WarSclerotic

GreekAmericanNewsAgency.

Γράφει ο/η Greek American News Agency

06.12.09

by Stephen Brown, FrontPAge Magazine The decade-long attempt to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may have entered the final round on Sunday when Iran announced to the world it intended to build ten new uranium enrichment sites. “This is really a statement of defiance,” a former senior Israeli atomic official told The Wall Street Journal, “telling the world we are going to go ahead with our nuclear program.” The Iranian government’s statement came only two days after the world’s major powers condemned Iran’s nuclear program, which, despite Iranian denials, is believed to be producing nuclear weapons. China and Russia joined the United States, France, Britain and Germany to support an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolution ordering Iran to stop construction on the uranium enrichment plant near Qom, a secret facility whose existence President Obama revealed last September. Due to the international criticism, Iranians are now threatening to pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and reduce cooperation with the IAEA, the U.N.’s nuclear watchdog. North Korea is the only other country ever to have pulled out of the treaty. According to news reports, the Iranian decision to thumb their nose at the U.N. and world opinion and construct new nuclear fuel refinement facilities was made Sunday evening at a cabinet meeting chaired by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinijad. The Iranians will start work on five of the new sites within two months and at an unspecified future time on the remaining five. It is believed the reason for the extra facilities is to allow Iran to build more nuclear bombs. One military analyst says U.N. weapons inspectors and the U.S. Department of Defense are of the opinion Iran currently has enough enriched fuel for one nuclear weapon. Iran would like to have several more in order to present itself as a “credible threat.” The Iranian announcement signals a defeat for President Obama’s ‘soft’ approach towards the Islamic Republic’s leadership. In an interview with Dubai-based Al-Arabiya satellite television network last January, Obama said Iran’s leaders would find the extended hand of diplomacy if they “unclenched” their fists. “As I said in my inauguration speech, if countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us,” Obama said. But as early as March there were already signs that Iran was in no mood to unclench and drop the rock it was holding in the form of its nuclear weapons program. That month, President Obama released a video, wishing the Iranians a happy New Year, which, in Iran, falls on the first day of spring. In return for his friendly overture, the American president received from the Iranian government nothing but a demand for apologies for America’s past transgressions, real or imagined, against Iran. Sunday’s statement simply proves what most have suspected all along: One cannot talk to the Iranian leaders and that they are simply stringing out negotiations to complete their nuclear arms program. And the fact the Iranians still celebrate the 1979 American embassy seizure every November, a flagrant and criminal breach of international law, shows they do not want to talk to the United States in particular and are still willing to flout international norms. Essentially, Iran’s leaders are religious fanatics who believe they have been chosen by God to establish a Shiite hegemony over the majority Sunni Islamic world and then, hopefully, over the whole planet. Of the world’s one billion Muslims, about 220 million are minority Shiites, of whom the largest number, about 62 million, live in Iran. Pakistan contains the next largest community of Shiites at 33 million, while India is third with 30 million and Iraq fourth with 18 million. Iran’s mullah regime sees possessing nuclear weapons as instrumental to its plans for world domination. Nuclear arms would also add significant muscle to Iran’s security in a part of the world where any sign of weakness or vulnerability could be dangerous. Iranians have not forgotten how Iraq took advantage of Iran’s revolutionary turmoil to launch a devastating eight-year war against it in 1980. And like Russia with its former Eastern European satellites, Iran would also use nuclear weapons to intimidate weaker neighbors. The Asia Times columnist, Spengler (a literary pseudonym), gives another reason why Iran is not afraid to seek confrontation over its nuclear weapons program. Iranian demographics have sunk to West German levels of about 1.6 children per woman, which would make waging a war in 20 years impossible. Iran currently has enough young men to embark on a military adventure, whether internally for nuclear weapons acquisition or externally against the Sunni world, while in twenty years it won’t. Iran’s heavily-subsidized economy is also imploding. Like Argentina with its 1982 Falkland Islands’ invasion and Germany in 1939, economically it is now or never for Iran to make a grab for the ring. In a year’s time it may be too late, especially if oil prices drop dramatically again. Besides, again like Argentina, a military adventure would probably cause those Iranian people actively opposed to the regime to put aside their economic and political grievances and rally around the country’s leadership in nationalistic pride. But if Iran wants a fight, it will most likely get one. The Islamic regime’s Holocaust-denying leadership has openly stated it wants to erase Israel from the map. Facing such a naked threat to their country’s existence, one military publication states the Israelis are now openly discussing using a missile attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. While Israel’s Jericho missiles can carry nuclear warheads, they also can be equipped with a conventional warhead. An attack by Israeli warplanes is also a possibility. The Israelis already have American backing for such a strike if negotiations fail, as they appear to have. American Vice-President Joe Biden said in an ABC interview last July America would not prevent an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. And since the only other option would be a nuclear-armed Iran, the Israelis will now likely ensure this last round ends in a knockout.

The Naval Arena in the Struggle against Iran | Global Terrorism.

DEBKAfile – US to focus on uranium findings in Syria – evidence of Iranian proliferation.

December 6, 2009, 9:00 AM (GMT+02:00)

Syrian reactor

A senior official in the Obama administration described the UN nuclear watchdog inspectors’ discovery of traces of highly processed plutonium at the bombed Syrian-North Korean facility at Dir a-Zur as a “smoking gun” – evidence of Iran’s covert nuclear activities and proliferation, DEBKAfile‘s Washington sources report.

It was confirmed by International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors in their Nov. 30 visit to the site which was demolished by Israel in September 2007.

Obama administration sources are confident that with this information of Iranian violations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, even Russia and China will have to endorse stiff new sanctions against the Islamic Republic.

The soil samples the inspectors collected at their last visit to Dir a-Zur confirmed an earlier discovery of uranium used in separating out bomb-grade plutonium from spent nuclear fuel which the US believes was supplied by Iran. Those experiments were clearly further along that previously assessed.

The same traces were found at the Syrian nuclear research reactor near Damascus.

Washington intends to present these findings as solid evidence of the tie-in between the Syrian and Iranian military nuclear programs, together with proofs of Tehran’s direct involvement in the planning and construction of the demolished Syria reactor.

Iran will also be shown to have supplied Syria with the nuclear materials and technology for its operation as part of its own program to attain a nuclear weapons capability.

The US will use this body of evidence to demonstrate Iran has been in grave breach of its NPT obligations since 2007. This week, officials in Tehran said their government has no plans to abdicate from the treaty.

According to DEBKAfile‘s Washington sources, the Obama administration may decide to plant the information in the US and world media before making a formal presentation.

Last Thursday, Dec. 3, Iran’s national security council director Saeed Jalili visited Damascus for urgent consultations with Syrian leaders on fending off the coming American assault on its nuclear program based on the evidence of Syria covert nuclear activities. His party included members of Iran’s nuclear energy commission who helped build the Syria’s North Korean reactor.

Jalili and Syrian president Bashar Assad spent several hours discussing how to respond to the forthcoming American revelations.

Their talks were violently interrupted by the bomb blast on an Iranian pilgrim bus in central Damascus. Official figures have not been released but the number of dead is believed to be fifteen Iranians with many more injured. Assad ordered Syrian officials on the spot to claim the blast was an accident and not an act of terror. Both sides assumed that the hand behind the attack had advance knowledge of the Iranian-Syrian conference and was bent on sabotaging it.

Poll: Americans find Iran greatest threat to US | International News | Jerusalem Post.

Americans say Iran poses a greater threat to the US than any other country, and a growing number call Teheran a major threat, according to a new Pew Research Center survey.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, third left, reviews Iran’s armed forces as an unmanned drone is paraded past during a ceremony commemorating Army Day.
Photo: AP

SLIDESHOW: Israel & Region |  World

Americans continue to approve of pre-emptive military attacks in some circumstances, with 63 percent telling pollsters that they would support a US use of force if Iran had produced a nuclear weapon, with only 30% opposed.

So far, Americans give US President Barack Obama mixed reviews on his Iran policy, with 43% approving and 40% disapproving.

Their attitudes on Iran came against a growing isolationist sentiment in America, which has reached a four-decades high. For the first time in that span, a plurality (49%) think the United States should “mind its own business internationally” and let other countries get along the best they can on their own, the Pew poll released Thursday found.

Four years ago, 42% agreed that the US should “mind its own business” in international affairs; in December 2002, just 30% agreed with this statement.

Additionally, 44% now agree that because the United States “is the most powerful nation in the world, we should go our own way in international matters, not worrying about whether other countries agree with us or not.”

//

That percentage is by far the highest since the question was first posed in the 1960s.

Still, Americans continue to sympathize more with Israel than the Palestinians, with just over half, or 51%, saying they sympathize more with the Israelis, while just 12% report that they sympathize with the Palestinians more. Pew points out that these results “have changed little in recent years.”

When it comes to US policy toward this conflict, Pew assessed the public doesn’t have a clear impression. About a quarter can’t offer an assessment of current or past American policy. Of those who can, 30% think that the US has favored Israel too much, with 15% saying the United States has favored the Palestinians too much and 29% say past policy has struck the right balance.

On Obama, the survey found 51% of Americans think he is striking the right balance with 16% saying he favors the Palestinians too much and 7% saying he favors Israel too much.

During his presidency, fears of a terror attack have risen. Now 29% of the public consider the ability of terrorists to attack the United States is greater than it was at the time of the 9/11 attacks, a figure that is 12 points higher than in February.

Terrorism continues to be the top international concern, with 76% saying Islamic extremist groups like al-Qaida are a major threat. Iran’s nuclear program comes in at 72%, a number that has grown steadily from the 60% who called it a major threat in September 2008.

And when asked in an open-ended format which country represents the greatest danger to the US, more Americans cite Iran (21%) than any other country. Iraq and Afghanistan garnered 14% each, 11% said China and 10% answered North Korea.

Even so, 76% of those polled say the US should “concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home” rather than think in international terms, close to a 45-year high.

The public also continues to stress that it is more important for President Obama to focus on domestic policy than foreign policy in overwhelming numbers: 73% think Obama should focus on domestic policy and only 12% think he should address foreign policy, consistent with when Obama took office in January.

“Tough economic times have always led the American public to turn inward rather than look beyond America’s shores,” assessed James Lindsay and Parke Nicholson of the Council on Foreign Relations, who collaborated on the survey. “These poll results highlight a potential political problem for President Obama.”

Specifically, they said, “He campaigned on a pledge to use energetic diplomacy to restore American global leadership. So far, though, his multilateral efforts have come up short. Iran and North Korea refuse to halt their nuclear programs. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process remains frozen.”

In that context, they continued, “he could face greater political resistance, from both ends of the political spectrum, to his activist foreign policy and multilateralism.”

The survey of 2,000 members of the general public was conducted via telephone from October 28 to November 8. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish with a margin of error of three percentage points.

What will it take to tame Tehran’s nuclear plans? – Telegraph.

Time is running out for the West’s conciliatory approach after President Ahmadinejad’s latest provocation, says Con Coughlin.

By Con Coughlin
Published: 6:45AM GMT 01 Dec 2009

Comments 60 | Comment on this article

Making his point: President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at a meeting last month Photo: AFP/Getty

The best that can be said about Iran’s announcement that it intends to build a further 10 uranium enrichment facilities is that at least we are now clear about its intentions.

For much of the past year, the West has been labouring under the illusion that Iran might somehow be coaxed into negotiating a resolution to the international crisis over its nuclear programme. Barack Obama, in particular, has gone out of his way since taking office last January to try to persuade Tehran to end the decades of anti-American hostility that have defined Iran’s approach to Washington since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

Shortly after his inaugural address, Mr Obama offered to negotiate directly with Tehran, without preconditions, if the regime would agree to “unclench its fist” and demonstrate its willingness to resolve the nuclear crisis by peaceful means. But all the President has got in return is a hardening of Tehran’s position, resulting in an announcement that, even by Iranian standards, represents a dramatic escalation in the country’s nuclear ambitions. Iran’s fist, it seems, remains as tightly clenched as at any time during the past 30 years.

And Iran is never averse to using intimidation to silence its critics – the detention of five British sailors, announced by the Foreign Office last night, is a tried and trusted tactic that we have seen used several times in the past.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president, said that a cabinet meeting at the weekend had agreed that the new facilities were required to help Iran produce 20,000 megawatts of nuclear-generated electricity by 2020.

Precisely why the world’s fourth largest oil producer is so obsessed with developing nuclear power has never been adequately explained by the government. All Mr Ahmadinejad and other senior members of the regime ever say when pressed is that Iran has an inalienable right to develop nuclear power if it chooses, and that is how it intends to meet its future energy needs.

The problem is that many of the facilities the Iranians have built so far, such as the massive underground enrichment facility at Natanz, are not suitable for the nuclear power plant that is currently being built by Russian technicians at Bushehr, in the Gulf. If the enriched uranium being produced at Natanz is unsuitable for the country’s domestic nuclear programme, what else might it be used for?

It is this and other glaring discrepancies in Iran’s public declarations about its nuclear programme that have led the West to conclude that Iran’s nuclear intentions are far from peaceful, and that the regime is secretly working to construct an atom bomb.

These suspicions deepened further after Mr Obama revealed the existence of a hitherto undeclared enrichment plant during September’s G20 summit at Pittsburgh. Flanked by Gordon Brown and the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, Mr Obama revealed that Iran had built a second uranium enrichment facility in a mountain range close to the holy city of Qom.

Iran was deeply embarrassed by this diplomatic démarche, and agreed to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, the UN body responsible for nuclear monitoring, to visit the site. At the same time, Mr Obama and other world leaders hoped that the revelation would finally persuade Tehran to take a positive approach to negotiations to end the crisis. To start with, the omens looked good. At a summit in Geneva in early October, Tehran indicated it was willing to accept a deal put together by six world powers – Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China and the US – to ship 75 per cent of its enriched uranium stocks to be processed in Russia, in return for UN sanctions being frozen.

Removal of the stockpiles of enriched uranium, which have been created in defiance of the UN, was seen as an important confidence-building measure, as it would eliminate suspicions that Iran might use the material to construct a nuclear weapon (Iran is currently believed to have sufficient fissile material to build one nuclear warhead).

But, as has so often been the case in the drawn-out negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, the Iranians have gradually backed away from the Geneva commitment, to the extent that they have now ruled out exporting any of their stockpiles of enriched uranium.

At the same time, the team of IAEA inspectors that was allowed to visit the Qom facility had reached some disturbing conclusions about the site’s proposed use. Its emphatic conclusion was that the facility, which is still several months away from completion, has no obvious civilian or commercial use, prompting the suspicion that it has been built as part of a clandestine military programme.

This conclusion would certainly fit in with the assessment made in a secret report drawn up by the IAEA earlier this year, details of which were leaked last month, which found that Iran now had “sufficient information” to make a nuclear bomb, and had probably carried out tests on key components.

A combination of the Qom discovery and Iran’s refusal to comply with the agreement to export its stockpiles of enriched uranium has now led to a complete breakdown of the negotiating process.

Even Mohammed ElBaradei, the IAEA director-general, concedes that his inspectors have reached a “dead end” in their attempts to unravel Iran’s true nuclear intentions. During his 12-year tenure as head of the IAEA, Mr ElBaradei has bent over backwards to accommodate Tehran, often blocking publication of sensitive material that might embarrass the Iranians in the hope that he could persuade them to make a full disclosure of their programme.

But before retiring at the end of last week, Mr ElBaradei effectively admitted that his diplomatic overture had failed, and accused Iran of lacking credibility over its handling of the nuclear negotiations. Mr ElBaradei’s gloomy assessment has now resulted in the IAEA’s 35-member board taking the exceptional measure of censuring Iran for building the Qom facility, and demanding that it freeze all work on its uranium enrichment programme. Perhaps the biggest surprise to emerge from the vote last Friday was that, for the first time, both China and Russia supported the resolution. Previously, Moscow and Beijing have resisted the West’s attempts to pressure Iran, arguing that the threat posed by Tehran’s nuclear programme has been exaggerated.

The fact that both Russia and China now appear to be prepared to take a tougher line with Tehran is about the only positive development to emerge from this otherwise sorry saga. This is partly due to Mr Obama’s intense diplomatic efforts to court both Moscow and Beijing, and a growing awareness that, unless urgent action is taken soon, the world will wake up one morning and find that the ayatollahs have successfully tested an atom bomb.

There are many reasons to be alarmed by this prospect, not least the impact such a development would have on a region that is not renowned for its political stability. If Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability, many of the major Arab states will try to follow suit, thereby destroying international efforts to curb the threat of nuclear proliferation. Saudi Arabia is believed to have reached an understanding with Pakistan to acquire its nuclear know-how, while Egypt and Syria have both expressed an unwelcome interest in developing their own nuclear capability.

Then there is the altogether more complex issue of how to handle Israel’s visceral opposition to the Iranian programme. Israel regards Iran’s nuclear quest as an existential threat to the Jewish people equal to that of the Holocaust, which is hardly surprising, given that Mr Ahmadinejad has repeatedly declared his desire to wipe Israel off the face of the Middle East.

Successive Israeli governments – including the current administration of Right-wing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – have pledged to take unilateral military action to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if its development is not checked.

Time is clearly not on the side of those attempting to talk Iran round. For the past six years, the West has been involved in intensive negotiations with Tehran to resolve this dispute, but all that has happened is that Iran has dramatically increased its nuclear capability while the West has received nothing in return.

This is a situation that can no longer be allowed to continue. If Iran wishes to persist with its defiant attitude, then it must face the consequences.

Hillary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, has argued in favour of “crippling” sanctions being imposed against Iran, and urgent action should now be taken to implement them as soon as possible, in a last-ditch effort to bring Tehran to its senses. Otherwise the consequences are too dreadful to contemplate.

Iran Rejects IAEA Transparency Demand on Atom Sites – NYTimes.com.

TEHRAN (Reuters) – Iran said it will provide the U.N. nuclear watchdog with the bare minimum of information about its plan to build 10 new uranium enrichment plants, a stance sure to stoke Western suspicions about its atomic agenda.

In a defiant response to last week’s International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors vote rebuking Iran for building a second enrichment plant in secret, Tehran said on Sunday it would build 10 more sites like its IAEA-monitored one at Natanz.

In 2007, in reprisal for U.N. sanctions slapped on it, Iran renounced an amended IAEA code of conduct requiring states to notify the agency of nuclear plans as soon as they are drafted, so as to catch any illicit atomic bomb work in the early stages.

Iran reverted to an earlier IAEA transparency code mandating only 180 days notice before a nuclear site begins production.

A senior Iranian official quoted by official news agency IRNA made clear Iran would apply the minimum transparency rule to its plan for 10 more enrichment plants.

Analysts say Iran will need many years if not decades for such a huge expansion of enrichment, but fear Iran’s adherence to obsolete notification rules will heighten the risk of Tehran trying to “weaponize” enrichment clandestinely.

Uranium enrichment can be calibrated to yield fuel either for nuclear power plants or the fissile core of a nuclear bomb.

A senior Iranian diplomat involved in now stalled nuclear talks with the West said Iran would continue cooperation with the IAEA only according to its 1970s basic safeguards agreement.

“According to the safeguards, after installation of equipment (centrifuges) and only 180 days ahead of injecting gas into the centrifuges … we should inform the IAEA,” Abolfazl Zohrehvand told IRNA. “And we will act within the framework of the safeguard,” the former Iranian ambassador to Italy said.

“Since 2007, Iran officially has stopped implementation of amendments to code 3.1, obliging countries to inform the IAEA when they plan to build a facility,” added Zohrehvand.

SHADOWY PROJECT

The IAEA has told Iran it was “outside the law” by failing to declare the second enrichment site taking shape inside a mountain bunker near Qom as soon as plans for it were drawn up.

Iran said construction there began in 2007 and the project was hushed up for fear of air strikes by Israel. Iran declared the plant to the IAEA in September after, according to Western powers, learning that their spy services had discovered it.

Western diplomats said they had intelligence evidence that the enrichment project was hatched before 2007, and that Iran probably would have used the site to enrich uranium to weapons-grade if it had not been exposed.

Iran says its enriched uranium will be only for electricity generation. Iran’s record of nuclear secrecy and lack of power plants to use low-enriched uranium has convinced the West that Iran is hiding a program to develop nuclear weapons capacity.

Last week’s IAEA resolution also urged Iran to halt all enrichment-related activity, allow unfettered IAEA inspections, guarantee it is not hiding more sites, and cooperate with an IAEA probe into allegations of nuclear weapons research by Iran.

The United States and Germany warned Iran on Thursday that it was rapidly approaching a December deadline to accept an IAEA-brokered nuclear cooperation deal with world powers.

Iran has backed off from the deal calling on it to send 75 percent of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia and France to be turned into fuel for a Tehran medical research reactor.

The West hoped that farming out a large amount of Iran’s LEU reserve for reprocessing would minimize the risk of Iran’s refining the material to high purity suitable for bombs.

But hard-line President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said on Wednesday Iran would enrich its LEU stockpile to 20 percent purity needed for the medical isotope reactor, a step the West fears would usher Iran closer to the 80-90 percent grade for an atom bomb.

In talks with six world powers in Geneva on October 1, Iran agreed in principle to the deal but has since balked. Iran has until the end of the year to agree to it or face the threat of tougher sanctions, U.S. officials say.

U.S. President Barack Obama’s efforts to engage Iran with confidence-building measures have so far been fruitless. Ahmadinejad ruled out further talks with six major powers on the future of Iran’s enrichment campaign.

(Writing by Mark Heinrich; Editing by Samia Nakhoul)

The Associated Press: AP sources: US eyes January for new Iran sanctions.

By MATTHEW LEE and JENNIFER LOVEN (AP) – 8 hours ago

WASHINGTON — The Obama administration is looking to press in early January for a new round of United Nations sanctions against Iran for its continued defiance of demands to come clean about its nuclear program, U.S. officials said Friday.

As President Barack Obama’s year-end deadline looms for Iran to comply with demands to prove its atomic activities are peaceful, the administration is reaching out to European allies, Russia and China to win support for new penalties at the U.N. Security Council after its membership changes Jan. 1, the officials said.

Senior U.S. diplomats, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and her chief deputy James Steinberg, raised the urgency of the matter with European foreign ministers at high-level meetings in Athens and Brussels this week ahead of a summit of European leaders.

The sanctions package is not yet “coherent,” one official said, but may include U.N. penalties aimed at elements of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, which the United States already has applied, and on Iran’s petroleum industry, which the Obama administration is considering.

The official said there are still disagreements over how far to push on sanctions, noting that some moves could affect world oil markets. “We are looking to find what everyone can agree will be most effective and have the least impact on the Iranian people,” the official said.

That official and others spoke on condition of anonymity to describe internal administration thinking on the evolving sanction proposals.

The State Department said Friday the administration was hoping for a strong statement on Iran, including a mention of possible sanctions, from the Dec. 10 and 11 European Council session in Brussels.

“There will be a broad discussion on next steps in that meeting,” spokesman Ian Kelly told reporters. “The E.U. is expected to have a written statement on Iran.”

“Our focus is shifting more towards the pressure track,” he added.

Senior diplomats moved this week to win backing from Russia and China, which are generally opposed to sanctions and have balked at imposing new penalties.

Clinton herself discussed Iran with her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov on the sidelines of a NATO meeting in Brussels. And she is dispatching the third ranking U.S. diplomat, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, William Burns, to Beijing next week.

Burns, who represents the United States at meetings of the six-nation group trying to persuade Iran to meet its international obligations, will be in the Chinese capital for talks on Iran and other issues on Tuesday and Wednesday, Kelly said.

Burns will try to persuade China to attend another possible meeting of the six-nation group before Christmas to discuss sanctions, the officials said. That meeting could set the stage for a referral of sanctions to the U.N. Security Council in January. China, though, has so far resisted scheduling it, the officials said.

With Iran’s continued resistance, its disclosure in September of a secret uranium enrichment plant and its recent threat to build 10 more, U.S. officials believe they can win Russian and Chinese support.

An Iranian nuclear official said Friday that Iran will not answer to the U.N. nuclear watchdog about the plan for new enrichment sites beyond the barest minimum required under the international nonproliferation treaty.

The comments by Abolfazl Zohrehvand came days after President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said Iran was considering whether to scale back cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency after it approved a resolution censuring Iran over its nuclear program.

Iran maintains its nuclear program is peaceful and insists it has a right to enrich uranium to produce fuel for nuclear reactors to generate electricity.

The U.S. and others believe Iran is using a civilian program to cover attempts to develop atomic weapons.

Israel Air Force chief’s “hard decisions” means no total security against multi-directional missiles

28 Nov. Israeli Air Force chief Maj. Gen. Ido Nehushtan told a Tel Aviv University audience Friday, Nov. 27: “The time for hard decisions is fast approaching,” adding “The scope of security threats to Israel is very complex and we must prepare for all exigencies.” He was addressing a ceremony marking 30 years of the IDF’s Talpiot program which offers hi-tech, math and physics training and degrees for high IQ conscripts to join special projects.

DEBKAfile’s military experts translate the “hard decisions,” he referred to as the tough choice of priorities facing government and military decision-makers in a potential war.

They would have to choose between striking Iran’s ballistic missile bases or the missiles pointing at Israel from Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, as well dealing with hostile ships facing Israel from a fifth direction, the Mediterranean.

The joint US-Israel Juniper Cobra 10 missile interception exercise at the beginning of November and exposed a major vulnerability: In the event of a coordinated missile offensive from several directions: Israel would be unable to extend total security both to its missile bases, airfields and strategic sites and also to its civilian population. The Israeli Air force is not capable of knocking out all out once all five potential sources of missile attacks.

This means that if the Israel air force first targeted Iran, Syria and Hizballah would be free to provide Iran with active support by sending their missiles and rockets flying into Israel from its northern borders before their bases can be seriously impaired by an Israeli counter-attack.

Lee Smith: How Iranian nukes would reshape the Middle East | News for Dallas, Texas | Dallas Morning News | Opinion: Points.

President Barack Obama has promised to “do everything that’s required” to keep Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons – but the fact that “engagement” has given way to new catchwords, like “deterrence” and “containment,” suggests that we may well choose to learn to live with an Iranian bomb. In that case, we will probably see the birth of a new Middle East, but not as we have ever envisioned it.

Today, there is an American-backed regional system, and then there are those – from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Soviet Union to Osama bin Laden and the Islamists – who are eager to create a new Middle East of their own design.

Since 1944, Saudi Arabia, home of the world’s largest known oil reserves, has been the anchor of the American order, with the other Gulf states and Jordan also safely within our orbit. And so, even after all the apparent upheaval of the last eight years – war, a tenuous democracy in Iraq and more war – the essential structure of the Middle East remained the same.

However, an Iranian nuclear program would rearrange the region’s political, economic and cultural furniture. Therefore, what’s most dangerous is not an Iranian bomb but the new Middle East that would issue from it.

If Iran gets the bomb, other regional powers will pursue nuclear programs – if they are not already doing so. Inevitably in a region as volatile as this, there will be a few small-scale nuclear catastrophes, probably rulers targeting their own people. Saddam Huusein gassed the Kurds and slaughtered the Shiites, Hafez Assad massacred the Sunnis of Hama, and mass graves throughout the region testify to the willingness of Arab rulers to kill their own people; in their hands, a nuclear weapon is merely an upgrade in repressive technology.

Still, it’s extremely unlikely the regimes will use these weapons against their regional rivals. Remember, the main reason these states support nonstate terror groups is to deter each other and thus avoid all-out war.

However, the prospect of states transferring nukes to so-called nonstate actors is a nightmare for the United States, which does not fare well against such tactics. Consider that our response to 9/11 was to use our armed forces to democratize the Middle East. Also, consider that the most convoluted reason for making war against the Taliban is to keep the nukes of a neighboring country out of the hands of its intelligence service’s dangerous elements. That is to say, we cannot even deter Pakistan, our ally.

In the hands of an adversary, an Islamic bomb is concrete evidence that Iran’s strategy of “resistance” to the West is a winning one. And this will change the region’s political culture from radical to many times more radical.

At best, this means that even those U.S.-friendly regimes that have much to fear from “resistance” will have no choice but to raise the pitch of their anti-American rhetoric to stay in step with their rivals – and their populations. Consequently, the basing rights that we have throughout the Gulf states are likely to be terminated.

At worst, an Iranian bomb sends a message to the more ambitious actors in the region that they should feel free to make a run at the Americans. If Tehran showed that it is less profitable to play nicely with Washington than it is to extort the Americans and kill their soldiers and allies, why shouldn’t they do the same? We will not be deterring Iran but inviting the rest of the region to shoot at us.

The one ally that shares our interests and is capable of defending them against Iran and its assets is Israel. Containment requires that the superpower persuade its allies that they should put aside local concerns and look at the big picture; but in this case it is Israel that is focused on Iran while the Obama administration has pecked away at the Netanyahu government over settlements. In Cold War terms, that is as though President Ronald Reagan had directed his “tear down this wall” speech not to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev but to West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Instead, Reagan put Pershing missiles at Kohl’s back and pointed them at Moscow.

Still, it is worth noting that our position will not necessarily be secured by an Israeli strike on Iran, for there are some things that need to be done by the alpha dog. Soft power, or what used to be called prestige, is effective only in proportion to how much our hard power is feared by enemies and prized by allies. If we leave Iran to Israel, we are enhancing Jerusalem’s prestige at the expense of our own.

At least all the talk of deterrence and containment should remind us why we fought the Cold War: to protect our way of life, a life sustained by oil. Without cheap oil, the life we came to associate with peace would not have been the same. The Persian Gulf was the Cold War’s strategic grand prize, and that we have held onto it for 65 years is a credit to the design of Washington’s policy of preventing any adversary from breaking out with just the sort of game-changing threat that the Iranian nuclear program represents.

In other words, the American order of the Middle East is containment; its unraveling will not allow for a different form of containment but spells the end of our hegemony in the region.

Human history is nothing but the record of nations that have miscalculated their capacity to project power, the willingness (and ability) of their allies to support them, and the determination of their rivals to reshape the world after their own image. As the debate over Iran policy has devolved from strategy to pop psychology – e.g., the discussion of whether the Iranians are acting rationally – the fact is that no regime consciously wishes to bring its own existence to an end.

And yet states and regimes do nonetheless cease to exist. No sane person believes that the United States is suicidal, but if a nation will not or cannot defend its way of life, it has taken the first step toward its inevitable decline, which is tantamount to suicide.

Lee Smith is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington. His book, “The Strong Horse: Power, Politics, and the Clash of Arab Civilizations,” will be published in January. A version of this column originally appeared at Slate.com.

An Israeli Strike on Iran – Council on Foreign Relations.

INTRODUCTION
Successive Israeli governments have held that a nuclear weapons capability in the region, other than
Israel’s own, would pose an intolerable threat to Israel’s survival as a state and society. Iran’s nuclear
program—widely regarded as an effort to obtain a nuclear weapon, or put Tehran a “turn of a screw”
away from it—has triggered serious concern in Israel. Within the coming year, the Israeli government
could decide, much as it did twenty-eight years ago with respect to Iraq and two years ago with respect
to Syria, to attack Iran’s nuclear installations in order to delay its acquisition of a weapons capability.
While U.S. officials—including the president––have declared a nuclear armed Iran to be “unacceptable,”
the administration has been clear in wanting to prevent such an outcome through peaceful
diplomatic means. Without forswearing the eventual use of military force, senior U.S. officials have
also indicated that a preventive strike on Iran by Israel would be “ill advised,” “very destabilizing,” and
“likely very bad,” and thus not in the U.S. interest. These concerns have evidently been transmitted
privately to the Israeli government.
This contingency planning memo assesses the likelihood of an Israeli strike against Iran despite
U.S. objections, the implications for the United States should it take place, the policy options available
to reduce the chances of its occurrence, and the measures that could be taken to mitigate the potentially
negative consequences.
THE C ONTINGENCY

An Israeli attack would likely concentrate on three locations: Isfahan, where Iran produces uranium
hexafluoride gas; Natanz, where the gas is enriched in approximately half of the eight thousand centrifuges
located there; and Arak, where a heavy water research reactor, scheduled to come on line in
2012, would be ideal to produce weapons-grade plutonium. It is conceivable that Israel may attack
other sites that it suspects to be part of a nuclear weapons program if targeting data were available,
such as the recently disclosed Qom site, whose location is known, or centrifuge fabrication sites, the
location(s) of which have not yet been identified. The latter would be compelling targets since their
destruction would hobble Iran’s ability to reconstitute its program. But attacks against the sites at
Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak alone would likely stretch Israel’s capabilities, and planners would probably
be reluctant to enlarge the raid further.
Israel is capable of carrying out these attacks unilaterally. Its F-16 and F-15 aircraft, equipped
with conformal fuel tanks and refueled with 707-based and KC-130 tankers toward the beginning
and end of their flight profiles, have the range to reach the target set, deliver their payloads in the face
of Iranian air defenses, and return to their bases. The munitions necessary to penetrate the targets are
currently in Israel’s inventory in sufficient numbers; they include Bomb Live Unit (BLU)-109 and
BLU 113 bombs that carry two thousand and five thousand pounds, respectively, of high-energy explosives.
These GPS-guided weapons are extremely accurate and can be lofted from attacking aircraft
fifteen kilometers from their target, thereby reducing the attackers’ need to fly through air defenses.
Israel also has a laser-guided version of these bombs that is more accurate than the GPS variant and
could deploy a special-operations laser designation unit to illuminate aim points as it is reported to
have done in the attack on the al-Kibar facility in Syria.

These munitions could be expected to damage the targets severely. Natanz is the only one of the
three likely targets that is largely underground, sheltered by up to twenty-three meters of soil and
concrete. BLU-type bombs, used in a “burrowing” mode, however, could penetrate deeply enough to
fragment the inner surface of the ceiling structures above the highly fragile centrifuge arrays and even
precipitate the collapse of the entire structure. Burrowing requires that attacking aircraft deliver their
second and third bombs into the cavity created by the first. GPS-guided munitions are accurate
enough to do this a little less than half of the time. The probability of successful burrowing increases
with the number of shots. The use of three bombs per aim point would confer better than a 70 percent
probability of success. (Laser-guided munitions are more capable of a successful burrow on the
first try.) The uranium conversion facility in Isfahan and reactor at Arak are not buried and could be
heavily damaged, or completely destroyed, relatively easily. This would be possible even if Iran managed
to down a third of the Israeli strike package, a feat that would far exceed historical ratios of
bomber losses by any country in any previous war.
These relatively upbeat ballistic assessments do not mean that the mission as a whole would be
easy. On the contrary, a coordinated air attack would be complicated and highly risky. The three
plausible routes to Iran involve overflight of third countries: the northern approach would likely follow
the Syrian-Turkish border and risk violation of Turkey’s airspace; the central flight path would
cross Jordan and Iraq; a southern route would transit the lower end of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and possibly
Kuwait. All but two of these countries are to a greater or lesser degree hostile to Israel. The exceptions,
Jordan and Turkey, would not wish their airspace to be used for an Israeli attack against
Iran. Turkey recently canceled an annual trilateral exercise involving Israel, in part to signal its opposition
to an Israeli strike. In any case, overflight would jeopardize Israeli diplomatic relations with
both countries. With respect to Syria and Saudi Arabia, operational concerns would trump diplomatic
ones. If either country detects Israeli aircraft and chooses to challenge the overflight using surfaceto-
air missiles or intercepting aircraft, Israel’s intricate attack plan, which would have a razor-thin
margin for error to begin with, could well be derailed.
Overflight of Iraq, whose airspace is under de facto U.S. control, would also be diplomatically
awkward for Israel and would risk a deadly clash with American air defenses since the intruding aircraft
would not have the appropriate Identification, Friend, or Foe (IFF) codes. Israel would have to
carefully weigh the operational risk and most of all the cost of a strike to its most vital bilateral relationship,
especially if President Barack Obama had explicitly asked Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
not to order an attack.
The sheer distances involved pose a challenge, as well. The targets lie at the outermost 1,750-
kilometer range limits of Israeli tactical aircraft. Diplomatic and military factors would confine Israeli
refueling operations to international airspace where tankers could orbit safely for long periods. These
locations, while usable, are suboptimal. They would yield the attackers little leeway to loiter in their
target areas, or engage in the fuel-intensive maneuvering typical of dogfights and evasion of surfaceto-
air missiles. The limited number of tankers would limit the number of sorties.
A final consideration for Israeli planners would be the effect of explosives on the nuclear materials
stored at the uranium conversion facility at Isfahan and the enrichment facility at Natanz. Both
facilities are likely to possess uranium hexafluoride and Natanz produces low enriched uranium.
Though these materials are not radioactive and do not pose radiological risks, the release of uranium
into the environment would almost certainly raise public health concerns due to heavy metal contamination.

This combination of diplomatic and operational complexities would clearly give Israeli leaders
pause. To act, they would have to perceive a grave threat to the state of Israel and no reliable alternative
to eliminating that threat.
A S S E S S I N G T H E LIKELIHOOD OF AN I SRAELI ATTACK
The likelihood of this contingency depends on Israeli assessments of U.S. and international resolve to
block Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability; the state of the Iranian program; the amount of
time a successful strike would buy to be worth the expected risks and costs, a point on which there is a
spectrum of Israeli views, from six months to five years; whether Israel believes there is a clandestine
Iranian program, which would lead some Israelis to conclude that an attack would not buy any time at
all; and the effect of a strike on the U.S.-Israel relationship. Because none of these factors is constant,
estimates about the likelihood of an Israeli strike within the coming year will vary.

For example, Israel is probably somewhat less likely to attack now than it was before the Qom installation was disclosed,
the P-3 took a firmer stance, and Russia appeared to concede that stronger sanctions had to be considered.
If Iran were to agree to ship the bulk of its uranium to France and Russia for enrichment—a
deal that has been agreed in working level negotiations but may never be consummated—Israel’s incentive
to accept the risks of an attack against Iran would probably diminish. Should diplomatic initiatives
run aground, the likelihood of an Israeli attack could be expected to increase accordingly.
Probability assessments will vary based on other factors, as well. Iranian rhetoric that reinforces
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s themes of Holocaust denial and the inevitable disappearance of
Israel only strengthen the hand of attack proponents within Israel by justifying fears about Iran’s intentions,
while lowering diplomatic barriers to an attack. Certain factors that will not be publicly apparent
could play a role, such as developments regarding Israel’s overflight options that reduce the
risks inherent in the mission; the availability to Israel of new, more accurate targeting intelligence,
especially relating to single points of failure, or other potentially catastrophic vulnerabilities in Iran’s
installations; and technical advances, particularly in air defense suppression, that reduce the risks in
attempting penetration.
It is clear, however, that Israel sees the stakes as very high. Netanyahu’s UN General Assembly
speech emphasized the existential nature of the threat that he and others in the current government
believe Iran represents. His emphasis on the Holocaust as a defining feature of Jewish history and his
self-conception as the one who bears the burden of preventing yet another such disaster suggest that
U.S. calculations of risk and benefit that tilt toward Israeli restraint might prove to be mirror-imaging
of a particularly deceptive sort. Given Iran’s supportive relationship with certain terrorist groups in
the region, Israel also cannot ignore the risk that a nuclear device might be transferred to them in the
future.

The longer-term impact of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons on triggering further proliferation
in the Middle East, not least among states hostile to Israel, will also enter into their strategic calculus.
Israeli officials are aware that no conceivable Israeli strike could completely eliminate the nuclear
threat posed by Iran and that an attack might only intensify longer-term risks as Iran reconstituted
covertly, advancing an argument long made by counterterrorism officials that any effort to counter
Iran’s nuclear challenge is going to be like “mowing the lawn.” Just as the grass will grow again, so will
the nuclear program; Israel will just have to mow again. And as Iran’s reconstitution effort goes underground
and its defenses are enhanced, Israel’s intelligence and military capabilities will have to
keep pace. They also argue, however, that the advantages of buying time should not be disregarded.

Thus, the 1981 Osirak attack won two crucial decades during which Operation Desert Storm effectively
disarmed Iraq and Operation Iraqi Freedom finally decapitated it. Neither tectonic event could
have been predicted in 1981. (The counterargument is that the Osirak raid stimulated Iraq to switch
to an highly enriched uranium [HEU] route and vastly increased the money and manpower devoted
to the program. Whether or not the bombing set back Iraq’s program, the point is that many Israelis
believe that it did.) On this Israeli view, a strike might prove worthwhile in ways that neither Israel
nor the United States can anticipate at this stage.
In assessing the likelihood of an attack, it is useful to look back on the origins of the Six Day War
in 1967 and the raid on the Osirak reactor in Iraq. In each case, Israel attacked only after a long period
of procrastination. In 1967, Washington’s hands-off posture tipped the balance in the cabinet in favor
of preemption. In the case of Osirak, the Carter and Reagan administrations’ unwillingness or
incapacity to intervene left Israel feeling cornered and compelled to act unilaterally. One lesson to be
learned from this is that Israel is more likely to use force if it perceives Washington to be disengaged.
Finally, if the Russian analysis is correct—namely, that the sort of crippling sanctions that would
help stave off an Israeli attack would also drive Iran out of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT)—then the probability of an Israeli strike would be correspondingly higher, since Iranian withdrawal
from the NPT would itself be a casus belli. Moreover, Iran’s withdrawal would diminish the
diplomatic opportunity cost of an attack.
WARNING I N D I CATOR S
Surprise would be essential to the success of an attack and Israel’s operational security would be correspondingly
strong. Accordingly, tactical warning would be elusive. However, certain indicators
have already surfaced; the appearance of others could indicate an Israeli intent to attack.
One indicator would be Israeli efforts to enhance the operational feasibility of the military option
before a political decision to attack. Such actions would also serve the dual purpose of signaling Iran
and others of Israel’s resolve and capability with an eye to deterring further Iranian movement toward
a nuclear weapons capability.

Recent developments in this category include the June 2008 longrange
joint-air exercise—involving one hundred aircraft, long-range combat search and rescue helicopters,
and refueling aircraft—which corresponded in scale and reach to an Israeli strike against
Iran. The unprecedented June 2009 passage of an Israeli submarine through the Suez Canal, which
showed that Israel had a maritime attack option in addition to air strikes, and that Jerusalem would
have the support of at least one regional state, namely Egypt, represents another such signal. Similar
indicators that might not be apparent outside of intergovernmental deliberations or the intelligence
domain could include requests for targeting data and/or repositioning of strike aircraft within Israel
once an attack path had been selected.
Other operational preparations could also portend Israeli action. These include bolstering homeland
security, especially if it involves an emphasis on shelter locations, distribution of gas masks,
or similar precautions against retaliatory attack. Tactical changes, including redeployment of ground
forces to reinforce Israeli Northern Command and potentially enter Lebanon from a cold start, could
also indicate a stronger likelihood of an Israeli attack.
Political developments inside Israel and Iran could also presage a decision to attack. For instance,
broader public references to the Holocaust and warnings that time is running out would suggest an
increasing probability of Israeli action. Netanyahu has sounded these themes regularly. If the political
opposition echoed them, domestic political barriers to attack would have lowered.
Finally, delivery of advanced Russian S-300 surface to air missiles to Iran, which would multiply
the risks of an air attack, Might spur Israel to strike before the missiles were fielded.
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES F O R U . S . INT E R E S T S
Some observers would view an Israeli attack that significantly degraded Iran’s nuclear weapons capability
as beneficial to U.S. counterproliferation objectives and ultimately to U.S. national security.
The United States has a clear interest in the integrity of the NPT regime and the compliance of member
states with meaningful inspection arrangements. The use of force against Iran’s nuclear program
would, at a minimum, show that attempts to exploit the restraint of interested powers, manipulate
the diplomatic process, game the NPT, and impede International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
access to nuclear-related facilities could carry serious penalties. Were Iran to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability, the ability of the U.S. military forces to operate freely in the vicinity of Iran could,
under some circumstances, be constrained. Looking into the future, a hostile Iran could also develop
reliable long-range delivery systems for nuclear warheads that could strike American territory.
At the same time, an Israeli attack—even if operationally successful—would pose immediate
risks to U.S. interests.
First, regardless of perceptions of U.S. complicity in the attack, the United States would probably
become embroiled militarily in any Iranian retaliation against Israel or other countries in the region.
Given uncertainties about the future of Iraq and a deepening commitment to Afghanistan, hostilities
with Iran would stretch U.S. military capabilities at a particularly difficult time while potentially derailing
domestic priorities.
Second, an Israeli strike would cause oil prices to spike and heighten concerns that energy supplies
through the Persian Gulf may become disrupted. Should Iran attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz
by mining, cruise missile strikes, or small boat attacks, these fears would become realized. According
to the GAO, however, the loss of Iranian oil for eighteen months would increase prices by only $6 to
$11/bbl, assuming that the International Energy Agency coordinated release of reserves. This said, at
the onset of the crisis, prices might hit $200/bbl (up from the current level of around $77/bbl) for a
short period but would likely quickly subside.
Third, since the United States would be viewed as having assisted Israel, U.S. efforts to foster
better relations with the Muslim world would almost certainly suffer. The United States has an enduring
strategic interest in fostering better relations with the Muslim world, which is distinct from
the ruling elites on whom the United States depends for an array of regional objectives. In part, this
interest derives from the need to lubricate cooperation between the United States and these governments
by lowering some of the popular resentment of Washington that can hem in local leaders and
impede their support for U.S. initiatives. A narrative less infused by anti-Americanism also facilitates
counterterrorism goals and, from a longer-range perspective, hedges against regime change. The perceived
involvement of the United States in an Israeli attack would undercut these interlocking interests,
at least for a while.
Fourth, the United States has a strong interest in domestically generated regime change in Iran.
Although some argue that the popular anger aroused in Iran by a strike would be turned against a
discredited clerical regime that seemed to invite foreign attack after its bloody postelection repres6
sion of nonviolent opposition, it is more likely that Iranians of all stripes would rally around the flag.
If so, the opposition Green movement would be undermined, while the ascendant hard-line clerics
and Revolutionary Guard supporters would face fewer constraints in consolidating their hold on
power.
Fifth, an Israeli attack might guarantee an overtly nuclear weapons capable Iran in the medium
term.
Sixth, although progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian final status accord remains elusive, an
Israeli strike, especially one that overflew Jordan or Saudi Arabia, would delay fruitful renewed negotiation
indefinitely. Both Washington and Jerusalem would be too preoccupied with managing the
consequences of an attack, while regional capitals would deflect U.S. appeals to upgrade relations
with Israel as an incentive to concessions. If Hamas or Hezbollah were to retaliate against Israel, either
spontaneously or in response to Iranian pressure to act, any revival of the peace process would
be further set back.
Finally, the United States has an abiding interest in the safety and security of Israel. Depending
on the circumstances surrounding an Israeli attack, the political-military relationship between Jerusalem
and Washington could fray, which could erode unity among Democrats and embolden Republicans,
thereby complicating the administration’s political situation, and weaken Israel’s deterrent.
Even if an Israeli move on Iran did not dislocate the bilateral relationship, it could instead produce
diplomatic rifts between the United States and its European and regional allies, reminiscent of tensions
over the Iraq war.
U. S . POLICY O P T I ONS T O FORESTALL AN I SRAELI STRI K E
Assuming that the U.S. continues to assess an Israeli attack to be undesirable, options to forestall or
hedge against a strike would have to be geared to negating factors that would lead Israel to assess that
the benefits of an attack outweigh the costs. These factors include perceptions that the White House
has given at least a yellow light to the strike; that the United States is disengaged either because it has
run out of diplomatic options or because an agreement with Iran has met Washington’s security objectives
but left Israel exposed; and that the United States has not proffered to Israel convincing security
guarantees against a nuclear-capable Iran. This list implies the importance of firm, direct communication
of U.S. opposition to a strike from the White House to the Israeli prime minister; continued
U.S. engagement that reflects an awareness of Israel’s greater exposure to the Iranian threat relative
to that of the United States; and a willingness to consider a palpable tightening of the U.S.-Israel
strategic relationship that secures Israeli restraint and, conversely, warns of a rupture should Israel
attack Iran despite the U.S. president’s explicit opposition. If, over time, events develop in a way that,
from a U.S. perspective, more fully warrants Israeli anxiety, the balance between warning and reassurance
would of course shift, both privately and publicly.
To facilitate this new bilateral understanding, Washington could take any or all of the following
preventive measures:
 make progress toward a verifiable, highly transparent agreement with Iran that will make it
very difficult to produce highly enriched uranium and/or weapons-grade plutonium, and secondarily
to weaponize.

 recreate the “Eagleburger” Mission. In 1991, Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger
led two small delegations to Israel when it was under Iraqi Scud attack. His objective was to
urge Israeli restraint. The missions succeeded because the United States was firm in refusing
Israeli access to Iraqi airspace, but worked with Israel on ways the United States could destroy
the Scuds. The United States should establish a similar channel to Israel (if it has not been already)
to gauge Israeli intentions and discuss steps to reduce the threat to Israel, while arguing
that an Israeli military option would test the U.S.-Israel relationship without reducing the longterm
Iranian threat. Other objectives would be to make clear that overflight of Iraq would not
be permitted; share the U.S. assessment of the risks and potential costs of overflight of third
countries; and explore Israeli expectations and response options about Iranian retaliation.

 continue to declare the “unacceptable” nature of a nuclear Iran and that “all options remain on
the table” to reassure Israel that the United States would not seek a diplomatic accommodation
that compromised Israel’s security.
 send high-profile visitors to Israel on reassurance missions; a presidential visit to express solidarity
with Israel and emphasize measures the United States is taking on the nuclear issue
would be helpful.
– extend to Israel the option of a defense treaty with the United States. Such a treaty would
contain unambiguous security guarantees to Israel that it would be covered by the U.S.
“nuclear umbrella” so as to deter Iran. Although it is unclear whether Israel would welcome
such a treaty, other states that felt threatened by Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, notably
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, would likely demand similar coverage if it were extended to Israel.

Finally, the United States could also consider the option advocated by former national security adviser
Zbigniew Brzezinski, that of the United States actively impeding an Israeli attack once it is
under way. It is hard to imagine, however, that the United States would risk the severe—even permanent––
damage such action would incur on its longstanding strategic relationship with Israel.
U. S . P OLICY OP T I ONS T O MITIGATE/MANAGE A C R I S I S
While doing all it can to forestall an Israeli attack, the United States must also plan for managing and
minimizing the crisis that would ensue if the primary policy fails and Israel does in fact attack Iran.
Such planning should include the following steps:
 work with basing countries—especially Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE)—on first response, consequence management capacities, and intelligence exchanges;
 ramp up air defenses and force protection in the Gulf and Iraq;
 discuss the possibility of Iranian retaliation and responses with Iraqi president Nuri al-Maliki
and senior Iraqi security officials;
8
 approach Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait with requests to increase oil production should
Iran attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, attack shipping, or damage transloading facilities
or offshore installations;
 ensure the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve is sufficient to offset shortages if necessary;
 use diplomatic and intelligence channels to urge increased readiness levels in friendly countries
where there is an Iranian Revolutionary Guard or a Hezbollah presence; and
 provide additional ballistic missile defense capabilities to Israel to defend against potential Iranian
retaliation.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Israeli leaders have stated repeatedly that the problem posed by Iran’s pursuit of mastery over the
nuclear fuel cycle was the responsibility of the international community. For straightforward diplomatic
reasons, Israel has not wanted the problem to be seen as Israel’s alone. Such a perception would
essentially permit important players to abandon the field, leaving Israel to cope with a threat that
many believe to be existential. While the historical record shows Israel will act in the face of such a
threat, there is a keen awareness among Israelis that the use of force would carry profound risks and,
potentially, be open-ended. Room exists, therefore, for the United States to persuade Israel to exercise
restraint. This goal will require a delicate balance of caution and reassurance.
As a first step, the United States and Israel should establish a high-level back channel to explore
the issues raised by Iran’s behavior and share views about managing them. Diplomacy, even secret
diplomacy, does not necessarily entail total self-disclosure. But the situation demands frank discussion.
As close allies exposed unequally to a consequential threat, conducting it will not be easy. There
will be contentious issues, including definition of red lines and the comprehensiveness of U.S. assurances
necessary to win the cooperation of a close ally boxed in by an indispensable patron and an implacable
enemy.

Above all, Israel must not be left to feel alone. Accordingly, the second step will be to
maintain the cohesion of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany
(the 5 + 1) that have taken the lead in diplomatic efforts, and to keep up the pressure on Iran. Simultaneously,
the United States must hedge against the failure of a war-avoidance policy, and begin preparing
for an Israeli attack on Iran and Iranian retaliation. This will be a thorny process insofar as defensive
measures the United States takes in the region, or urges its allies to take, could be read in Tehran
as preparation for an attack and thus cast as justification for further destabilizing Iranian action.
Israel is not eager for war with Iran, or to disrupt its special relationship with the United States.

But the fact remains that it considers the Iranian threat an existential one and its bilateral relationship
with the United States a durable one, and will act if it perceives momentous jeopardy to the Israeli
people or state. Thus, while Israel may be amenable to American arguments for restraint, those arguments
must be backed predominantly by concrete measures to contain the threat and reaffirmations
of the special relationship, and only secondarily by warnings of the deterioration of the relationship,
to be persuasive.