WarSclerotic

Insight No. 157

In early 2010 the Israeli public and the country’s enemies learned of two important developments with regard to intensified protection of the civilian front. It was reported unofficially that the security cabinet decided to distribute protection kits to the public beginning in February 2010, over a period of three years and costing some NIS 1 billion. Immediately thereafter it was announced that the Iron Dome mobile air defense system, developed by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to intercept mortar fire and short range (4-70 km.) rockets, succeeded in intercepting an integrated barrage of missiles simulating Qassam and Grad rockets.

It was also reported that following the success of the trial, the system would be proclaimed operational in the near future and the first batteries will be deployed in the coming months, initially in southern Israel and later in the north as well.

These announcements join a series of other developments that collectively indicate a more serious approach by the defense authorities than in the past with regard to the home front’s readiness to deal with the growing challenges of Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria, and Iran. Among these are the series of intense regional and national exercises initiated and operated in various areas by the Home Front Command and National Emergency Authority (NEA) that addressed various threat scenarios, including non-conventional. These exercises demonstrated enhanced professionalism among the different civilian systems and familiarized much of the general public with what is required in real emergency situations.

There was also a recent report of improvement in the discovery and identification capabilities of the Arrow missile (whose production has recently increased) and Patriot missile batteries, offering greater flexibility in defense against long range ballistic missiles. This improvement was reflected in the last joint exercise with the US Army, Jennifer Cobra, which also involved American radar units permanently stationed in Israel. In addition, development of the Magic Wand medium range active defense system continued, and the system should be operational by 2012. Work was also maintained on the warning system for the general public which, in the next two years, is designed to produce focused alerts for more specific areas. This will make it possible to alert people under real threat and to allow the others to carry on with their lives as usual.

All this indicates a planned, orderly, and ongoing effort to maintain readiness for war on the home front. It is hoped that within three years this will lead to a significant reduction in the gap between the improved ability of the enemy to strike civilian targets in the periphery and center of the country, and Israel’s civilian defense abilities. Of course the defense capabilities do not stand alone and must combine with the IDF’s deterrent and offense abilities. Yet their contribution is crucial to the prevention or postponement of a military confrontation and to the provision of a suitable response for renewed escalation where there is a high probability of extensive attack scenarios on the home front.

This encouraging picture of progress regarding civil defense capabilities in Israel indicates that Israel’s decision makers have come to the realization that in the age of asymmetric confrontations, civil defense capabilities must be established. The Meridor committee on Israel’s defense doctrine (2006) updated the doctrine by including a recommendation in this regard. Something has apparently shifted in the traditional debate on the importance that should be attached to the various components of Israel’s overall defense force: Since 2006 Israel has invested more resources in constructing a military and civil defense capability. The turning point undoubtedly followed the Second Lebanon War which set off shockwaves not only as to aspects of the IDF’s offensive abilities and limitations but also with regard to the defense limitations of the home front. It is also clear that conveying the Iranian threat, directly and indirectly – through its local “emissaries” – did the trick. Overall, the general orientation is fundamentally correct and balanced and the progress toward a strategic solution is noteworthy.

Nevertheless, a number of reservations balance the picture, particularly as to the future:

• Developing active defense operational systems is of the utmost importance. The true test will be the actual extent and rate of equipment procurement. In order to generate effective defense cover against the various threats and for the different ranges, it will be necessary to deploy large numbers of different types of batteries at high costs. The assumption is that the IDF’s force development programs will continue to focus on building deterrent and offensive abilities. The rest will first and foremost be devoted to the strategic active defense systems, mainly against the Iranian threat. This will probably be indicated by attributing relatively low priority to acquiring tactical defense systems such as Iron Dome. According to various assessments, around 20 such batteries will be needed in order to provide proper defense in the north and the south, costing in excess of NIS 1 billion. Full deployment of such batteries is not expected to be implemented in the foreseeable future, with the many considerations always including the discrepancy between the high cost of the interception missile (tens of thousands of dollars for each) and the negligible cost of the attacking rocket. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the IDF will be limited in terms of acquiring the new tactical defense system and will prefer to view it as a means of providing a deterrent, limiting damage – particularly with regard to national infrastructures – and enhancing the population’s sense of security, rather than as a full defense solution.
• The economic consideration – or the order of priorities, to be determined by the government – will also apparently be decisive with regard to distribution of defense kits. Even though the media reported that the operation will be completed within three years, it has not yet been fully budgeted and as of now the kits can be distributed to no more than two thirds of the population. Declarations create an optimistic image that impact on the public’s perception of the leadership’s degree of commitment to provide it with the protection it deserves. Exposure of a significant gap between words and actual deeds with regard to protection of the home front is liable to generate mistrust in this crucial area, and lead to a negative effect on the Israel’s social robustness. The absence or deferment of realization of the plans will not only harm the physical defense capabilities but also public morale and the ability to confront the real situation successfully by optimizing social resilience, which is measured by society’s ability to resume a normal routine quickly following traumatic events. Increasing resilience requires constant investment, particularly during times of calm.
• This leads to a final and crucial reservation: assembling the home front’s defense system is not only a technical matter of constructing and deploying active and passive defense means. In essence, it addresses the establishment of an image and positions of the general public that will have to contend with a supreme and direct test during a war. The words and actions of the leadership, on a national level and to no lesser a degree on a local level, also during periods of calm, directly impact on the public’s resilience and ability to cope with the expected challenges. In order to convey this matter consider the definitions of Leonard Marcus and Barry Dorn from Harvard University, who developed a triangular model of meta-leadership for preparing the public for emergency situations: meta-leaders assume responsibility for leading in emergency situations, meta-leaders generate social (community) strength, and meta-leaders coordinate their work and their positions with the other parties working on building up the home front and directing it in emergency situations. As long as it is not understood and inculcated in Israel on a national level and local authority level that active, committed, and reliable meta-leadership is the principal means of establishing civil robustness, the incremental technological leap in developing civil defense systems will not be fully realized