WarSclerotic

WORLD FOCUS: Straight talk diplomacy

FRANK SHATZ

The United States has lived 31 years with the consequences of the Iranian Revolution. We may need to live with it for several more decades.

An increasing number of foreign policy experts are saying that the United States and the Middle East would have great difficulty in living with the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran.

Former Ambassador James Bullington, a career diplomat who served as dean of the Senior Seminar, the State Department’s highest level of training program, in a recent interview with the Lake Placid News and The Virginia Gazette, said that beneath a nuclear-armed Iran, “much of the Middle East could fall under the strategic domination of a radical Islamist regime that supports global terrorism. Nuclear proliferation would be accelerated, with unforeseeable consequences, and vital energy supplies would be permanently threatened,”

He posited that in coming years the United States will need to rely more and more on diplomacy, broadly understood. “We have to recognize that ‘soft power’ has to be combined with ‘hard power’ in order to constitute the ‘smart power’ that is required to protect our interest in an increasingly dangerous world,” he said.

The actions of Iran, in defiance of the international community, could provide a test case for applying “smart power” to solve the most serious threat facing U. S. interests in the Middle East.

Both the Bush and the Obama administrations have proclaimed repeatedly that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Apparently those broad-based proclamations had little effect. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared recently that Iran has begun enriching uranium to a level closer to weapons-grade, a step that clearly violates an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency

The question of how rapidly Iran’s uranium enrichment program would move the country closer to attaining nuclear-power status, is almost irrelevant. The Soviet Union was years behind the progress made by the Manhattan Project, but through a highly successful espionage effort it leapfrogged, and well ahead of all estimates; in 1949 it tested its first nuclear weapon.

Israel, whose destruction is a proclaimed aim of Iran’s President Ahmadinejad, is rightfully concerned that Iran may achieve a comparable nuclear breakout. According to press reports, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was recently in Moscow to convince the Russians not to sell their S-300 defense missile systems to Iran. He proclaimed that Israel faces an “existential threat” from an Islamic extremist Iranian regime determined to get nuclear weapons.

Israel feels time is running out, and if international pressure in whatever form doesn’t deter Iran from developing a capacity to build a nuclear weapon, it has no choice but to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities.

It is well to remember that the Israeli prime minister is the younger brother of the late Yonatan Netanyahu, the commander in the elite Sayeret Matkai unit of the Israeli Defense Forces. He was the leader of the assault on Entebbe airport in Uganda. The raid was considered a “mission impossible.” Although he was killed during the raid, the Israeli military managed to rescue the hostages held by Palestinian terrorists after an aircraft hijacking.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently warned Israel against striking Iran’s nuclear facilities, arguing that it would only delay Tehran’s nuclear program for a couple of years. Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his visit to Jerusalem, reinforced this warning.

But to apply American “smart power” to the task of defusing the Iranian nuclear threat, the Obama administration needs more than to restrain Israel. It has to persuade China and Russia that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is not bluffing. It must also remind those who are averse to confronting Iran that considering  the support Israel enjoys in the U. S. Congress, an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities won’t lead to irreparable damage to U.S.- Israeli relations.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates may be right in saying that the acquisition of nuclear bombs by Iran can only be prevented if “Iranians themselves decide it’s too costly.” The task of America’s “smart power” diplomacy is to persuade Iran that it would indeed be too costly.

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For the sake of argument, let us assume that the US administration has already arrived at the tacit conclusion that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is inevitable, in spite of all US and international efforts to prevent this. What would the repercussions be if this conclusion became known? How would the administration behave if its conclusions became known to the public? How would it work to minimize the ensuing damages from this revelation, both internally and internationally?

If the conclusions are made public, the effects will not be far off from those that would follow a realization that Iran had achieved its aims. Without elaborating, the main damages would probably be in the following areas: increasing threats to US allies in the Middle East states in general and to the Gulf states in particular; threats and pressures on the oil market; serious damage to the prestige and standing of the US; increasing stature to both Russia and China in the international arena; increasing threat to Israel from both Syria and the Hizbollah; and possible increase in world terrorist activities. It is also possible that if not managed correctly, the acceptance of a nuclear Iran could cost President Obama his post and the Democrats the majority in Congress. Indeed, it is hard to see any long term benefits that the US would reap from such a situation. It is in the short term, however, that the US needs to make up its mind on how to act to calm the situation, since it could easily get out of hand.

For its part, if the US has come to see a nuclear Iran as inevitable, it would need to act prudently on several fronts to avoid any significant increase of tensions with Iran. It would need to present a facade that it has not come to terms with a nuclear Iran; thereafter, it would need to assure its allies both in the Gulf area and outside that it will not permit Iran to use its newly found power for furthering its ambitions. It would also need to deter Israel from military actions against Iran’s nuclear installations, since this could open a hornet’s nest. Overall, these can be condensed into one expression: playing for time. This, if the above hypothesis holds true, constitutes a meeting of interests of both the US and Iran. It still would not solve anything, but postpone the crisis of exposure – when the new stance of the US administration is publicly acknowledged, or even generally perceived as such – which is a sort of an achievement by itself.

Playing for time is not so simple in this case, since Iran is rushing full steam ahead in its enrichment program, in its development of the explosive mechanism (if it is not already completed), and in its development of the delivery systems – the surface to surface medium-range missiles. At the moment the rate of enrichment is not very high, but a breakthrough in the development of newer models of gas centrifuge machines could change that very rapidly. With the exception of some states (led by Russia and China) there is wide agreement today that the Iranian project is aimed at the development of a full capacity potential for the production of nuclear weapons. It is immaterial whether the actual decision to complete this development has been taken, since the time difference between the decision and the actual completion of the task is relatively short.

So if the US has indeed accepted an inevitable reality of a nuclear Iran, how would the administration behave? It would encourage delays, particularly in the adoption of sanctions resolutions at the UN Security Council. It would accept weakened sanctions resolutions, since these would not lead to crises, and at the same time it would not pursue strong actions on the part of “like-minded” allies. It would not come out with strong statements condemning Iran for developing nuclear weapons, and would take actions to assure allies in the Gulf states that they are protected from Iranian hostile actions. It would try to convince strong Iranian allies (like Syria) that they would be better off not strengthening alliances with Iran but allying themselves with the West. And it would take strong diplomatic efforts to assure that Israel would not attack Iran on its own.

Yet is this not exactly what is already happening? Any deadline or pseudo-deadline that has been set since Mr. Obama assumed the presidency has come and gone, without any excuse. First were the delays until after elections in Iran, and then the (fruitless) October talks, whereby even if the nuclear fuel deal had been accepted, it would have given the US an illusory breathing space of maximum up to a year. The close of 2009 saw the unfulfilled end of the year deadline for an agreement on the suspension of enrichment in Iran, and more recently Secretary Clinton said that the issue of sanctions might take many months to resolve.

Then came the news that the sanctions would not be as severe as previously thought, would not target the central bank of Iran, would target only the Revolutionary Guards, and would certainly not attempt to cause difficulties for the people of Iran, in spite of the fact that only these could bring about a change of regime. Indeed, the US did not actively support the budding uprising of the people following the rigged Iranian elections. In addition, Newsweek reported that the new edition of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that was supposed to correct the mistakes of the 2007 NIE would not be presented in the near future because of interagency bickering and differences of opinions, and even if approved, it was not certain that an unclassified version would be published. In this, the administration avoids the immediate necessity of taking strong action.

The US is increasing air defense capabilities of some Gulf states, which is another impressive sign of US acceptance of the inevitable, and the remarkable air lift of administration notables to Israel to persuade it not to attack Iran is certainly part of the larger picture. Taking all the above into account, it would need a large effort on the part of the US to persuade others that the hypothesis that the US is ready to accept a nuclear Iran, even if not immediately, is wrong.

The US is today the only international power that could, if it wanted, prevent Iran from acquiring the potential to become a nuclear state. If, as suspected, it is not going to act in this way, the countries that could be affected will have to take a renewed look at the situation and assess their options for their future.

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The Institute for National Security Studies – INSS Insight No. 166, March 8, 2010

Biden: Nuclear Iran would be a threat not only to Israel but also to the U.S. – Haaretz – Israel News.

The Obama administration has boosted U.S. defense ties to Israel and will close ranks with its ally against any threat from a nuclear-armed Iran, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said on Monday ahead of a trip to Israel. Biden will arrive in Israel on Monday afternoon, to deliver a message to the Israeli public about U.S.-Israel relations, the Iranian nuclear program and the Middle East peace process. Biden, the most senior U.S. official to visit since Israel President Barack Obama took office in January 2009, is widely expected to caution his hosts not to attack Iran pre-emptively while world powers pursue fresh sanctions against Tehran. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth, Biden emphasized Washington’s efforts to drum up greater international diplomatic pressure on the Iranians, as well as unilateral measures imposed by the U.S. Treasury. Asked about the prospect of an Israeli attack, he said, “though I cannot answer the hypothetical questions you raised about Iran, I can promise the Israeli people that we will confront, as allies, any security challenge it will face. A nuclear-armed Iran would constitute a threat not only to Israel – it would also constitute a threat to the United States.” The Obama administration, Biden said, “gives Israel annual military aid worth $3 billion. We revived defense consultations between the two countries, doubled our efforts to ensure Israel preserves its qualitative military edge in the region, expanded our joint exercises and cooperation on missile-defense systems.” Israel, which is believed to have the region’s only atomic arsenal, bombed Iraq’s nuclear reactor in 1981 and, in 2007, launched a similar sortie against Syria. Those tactical challenges, and U.S. reluctance to see a new regional war, has led some analysts to predict Israel will eventually come round to a strategy of “containing” Iran – which denies its controversial uranium enrichment is for bombs. Biden, who arrives in Jerusalem on Monday and departs Israel on Thursday, was not expected to take part in indirect Israeli-Palestinian talks that would be spearheaded by Obama’s special envoy, George Mitchell, and could be announced during his visit, although he will be briefed on them. U.S.-Israeli tensions flared over Obama’s early push for a complete freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank. Obama has since embraced a more limited, 10-month moratorium on new building announced by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in November. Obama’s has been trying to reach out to the Muslim world, a priority he highlighted with high-profile visits to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and, later this month, to Indonesia. “We certainly believe that when the United States effectively builds bridges with Muslim communities, this allows us to promote our interests, including interests that Israel benefits from,” Biden told Yedioth. “The construction freeze was a unilateral decision by the Israeli government, and it is not part of an agreement with the American administration or with the Palestinians,” he said. “It is not everything that we wanted, but it is an important action that has significant impact on the ground,” said Biden. Biden’s meetings in Jerusalem will begin Tuesday morning, when he will meet with President Shimon Peres at the President’s Residence in Jerusalem. He will then continue on to the prime minister’s Jerusalem residence to meet with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and advisers. Following a private session, the two leaders will hold a joint press conference. Biden will address the Israeli public at Tel Aviv University on Thursday, during which time he will discuss U.S.-Israel ties and U.S. President Barack Obama’s vision for the peace process and dealing with the Iranian nuclear threat.