WarSclerotic

AFP: US to pursue pressure track on Iran: Petraeus.

By Stephanie Griffith (AFP) – 1 hour ago

WASHINGTON — The United States is raising the stakes in its bid to halt Iran’s nuclear program, putting the issue on a “pressure track,” top US general David Petraeus said Sunday.

The US and other world powers are drumming up support for a fourth round of UN sanctions against Iran for its refusal to comply with repeated ultimatums to suspend uranium enrichment and agree to a UN-backed nuclear fuel deal.

President Barack Obama had talked about a dual-track approach to dealing with Iran’s suspect nuclear activities, involving efforts to engage Iranian leaders backed up by the threat of further sanctions.

“I think that no one at the end of this time can say that the United States and the rest of the world have not given Iran every opportunity to resolve the issues diplomatically,” Petraeus, the head of US Central Command, said.

“That puts us in a solid foundation now to go on what is termed the pressure track. That’s the course on which we are embarked now,” he told NBC television’s “Meet the Press” program.

Petraeus said the administration intends to “send the kind of signal to Iran about the very serious concerns that the countries in the region and, indeed, the entire world have… about Iran’s activities in the nuclear program.”

Concerns on Iran rose last week when the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN’s nuclear watchdog, said it suspected that Tehran might already be trying to develop a nuclear warhead.

A US intelligence report in 2007 said Iran halted such research in 2003, but the latest IAEA report gives credence to the belief held by some Western countries that the program continued.

Petraeus suggested that Iran’s recent actions were leading US intelligence agencies to update their estimations.

“There is no question that some of the activities have advanced during that time. There is also a new national intelligence estimate being developed by our intelligence community in the United States,” he said.

The IAEA also confirmed on Thursday that Tehran had begun enriching uranium to higher levels, theoretically bringing it closer to the levels needed for an atomic bomb.

Iran has previously reached uranium enrichment levels of no more than five percent at its facility at Natanz, in defiance of UN orders for it to cease and despite three rounds of UN sanctions.

Earlier this month, Iran announced it would begin enriching uranium to 20 percent, ostensibly to make the fuel for a research reactor that makes medical radioisotopes.

Iranian officials have dismissed the IAEA report and the country’s all-powerful supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei denied on Friday that Tehran was seeking atomic weapons.

Last year the IAEA proposed sending Iranian low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for further enrichment, denying Tehran refining capacity world powers fear could be used to help build an atomic bomb.

The offer would have seen the uranium returned to Iran in a high-grade form for use in a medical research reactor, but Tehran rejected the plan.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad insisted that the exchange had to be “simultaneous,” an Iranian stance that has led to a deadlock over the deal.

Israel unveils new drone fleet that can reach Iran – News – World – bnd.com.

//

E-Mail Print

Text Size:

A visitor looks at an Israeli air force unmanned plane in the Tel Nof base, central Israel, Sunday, Feb. 21, 2010. Israel’s air force has introduced a fleet of large unmanned planes that it says can fly as far as Iran. Air force officials say the Heron TP drones have a wingspan of 86 feet (26 meters), making them the size of passenger jets, which can fly 20 consecutive hours, and are primarily used for surveillance and carrying payloads. – AP Photo

// <![CDATA[
_krdDartInc++;
document.write('’);
]]>

//

Iran…Not Our War Asharq Alawsat Newspaper (English).

18/02/2010

By Tariq Alhomayed

The first stage of war is fought with words, as the saying goes, and what we see today between Iran and the West is a real war of words. As soon as Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz recently, Tehran found itself face to face with Washington in an ongoing and dangerous escalation, and Iran has been dragged into a verbal confrontation with the US, rather than Israel, with the intransigence now coming from the Obama administration. In Washington on Tuesday the White House said that it was not ruling out any option – including a military option – with regards to dealing with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said “Iran is the largest supporter of terrorism in the world today” and said that the country is on its way to becoming a “military dictatorship.”

The Iranian response to this was further escalation and Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei accused Clinton of spreading “lies.” What was also noticeable in Iran’s response is what was said by Ahmadinejad, who said that he expects a war to break out in the spring or the summer, and he threatened Israel saying that in the event of a war breaking out, “the resistance and regional states will finish them.” He also threatened that Tehran’s response will make the superpowers “regretful” should they choose to impose new sanctions on the country over its nuclear program. While on the exact same day, and only hours after Ahmadinejad’s statement, Hassan Nasrallah came out threatening Israel, saying that if Israel attacks Lebanon’s airport then Hezbollah will attack Israel’s airport, and that if Israel attacks civilians, Hezbollah would attack Tel Aviv in retaliation. Nasrallah also mocked those who warned of the necessity of “not giving Israel any pretext to launch aggression against Lebanon” as such talk was dangerous “and was an attempt to acquit Israel and presumptively lays all the responsibility on the resistance.”

Some might ask what has one thing got to do with the other; what ties Ahmadinejad’s statement with what Nasrallah said?

This is the crux of the matter, for as we have repeatedly stated, whenever Israel threatens Iran, Tehran responds by threatening the Gulf States, and whenever Tehran raises its voice, Nasrallah comes out repeating Iran’s words as if he were an echo. What is interesting today is that in the event of a war breaking out Ahmadinejad is threatening Israel and the West, and not on behalf of his own country, but in the name of “the resistance and regional countries.”

Firstly, what is the connection between the resistance and the regional countries and Iran’s nuclear program?

The other issue is that if Nasrallah is criticizing the Lebanese people who are advocating not giving Israel any excuse to attack their country, and who are intimating that is not their war, but rather Iran’s war, then why on 28 December 2008, after the discovery of a Katyusha rocket cache, did Nasrallah criticize those who were saying that these rockets belonged to Hezbollah, saying that this would give Israel a justification and excuse to launch aggression against Lebanon?

Therefore this war, should it take place, is Iran’s war, and it is up to Iran – which has not attempted any wise acts – to defuse this. Why should our region and our countries be involved in this? It is not our war, and we do not desire for it to take place, therefore this is solely Iran’s war and that of its agents as well. As for us, we will be victims of Iran should it gain nuclear capabilities, and we will also be Tehran’s victims should a war break out. Can we realize this issue before we lose our minds in the midst of any future war breaking out, God forbid?

James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh – The force needed to contain Iran – washingtonpost.com.

Sunday, February 21, 2010

As Iran relentlessly moves toward acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, calls will grow for the United States to think seriously about how to contain Tehran. A preventive attack will not work, some will argue, and could unleash a wave of terrorism that would further imperil Iraq and Afghanistan. Conversely, containment will be held up as a way to deter Tehran without having to resort to military force.

But this view draws a false distinction between containment and force. A preventive attack might not end Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Defense Secretary Robert Gates argues that a successful attack would delay the Iranian program by at most a few years. Yet a policy of containment will not save the White House from having to make tough choices about using force. Indeed, Iran can be contained only if Washington is prepared to use force against an emboldened adversary armed with the ultimate weapon.

The rationale for the Iranian nuclear program has changed over time. It began as part of a largely defensive strategy under the moderate presidencies of Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. Nuclear weapons would provide a way to deter a range of foes while enhancing national prestige.

Today, as Iranian hawks consolidate their power and the Revolutionary Guards emerge as a key pillar of the state, Tehran views nuclear weapons as the means to regional preeminence. A nuclear shield would give Iran freedom to project its power in the Middle East. Such an Iran is unlikely to be subtle about brandishing the nuclear card.

It would take considerable American political skill and will to contain such regional pretensions. Washington would need to be explicit about its red lines: no initiation of conventional warfare against other countries; no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, material or technologies; no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. Washington would need to be just as explicit about the consequences of crossing those lines: potential U.S. military retaliation by any and all means necessary.

Tehran would probably test U.S. resolve early on, believing that regional dynamics had shifted sharply in its favor. In that case, the United States would face a momentous credibility crisis because it had failed to stop Iran from going nuclear after persistently declaring that such an outcome was unacceptable. Even close U.S. allies would doubt Washington’s security guarantees.

An emboldened Iran would test Washington in several ways. It would probably lend more support to Hezbollah and Hamas and encourage them to act more aggressively against Israel. It might step up subversive activities against the Gulf sheikdoms and demand that they evict U.S. troops from their territory.

A nuclear Iran could also be tempted to transfer nuclear materials and technologies to other countries. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has already declared that “Iran’s nuclear achievements belong to all those countries thinking of peace and welfare, and we are prepared to provide these achievements to those who hate war and aggression.” How would the United States respond to an Iran that transferred advanced centrifuges or nuclear weapon designs to its Syrian ally? Or if it gave fissile material to a terrorist group?

Such dangerous and destabilizing actions cannot be addressed by tough diplomatic talk or yet more U.N. Security Council resolutions. It can be addressed only by a willingness to respond with force. And in the curious logic that governs deterrence, a Tehran that believes Washington will retaliate will be less likely to act aggressively in the first place.

The challenges of making containment work make it far preferable that Iran stop — or be stopped — short of becoming a nuclear power. Efforts to negotiate limits on Iran’s nuclear program must be pursued with vigor, and economic pressure on Tehran must be maintained. Military options should not be taken off the table.

If Tehran remains determined to go nuclear and preventive attacks prove too risky or unworkable to carry out, the United States will need to formulate a strategy to contain Iran. In doing so, however, it would be a mistake to assume that containment would save the United States from the need to make tough choices about retaliation. If Washington is not prepared to back up a containment strategy with force, the damage created by Iran’s going nuclear could become catastrophic.

James M. Lindsay is senior vice president and Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Their article “After Iran Gets the Bomb” will be published in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs.