Archive for October 2009

DEBKAfile – US, French, Israeli army chiefs rendezvous secretly in Normandy

October 8, 2009

DEBKAfile – US, French, Israeli army chiefs rendezvous secretly in Normandy

Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the joint US chiefs of staff, French chief of staff Gen. Jean-Louis Georgelin and Israel’s armed forces chief, Lt. Gen. Gaby Ashkenazi met secretly in Normandy, northern France Sunday, Oct. 4. DEBKAfile‘s military sources report it was not the first encounter between the US and Israel army chiefs. On April 3, Adm. Mullen invited Gen. Ashkenazi to meet him on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Strasbourg, to sound him out on Israeli plans for striking Iranian nuclear facilities.

According to our sources, the Normandy get-together is quiet different. The three army leaders met to review the new military conditions emerging in the Middle East following the understanding reached between Washington and Moscow for scrapping US plans to install missile shield systems in East Europe. Russia is assuming a major role in the region with the full support of the Obama administration, part of its plan for a new diplomatic-military front against Iran composed of the US, Russia and Middle East nations.

Leon T. Hadar: Let France, Israel, the Saudis Deter Iran

October 8, 2009

Leon T. Hadar: Let France, Israel, the Saudis Deter Iran

Leon T. Hadar

Leon T. Hadar

Journalist and foreign affairs analyst

Posted: October 7, 2009 06:38 PM
According to Washington’s latest conventional wisdom, France under President Nicolas Sarkozy has been steadily embracing a tougher approach towards Iran and is sounding now more belligerent than the Obama Administration in demanding that Tehran end its nuclear program. Indeed, Sarkozy seems to have been transformed into the “Scoop” Jackson du jour of neoconservative pundits who just a few years ago were bashing France as “our oldest enemy” and the French as “Cheese-eating surrender monkeys” and who now seem to be doing a lot of French kissing.

Hence, columnist Charles Krauthammer who had expressed “the particular satisfaction of seeing Anglo-Saxon cannonballs puncturing the [French] Tricolor,” after watching the naval epic film “Master and Commander” in November 2003, is now contrasting “Obama’s fecklessness” on Iran with Sarkozy’s manly attitude towards Tehran’s ruling clerics.

That Sarkozy has been expressing his growing concerns over Iran’s nuclear program with an uncompromising language may have something to do with his prickly personality or it could reflect his reliance on alarming reports provided to him by French intelligence services. Or perhaps as some suggested, the French have been designated to play the role of the “bad cop” against the American “good cop” in the negotiations between members of the E3+3 group and the Iranian representatives in Geneva.

But instead of searching for a secret agenda to explain the French behavior we should take them at their word. It’s more likely that Sarkozy’s comments reflect real concerns in Paris about the possibility that the Islamic Republic of Iran is getting close to acquiring nuclear military capability. It may be difficult for American pundits who tend to subscribe to a world-view according to which the French and other foreign leaders either assume the role of anti-American bad guys, as former French President Jacques Chirac supposedly did in responding to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or play the part of the pro-American good guys, the way President Sarkozy is allegedly doing now, to apply the following Realpolitik axiom: Decisions about war and peace are made in Paris or other world capitals almost always based on existing perceptions of national interest.

Chirac, reflecting the view shared by the French political elites was skeptical about U.S. allegations that Iraq had nuclear weapons or that it had posed any direct threat to French security interests (and he was right). Sarkozy believes that unlike the Iraq ruled by the bungling and secular Saddam Hussein, a resurgent Islamic Republic of Iran (thanks to the Bush Administration’s policies) with nukes could pose such a threat to French national security.

In fact, Sarkozy’s predecessor in office was also very apprehensive about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Without naming Iran, Chirac in an address he made in early 2006 warned that states which threatened his country could face the “ultimate warning” of a nuclear retaliation. The warning was followed by a French decision to modify its nuclear arsenal to increase the strike range and accuracy of its weapons, according to a report published by the French Liberation. Moreover, in an interview with American and French journalists in January 2007, Chirac suggested that if Iran were ever to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran. According to The New York Times, Chirac explained that it would be an act of self-destruction for Iran to use a nuclear weapon against another country. “Where will it drop it, this bomb? On Israel?” Chirac asked. “It would not have gone off 200 meters into the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed to the ground.”

The deconstruction of Chirac’s remarks suggests that French strategic planners, not unlike many of the leading U.S. foreign policy realists, have concluded that the most effective response to the threat of a nuclear Iran would be a robust containment and deterrence policy. Indeed, while they continue to publicly threaten a possible military strike against Iran’s nuclear sites, the Israelis have been preparing for the “day after” – if and when Iran goes nuclear — by developing a second-strike capability. Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak said recently that he didn’t consider Iran’s nuclear program an “existential issue” reflecting the assumption that Israel would be able to deter an Iranian nuclear attack by demonstrating that it could survive a first strike to retaliate effectively against Iran (as Chirac pointed out).

There is no doubt that the acquisition of nuclear weapons could reduce Israel’s security margin if and when it tries to respond to potential threats from Iran’s regional allies, like Lebanon’s Hizbollah. Tehran’s nuclear capability could become an element in the strategic calculation, in the same way that the U.S. was constrained in its ability to use conventional military force against Soviet’s allies during the Cold War when the doctrine of mutual assured destruction (MAD) was in place.

Indeed, the utilization of a version of the same doctrine — call is mini-MAD — may explain why the two nuclear military powers of South Asia — India and Pakistan — have been able to preserve a stable balance of power in the region and refrained from going to war since they both had gotten the bomb. In fact, the notion that Saudi Arabia and other Arab governments could decide to join the nuclear club shouldn’t cause us too many sleepless nights. There is no reason why Washington should not encourage the French, the Saudis, or the Israelis to protect themselves against a potential threat from a nuclear Iran. The French, working together with other members of the European Union (EU) have all the financial and technological resources they need in order to develop an effective deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Iran. At the same time, the Saudis and the other Arab governments and the Israelis should consider the notion that taking steps to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and create the conditions for regional strategic cooperation in dealing with Iran is in their national interest; after all, a nuclear attack on Israel will probably destroy most of Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

In a way, by continuing to count on the Americans to protect them against a nuclear Iran, the French, the Saudis and the Israelis are trying to avoid making the very costly decisions involved if they are forced to assume the responsibility for their own security. From that perspective, a U.S. military strike against Iran that would probably retard the Iranian nuclear program by a few years would also allow the French, the Saudis and the Israelis and other governments to postpone making some hard choices about their security as they continue to free ride on U.S. military protection.

U.S. foreign policy makers and analysts who are calling on the U.S. to assume that responsibility by either attacking Iran or by providing a “nuclear umbrella” to Israel and the Saudis hope that such a costly American policy would allow the U.S. to continue maintaining its strategic hegemony in the Middle East. After all, if the Europeans and the Middle Eastern end-up demonstrating that they are able to protect themselves without the need to rely on U.S. leadership aka American military interventions, those who in Washington who benefit from securing that leadership could become the main losers.

US may leave PAC3 missile defense systems in Israel | Israel | Jerusalem Post

October 6, 2009

US may leave PAC3 missile defense systems in Israel | Israel | Jerusalem Post

Israel and the US are in talks regarding the possibility that America will leave several Patriot 3 missile defense systems behind, following a joint missile defense exercise that will begin next week, defense officials said Monday.

The Patriot (PAC) 3 system.

The Patriot (PAC) 3 system.
Photo: AP

The Juniper Cobra exercise will begin next week in southern Israel, where US and Israeli forces will run simulations on various threat scenarios involving missile attacks against Israel.

Ahead of the exercise, some 15 US Navy ships have arrived in Israel, in addition to about a dozen transport planes that brought equipment to air force bases in the Negev.

This year’s drill is being described as the largest joint exercise ever held by the countries. During it they will jointly test four ballistic missile defense systems – the Israeli Arrow 2, the ship-based Aegis, the high-altitude THAAD and the Patriot (PAC) 3 systems. This is the first time that all of these systems are deployed here.

Israeli defense officials said that there were ongoing talks between the sides regarding the possibility that the US would leave several of the PAC3 systems behind following the drills.

“There are talks about this possibility and the Americans will likely decide to leave the PAC3 systems here after the exercise,” one official said.

Juniper Cobra, senior defense officials said this week, is aimed at creating infrastructure in case Israel is attacked and the US decides to send the Aegis or THAAD to bolster the Arrow. The exercise spans several days and involves hundreds of Israeli and American soldiers, mostly from the air force.

The primary focus of the Juniper Cobra exercise held in 2007, for example, was integrating the lower-altitude US Patriot missile systems with the higher-altitude Arrow 2. This year, the integration will focus on improving the interoperability between the Arrow, THAAD and Aegis.

Ahead of the 1991 Gulf War, the first Bush administration sent Patriot missile batteries to help defend the country against Saddam Hussein’s Scud missile attacks, and last October, the second Bush administration gave Israel a farewell gift in the form of the X-Band radar, which is deployed in the Negev and is capable of detecting targets thousands of miles away, providing five to seven minutes of warning before an Iranian missile strikes.

Iran’s nukes in exchange for peace – Haaretz – Israel News

October 5, 2009

Iran’s nukes in exchange for peace – Haaretz – Israel News

Iran’s nukes in exchange for peace
By Akiva Eldar
Tags: Iran nuclear program, Iran

One of the best-known sayings bandied about in this region is that “Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.” This has been the official position of successive Israeli governments. What is less known is that after a comprehensive, regional peace agreement is reached, Israel will support a regional decommissioning of nuclear weapons. Recently, President Shimon Peres personally confirmed to me that this was the policy he had presented to the world when he served as prime minister. He added that as far as he knows, this policy remains in effect to this day.

Let us assume that tomorrow Iran informs its American interlocutors that it will cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, abide by all United Nations resolutions relating to nuclear weapons, and recognize Israel – but on two conditions: first, that Iran will receive assurances from the international community that it will immediately act to implement UN resolutions calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state in territories conquered in 1967, and a commitment to expedite the end of Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights; secondly, that Israel be forced to open its reactor in Dimona to IAEA inspectors, to ensure that the country has developed nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes rather than for producing dozens of atomic bombs, which foreign press reports say do, in fact, exist.

Is this a scenario for the distant future? Not necessarily. During a meeting among the foreign ministers of Muslim states that took place in Tehran in May 2003, Iran – then led by president Mohammad Khatami – voted in favor of the Arab League peace initiative introduced in March 2002. According to the initiative, which has since become part of the road map as well as UN Security Council Resolution 1515, the Arab League would offer Israel full, normalized relations in exchange for a total withdrawal from the territories.

Flynt Leverett, the senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council during president George W. Bush’s first term in office, claims that on at least two occasions, Washington ignored conciliatory gestures from Tehran. In a lecture he gave in June 2006 before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Leverett recalled that in the spring of 2003 – a short time after the U.S. invasion of Iraq – the Swiss ambassador to Tehran relayed to the White House an Iranian offer which included three elements: an agreement to launch negotiations with the U.S. administration over the nuclear issue, to adopt the Arab League initiative, and to cease support of Palestinian terrorist organizations based outside of the territories. The Bush administration ignored the message.

According to an article written by Leverett at the time, this was not the first time that an Iranian offer was met with a cold shoulder. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, he noted, Iran offered the Bush administration assistance in stopping the terrorism sowed by Al-Qaida and the Taliban. Bush preferred to adopt the “Axis of Evil” strategy. In a New York Times op-ed piece which he co-authored with his wife, Hillary Mann Leverett, Leverett warned U.S. President Barack Obama not to repeat the same mistakes as his predecessor vis-a-vis Iran.

Today Leverett, a research fellow who specializes in Iran at The New America Foundation, shares the view of many experts, who are doubtful of the chances that Russia and China will support more stringent sanctions against Iran. Given the fact that the “traditional” sanctions policy has not produced any tangible results, they warn that Obama will be faced with two unsavory options: coming to terms with an uninspected Iranian nuclear program that will demonstrate the powerlessness of the international community; or another war in the Middle East.

Leverett proposes a different approach: replacing the language of sanctions against Iran with an attempt to build new relations with it, based on shared interests. In the op-ed piece, he noted that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared recently in New York that cooperation with the United States on the nuclear issue is possible only within the context of a wider strategic understanding in the diplomatic, security-related and economic realms.

Is this a case of naivete? Perhaps. It is certainly possible that the ayatollah regime seeks to mislead the Americans in order to buy more time to complete its nuclear program. But what will we do if the Iranians surprise Obama with an offer to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons and to help establish peace throughout the entire region? It is so convenient for us to remain tied to the policy of ambiguity on both issues. Netanyahu needs to prepare himself for the possibility that Iran will redeem its concessions vis-a-vis its nuclear program with Israeli concessions over the territories.

No relief in Geneva | Iran news | Jerusalem Post

October 5, 2009

No relief in Geneva | Iran news | Jerusalem Post

DAVID HOROVITZ DAVID HOROVITZ
Oct 5, 2009 0:15 | Updated Oct 5, 2009 9:08
Analysis: No relief in Geneva
By DAVID HOROVITZ

In remarks to American Jewish leaders on Friday, Israel’s man in Washington, Michael Oren, gave a certain cautious welcome to the results of the previous day’s first direct Iranian-American diplomatic engagement on Iran’s nuclear program.

IAEA’s ElBaradei: Inspectors to visit Qom plant on October 25

Teheran’s readiness to open its Qom enrichment site to IAEA inspectors and its apparent willingness to have other countries process its enriched uranium for ostensible peaceful use, said the ambassador, could be considered “important and rather positive developments.”

It would be a mistake, however, to read any genuine sense of Israeli relief, much less pleasure, into that kind of polished diplomatic response. Oren’s comments merely reflect Israel’s decision to publicly endorse President Barack Obama’s attempt at diplomacy, even though there is utter certainty in Jerusalem that Iran is playing for time and will not be talked out of the bomb.

Oren spelled out, tellingly, that Israel was backing the effort at engagement on condition that the talks with Teheran “not be open-ended, that there would be an eye on the enrichment clock, which continues to tick.”

Indeed it does. And there can only be heightened concern in Jerusalem that the headlines from Geneva, hailing the apparent positive headway made at the engagement talks there, are obscuring this immensely troubling fact.

What happened in Geneva was that Iran grudgingly accepted inspection of a facility it had constructed in secret, and is now presumably rendering inoffensive ahead of those checks, and it agreed in theory to have its uranium enriched overseas – a concession it is now disputing and no great hardship anyway.

What didn’t happen in Geneva was anything that moved Iran any nearer to freezing enrichment – that is, to halting its serene path to nuclear weapons.

Indeed, Iran has been unprepared to so much as discuss halting those parts of its program that are slowly but surely bringing it to the status of a nuclear threshold nation.

The flawed nature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is that states can claim to be working within its framework and complying with its requirements while hauling themselves to the very brink of nuclear weapons capability – ready to “break out” to the bomb in a matter of months, if not weeks.

It has long been Israel’s conviction that this is the Iranians’ game plan: stay more or less within the parameters of the NPT until they have reached that threshold, and then, at the moment of their choosing, aided with progress made at various non-disclosed facilities, breach the treaty and go nuclear when it’s too late for anyone to stop them.

Israel never accepted the dramatic assertion in the 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Jerusalem is convinced that by now, neither delivery systems nor weaponization constitute serious obstacles to an Iranian bomb.

That’s why, from Israel’s point of view, Iran must be denied sufficient quantities of sufficiently enriched uranium to make that final push for the bomb. The “break out” capacity must be prevented.

Curiously, Oren’s was a lone official Israeli voice responding to Geneva. The silence from Jerusalem was deafening.

And whatever the ostensible “important and positive” developments at the talks, the fact is that so long as Iran keeps those centrifuges spinning, the window on diplomacy, from Israel’s point of view, is closing by the day.

petroleumworld

October 5, 2009

petroleumworld

Editorial / Commentary / Opinion

Kenneth R. Timmerman : Big, ominous win for Iran



Thursday’s meeting in Geneva between the great powers and Iran delivered a big win for Iran, whose President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad could go to bed that night once again truly believing “America can do nothing” – a phase his mentor, Islamic revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, loved to repeat.

The buildup on our side of these talks was tremendous. Expectations ran high that Iran’s representative would simply grandstand and use the talks to sermonize the United States, that we would walk out, and “crippling sanctions” would begin.

But the Iranians played us masterfully. Instead of repeating Mr. Ahmadinejad’s mantra that the nuclear issue was “off the table” and Iran would be happy to discuss the terms of our surrender, his representative, Saeed Jalali, bought precious time for Iran to continue its clandestine nuclear activities.

Sen. Joe Lieberman, Connecticut independent, set the standard for what the talks should have produced in remarks to a conference on Capitol Hill at the very moment our negotiating team was getting snookered by the Iranians.

“If our engagement with Iran is to have credibility, the parties need to emerge from the meeting in Geneva today with a set of clear and credible benchmarks for mutual steps forward and a timetable for meeting them,” Mr. Lieberman said. “These benchmarks must include verifiable suspension of all enrichment activities, as repeatedly demanded by the U.N. Security Council, and full cooperation with the [International Atomic Energy Agency] to resolve all outstanding questions about Iran’s nuclear-related activities.”

None of that came out of Thursday’s meeting with the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany (P5+1). Instead, the Iranians changed the subject.

Iran remains in utter defiance of multiple Security Council resolutions that demand total suspension of uranium-enrichment activities.

Rather than discuss that issue – the core issue – the P5+1 allowed Mr. Jalali to sidetrack the discussions to make complex arrangements so Iran could gain access to enriched uranium. That’s right. Rather than talk about stopping Iran’s enrichment activities, the meeting enhanced Iran’s access to enriched uranium. No amount of White House spin can call that a “win” for the United States.

The last-minute “deal” with Iran about sending its declared supplies of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for further enrichment is a cute negotiating ploy that Mr. Ahmadinejad floated a few days ahead of the meeting. It is a side issue of no relevance to the core problem of Iran’s continued defiance of the Security Council and its refusal to come clean on its nuclear weapons research, which very well could include additional, undeclared supplies of LEU.

Mr. Ahmadinejad only needed one thing from the Geneva talks: to keep us talking. The longer he can delay hard deadlines and hard demands from the world powers, the more time he has to complete his nuclear designs and put in place new sources of refined petroleum should the U.S. Congress move forward legislation – stalled at White House request – to impose a ban on gasoline sales to Iran.

Mr. Obama was right to respond cautiously to the news from Geneva, saying that “talk is no substitute for action.” Yet, on the action side of the talks, Iran won hands-down.

Iran has been demanding that its case be handed back to the IAEA, not the Security Council. Why? Because it knows it can slow-roll the Vienna-based inspectors, as it has been doing for the past 17 years. (That’s right: since 1992, when the IAEA under blind Hans Blix first attempted to conduct something akin to a surprise inspection and failed miserably even to find the sites it wanted to inspect). The great powers granted Iran’s request and announced that IAEA inspectors would leave in two weeks for Iran to ask permission to visit the formerly secret uranium enrichment facility in Qom.

That inspection could stretch out a long time. Meanwhile, we have no confidence that Iran has not built additional underground enrichment plants or a warhead-design facility. We don’t even know for certain that Iran has not actually tested a low-yield nuclear device, as Assistant Secretary of State for Verification Paula A. DeSutter revealed in 2007 in written responses to questions from Sen. Jon Kyl, Arizona Republican. By digging a test cavity into the massive salt domes of its eastern desert and using venting and decoupling techniques, Iran could reduce the seismic signature of a nuclear test by 70 percent to 100 percent and thus escape detection, Ms. DeSutter said.

Brookings Institution scholar Kenneth M. Pollack, a self-styled “cheerleader” of Mr. Obama’s engagement policy, now says engagement is a “pipedream” and that the administration must consider new policies for the long-term “containment” of Iran.

In clear terms, that means learning to live with a nuclear-armed Iran. Not only is this a dangerous admission of U.S. failure and U.S. weakness, but it also essentially shifts the entire burden of preventing a nuclear Iran onto Israel.

As Winston Churchill said after Neville Chamberlain returned from negotiating with Adolf Hitler in Munich, “You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor, and you will have war.”

Good news?!!!!

October 4, 2009

Obama aide: U.S. pleased by Iran nuke cooperation – Haaretz – Israel News

Last update – 17:48 04/10/2009
Obama aide: U.S. pleased by Iran nuke cooperation
By The Associated Press
Tags: IAEA, Israel news, Iran

The United States is pleased by some positive signs of cooperation from Iran regarding the latter’s contentious nuclear program, a senior official in the Obama administration said Sunday.

“For now, things are moving in the right direction,” U.S. President Barack Obama’s national security adviser James Jones said on CNN’s “State of the Union” program.

“The fact that Iran came to the table and seemingly showed some degree of cooperation is a good thing,” Jones told CNN.

“Clearly, on non-proliferation, whether it is North Korea or Iran, the world is sending its own message to both countries and fortunately we are seeing some positive reaction to that,” Jones said.

Jones made the comment after word from the head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog agency that international inspectors would visit Tehran’s newly revealed uranium enrichment site on October 25.

Asked whether Iran was closer to having a bomb, Jones said: “No, we stand by the reports that we have put out.”

“What has happened with regard to Iran in the last couple of weeks has been very significant,” Jones said, pointing to the Iranian decision to open a new uranium enrichment facility near the holy Shi’ite city of Qom for inspection.

The U.S. and other world powers are still looking for answers in the short term, Jones said, adding that it would not likely take extended discussions before the U.S. and others decided on their bext step.

Also on Sunday, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice said that Washington and other veto-holding permanent members in the United Nations Security Council were studying sanction options if Iran does not prove its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes.

Rice also said the so-called P-5 + 1 is in a period of intense negotiations with Tehran, but that Iran had a finite period to completely open its nuclear program to international inspections. She refused to set a deadline.

Rice said the United States had three options: to push sanctions through the UN, to work with European allies to punish Iran, or to take unilateral action in conjunction with the other possible courses of action.

Rice spoke Sunday on NBC television’s Meet the Press.

UN watchdog to inspect Iran nuclear site Oct. 25

The head of the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog on Sunday said inspectors would be examining Iran’s recently revealed nuclear facility on October 25.

Head of the United Nations’ nuclear watchdog, Mohammed ElBaradei, said Sunday that inspectors would be examining Iran’s recently revealed nuclear facility on October 25.

ElBaradei spole in Tehran following talks with Iranian officials over a recently revealed uranium enrichment facility that has caused consternation around to world over the extent and purpose of Iran’s nuclear program.

At the news conference Sunday, ElBaradei said that Iran’s relations with the West were moving from “conspiracy” to “cooperation” and that the nuclear dispute could be resolved through diplomacy.

“It is important for us to send our inspectors to have a comprehensive verification of the facility and to make sure that it is for peaceful purposes,” he said. “We agreed that our inspectors will inspect the site on the 25th of October.”

ElBaradei, who sat alongside Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi, said talks had been a success and he saw the possibility of defusing the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear program.

“We need transparency on the part of Iran and we need cooperation on the part of the international community,” he said, describing a shifting of gears in relations between Iran and the western powers.

Revelations that Iran had a second, previously unknown, site to refine uranium has raised new international fears over the purposes of the nation’s nuclear program.

The U.S. and its allies say Iran’s program is seeking nuclear weapons while Iran says it is for peaceful purposes.

Addressing the issue of the recently revealed nuclear site at Qom, ElBaradei said that “Iran should have informed us the day they decided to construct the facility … Iran has a different view on that but the agency view was that,” he said.

He said Salehi would visit the IAEA headquarters in Vienna on October 19, ahead of the inspectors visit to Iran.

“It is important for us to have comprehensive cooperation over the Qom site. We had dialogue, we had talks on clarification of the facility in Qom, which is a pilot enrichment plant,” ElBaradei said.

He said there was no “concrete proof” that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons capability but the IAEA remained concerned over the possibility.

“I continue to say today that the agency has no concrete proof that there is an ongoing weapons program in Iran. There are allegations that Iran has conducted weaponization studies. However, these are issues that we are still looking into,” ElBaradei said, speaking in English.

Nuke expert: Obama?s two-week inspection deadline gives Iran time to hide the evidence

October 3, 2009

Hot Air » Blog Archive » Nuke expert: Obama?s two-week inspection deadline gives Iran time to hide the evidence

Allowing access within two weeks of the announcement would in effect give Tehran almost a month after its Sept. 21 acknowledgment of the plant’s existence to obscure evidence, they said.

David Albright, a former international weapons inspector and president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security, said it would probably take Iran some time to conceal activities. But, “if you have a month, you have the time,” he said.

A European official who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the issue said the six world powers “did well” to win Iran’s agreement to permit access. But the official acknowledged that swifter access would have been better…

But Albright said faster is better. “It’s not good that the inspection has taken so long,” he said.

“There is no reason it could not have happened yesterday,” he said. “It should have.”

He’s assuming Iran will have a month because he’s using Sept. 21, the date they finally told the IAEA that the Qom facility exists, as his starting point. But in fact, assuming they intend to let inspectors into the plant — which is still uncertain, believe it or not — they probably started moving equipment out of there before then. Remember, the strong suspicion among diplomats is that Iran only disclosed the Qom site because they were tipped off that the west knew about it and was about to reveal it; the “voluntary” disclosure was Tehran’s way of making it look as though they were being good, honest international citizens. In all likelihood there was some (short) interim period between the time they learned that the west was onto them and their decision to disclose on Sept. 21, and that interim could have been used to hide evidence. That was the risk the west ran by sitting on their intelligence about the building, which leaves The One now forced to issue tough-sounding deadlines that really don’t mean much since (a) the smoking gun is probably already gone and (b) a truly tough deadline, demanding inspections immediately in order to seize whatever smoking gun might still be there, would provoke an international crisis if Iran said no, and the west simply isn’t prepared to deal with that. In fact, read this dishy Telegraph piece about the argument between Obama, Brown, and Sarkozy about when to spill the beans on Qom. The Europeans wanted it done in dramatic fashion at the Security Council meeting that Obama chaired, but The One didn’t want his special moment on disarmament interrupted so they waited until the next morning to do it at a presser. And really, why not? It’s already too late. What’s another day?

So where are we at now? Same place we’ve always been: Wondering if Iran’s simply jerking us around to buy time.

For the administration, though, the problem is that no one is certain that the Iranian government will actually do what Western officials say that it has now agreed to do. In fact, on Friday, less than 24 hours after the talks in Geneva broke up, Iranian officials did not sound as if they thought they had promised anything.

“No, no!” Mehdi Saffare, Iran’s ambassador to Britain and a member of the Iranian delegation to the negotiations, said, according to the Associated Press. He said that the idea of sending Iran’s enriched uranium out of the county had “not been discussed yet.”

This is not the first time that Western officials have left discussions with their Iranian counterparts thinking they had a deal, only to see it melt away. In 2007, European diplomats said they thought they had wrung a concession from Iran on the same issue, enriching uranium outside the country for use in Iranian reactors, only to have Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reject the idea as an infringement of Iran’s sovereignty.

“That’s the big ‘if,’ isn’t it?” a senior Obama administration official said. “Will they do it? No one wants to do a premature victory lap.”

By all means, let’s hold off on that, um, “victory lap” for the time being. Your must-read of the day is this Jackson Diehl commentary on what will be, in short order, the new international reality on Iran: Trying to “contain” an Islamic fundamentalist regime that has nuclear weapons. We all know the talks are going to go nowhere, so much so that Congress is already working on authorizing sanctions so that Obama can put them into practice at a moment’s notice. Which is to say, we’re really just buying time too at this point. The reckoning will come next year.

Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb – NYTimes.com

October 3, 2009

Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb – NYTimes.com

Senior staff members of the United Nations nuclear agency have concluded in a confidential analysis that Iran has acquired “sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable” atom bomb.

The report by experts in the International Atomic Energy Agency stresses in its introduction that its conclusions are tentative and subject to further confirmation of the evidence, which it says came from intelligence agencies and its own investigations.

But the report’s conclusions, described by senior European officials, go well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States.

Two years ago, American intelligence agencies published a detailed report concluding that Tehran halted its efforts to design a nuclear weapon in 2003. But in recent months, Britain has joined France, Germany and Israel in disputing that conclusion, saying the work has been resumed.

A senior American official said last week that the United States was now re-evaluating its 2007 conclusions.

The atomic agency’s report also presents evidence that beyond improving upon bomb-making information gathered from rogue nuclear experts around the world, Iran has done extensive research and testing on how to fashion the components of a weapon. It does not say how far that work has progressed.

The report, titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” was produced in consultation with a range of nuclear weapons experts inside and outside the agency. It draws a picture of a complex program, run by Iran’s Ministry of Defense, “aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system,” Iran’s medium-range missile, which can strike the Middle East and parts of Europe. The program, according to the report, apparently began in early 2002.

If Iran is designing a warhead, that would represent only part of the complex process of making nuclear arms. Experts say Iran has already mastered the hardest part, enriching the uranium that can be used as nuclear fuel.

While the analysis represents the judgment of the nuclear agency’s senior staff, a struggle has erupted in recent months over whether to make it public. The dispute pits the agency’s departing director, Mohamed ElBaradei, against his own staff and against foreign governments eager to intensify pressure on Iran.

Dr. ElBaradei has long been reluctant to adopt a confrontational strategy with Iran, an approach he considers counterproductive. Responding to calls for the report’s release, he has raised doubts about its completeness and reliability.

Last month, the agency issued an unusual statement cautioning it “has no concrete proof” that Iran ever sought to make nuclear arms, much less to perfect a warhead. On Saturday in India, Dr. ElBaradei was quoted as saying that “a major question” about the authenticity of the evidence kept his agency from “making any judgment at all” on whether Iran had ever sought to design a nuclear warhead.

Even so, the emerging sense in the intelligence world that Iran has solved the major nuclear design problems poses a new diplomatic challenge for President Obama and his allies as they confront Iran.

American officials say that in the direct negotiations with Iran that began last week, it will be vital to get the country to open all of its suspected sites to international inspectors. That is a long list, topped by the underground nuclear enrichment center under construction near Qum, that was revealed 10 days ago.

Iran has acknowledged that the underground facility is intended as a nuclear enrichment center, but says the fuel it makes will be used solely to produce nuclear power and medical isotopes. It was kept heavily protected, Iranian officials said, to ward off potential attacks.

Iran said last week that it would allow inspectors to visit the site this month. In the past three years, amid mounting evidence of a possible military dimension to its nuclear program, Iran has denied the agency wide access to installations, documents and personnel.

In recent weeks, there have been leaks about the internal report, perhaps intended to press Dr. ElBaradei into releasing it.

The report’s existence has been rumored for months, and The Associated Press, saying it had seen a copy, reported fragments of it in September. On Friday, more detailed excerpts appeared on the Web site of the Institute for Science and International Security, run by David Albright, a nuclear expert.

In recent interviews, a senior European official familiar with the contents of the full report described it to The New York Times. He confirmed that Mr. Albright’s excerpts were authentic. The excerpts were drawn from a 67-page version of the report written earlier this year and since revised and lengthened, the official said; its main conclusions remain unchanged.

“This is a running summary of where we are,” the official said.

“But there is some loose language,” he added, and it was “not ready for publication as an official document.”

Most dramatically, the report says the agency “assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device” based on highly enriched uranium.

Weapons based on the principle of implosion are considered advanced models compared with the simple gun-type bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima. They use a blast wave from a sphere of conventional explosives to compress a ball of bomb fuel into a supercritical mass, starting the atomic chain reaction and progressing to the fiery blast. Implosion designs, compact by nature, are considered necessary for making nuclear warheads small and powerful enough to fit atop a missile.

The excerpts of the analysis also suggest the Iranians have done a wide array of research and testing to perfect nuclear arms, like making high-voltage detonators, firing test explosives and designing warheads.

The evidence underlying these conclusions is not new: Some of it was reported in a confidential presentation to many nations in early 2008 by the agency’s chief inspector, Ollie Heinonen.

Iran maintains that its scientists have never conducted research on how to make a warhead. Iranian officials say any documents to the contrary are fraudulent.

But in August, a public report to the board of the I.A.E.A. by its staff concluded that the evidence of Iran’s alleged military activity was probably genuine.

It said “the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts” about the nature of its nuclear program.

The agency’s tentative analysis also says that Iran “most likely” obtained the needed information for designing and building an implosion bomb “from external sources” and then adapted the information to its own needs.

It said nothing specific about the “external sources,” but many intelligence agencies assume that Iran obtained a bomb design from A. Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani black marketer who sold it machines to enrich uranium. That information may have been supplemented by a Russian nuclear weapons scientist who visited Iran often, investigators say.

The I.A.E.A.’s internal report concluded that the staff believed “that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly.”

News Analysis – U.S. Wonders if Iran Is Playing for Time or Is Serious on Deal – NYTimes.com

October 3, 2009

News Analysis – U.S. Wonders if Iran Is Playing for Time or Is Serious on Deal – NYTimes.com

By HELENE COOPER
Published: October 2, 2009

WASHINGTON — President Obama got what he said he wanted when United States negotiators met with their Iranian counterparts this week in Geneva: direct engagement, without preconditions, with Iran.

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Pablo Martinez Monsivais/Associated Press

President Obama is trying to walk a fine line between celebrating a possible breakthrough in negotiations with Iran and being wary of the possibility that Tehran may just be playing for time.

But the trick now for Mr. Obama, administration officials concede, will be to avoid getting tripped up. In other words, is the Iranian government serious this time?

The clearest risk is that the Iranians may play for time, as they have often been accused of doing in the past, making promises and encouraging more meetings, while waiting for political currents to change or the closed ranks among the Western allies to break.

After Tehran agreed to send most of its openly declared enriched uranium outside Iran to be turned into fuel, Obama administration officials were clearly walking a fine line on Thursday between celebrating what could be a possible breakthrough in international efforts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions and sounding appropriately skeptical that the administration was not going to be played by Tehran.

“Taking the step of transferring its low-enriched uranium to a third country would be a step towards building confidence that Iran’s program is in fact peaceful,” Mr. Obama said Thursday. But, perhaps aware of the country’s history of appearing to make concessions and then backing off, he quickly added: “We’re not interested in talking for the sake of talking. If Iran does not take steps in the near future to live up to its obligations, then the United States will not continue to negotiate indefinitely, and we are prepared to move towards increased pressure.”

It was, in many ways, the exact opposite of what a White House usually does after major international talks. Instead of painting lukewarm concessions as major breakthroughs and going on and on about “warm substantive” meetings, officials were treating a potentially major breakthrough as if it were a suspicious package.

If Iran has really agreed to send most of its openly declared enriched uranium out of the country to be turned into fuel, that is a significant concession, experts said, and much more than the Bush administration ever got over the years of its nonengagement dance with Iran.

“This is actually quite important if it takes place,” said Ray Takeyh, a former Iran adviser to the Obama administration. “If you establish an arrangement whereby Iran’s fuel is exported abroad, then that relieves some degree of your proliferation concern.”

For the administration, though, the problem is that no one is certain that the Iranian government will actually do what Western officials say that it has now agreed to do. In fact, on Friday, less than 24 hours after the talks in Geneva broke up, Iranian officials did not sound as if they thought they had promised anything.

“No, no!” Mehdi Saffare, Iran’s ambassador to Britain and a member of the Iranian delegation to the negotiations, said, according to the Associated Press. He said that the idea of sending Iran’s enriched uranium out of the county had “not been discussed yet.”

This is not the first time that Western officials have left discussions with their Iranian counterparts thinking they had a deal, only to see it melt away. In 2007, European diplomats said they thought they had wrung a concession from Iran on the same issue, enriching uranium outside the country for use in Iranian reactors, only to have Iran’s supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, reject the idea as an infringement of Iran’s sovereignty.

“That’s the big ‘if,’ isn’t it?” a senior Obama administration official said. “Will they do it? No one wants to do a premature victory lap.” He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly about the issue.

There are some circumstances that would seem to favor Mr. Obama, analysts said. Fresh from the turmoil in Iran after the disputed presidential election in June that secured a second term for the hard-line president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian government is “fighting on three fronts,” said Abbas Milani, director of the Iranian studies program at Stanford University. “They’re fighting with the people of Iran, they’re fighting within themselves, and they’re fighting with the international community. They’ve just decided that they can’t fight a three-front war, so they’re trying to lower the tension on the fight with the international community, at least.”

In recent weeks, Mr. Obama has also secured — at least for now — some support from Russia, which emerged after Mr. Obama decided to replace the missile defense program in Eastern Europe favored by President George W. Bush with a version less threatening to Moscow. President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia signaled for the first time that Russia would be amenable to longstanding American requests to toughen sanctions against Iran if the nuclear talks failed.

Still, the administration’s caution is warranted, said Mr. Takeyh, the former adviser on Iran, especially since some Iranian officials in Tehran denied on Friday that they had assured the United States and other major powers in Geneva that they would open a recently disclosed uranium enrichment plant near Qum to international inspectors within two weeks.

This was in addition to the dispute over whether Iran had agreed to send much of its low-enriched uranium, known in the field as L.E.U., to be turned into fuel in other counties.

“You don’t want to go out and celebrate an achievement and then watch the Iranians backtrack,” Mr. Takeyh said. “You have to actually get that L.E.U. on a plane.”