FT.com / Comment / Analysis – Middle East: Atomic agitation.
For all that, the moment of decision long dreaded by Washington has finally arrived. Mr Obama campaigned for the presidency on the idea of “engagement” with Tehran, and took office emphasising his willingness to negotiate without conditions over the nuclear programme and other issues. But he also said he would judge the effectiveness of his policy by the end of 2009. That time is now past: today the president is left contemplating the failure of his outreach and looking for a Plan B.
Today, while western fears mount about Iran’s intentions and condemnation grows of its internal repression, Tehran is closer to becoming a nuclear state. Direct talks have failed to produce results. Washington is nervous that any military attack – such as has been sporadically threatened by Israel – would be a catastrophe for the region.
As a result, officials throughout the Obama administration and its allies now agree: the time has come to put greater emphasis on sanctions, in an effort to make Tehran think again about its nuclear programme. “We want to keep the door to dialogue open,” Hillary Clinton, US secretary of state, said this week. But she added: “We can’t continue to wait and we cannot continue to stand by.”
Published: January 7 2010 20:50 | Last updated: January 7 2010 20:50
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Just over a month ago, a group of veteran US and Israeli diplomats met at Harvard to play out scenarios for one of the most momentous issues facing the world this year – Iran’s nuclear programme.
In the simulation, as in real life, the stakes were high. If Iran comes within reach of a nuclear weapon – as Washington and its allies fear – the power map of the Middle East will alter, the rules that have held back atomic proliferation for decades may be damaged beyond repair and the US and Israel will see a bitter foe empowered as never before. Not least, US President Barack Obama will also have failed on a key foreign policy objective.
The result of the Harvard simulation was not promising for the White House. Tehran emerged the victor, ending 2010 closer to the bomb, with a western push for sanctions backfiring, and Russia and China talking to Iran behind their partners’ backs.
As Robert Gates, US defence secretary, caustically remarked recently: “There are no good options” on Iran.
As the push to enact sanctions intensifies, the problems are clear. The US is far from certain of attaining even the limited sanctions it and its allies seek, and is well aware that historically such measures have often failed to bring results.
Even now, Washington is trying to rein in far-reaching sanctions legislation already backed by the House of Representatives that it fears will do more to irritate allies – by threatening penalties on international companies – than it will hurt Iran.
Indeed the Islamic Republic is currently in turmoil, convulsed by fervent opposition demonstrations and the resulting bloody crackdowns. The nuclear programme is widely depicted as a symbol of national sovereignty. Both the government and the opposition insist that Iran is fully entitled to enrich uranium – the process that can yield both nuclear fuel and weapons grade material.
Dismissing calls for concessions, Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, Iran’s president, recently said that if the west did not “correct” its attitude, “we will demand from them the Iranian nation’s historic rights”. Tehran does not look like it is is preparing to sit down at the negotiating table.
But with such big issues at stake the sanctions drive is becoming the focus of international policy.
Already Mr Obama’s Iran and national security teams are meeting to decide on “next steps”. At the United Nations, ambassadors from the permanent five security council members are preparing to negotiate a new round of sanctions, with the debate set to reach a head next month.
It is familiar territory. Three UN sanctions resolutions have been passed in recent years with little discernible impact on Iran’s nuclear progress. Russia and China, two veto-wielding security council members with significant economic interests in Iran, remain highly reluctant to agreeing punitive measures.
Zhang Yesui, China’s ambassador to the UN, said this week, that it was “not the right time or right moment” for sanctions, as diplomatic efforts were still under way. His comments underline the difficulties for the sanctions drive – not least because Beijing is chairing the Security Council this month. Western diplomats complain that Beijing prioritises its mercantilist interests, rooted in its growing trade with Iran, over efforts to restrain Tehran’s nuclear programme.
At the UN over the next few weeks, the US will ask other states to explore alternative measures that could hit Iran’s energy, financial and transport sectors. The European Union will also this month begin discussing how to reinforce UN action.
T op of the list of possible sanctions would be hitting Iran’s imports of refined petroleum. Although Iran sits on the fourth-largest oil reserves in the world, it has to import 40 per cent of refined petrol and 11 per cent of diesel for domestic use because of a historic lack of investment in its antiquated refinery infrastructure.
But China, which has investments in the Iranian energy sector, appears determined to stop measures that would affect the sale of refined petroleum to Iran, say diplomats. “Without Chinese support you can’t make any progress,” says a European diplomat. “Our own oil companies would simply come to us and say, ‘It won’t work – the Chinese are selling petrol to Iran by the back door’.”
A second possible area could be arms sales to Iran. Here, however, the problem is with Russia, which accounts for some 85 per cent of Iran’s arms imports according to European diplomats, and would oppose measures. “Russia exported $2bn in weapons to Iran between 2000 and 2007,” says the same European diplomat. “These are the kinds of figures that would make the Kremlin very reluctant to curb arms exports.”
The US and its EU allies are thus likely to look at a third series of possible measures, both at UN and at EU level. These would aim at targets such as investment in Iran’s petroleum sector, its shipping companies and the insurers that underwrite them.
As was the case with previous resolutions, sanctions could also hit banks connected to Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes, the increasingly powerful Revolutionary Guard, and goods and technologies that can have a dual military and civilian use.
Washington maintains that Iran’s financial isolation is now greater than at any point over the past 15 years. This is partly because of an informal US campaign to lobby companies against doing business with Tehran and partly because of tougher US rules against transactions with Iran, which contributed in December to a $536m fine on Credit Suisse, the Swiss bank.
US officials also take heart in the fact that Dmitry Medvedev, president of Russia, has appeared particularly irritated recently at the way Tehran has rejected Moscow’s attempts to broker a deal on uranium enrichment.
Yet privately, there are doubts about what sanctions can achieve. Some diplomats wonder what the impact on international policy might be of the recent round of demonstrations against the Iranian leadership that have seen eight people killed. “There will be those who argue that at this very moment – just as Ahmadi-Nejad faces acute internal political pressures – the US and the west should not boost the regime’s allegations that they are the enemy,” says a European diplomat.
Iranian analysts also maintain that a fresh round of UN sanctions restricting travel on individuals and limiting purchases of nuclear- and military-related commodities would have little impact on the country’s nuclearpolicies.
Iranian businessmen say they have proven success in mitigating the effects of previous sanctions by re-arranging the way they do business. Israel has long warned the US that Iran uses Dubai as a channel through which it can bypass the international sanctions regime. As Steve Clemons of the New America Foundation in Washington puts it: “The sanctions path has more to do with providing a focus for American frustration and emotion than achieving a successful course of correction by Iran.”
F or the US, the problem is that it cannot afford to be ineffective. The past few months have brought a string of worrying developments, despite Tehran’s insistence that its purposes are purely peaceful.
Iran has now accumulated more than 1.5 tonnes of low-enriched uranium, more than enough, if further enhanced, for one nuclear bomb. It is pressing ahead with tests of ballistic missiles that could one day convey a nuclear warhead. Western intelligence agencies, meanwhile, are now robustly rejecting a US intelligence assessment that Iran stopped work on warhead design back in 2003.
Exactly when Iran could test a bomb is debated between intelligence agencies, although some experts say the programme is constrained by the out-of-date Pakistani nuclear technology obtained on the black market. Some western diplomats also argue that Tehran may hold back from going all the way for nuclear weapons – since it could lose out in any subsequent regional arms race in which neighbours, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, sought to catch up.
Still, US officials say they believe Iran is seeking, at the very least, to shorten the “lead time” for a bomb even if it has not yet made the final, high-risk decision to build a weapon.
There is also uncertainty over how Israel will respond if Iran’s nuclear ambitions fail to be contained in the next year or two. The assumption in some western capitals is that an Israeli military strike on Iran’s nuclear installations remains highly unlikely. The Obama administration has repeatedly warned Israel against such an action – which, Mr Gates says, “would only buy some time, maybe two or three years” at the risk of inflaming the region.
“Iran would be able to inflict a heavy retaliatory strike on population centres inside Israel,” says a European diplomat. “That is the issue that weighs on Israeli thinking.” Still, Israel has never ruled out a sudden strike on what many Israelis see as an existential threat to their state.
As they enter a new phase of diplomacy on Iran, US officials recognise big problems ahead. “The dysfunctionality of the regime is a real problem,” says a senior US official, referring to Iran’s reluctance to accept a proposal in October that would have swapped most of its enriched uranium stockpile for isotopes for medical use. “They haven’t even been prepared to accept a proposal that everyone considers balanced. Whether they are unwilling or unable, the result is that they haven’t been prepared to engage.”
Back in June 2008, in the course of his presidential campaign, Mr Obama said he would “do everything in my power to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon – everything.”
The problem for him – and the world – is that “everything in his power” may not be enough.




Underground bunkers and tunnels gave Hizbullah a decisive edge over the IDF in the Second Lebanon War, when soldiers were surprised to discover that bushes in southern Lebanon began to move. The vegetation was a camouflage that stood over the entrances to huge tunnels, which hid rocket launchers, missiles and full-fledged communications headquarters and escape routes.


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