WarSclerotic

Redeployment serves Israel well
Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yaakov Amidror Monday August 4, 2014

Not sure I agree, but I’m just an armchair general and have not children being sent into harm’s way. I would, however, rename the article, ‘Digging in for a Long Protracted War’ or ‘How I Learned to Love the Rules of Engagement’ – LS

Israel has pulled back a large number of troops from inside the Gaza Strip. Once the remaining few tunnels are destroyed, the Israel Defense Forces will only leave a residual force along the border. The order of battle will shrink to the level that preceded the ground operation.

The troops will assume a better defensive posture that would not require any direct engagement with the Gaza Strip’s urban environment. They will essentially control the area in between the tunnels’ entry point inside Gaza Strip and the border fence on its perimeter.

The Diplomatic-Security Cabinet had a very clear objective when it authorized the ground offensive: destroying the tunnel network. The troops were told to limit their activity to those areas where the Israel-bound tunnels originated and their immediate surroundings.

With the tunnels taken care of, and without any new intelligence coming up, it was determined that the mission was accomplished. Keeping the troops inside any longer would have been disadvantageous. But now, having settled on a new tactical approach, Israel must decide about the next phase of Operation Protective Edge.

The conscripted army has shouldered most of the war effort, with the reserves serving in a supportive role. The younger troops will be the ones who go into Gaza in the event of a wide-scale ground invasion. Thus, to better prepare for such a contingency, it made sense to withdraw the troops and let them rest, resupply and recharge. Israeli troops would have to be at the top of their game if they were to endure a protracted campaign.

It is not just about seizing key parts of the Gaza Strip. The IDF would do that rather quickly. The problem is that the IDF would have to then begin demilitarizing the Gaza Strip by seizing weapon systems and arm-production facilities, as well as crackdown on terrorists. That would take months.

The IDF now has troops deployed along the entire border. This way they can tackle all the tunnels simultaneously and quickly. But this is not the best posture if one is to launch a large offensive. The IDF would be well served if it were to withdraw even further and position the troops in a battle-ready posture. It makes no sense to stretch them thin by deploying them along the entire length of the border.

When it comes to prosecuting the next phase of the operation, there are alternatives to a total occupation of the Gaza Strip, although that option should not be taken off the table, and it should be executable within days or hours.

Israel can afford to hold off on an occupation because Hamas has not been able to inflict significant damage on the homefront — thanks to the Iron Dome aerial defense system — and the threat the organization poses will likely diminish as it runs out of rockets (I believe it currently has between half and a quarter of what it had when the fighting began). Such a course of action would also let Israel gather more intelligence on Hamas.

The IDF would have fewer casualties by disengaging the enemy (especially if the troops remain vigilant and scrupulously follow the necessary procedures). Even as it prepares for a ground invasion, the IDF must continue targeting Hamas with precision-guided munitions and pinpointed attacks.

Israel has much more staying power because it has been able to maintain its strength, unlike Hamas, which cannot resupply and make up for the various shortfalls. That is why the pullout has won across-the board support. Israelis see eye to eye on this tactical move, be they proponents of an all-out campaign to conquer Gaza because this is the only way to solve the problem, or advocates of a new arrangement with Hamas, knowing full well that it will most likely collapse in a few years. Widening the scope of the operation without pulling out first would have turned out to be a colossal error. It is a good thing this was averted.

Israel must provide Gazans with humanitarian relief because their situation is grave and will only worsen, primarily because Hamas has launched rockets from civilian sites, resulting in many Gazans being hurt after Israel targeted rocket launching sites, command posts, manufacturing facilities and arms depots.

The number of fatalities in Gaza will likely reach 2,000 because there are some dead Hamas fighters who are unaccounted for. Some 10,000 Gazans will have been injured by the end of the conflict, and the number of internally displaced persons, who will have nothing but rubble to return to, will be much higher than that.

This terrible tragedy is of Hamas’ own making. That said, Israel must not ignore it.

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