WarSclerotic

Abstract: Russia‘s interests in Iran fundamentally diverge from those of the United States. Russia considers Iran a partner and de facto ally in its plans to reshape the power balance in the Middle East and dilute U.S. influence in the region. The U.S. should expect only token assistance from Russia in countering the Iranian nuclear threat. Instead, the U.S. needs to develop a broader policy that convincingly argues that Iran will lose–even if it obtains nuclear weapons and that clearly demonstrates to the Russians that the risks of betting on Iran outweigh the potential rewards.

The Obama Administration hopes that Russia will assist with U.S. efforts to stop the Iranian nuclear program. However, a review of Russian policy on Iran since the mid-1990s under Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev demonstrates that Russia’s interests in Iran fundamentally diverge from the U.S. agenda. Powerful Russian special interests–security, nuclear, oil and gas, and the military-industrial complex–are vehemently opposed to any significant reversal of Russian policy toward Iran. Therefore, it is naïve, if not dangerous, to hope that Moscow will provide decisive assistance in the U.N. Security Council or bilaterally vis-à-vis Iran.[1] The Obama Administration and Congress should recognize this inconvenient truth.

It is time for the U.S. to take a realistic look at Russia’s policy toward Tehran. The Obama Administration needs to develop a broader policy that convincingly argues that Iran will lose even if it obtains nuclear weapons and that clearly demonstrates to the Russians that the risks of betting on Iran outweigh the potential rewards.

Specifically, the 111th Congress should stop expecting Russia to support U.N. Security Council Sanctions and stop offering further incentives to Moscow.

• Congress should reintroduce sanctions against Russian private and state-owned companies that conduct business with Iranian energy, military, and security interests.
• Congress should demand that the President certify Russian compliance with existing sanctions.
• Congress should rescind the President’s authority to waive Iran-related sanctions against Russian entities for national security purposes.
• The U.S. must insist that Russia halt the sale of its S-300 air defense system to Iran and withdraw “renegade” Russian scientists working in Iran on sensitive technologies.
• The U.S. should adopt a “protect and defend” strategy to deter and counter the Iranian threat and provide nuclear guarantees to U.S. allies in the Middle East, including Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The U.S. should deploy a visible deterrent, including overwhelming nuclear forces near Iran, on surface ships, aircraft, or permanent bases.[2] These offensive forces should be designed to hold at risk the facilities that Iran would need to launch a strategic attack, thereby making any such attack by Iran likely to fail.

Such measures would communicate a strong message of deterrence and dissuasion to Tehran.

Russia’s Iran Policy

Over the past two centuries, Russia has pursued a policy of steady engagement with Iran. Currently, Moscow keeps Tehran placated through sales of nuclear and missile technology and diplomatic support, while encouraging its ambitions to dominate the Persian Gulf, where Iran challenges U.S. Sunni allies and the American presence. The Heritage Foundation expressed concern about this dangerous Russian policy as early as 1997.[3]

Russia, weary of Iran’s fiery Islamist rhetoric, wants to protect its “soft underbelly” in Central Asia and the Caucasus from Tehran’s interference. Some strategic thinkers in Moscow may recognize that in the long term Iran could become a geopolitical competitor in the Muslim territories of the former Russian and Soviet empires, but they do not believe that confrontation with Tehran is necessary or imminent today.[4]

Russian leaders believe that Iran is a rising Middle Eastern “regional superpower”[5] and do not want to challenge it directly. Heightened tensions in the Middle East and bad relations between Washington and Tehran suit Moscow nicely. Thus, the Kremlin’s ideological anti-Americanism and perceived geopolitical and economic interests are unlikely to lead it to significantly interfere with Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

However, a nuclear-armed Iran would be a game changer–a protracted and destabilizing threat to the region and the world. Iran would likely use its nuclear arsenal to bully neighbors, deter the U.S. and other nuclear powers, and provide diplomatic cover for its terrorist proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. A nuclear Iran would likely undermine the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf and U.S. allies in the Middle East, triggering a regional nuclear arms race that could involve Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria, and Egypt. A nuclear Iran would also threaten Israel’s existence, which presumably would be unacceptable to the U.S. and Europe.[6] If the U.S. allows the situation to deteriorate to the point that the only viable options are to bomb or to surrender, the U.S. would send a message to other countries that nuclear weapons are the trump card that can force U.S. and Israeli acquiescence.

Russia and Iran During the Bush Administration

During the Bush Administration, efforts to dissuade Russia from providing diplomatic cover for the mullahs ultimately failed. The Bush Administration attempted to lift the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which denied the USSR permanent normal trade relations,[7] but Congress refused.

During his second term, President George W. Bush sought to give Vladimir Putin a visible role in persuading Iran to abandon the nuclear program, acquiesced to Russia’s construction of the Bushehr nuclear reactor, and encouraged Russia to enrich uranium for Iran’s civilian nuclear sector. He also pursued the 123 Framework Agreement with Moscow for further cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector. This agreement would have given Russia a continuous role in supplying nuclear fuel to the U.S. to the tune of $10 billion to $15 billion annually.[8] The Administration pulled the 123 Agreement after the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war.

Three rounds of weak Security Council sanctions passed during this period failed to halt Iran’s uranium enrichment. While ultimately offering support for all three rounds, Russia and China successfully worked together to dilute and strip the measures of any real substance.

Congress Checkmated: Past and Current Sanctions Bills

The U.S. Congress has attempted to provide leadership opposing Iran’s effort to become a nuclear power, with mixed results. The Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) imposes sanctions on foreign firms or persons who invest more than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector or that sell Iran weapons of mass destruction technology or “destabilizing” advanced conventional weapons. The 110th Congress worked on several bills that would have tightened the ISA, but none were adopted.

One of these bills, H.R. 1400,[9] would have removed the President’s authority to waive ISA sanctions on the grounds of national interest. It would have also expanded the scope of entities that could be sanctioned, particularly in the credit and energy sectors. Another bill, H.R. 2880, would have stipulated sanctions under ISA against any firm that sells gasoline to Iran.[10] Although a leading oil exporter, Iran imports up to 40 percent of its gasoline due to mismanagement and inadequate investment in its refineries. Under the current law, gas sales to Iran are not subject to sanctions.

A number of similar bills have been reintroduced in the 111th Congress. These bills also seek to target Iran’s refined petroleum imports. The Senate passed a Sense of Congress resolution (S. Con. Res. 13) that the U.S. government will not purchase any products from any firms that derive over $1 million in revenue from sales to Iran’s energy sector, including sales of oil and gas services.[11] This would also ban such firms from selling oil to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. In April 2009, additional bills (H.R. 2194, S. 908, and H.R. 1985) were introduced to target energy sales to Iran. These bills would expand sanctions against any firm that sells Iran refined petroleum products or equipment that could increase its refining capacity.[12]

Despite these congressional efforts and the Obama Administration’s “reset” policy with Russia, Moscow does not appear eager to join with the U.S. and Europe in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. On the contrary, Russian leaders appear poised to benefit from what appears to be an emerging nuclear-armed Iranian juggernaut.

Russia to the Rescue? No So Fast…

Many in and around the Obama Administration believe that the Kremlin may be willing and able to pressure Iran not to go nuclear. For example, a high-level bipartisan commission jointly organized by the Nixon Center and Harvard University’s Belfer Center recently suggested this approach. Among other measures, the commission recommended making Russia a “partner in dealing with Iran.”[13] However, assessing Russia’s willingness to cooperate with the West requires comparing Russia’s actions to its public rhetoric, which is aimed at external audiences, and placing both in the context of Russia’s perceived interests and its strong and multifaceted relationship with Iran.

Some in Washington have interpreted Russian statements as signs that the Kremlin may be more willing to cooperate on Iran than in the past. In a spring 2009 closed-door meeting at the Kremlin, President Medvedev purportedly expressed “concern” and “alarm” in “very graphic language” over Iran’s satellite launch.[14] However, only a few days after Medvedev’s statements, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said, “We still believe that at this point in time there are no signs that this [Iranian nuclear] program has switched to a military purpose.”[15] This echoes Putin’s recent remarks disingenuously comparing Iran’s program to India’s civil nuclear program. In previous public pronouncements, other Russian leaders have characterized Iran’s nuclear and “civilian space” program as peaceful.[16]

More recently, Medvedev refused to rule out the imposition of sanctions against Iran during his U.N. General Assembly visit to the U.S.[17] However, Prime Minister Putin and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov have since essentially disavowed Medvedev’s position and said that Russia does not support further sanctions on Iran.[18]

Differing Threat Perceptions. Statements by Russian officials, military officers, and security elite reveal that Russia does not favor sanctions and that Moscow does not perceive a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. During a recent trip to Russia, this author was told by senior advisers to Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev that “Russia has good relations with Iran; has very significant economic interests there. Iran never supported any Islamist terrorism [in the North Caucasus], and Russia would be the last state Iran would target even if it gets nuclear weapons.”[19] In addition, both Putin and Lavrov warned against any military strikes on Iran and refused to support a gasoline sales embargo against Tehran.

Fyodor Lukyanov, editor in chief of the prestigious Russia in Global Affairs, recently noted that “Iran is seen by Russia as much more rational and reliable than it is seen by the United States or Israel.”[20]

To make matters worse, according to the U.S. intelligence community, Moscow is still aiding Iran’s ballistic missile development and may be aiding its military nuclear program. As recently as 2007, the U.S. intelligence community accused Russia of violating nonproliferation agreements and arrangements by providing ballistic missile technology to Iran and North Korea, stating that “individual Russian entities continue to provide assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs. We judge that the Russian-entity assistance…has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in production of ballistic missiles.”[21]

In March 2009, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified that Iran had stockpiled enough fissile material to build a nuclear bomb. This was the first such definitive commentary from a senior Pentagon official.[22] Currently, Iran has 1.5 metric tons of low-grade enriched uranium, and France and Russia have proposed further enriching 75 percent of this amount for a Tehran research reactor. At the time of this writing, Iran had not accepted the offer.[23]

More recently, a “secret annex” to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report revealed that Iran has “sufficient information” to make a nuclear weapon and has “probably tested” a key component.[24] This leaked report indicates that Iran’s nuclear program is far more advanced than previously thought. The IAEA information may shed light on reports that Russian scientists are developing nuclear warheads for Iran. According to The Times, Israel presented Russia with a list of its scientists working in Iran and demanded that the Kremlin take action to stop it.[25] If the story is true, it means the West was wrong to assume that a nuclear-armed Iran runs counter to Russia’s national interest. It would also mean that Russia cannot be a bona fide partner in stopping the Iranian nuclear effort.[26]

These developments have no doubt disappointed the Obama Administration, which had extended a hand to Iran and had hoped for Russian support in the Security Council. Some touted the October 2009 meeting in Geneva between Iran and the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1) over Iran’s nuclear program as a success. However, Iran refused to sign any agreement for the export and enrichment of its uranium, and without Iranian cooperation, Russia and China may not support a “crippling sanctions” regime.

The Primakov Doctrine Revisited. Russia is using Iran like a piece in a game of multidimensional chess that combines a realpolitik recognition of Moscow’s relative weakness vis-à-vis Washington with Russia’s desire to push America out of the Persian Gulf, a vital zone of military and political predominance. Furthermore, an arms race in the Gulf could benefit Russia’s weapons exports. After all, Moscow sold weapons to both sides during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. The perceived geopolitical and economic benefit of an unstable Persian Gulf in which American influence is on the wane outweighs any Russian concerns about a nuclear Iran. Today, Russia’s commercial interests in Iran range from billions in arms sales to transfers of nuclear and space technology to lucrative oil and gas contracts for state-controlled Russian companies.

The Kremlin does not see Iran as a threat, but as a partner and an ad hoc ally to challenge U.S. power through the expansion of Russia’s regional and international influence.[27] While the Iranian agenda is clearly separate from that of Russia, the Kremlin uses Iran as geopolitical battering ram against the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf region and the Middle East. Not only is Russian support for Iran’s nuclear program and arms sales good business from the Kremlin’s perspective, but it advances a geopolitical agenda that is at least 20 years old.

These efforts are a part of a strategy aimed at creating a multipolar world. This strategy, which this author named the Primakov Doctrine in 1997,[28] was formulated in reaction to the perceived decline of Soviet stature in the waning years of the Cold War, the emergence of independent states in Eastern Europe and Eurasia, and subsequent NATO enlargement. In early 1997, then-Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov and Ali Akbar Velayati, his Iranian counterpart, issued a joint statement calling the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf “totally unacceptable.”[29]

Today, both Russia and Iran favor a strategy of “multipolarity,” both in the Middle East and worldwide. They seek to dilute American power, revise current international financial institutions, shift away from the dollar as a reserve currency, and weaken NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They are also working to forge an anti-U.S. coalition to counterbalance the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The coalition will likely include Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Syria, and terrorist organizations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Russia is courting China, India, and other states to offset American influence.[30]

Putin has pursued his own version of the Primakov doctrine since his ascendancy. Signaling the importance of Iran, Putin abrogated the 1999 Gore- Chernomyrdin Agreement when he came to power. The accord would have required Russia to stop supplying arms to Iran after the current contracts expired in 1999-2001.[31]

Russia also has excellent Iranian human intelligence sources. Hundreds of Iranian engineers and scientists have studied in Russian military, security, and engineering schools, and Russian scientists work in the Iranian space and nuclear programs. Former President Hashemi Rafsanjani attended Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. Through these networks, Russia is aware of and profits from the Iranian push to acquire deliverable nuclear weapons. However, past Russian actions indicate that Russia likes to play both sides. Russia demonstrates some responsiveness to U.S. requests and occasionally even to Israeli entreaties, while inexorably enabling Iran to obtain its wishes, including ballistic missile and space technology.

Russia and Iran’s “Civilian” Space Program. In the February 2008 annual threat assessment, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell stated that Iran was developing and deploying longer-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Yet the report did not mention Russian involvement in this development.[32] However, Russian technological aid is evident throughout the Iranian missile and space program. Russian scientists and experts have played a direct and indirect role in this program for years. On February 5, 2008, Iran launched a ballistic missile described as a “space launch vehicle.”

In March 2009, Iran launched its first indigenously produced satellite ahead of schedule using the Safir-2 (Ambassador), an Iranian-built rocket. Safir is a space-launch version of the Shahab-3, which is likely based on Russian technology.[33] Russian specialists are helping to develop the longer-range Shahab-5, using missile production facilities, technical documents, and fuel exported from Russia.[34] The Shahab-5 is based on the Taepodong-2 developed by North Korea, but Russian interests have reportedly facilitated technology transfer from Pyongyang to Tehran.[35]

Most dangerous is Iran’s successful testing of the Sejil, a two-stage solid-propellant intermediate-range ballistic missile that can reach all of the Middle East and parts of Russia and Europe. If Sejil is upgraded, it could reach as far as London. Within 10 to 15 years, it could be upgraded to an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).[36]

Russia‘sSupport for Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions. Russia’s eagerness to assist Iran may also stem from Russia’s clearly articulated assessment that the U.S. and NATO are a threat. If Iran achieves a longer-range ballistic missile capacity and arms the missiles with nuclear warheads, it could intimidate NATO countries hosting important U.S. bases. À refusal by NATO allies to provide aid to the United States in a future Middle East conflict could fracture the alliance’s cohesion, an outcome that Moscow would welcome. Thus, Russia may be using Iran as an important chess piece, not only to threaten U.S. interests in the Gulf, but also to eventually undermine the transatlantic alliance.

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has received Russian support since 1992. Russia provided technical expertise, nuclear fuel, equipment, parts, and other components for the Bushehr reactor and protected it from U.N. sanctions.[37] Russia and Iran completed the Bushehr plant on February 25, 2009, and the reactor was tested successfully. After successfully passing tests, the actual launch of Bushehr will take place in 2010.[38] Russia and Iran have recently agreed to sign a 10-year nuclear fuel contract and to operate the reactor with the help of Russian experts.[39] If used “off the books,” however, the complex is capable of producing enough nuclear material for up to 30 atomic bombs per year.[40]

Iran is feverishly developing its own uranium enrichment capability so that it can process reactor fuel into weapons-grade material.[41] This would undermine global nonproliferation efforts and challenge President Obama’s stated priority to rid the world of nuclear weapons. Clearly, Russia does not share the Administration’s nonproliferation goals.

Russia‘s Security Blanket over Iran. Moscow pretends that it can play a vital role in brokering a strategic agreement with Tehran, but its actions speak louder than words. In March 2009, the Russian state news agencies confirmed that Moscow signed a contract as early as 2007 to sell advanced long-range, multi-target S-300 air-defense systems to Iran and that “the contract itself…is being gradually executed.”[42] Yet this past spring a Russian official signaled that supply of the system depends on the Kremlin’s good will.[43] This system, coupled with the Russian-made TOR-M1 surface-to-air missile system already deployed by Tehran, would offer Iran a shield against air strikes on its nuclear program.[44]

Once Iran has robust and layered air defenses to repel air strikes and deploys nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles, it will have the capacity to destroy Israel (an openly stated goal of the regime) and strike targets throughout the Middle East and Europe.[45] Beyond that, if and when it achieves an ICBM capability, Tehran could directly threaten the U.S. homeland. The choice would then become something starkly resembling the early Cold War: deter or pre-empt.

Energy Cooperation. In addition to nuclear and arms sales, the Kremlin has major plans with Tehran in the energy sector. The Kremlin is in the process of creating an OPEC-style gas cartel with Iran and other leading gas producers. By launching this cartel, Moscow hopes to enhance its energy superpower status and to control gas projects and pipelines in Eurasia.[46] It also plans to become a market maker in the liquefied natural gas sector. Moscow and Iran are also implementing a massive energy and transportation corridor to connect the Indian Ocean, the Caspian, and Europe.[47]

Russia is unlikely to risk this ambitious agenda in return for the Obama Administration’s concessions. Clearly, if Russia is neglecting the proliferation threats stemming from the Iranian quest for nuclear arms, Moscow no longer has a stake in the geopolitical status quo and is willing to take risks to undermine the perceived U.S. “hegemony” in the Middle East.

High Stakes for the U.S.

The Obama Administration should carefully examine the attempts of previous Administrations to entice and encourage Russia to become a partner in restraining Iran. Sadly, all of these attempts failed.[48] Moscow’s long-term interests in Iran militate against substantial cooperation or any potential “grand bargain.” Some realpolitik advocates in Washington and Russian professional propagandists have argued that the U.S. should have cancelled the Bush-era missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic (which President Obama has since accomplished), scale back relations with former Soviet countries, and overlook Moscow’s abysmal rule-of-law and human rights records in exchange for putative Russian cooperation on preventing Iran from going nuclear.[49] Even that may not be enough. The Obama Administration may still hope for this bargain–but it is highly doubtful that Moscow will ever deliver.

What Congress and theAdministration Should Do

This is a dangerous time for naïveté. Given the substantial Russian interests and ambitions, any grand bargain would almost certainly require the United States to pay an excessively high price to the detriment of its friends and allies.[50] Instead, the Obama Administration needs to develop a broader policy in such a way that Iran will lose even if it obtains nuclear weapons and that clearly demonstrates to the Russians that the risks of betting on Iran outweigh the potential rewards.

To counter the Iranian nuclear program, Congress and the Administration must:

• Stop waiting for Russia to support robust U.N. Security Council sanctions and stop offering further incentives to Moscow. The Obama Administration should disabuse itself of any such expectations because Russia’s perceived long-term national interest is in favor of a strategic relationship with Iran and against any significant sanctions regime. Instead, the U.S. should proceed with a coalition of the willing, from Europe to India, to impose robust and crippling sanctions on Tehran to stop the military component of that country’s nuclear program. The sanctions should include a gasoline embargo, aircraft parts embargo, more robust financial and banking sanctions, and other measures that make the Iranian regime suffer until the nuclear program is fully demilitarized and made transparent.
• Reintroduce sanctions in the 111th Congress against Russian private and state-owned companies doing business with Iran, especially companies that sell arms; ballistic missile and space technology; oil, gas, and refined products; and oil and gas services. These previously mandated, bipartisan sanctions are included in pending bills now before the House and the Senate. As the confrontation with Iran approaches its decisive phase, Congress should further demand that the President certify that Russia is complying with existing sanctions and should deny the President the ability to waive Iran-related sanctions against Russian entities for national security purposes.
• Adopt a “protect and defend” strategy to deter and counter the Iranian threat.[51] The U.S. and its allies should deploy robust missile defenses against the potential Iranian nuclear threat, including SM-1 long-range interceptors.The Bush Administration planned to deploy a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend against a limited Iranian ballistic missile attack. The Obama Administration scrapped those plans, offering instead a smaller, cheaper system based on SM-3 missiles, partially deployed on Aegis cruisers. This system may be too little too late. The U.S. should continue working with Israel to deploy Israeli missile defenses, including the THAAD, SM-3, and Arrow-2 systems. The U.S. should undertake similar deployments in the Persian Gulf. Finally, the U.S. should provide nuclear guarantees to U.S. allies in the Middle East, including Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This would communicate a strong message of deterrence and dissuasion to Tehran. The U.S. should deploy a visible deterrent, deploying overwhelming nuclear forces near Iran, including on surface ships, aircraft, or permanent bases.[52] These offensive forces should be designed to hold at risk the facilities that Iran would need to launch a strategic attack, thereby making any such attack by Iran likely to fail.

Conclusion

Russia considers Iran a partner and de facto ally in its plans to reshape the power balance in the Middle East to America’s detriment, dilute U.S. influence in the region, sell weapons and nuclear technology to both sides, and boost oil prices, thereby greatly improving Moscow’s balance sheet.

Russia blocked a series of Security Council sanctions against Iran after the Russia-Georgia war and has provided only limited support in previous sanction rounds. Ironically, in the long term, Russia and its allies in the region will likely come under pressure from a nuclear-armed Iran and other Middle Eastern countries that may develop their own nuclear arsenals to counter Iran.[53]

With Russia providing diplomatic, technological, and military support for Iranian ambitions and the price of a “grand bargain” likely being too high, the U.S. is left with a significantly more difficult problem. The potential consequences of a nuclear strike on Europe or Israel justify deploying a robust missile defense system as an insurance policy against Iranian attacks.[54] Beyond that, if diplomacy and sanctions fail, the U.S., Europe, and Israel need to consider military options. During the 2008 presidential election campaign, candidates Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton both said that “all options are on the table.” They should indeed remain on the table until the Iranian problem is resolved.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation. The author thanks Owen Graham, Research Assistant at the Allison Center, for his help in preparing this paper.

Abstract: Iran‘s nuclear weapons ambitions are ominous in light of its hostile foreign policy and longstanding sup­port for terrorism. But Iran’s repeated threats to annihilate the state of Israel while it develops the world’s most dan­gerous weapons have created an even more explosive situ­ation. If diplomatic efforts to defuse the situation fail, Israel may see no other choice than to launch a preventive strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Heritage Foundation Mid­dle East expert James Phillips maps out the likely results of an Israeli attack, outlines Iran’s probable reaction, and explains why it is now crucial that the Obama Administra­tion take action to mitigate and defend against Iran’s response to an Israeli strike.

The Iranian regime’s drive for nuclear weapons, rapid progress in building up its ballistic missile arse­nal, ominous rhetoric about destroying Israel, and the failure of international diplomatic efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear weapons program have potentially created a–literally–explosive situation. Israel may launch a preventive strike against Iran’s nuclear weapons infra­structure.

The United States would almost certainly be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian conflict. The Obama Adminis­tration must start planning now to counter and mini­mize the destabilizing consequences of an expected Iranian backlash. To mitigate the threats posed by Iran to U.S. national security and to protect U.S. interests, the United States must:

• Recognize Israel’s right to take action in self-defense against Iran’s growing threat;
• Prepare for a violent Iranian response to an Israeli preventive strike, including preparations for a possible U.S. war with Iran;
• Deploy missile defenses to defend Israel and other U.S. allies from Iranian missile attacks;
• Enhance deterrence against Iranian attacks by making it clear to Iran’s leadership that such attacks will make a bad situation worse for Iran;
• Work with allies to take precautions to miti­gate the impact of a possible Iranian-instigated oil crisis;
• Block arms sales to Iran; and
• Veto any U.N. Security Council resolution that does not acknowledge Iran’s provocations and continued defiance of U.N. Security Council res­olutions on the nuclear issue.

Israel’s Preventive Option Against Iranian Nuclear Threat

Israel has acceded to the Obama Administration’s engagement strategy despite having strong doubts that it will succeed. Israeli leaders have stated their preference: that the Iranian nuclear weapons pro­gram be halted by diplomacy–backed by punish­ing sanctions. But they warn that they must regard the use of force as an option of last resort.

Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran’s nuclear sites if diplomacy fails to dis­suade Iran from continuing on its current threaten­ing course. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized air exercise over the Mediter­ranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeli warplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on tar­gets that were more than 870 miles away, approxi­mately the same distance from Israel as Iran’s uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Lt. General Dan Halutz, the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces in 2006, when asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran’s nuclear program, replied simply: “Two thousand kilometers.”[1]

Last year, Israeli officials leaked the details of a secret Israeli air attack against a convoy transport­ing Iran-supplied arms in Sudan that was headed for Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula to be smuggled through tunnels to Hamas. The officials stressed that the long distances involved signaled Israeli prepared­ness to launch other aerial operations against Iran if necessary.[2]

The government of Israeli Prime Minister Ben­jamin Netanyahu has sent even stronger signals since entering office last March. In an interview con­ducted on the day he was sworn into office, Netan­yahu warned that, “You don’t want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran.”[3] Significantly, both Netan­yahu and his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, for­merly served as commandos in the Israel Defense Forces and would be open to bold and risky action if the circumstances warrant it.

From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civil defense drill, which sim­ulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, an Israeli Dolphin-class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time to deploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli Saar-class warships followed in July. An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program, “These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its threats.”[4] The high-profile transits of the canal also signaled that Egypt, which shares Israeli concerns about the threats posed by Iran, particularly after the discov­ery of a large Hezbollah cell operating in Egypt, is willing to cooperate with Israel to defend against threats posed by Iran.

The head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency reportedly has met with Saudi officials and assured Prime Minister Netanyahu that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli warplanes passing through Saudi air space to strike Iranian targets in a possible future air raid.[5]

An Israeli strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities would not be unprecedented. Israel has launched preventive air strikes at nuclear facilities developed by hostile states in the past. In June 1981, Israel launched a successful air strike against Iraq’s Osiraq reactor and inflicted a major setback on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program.[6] In September 2007, Israel launched an air strike against a nuclear facility in Syria that was being built with North Korean assistance. The Israeli warplanes penetrated Syrian air defenses–which were more formidable than the air defense systems currently protecting Iranian nuclear sites–with little apparent problem.[7]

Israel probably can only delay, not halt, Iran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless, Israeli leaders may conclude that buying time is worth the considerable costs and risks of Iranian retaliation because Israel perceives a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat. Israel is a small country that would be dev­astated by a single nuclear explosion.

It would take an extensive air campaign, proba­bly including more than a thousand sorties over several weeks, to increase the certainty of destroying the bulk of Iran’s known nuclear infrastructure. But Israel does not have enough warplanes and refuel­ing capabilities to sustain such an intensive cam­paign against such distant targets over a prolonged period of time, especially if the countries located between Israel and Iran (Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia) object to Israeli use of their air­space, as they undoubtedly would, at least publicly.

Nevertheless, Israel could opt to launch a single surprise attack at a limited number of key facilities to disrupt the Iranian nuclear weapons effort. The overall success of such a mission would depend on the quality of Israeli intelligence on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the capabilities of Iran’s air defenses, the accuracy of the strikes and the capability of Israeli ordnance to penetrate hardened targets. A single wave of attacks would not bring lasting benefits; Israel would have to launch multiple follow-up strikes to inflict higher levels of damage on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure.

From Israel’s perspective, buying even a small amount of time to postpone an existential threat is a worthwhile endeavor. The 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor did not end Iraq’s nuclear weapons efforts, but it paid large dividends because Saddam Hussein’s regime never was able to replace the reactor. Iraq’s nuclear program suffered further setbacks due to U.S. air strikes during the 1991 Gulf war and the U.N. sanctions that followed after Iraq refused to abide by the subsequent ceasefire agreement. An Israeli military operation that delayed the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran also would have the benefit of delaying the prospective cascade of nuclear proliferation that would acceler­ate a nuclear arms race among other states threat­ened by Iran, such asSaudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, which would further destabilize the tense region and immensely complicate Israel’s security environment.

An Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear facilities would be a much more difficult and complex oper­ation than the 1981 raid on Iraq’s Osiraq reactor. The Iranian dictatorship learned the lessons of Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor: The Ira­nian nuclear infrastructure is more decentralized, dispersed, hardened, and protected than was Iraq’s nuclear program. Some of the nuclear sites have been located in cities, which would magnify the col­lateral casualties of air strikes. Other sites have been built deep underground with assistance from North Korea, which has developed world-class tunneling technology.

Israel may not have the specialized “bunker buster” ordnance necessary to destroy some of the hardened facilities buried deep underground. But the Israelis may strike the entrances of the under­ground facilities to shut them down, at least tempo­rarily. Israeli warplanes could destroy nearby power plants to deprive some of the facilities of the electri­cal power necessary for their operation. The Israeli air force also has trained to destroy Iranian targets by using low-yield nuclear weapons.[8] But it is doubtful that Israel would break the nuclear taboo unless Iran first launched ballistic missile or air attacks with chemical, biological, or radiological weapons of mass destruction.

Israeli strikes are likely to be hampered by long distances to targets and the need for extensive air-to-air refueling from slow-moving aerial tankers. Iran’s air defenses, which rely on quantity rather than quality, probably would pose a limited threat to Israeli warplanes, which have sophisticated elec­tronic warfare capabilities.[9] But improvements in Iranian air defenses could make air attacks much riskier. Israel’s window of opportunity for launching an air strike could soon close if Iran acquires more sophisticated air defense missiles, such as the S-300 surface-to-air missile that it has long sought to pur­chase from Russia.[10] The delivery of this system, which can track up to 100 targets and engage up to 12 targets simultaneously within a 120-mile range, could greatly complicate an Israeli air campaign.

The timing of an Israeli attack would also be determined by estimates of when an attack would no longer be effective. Israeli analysts reportedly believe that Iran now has enough low enriched ura­nium that it could further enrich to build a bomb in about 10 months, but that after another year of ura­nium enrichment it would only need half that time to build one.[11] Clearly, the clock is ticking not only for Iran’s nuclear program, but for Israel’s preventive option.

Iran’s Reaction

Iran’s retaliation for an Israeli strike is likely to be fierce, protracted, and multi-pronged. Iran is likely to bombard Israel with its Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missiles, possibly armed with chemical, biological, or radiological warheads. Such a missile barrage would amount to a terror campaign, similar to the “war of the cities” during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, when the two adversaries launched hundreds of SCUD surface-to-surface missiles at each others’ cities. Possible suicidal air attacks, per­haps launched from bases in Syria, or attacks by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), based in Leba­non, Syria, or ships off Israel’s coast, could not be ruled out.

In addition to direct attacks on Israel, the Tehran regime is likely to launch indirect attacks using a wide variety of surrogate groups, such as Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, all of which are armed with Iranian-supplied rockets. Hezbol­lah, the Lebanese terrorist organization created in 1982 by Iran to oppose the Israeli intervention in Lebanon and support Iran’s Islamist revolution, continues to receive arms, training, financial sup­port, and ideological leadership from Iran’s radical regime through the Revolutionary Guards. Iran has completely re-equipped Hezbollah since its 2006 war with Israel in direct violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Hezbollah has received longer-range and more lethal Iranian rockets that would threaten many more Israeli civilians than during the 2006 war.

Iran also has armed Hamas with increasingly sophisticated long-range rockets. Recently, Israeli military officials disclosed that Hamas has acquired an Iranian-supplied rocket capable of striking Tel Aviv, Israel’s largest city, from Gaza.[12] Terrorist attacks on Israeli targets outside Israel, as well as against Jewish communities abroad, would also be near-certain. Iran was involved in the 1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings of the Israeli embassy and a Jewish NGO.[13] Iran could activate Hezbollah sleeper cells to attack Israeli targets not only in the Middle East, but in South America, North America, Africa, Asia, and Europe.[14]

Tehran could also attack American interests in the region in retaliation for an Israeli strike. Despite the fact that both the Bush and Obama Administrations have opposed an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facil­ities, the conspiracy-minded Islamist regime may presume the existence of at least tacit American sup­port for an Israeli attack. Iran could target American soldiers in Iraq by escalating its support for proxy groups such as the Mahdi Army or by infiltrating more elements of the Revolutionary Guards into the country to attack Americans directly. The Iranian regime could increase the supply of sophisticated improvised explosive devices, such as the lethal explosively formed projectile (EFP) mines that are capable of penetrating even the heaviest armor. It could also foment more trouble for the United States in Afghanistan by inciting Shia Afghans against U.S. forces, renewing its support for Gulbuddin Hekmat­yar’s Hezbi Islami (Party of Islam) forces, or throwing its weight more forcefully behind the Taliban. Tehran has already provided limited quantities of arms and supplies to the Taliban.[15]

American military, diplomatic, and government personnel, as well as civilians, would be put at risk of Iranian-supported terrorist attacks throughout the world, particularly in Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to using surrogates, such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iran may also upgrade its arms-length relations with the al-Qaeda terrorist network and give it more sup­port beyond the sanctuary and tacit cooperation that it has already provided.

International Reactions to an Israeli Strike

Russia. Moscow would be the big winner of an Israeli-Iranian war. Russia has invested heavily in cultivating a strategic alliance with Tehran that has given it a lucrative export market for its nuclear, military, and other technologies and a useful ally for contesting American influence. Russia also stands to accrue substantial economic benefits from the spike in world oil prices that would accompany an Israeli-Iranian military crisis since its chief export is oil. But an Israeli-Iranian war would also pose risks for Moscow. Hundreds of Russian scientists and technicians work at the Bushehr nuclear complex and could become collateral casualties if Israel opts to destroy that facility. If any were killed it would be added incentive for Moscow to push hard at the U.N. Security Council for sanctions on Israel.

China. Beijing is likely to protect its growing economic, energy, and geopolitical investment in Iran by firmly supporting its ally at the Security Council and pushing for a denunciation and possi­ble sanctions against Israel.

Arab states. Publicly, most Arab countries would denounce an Israeli preventive attack as fur­ther evidence of Israeli hostility to the Muslim world. But most, with the exception of Iran’s ally Syria, would privately welcome the attack. Even if it did not permanently prevent an Iranian nuclear bomb, it could divert Iran from threatening its smaller Arab neighbors.

Europe. Most European states, with the possible exception of Britain and France, would likely criti­cize Israel for launching its attack. Many European states would suffer adverse economic consequences from the resulting spike in world oil prices.

U.S. Policy and the Limits of Diplomacy

Despite the diplomatic efforts of several U.S. Administrations, Iran has repeatedly rejected offers to permanently defuse the long-simmering con­frontation over its illicit nuclear weapons program. Tehran temporarily froze its uranium enrichment efforts from 2003 to 2005, undoubtedly due to fear of possible U.S. military action after American interventions in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq. But once the Iranian regime concluded that the U.S. was bogged down in Iraq, it dropped the charade of negotiations with the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) and resumed its nuclear efforts in 2005 after hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power.[16] The Bush Administra­tion endorsed the EU-3 diplomatic initiative and later joined the broader P5 +1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Ger­many) diplomatic initiative, but Tehran dismissed these diplomatic offers and ignored three rounds of mild sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council.

The Obama Administration sweetened the U.S. diplomatic offer and sought to engage Iran diplo­matically without any preconditions. But President Obama’s engagement policy has failed to budge Tehran, which has accelerated its uranium enrich­ment efforts and again was caught cheating on its legal obligations under the Nuclear Nonprolifera­tion Treaty by building a secret nuclear facility near Qom that was revealed by President Obama in late September. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suspects that Iran has additional secret nuclear facilities that it has illegally hidden from the IAEA.

Diplomacy backed by timid U.N. Security Coun­cil sanctions is not likely to dissuade Iran from con­tinuing its nuclear weapons program. It is too late in the game and Tehran has invested too much scarce economic resources, human capital, and prestige to refrain from taking the final steps to attaining a nuclear capability. Moreover, Iranian hardliners, who have established an increasingly firm grip on power, are vehemently opposed to better relations with the United States. They fear that improved bilateral relations with the “Great Satan” would pose a threat to their own dominant position within Iran because it would tempt disillusioned Iranians to join a “soft revolution” against them. They know that three previous Iranian revolutions were aborted after westernized elements defected from the revolution­ary coalition and cooperated with foreign powers.

The Obama Administration argues that the ero­sion of Iranian domestic political support for the regime after the post-election crackdown in June will make Tehran’s hardliners more open to com­promise on the nuclear issue. But in reality, the prospects for any kind of a satisfactory diplomatic resolution of the stalemate over Iran’s nuclear activ­ities are bleaker in the wake of Ahmadinejad’s dis­puted “re-election.” Having violently quelled opposition protests, which were blamed on Western meddling in Iran’s internal affairs, it is unrealistic to expect a more conciliatory attitude from Iran’s dog­matic anti-American regime.

On the contrary, isolated internationally and stripped of any semblance of legitimacy at home, the regime now has an even greater incentive to fin­ish its nuclear weapons project to ensure its own survival. Iran’s hard-line leaders see a nuclear capa­bility as a trump card that will deter foreign inter­vention and give at least a modest boost to their shrinking base of popular support. Negotiations are useful to the regime for buying time and staving off more international sanctions, but Tehran will obsti­nately resist international efforts to persuade it to halt uranium enrichment, as its leaders continue to publicly proclaim at every opportunity.

The United States has the advantage of being geographically further away from Iran than Israel and thus less vulnerable to an Iranian nuclear attack. But it must be sensitive to its ally’s security perspective.

Vice President Joseph Biden spoke the truth when he said on July 5 that “Israel can determine for itself–it’s a sovereign nation–what’s in their inter­est and what they decide to do relative to Iran and anyone else.” Biden recognized that, “Look, we can­not dictate to another sovereign nation what they can and cannot do when they make a determina­tion–if they make a determination that they are existentially threatened.”[17] President Obama quickly denied that his Vice President’s comments signaled a green light for an Israeli attack.[18]

But Vice President Biden was correct in assessing that Israel cannot afford to bet on Iranian self-restraint. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, also has warned that “there is a leadership in Israel that is not going to tolerate” a nuclear Iran.[19] Given this reality and Iran’s public threats to attack the United States in retaliation for an Israeli attack, the Obama Administration must be mindful of the fact that the United States inevita­bly will be drawn into an Israeli-Iranian crisis.

To mitigate the threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran and protect American interests, the United States should:

• Recognize Israel’s right to self-defense against a hostile Islamist dictatorship that also threat­ens U.S. interests and regional stability. Wash­ington should not seek to block Israel from taking what it considers to be necessary action against an existential threat. The United States does not have the power to guarantee that Israel would not be attacked by a nuclear Iran in the future, so it should not betray the trust of a democratic ally by tying its hands now. Although an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program will entail increased risks for U.S. interests in the Middle East, these risks would be dwarfed by the threats posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. Not only would a nuclear Iran pose a much more dire direct threat to the U.S., Israel, and other allies, but Tehran might pass a nuclear weapon to one of its Islamist ter­rorist surrogates. Its support for terrorism against Israel, insurgent attacks against U.S. troops in Iraq, and subversive efforts against moderate Arab governments are likely to grow steadily if it believes its nuclear capability gives it a carte blanche to act with impunity. Moreover a nuclear Iran would induce many other Middle Eastern states to seek their own nuclear weapons. This cas­cade of nuclear proliferation would enormously increase the risks of a future nuclear exchange involving some combination of Middle Eastern nuclear powers, threaten Israel and other U.S. allies, and increase the risks of oil disruptions, even if Iran was not involved in a future crisis.
• Prepare for war with Iran. Given that the United States is likely to be attacked by Iran in the aftermath of an Israeli strike anyway, it may be logical to consider joining Israel in a preven­tive war against Iran. But the Obama Administra­tion is extremely unlikely to follow this course. However, the Administration must be ready to respond to any Iranian attacks. It must prepare contingency plans and deploy sufficient forces to protect U.S. military forces and embassies in the Middle East; defend allies, oil facilities and oil tanker routes in the Persian Gulf; and target Iranian ballistic missile, naval, air force, and Rev­olutionary Guard forces for systematic destruc­tion.[20] In the event of a conflict, Iran’s nuclear facilities should be relentlessly targeted until all known nuclear weapon-related sites are destroyed completely. Perhaps the preparations for such a war, combined with the knowledge that Washington will not restrain Israel, would enable cooler heads to prevail in Tehran before Israel is forced to take action to defend itself.
• Deploy missile defenses to defend Israel and other U.S. allies from Iranian missile attacks. The Pentagon has already deployed a sophisti­cated X-Band radar to Israel to support several different types of American and Israeli missile defense interceptors. Israel has already deployed the Arrow and the Patriot PAC-3 missile defense systems. In addition, the United States should make preparations to deploy or transfer to Israel the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and sea-based or land-based versions of the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) inter­ceptors. It would be particularly useful to deploy U.S. Navy Aegis-class warships off the coasts of Israel and other threatened U.S. allies in the event of a crisis to help defend against a possible Iranian ballistic missile attack.
• The United States should also hold more fre­quent missile defense exercises with Israel and other allies. The recent Juniper Cobra joint missile defense exercises conducted with Israel in October-November 2009, for example, involved up to 2,000 personnel and some 17 U.S. Navy warships that simulated a joint defense against a missile attack on Israel from all directions. The most important aspect of the exercise was that it provided hands-on experi­ence to the U.S. and Israeli military personnel in operating an integrated command and control system for defending Israel against missile attack. This experience is necessary to maintaining an effective overall missile defense system.

  The U.S. and Israel, however, still need to keep an eye on the development of more sophisti­cated missile threats, which may include coun­termeasures designed to confuse or overwhelm existing and near-term missile defense systems. This is why Israel should ask the United States to develop and deploy space-based missile defense interceptors for its own defense and for the defense of U.S. allies. Such space-based sys­tems will address the countermeasures threat because they will be effective in downing bal­listic missiles in the boost phase, before such countermeasures are released. The U.S., how­ever, has not pursued space-based defense options since the early 1990s. The Obama Administration has shown no commitment to move on this front. The U.S. needs to move for­ward in this area and Israel should be encourag­ing it to do so.

  The Obama Administration also should offer to deploy land-based or sea-based missile defense systems in the greater Persian Gulf area and con­duct missile defense exercises in the area with the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the alliance formed in 1981 by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates to provide collective defense against Iran and other threats.

  The Bush Administration’s “third site” missile defense plan for Europe would have provided some additional protection to European allies and the United States from Iranian missiles by the middle of the next decade. The Obama Adminis­tration abandoned that system,[21] intending to replace the planned ground-based third-site sys­tems with sea-based and land-based versions of the SM-3. The two should be pursued in tandem to build a more robust defense. The Obama Administration’s retreat on missile defense in Europe has sent a signal that foreign political pressures, in this case from Russia, can cause the U.S. to withdraw defensive commitments to its allies and friends. This is not a reassuring message in the dangerous and volatile Middle East.

• Enhance deterrence against Iranian attacks. To deter Iran from following through on its threats to attack American targets in response to an Israeli preventive attack, the Obama Adminis­tration must make it clear to Tehran beforehand that such attacks will make a bad situation much worse for the regime. Since the Islamist dictator­ship’s highest priority is its continued domina­tion of Iran, Washington should privately warn the Supreme Leader that if the Ahmadinejad regime launches attacks against U.S. targets, the U.S. will respond with devastating strikes not only against Iran’s military and nuclear targets, but against regime leaders and the institutions that keep the regime in power: particularly the Revolutionary Guards, intelligence agencies, and internal security forces.
• Mitigate the impact of a possible Iranian-instigated oil crisis. Iran has threatened to dis­rupt oil shipping through the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a crisis. This would put at risk approximately 16-17 million barrels of oil per day, or about 20 percent of world oil consump­tion. Such a disruption would spike oil prices to previously unseen heights and would impose a major oil shock on the global economy. Iran could also launch air attacks, naval attacks, com­mando raids, or sabotage operations against Arab oil facilities in the Persian Gulf to further disrupt world oil markets. The United States and its allies must be prepared to immediately take action to defend against these attacks, repair any damage to pipeline or other oil infrastructure, and facilitate the production and transportation of alternative sources of oil to panicked oil con­sumers. Washington should mobilize and lead a coalition of NATO, the Gulf Cooperation Coun­cil, Japan, Australia, India, and other interested countries to deploy naval and air forces to pre­vent the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and min­imize the economic impact of an oil crisis as soon as possible.

  Washington should alsowarn Tehran that if it takes action to disrupt Arab oil production in the Persian Gulf or attacks American targets, the U.S. will prevent any Iranian oil from being exported through a naval blockade. Communicating this ahead of time could help to deter Iran, as the loss of oil income would be a major blow that would threaten the survival of the regime.

• Block arms sales to Iran. Washington and its allies should make every effort to deprive Iran of foreign arms transfers, particularly the impend­ing sale of Russian S-300 surface to air missiles, which could provoke Israel to strike sooner rather than later. Stronger multinational efforts also need to be made to prevent Iran from trans­ferring arms to Hezbollah and Palestinian terror­ist groups, which pose a threat not only to Israel, but to stability in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. On November 3, Israeli naval forces intercepted the Francop, an Antigua-flagged cargo ship that was transporting about 500 tons of weapons from Iran to Hezbollah, via Syria.[22] The U.S. should press other allies to join in giving greater assistance to Israeli efforts to intercept Iranian arms flows, particularly to Hezbollah and Hamas.
• Veto any Security Council resolution that does not acknowledge Iran’s provocations and continued defiance of U.N. resolutions. The U.S should veto any resolution at the U.N. Secu­rity Council that condemns Israel without con­demning Iran’s long history of threats and sponsorship of terrorism against the Jewish state. Iran’s radical regime has brought this war on itself. The Ahmadinejad regime has frequently stoked tensions with Israel by threatening to “erase Israel from the page of history” and a con­stant stream of other threats that are tantamount to incitement for genocide. Ahmadinejad’s denial of the Holocaust while building weapons for another possible holocaust was unwisely provoc­ative as well. Israel, whose unofficial motto is “Never again,” is especially sensitive to such bel­licose rhetoric, particularly when it is backed up with concrete signs that Tehran is developing a nuclear capability and the missiles to deliver it. Washington should point out to members of the Security Council that are critical of the veto that the U.N.’s weak and ineffective response to Iran’s nuclear program helped to sow the seeds of the Iran-Israel war.

Conclusion

The Obama Administration must develop a Plan B to contain the fallout if its engagement strategy fails to dissuade Iran from continuing on its current nuclear path. Tehran must recognize that America’s allies and friends will protect their own interests, particularly Israel, which faces the greatest threat from a nuclear Iran. As bad as the consequences could be if Israel launched a preventive strike against Iran–it would be far worse if the two coun­tries fought a nuclear war, or if the United States were forced to fight a war against a nuclear Iran.

James Phillips is Senior Research Fellow for Mid­dle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.