Commentary: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Options
Commentary: Understanding Iran’s Nuclear Breakout Options | The National Interest.
( Thanks, Artaxes… – JW )
In the UN General Assembly on October 1, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu described Iran’s strategy as to retain “sufficient nuclear material and sufficient nuclear infrastructure to race to the bomb at a time it chooses to do so.”
In general, there are three main conditions that will need to be present in order for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. First, Iran would need the technical capacity to produce a critical mass of the uranium isotope U-235 (about 25 kg of uranium enriched to 90%) or the plutonium isotope Pu-239 (about 8 kg of weapons-grade plutonium), develop a detonation mechanism, and a delivery method. Secondly, Iran would need to make a political decision to militarize the nuclear program. And third, no external actor must succeed with halting, delaying or destroying the nuclear program with neither military nor other means. The U.S. and Israel are the only two countries that have signaled willingness to conduct a military operation against Iran’s nuclear program.
Given the first two conditions, one critical question should be examined to derive Iran’s strategy to “race to the bomb at a time it chooses to do so”: How can Iran reduce the probability that a military operation would succeed (or even undertaken) after it has made the decision to break out for the bomb?
Iran can reduce the expected time frame between when the militarization process begins and when a nuclear bomb is produced, thereby reducing the time available to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Western intelligence agencies to detect the militarization and for political decision makers to undertake actions to stop it. Iran can reduce the time frame needed to acquire critical mass of enriched uranium to a minimum by stockpiling a large amount of uranium enriched to a level of near 20% and install more advanced and effective centrifuges. A small time frame would also have an internal effect on the Iranian decision-making and decision-undertaking. When the time from breakout to bomb is large, it is difficult to keep knowledge of the breakout secret within a limited group. It would then be time available for oppositionists in the regime (or workers at the facilities) to mobilize against the decision (or alert external actors). The opposite would be the case when the time frame is limited.
A successful Israeli military operation would in part rely on the ability to achieve surprise. However, since an Israeli operation might be triggered by the breakout itself, Iran would be able to dictate the terms. By reducing the time needed to produce critical mass of enriched uranium and coordinate the breakout with a larger military exercise, Israel’s ability to achieve the element of surprise would be reduced—and Israel would thus have an incentive to launch an attack before the breakout.
Iran can also reduce the utility of an intervention by finishing the heavy-water reactor in Arak and start operating it. A fully operational plutonium-producing reactor would be a politically sensitive target for any interventionist, since the civilian—and thus political—costs of bombing such a reactor would be quite large. If a military operation would leave the Arak reactor intact and only focus on the three other critical facilities in Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan, Iran could use the reactor for producing material for a nuclear bomb in the aftermath of the attack. In practice, this means that if a military operation is to be deployed, it should be conducted before the Arak reactor is operative. The attack on the Syrian al-Kibar reactor was reportedly triggered by similar concerns. Given the prize of achieving the immunizing effect of an operative reactor, Iran might be willing to temporarily suspend the enrichment program (or part of it) if a military intervention seems probable. In particular, a negotiated agreement where Iran is required to suspend its enrichment activity in Natanz and Fordow might be acceptable for the regime as long as the construction of the heavy water reactor in Arak is allowed to continue. An agreement of this kind might also provide Iran with more time to continue possible research concerning a detonation mechanism, warhead design, and delivery method. However, an interventionist would have an incentive to launch an attack before the reactor is operational, which means that its start-up date might trigger an operation against the other facilities as well. Iran’s strategists are probably thinking hard about how to make the reactor operative without anybody finding out until after its start-up date.
Iran would have an incentive to delay the construction of a reprocessing facility. Such a facility would be necessary to extract plutonium from the fuel rods used in the reactor. Iran has currently no known such facility with the capability to serve the Arak reactor, but would have an incentive to construct it after the reactor has gone critical. Constructing it now would just cause unnecessary friction with Western countries due to its probable military purpose.
Iran would also have an incentive to delay the breakout if it expects new defensive military means to be acquired or developed within a certain time frame. New acquisitions would increase Iran’s general defensive capacity, thereby reducing an interventionist’s ability to achieve a successful military operation. Iran has previously voiced its interest in the Russian-made S-300 anti-aircraft battery, though the Russians chose to halt the transfer of the system. Iran could be expected to delay the breakout if Russia would signal renewed interest in transferring this system or similar ones.
Lastly, Iran could choose to delay the breakout until the Syrian civil war is stabilized. Hezbollah, its main proxy against Israel, is currently participating in the conflict on the regime’s side. Should Israel undertake a military operation against the nuclear facilities at the current time, Iran would need to decide whether Hezbollah should focus on the Syrian civil war or a reprisal attack on Israel. By delaying the breakout until Hezbollah once again can focus its firepower on its southern enemy, Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel would be restored.
If Iran’s goal is to have the ability to produce nuclear weapons sometime in the future, it has several incentives to make concessions in the ongoing negotiations with the P5+1 countries. Careful thought should be given to what Iran’s breakout strategy might be—and how to obstruct it.
Thomas Saether is a Norwegian security analyst specializing in Middle Eastern affairs. He is a post-graduate of the MA program in Security Studies at Tel Aviv University.
WarSclerotic 
October 21, 2013 at 9:43 PM
Here is a creative idea about what Israel can do to create the necessary conditions for a military strike.
Taking the initiative
By Artaxes
It has long been complained that the Saudis have way to much influence in Europe because of the European dependency on Saudi money and on Saudi oil.
The Saudi influence in Europe is indeed way to great and it has found its expression in the rapid islamisation of Europe, the creeping indroduction of Sharia courts in Britain, the appeasement of Islam, the oppressive use of political correctness, the systematic disinformation about islam and the suppression of free speech.
All this is true. All this is bad.
But why not use Saudi influence for something good for a change?
Anyone who cares about the Iran/Israel conflict cannot fail to notice that the focus of discussion has been almost exclusively the Israeli military option and various scenarios.
This obvious neglicence of the diplomatic and options has come back to haunt us.
In the current situation the problem for Israel is not so much how to strike Iran militarily.
The problem is that the political circumstances (the appeasement negotiation with the West) make it diffcult for Israel to actually execute this plan and if it is actually executed the tremendous negative poltical consequences.
Israel cannot rely on the current US administration for support in the UN.
How could the Saudis help?
The Saudis have a shared interest with Israel to prevent a nuclear Iran and so they would love to see an Israeli strike on Iran.
Israel should seek the help of the Saudis who have a tremendous influence in Britain to use all their influence in Britain to ensure British support in the UN security council.
As permanent member of the security council Britain has the power to veto any anti-Israel UN resolution that no doubt would be put before the UN after any Israeli strike.
Israel should not wait passively but take the initiative to create the conditions that would enable a stríke.
October 21, 2013 at 11:30 PM
The Saudis wont do that and the Brits wont even look in that direction. As I already pointed out in my last comment here, only a decisive knock out delivered to Iran in the first seconds of the first round will bring peace of mind and dignity to Israel. Its the time for drastic and incisive action. The strongest will be honored in the middle east and in the world. How the blow will be executed is also of capital importance regarding the time and the outcome of the operation. Maximum assets in minimum of time, that will cut the Middle East Gordian Knot and will send Iran back in 1700.
October 22, 2013 at 7:57 AM
Yes here in the ME the rule is:
Tishtageiah-Tarviach.
Flip your lid-you win.
October 22, 2013 at 10:33 AM
Accurate.
October 22, 2013 at 1:52 PM
Would you care to tell us why the Saudis won’t do that?
Would you care to tell us why the Brits wont even look in that direction?
October 22, 2013 at 3:26 PM
The King of Saudi Arabia will not initiate any action that might put him in a light that ” he helps Israel ”. That will mean political suicide and roses to the Iranians. The King might look slightly – I said, slightly – in another direction when certain actions will take place close or into the Saudi air space, but not beyond that. And the Brits? Remember their last vote in the parliament, against the very PM of theirs. And I cannot see the Britons make any actions which might help Israel directly or indirectly, either. What I can see its a new funk song which title might be like: ” Britain? Who the fuck is Britain? ”
October 22, 2013 at 4:08 PM
Thanks for your very good explanation.
It makes a lot of sense if such things cannot be kept secret.
As for the Brits, I beg to differ.
I don’t think that their antipathy for Isarel is greater than their greed.
It all depends on the price.
Of course such deals would have to be totally secret.
October 22, 2013 at 6:16 PM
Artaxes, those Britons will never forget who expelled them from their beloved Palestine. May be you didn’t know – and like you, I too learned it – but there is an unfinished business between the ”jews” and the ”brits”, which may be considered from the end of the WWII, through the ”terrorists” attacks against the british rule in Palestine by the militants jews, the execution of jews activists by the brits and so on…Israel and Britain? An unspoken love song, sweet poetry, pure love with bombs, un- justice, terror, crimes and assassinates. And now, when the muslims conquest of Britain is almost complete and London is not London anymore, less than ever will be any british involvement in the region, with the exception of a nice and cozy agreement with Iran. And now, if we already have spoken so much about the ”New” Britain, I cannot finish my lines without pointing out how History is playing with the people, sometimes: Napoleon tried hard to finish the British Empire; he failed, being even defeated in his last battle by a british(!) general, the Duke of Wellington, at the Waterloo. Hitler tried even harder to terminate Britain, but Churchill was even tougher and won. But there is a factor who can finish Britain today, who can accomplish what any other else – but the Romans – didn’t accomplished, the conquer of Britain. This factor is Britain itself and it is working hard trying to finish itself.
October 23, 2013 at 8:34 PM
I’m aware of the ‘special relationship’ of the UK and Israel and of history.
And while this history does play a big role it is not the only motivating force.
Britains actions were not all anti-Israel/anti-Jewish and are not solely caused by this history.
Also we shouldn’t forget that it was the British Belfour declaration which was the first big step toward a Jewish state.
In recent history it was the UK which wanted to attack Syria, an action which by weakening the Iran axis would have been good for Israel.
I don’t see that Britain is fixated on hurting Israel at all costs even the loss of great economic opportunities.
October 23, 2013 at 9:16 PM
You are right, Britain is not fixed to hurt Israel, but Britain wont rise even a finger to help Israel intentionally and if, by chance, Britain will initiate something or should initiate something, it will be only if it is in its own interest; if Israel will also take any advantage of it, so be it. We don’t expect any help from Britain, don’t want any help from Britain and we are not angry for what bitches they are. All is ok, Israel will follow its own path. As it always did.
October 23, 2013 at 9:30 PM
If Israel is negotiating with ‘Palestinians’ with Jewish blood on their hands, I cannot see why this should be impossible.
I was thinking along the lines “make them an offer they can not refuse”.
Anyway, my ideas are for free. It’s up to the reader to make something out of them. That’s all.
October 23, 2013 at 10:01 PM
My dear friend, you got those palestinians- israeli negotiations thing totally wrong. There are no really negotiations between us. They were, once. And they finished with Oslo agreement which was a disaster for the jewish state and its people. Even Rabin’s murderer was one of the consequences of that disaster. Today? Negotiations? Where? Who? Its a show, put in scene by Netanyahu for getting rid of the american pressure. We are pretending that we are negotiating and Obama is pretending he is helping us. In fact, Bibi fucked Obama on this one and Obama returned the courtesy on that. What a fit couple are those two clowns, aren’t they? And, my friend, forget about the Brits and Israel together. Its not gonna happen. Not in this lifetime.
October 22, 2013 at 5:51 AM
The author left out Bushehr. There’s no need for them to finish Arak to produce plutonium given Bushehr is bigger and already fully operational.
Israel has their work cut out for them because any preemptive strike won’t be effective unless they go after Bushehr,
October 22, 2013 at 11:28 PM
A few things:
Brief research confirms that a soft water reactor, like Bushehr, cannot be used as a route to weapons.
Regulars may remember that Israel and Saudi Arabia have apparently already agreed on use of airspace and more extraordinary, landing and medical services for stricken planes. This can be explained away by flying “under the radar” to Iran and a boastful display of humanitarian superiority on the way back.
In light of three out of six big energy companies already raising domestic bills by an average of 10%, with the rest to follow suit, any action or inaction by the British government that further raises prices would be unthinkable, giving the Saudis enormous political currency.
October 23, 2013 at 1:09 PM
your are wrong about that plutonium thing. to difficult to explain, but take it from me you are wrong, it is possible
I can give you high tech documentation but it is a pain in the neck to read and understand it this is readable.
http://www.nci.org/i/ib32897c.htm.
October 23, 2013 at 1:10 PM
read this also
http://www.fas.org/rlg/980826-pu.htm
October 23, 2013 at 1:15 PM
and this
http://www.ccnr.org/plute.html
October 23, 2013 at 1:25 PM
I won,t go in to pu240 deuterium tritium fusion, but believe me a nice nuke can be build from power reactors PU, 239, 240 etc etc
Just a comment, dig into the burn up time from uranium in a reactor, pu 239 is there enough if you do not wait to long.
enough about this shit.
October 23, 2013 at 6:20 PM
I stand corrected, thank you.
October 23, 2013 at 10:20 PM
No thanks, it,s my pleasure
October 25, 2013 at 2:34 PM
Correct me if I’m wrong JW, but surely the raison d’etre of this blog is to educate, ergo I hope I wasn’t the only one who followed Joop’s links. I found the third particularly informative. I always welcome genuine erudition and consider supposition, but I refuse to be blinkered by a concept.
Pas op makker