to use overwhelming force in certain circumstances. It is not clear whether the president is willing or prepared to make such a commitment in the case of Iran.

Second, even if this commitment was forthcoming, many experts do not believe it is possible to contain Iran. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union refused to take overtly hostile actions directly against the U.S. or its allies during the Cold War, presumably because it feared a massive nuclear retaliatory strike. Essential to this assessment is the fact that the leaders of the Soviet Union understood that American retaliation would preclude the possibility of an eventual global communist triumph.

Iranian leaders may not be encumbered by the modicum of rational statecraft distilled into the collective Soviet brain. Rather than discouraging the use of nuclear weapons against U.S. interests, the prospect of inducing destruction may actually appeal to the mullahs calling the shots in Tehran.

It is telling that while the Obama administration downgrades the role U.S. nuclear weapons play in our national security, the Iranians seem to be striving unabated to obtain atomic arms. Thebestway to counteract uncertainty about Iran’s intentions,however, isa certain indication of what is intolerable to the United States.

The first step to halting an Iranian bomb program is increasing our intelligence-gathering capabilities to monitor the progress of Iran’s nuclear program. Meanwhile,effective sanctions must be imposed immediately, and the United States must demonstrate its unequivocal support for the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people. We also must not foreclose the possibility of a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities or the option of overwhelming retaliatory force should Iran launch itself or supply terrorists with the resources to launch an attack on the United States or our allies. Iran should have no doubt about the full force of America’s military strength and no question about our willingness to use it.

To date, however, the president’s policy for dealing with Iran is both incoherent and frighteningly similar to the failed approach of the Carter era. It wasn’t until a reinvigorated Kremlin – tempted by an anemic and indecisive American administration – sent Soviet tanks into Afghanistan that President Carter began to acknowledge the threat of a nuclear-armed foe. We hope it will not require another strategic surprise to educate President Obama about a pressing contemporary nuclear threat.

Rep. Darrell Issa of California is ranking member of the House Oversight Committee. Rep. Dan Burton of Indiana is ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East. Rep. Jeff Miller of Florida is ranking member of the House Armed Services subcommittee on terrorism and unconventional arms.

U.S./IRAN: Sanctions Debate Heats Up – IPS ipsnews.net.

By Jim Lobe*

WASHINGTON, Apr 28, 2010 (IPS) – Wednesday’s highly unusual public launch of a “conference committee” of both houses of Congress to hash out differences in long-pending legislation to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran marks a new stage in the escalating debate over what to do about Tehran’s nuclear programme.

With mid-term elections only six months away, many lawmakers are eager to demonstrate their strong support for Israel, which has argued for the adoption of “crippling” sanctions against the Islamic Republic as the only way to halt its alleged effort to acquire nuclear weapons short of a military attack.

But they are running into opposition from the administration of President Barack Obama which, while declaring that it, too, favours sanctions, insists that it be given sufficient time and flexibility in imposing them to ensure that they do not undermine U.S. efforts to rally other key countries behind multilateral sanctions or alienate key sectors of the Iranian population.

Meanwhile, the entire strategy of using sanctions as an effective way to pressure Iran to curb its nuclear programme is coming under renewed question from several quarters.

Neo-conservatives and other right-wing hawks, notably former U.N. Amb. John Bolton and Weekly Standard editor William Kristol, argue that sanctions – whether sweeping and unilateral as those being considered by Congress, or more narrowly targeted and multilateral as those favoured by Obama – are unlikely to deter Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. In their view, Washington needs to prepare for a military attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities or, in any event, not prevent Israel from carrying one out.

At the same time, some Iran specialists fault the administration for not making more generous offers to Iran during its “engagement” phase last year before moving to a containment strategy that includes additional sanctions, as well as other forms of pressure.

In their view, the “pressure track” – whether unilateral or multilateral – will not only prove ineffective, but will also strengthen Tehran’s hardliners and ultimately make war more, rather than less, likely.

Cheered on by the so-called “Israel Lobby” centred around the powerful American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its Christian Zionist allies, the House of Representatives voted 412-12 last December to approve a far-reaching sanctions bill that, among other measures, would penalise foreign companies that export gasoline and other refined petroleum products to Iran.

The Senate followed with an even more sweeping bill aimed at third-country companies the following month.

Largely at the administration’s behest, however, the Democratic leadership of both the House and the Senate held off selecting its delegates to a House-Senate conference committee charged with reconciling the two bills until just last week.

The administration had requested the delay to carry out intensive consultations with other members of the U.N. Security Council in hopes of getting it to approve a fourth round of sanctions against Iran, the specific terms of which are currently being negotiated.

The Council has approved three previous sets of sanctions against Iran since 2006 for failing to heed demands to stop enriching uranium and to clear up unanswered questions posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding its nuclear programme.

The administration has argued that imposing unilateral sanctions before the Council acts would threaten the multilateral consensus it is building with its European partners to get a strong U.N. resolution.

“We want to make sure we don’t send wrong messages before we get everyone signed up on what we can achieve internationally,” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned lawmakers last month.

The administration has also argued that Obama should be given the authority to exempt from punishment any companies from other nations, such as China, that he deems are cooperating with Washington’s Iran policy – a position that was harshly criticised, especially by Republicans, at Wednesday’s opening conference committee hearing.

In addition, the administration said that sweeping sanctions, such as the one punishing foreign companies that export gasoline to Iran, could, if enforced, harm and ultimately alienate the general public in Iran and thus trigger a nationalist backlash that could benefit hardliners, notably the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and weaken the opposition Green Movement.

As a result, the White House, which has reportedly stepped up its lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill significantly in the last two weeks, is pressing the conferees both to grant the president significant authority to waive sanctions if he deems it necessary to the national interest and to delay final passage of a compromise bill until the end of next month.

Most analysts believe that the Security Council is unlikely to reach agreement on a new sanctions resolution before then, and, in any event, Lebanon, which will preside over Council in May and whose government relies on the support of Tehran’s local ally, Hezbollah, is expected to prevent any resolution from coming to a vote.

In its efforts to rally support for a new sanctions resolution, the administration reportedly dropped several key provisions in its initial draft, including sanctions that would deny Iran access to international banking services, capital markets and to international airspace and waters for its commercial trade.

The administration and its European allies are now reportedly pressing for a resolution that would include an arms embargo on Iran, backed by the authority to seize Iranian vessels suspected of carrying weapons or nuclear-related material, other measures designed to discourage commercial relations with Iranian companies allegedly involved in nuclear transactions, and restrictions on foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector.

Some of these provisions are expected to be resisted by veto-wielding China, a major investor in Iran’s energy sector, as well as by Brazil and Turkey, and may be further watered down.

Analysts on Capitol Hill believe that the administration, which is strongly backed by business and trade associations whose members have extensive international interests, is likely to succeed in getting significant waiver authority in the final version, despite the wishes of AIPAC and its allies that a sweeping sanctions bill with very limited waiver authority be approved as quickly as possible.

The administration has bolstered its case, particularly with fellow-Democrats, by quietly pledging to follow up a U.N. resolution with much-tougher measures targeted on specific IRGC-controlled commercial institutions, including, for example, Iran’s national shipping line, to be adopted by its European and other western allies on their own.

The sanctions debate, both in Congress and the Security Council, has already had an impact, according to administration officials. They point out that a number of multinational companies and subsidiaries that have done business with Iran have either severed their ties with Iranian partners or reduced their operations there.

Among the most significant in the energy sector are Royal Dutch Shell, Malaysia’s state oil company Petronas, Netherlands-based Vitol, Swiss-based Glencore and Trafigura. France’s Total announced this week that it will end gasoline sales to Iran if sanctions are approved.