WarSclerotic

The horrific news out of Syria, where forces loyal to President Bashar Assad used chemical weapons against civilians, is testament to the total breakdown and system-wide failure — not an individual, isolated lapse — that has crippled American foreign policy in its dealings with Damascus.

The fact that Assad saw fit to ignore President Barack Obama’s “red-line doctrine” linking American intervention with Syrian use of chemical arms in such a callous, lethal and brazen manner goes to show just how bankrupt and irrelevant U.S. influence and deterrence has become in the Middle Eastern theater.

The Syrian ruler has been accurate in his reading of the map. Furthermore, he isn’t the only one to have drawn the appropriate conclusions from the administration’s dawdling over the raging fires and challenges that are desperately waiting for a guiding American hand.

Over 60 years ago, American diplomacy was sucked into the political turmoil that engulfed China, a country that was in the throes of a brutal civil war that pitted the nationalists against the communists. In an effort to put an end to the fighting and establish a “national unity government,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his successor, Harry Truman, sent a number of their emissaries to the Asian colossus in an attempt to broker an agreement. This lengthy diplomatic gambit, however, was doomed to fail.

Unlike the traditions and ethos of Western democracies that rely on pragmatic and practical approaches to the diplomatic process, what took place in China was a vicious, ethnic clash between two movements that were polar opposites of one another from both a political and ideological standpoint. The philosophies that guided their behavior were light years from the principles of tolerance and compromise that were championed by the West.

It is hardly surprising that attempts to impose these codes of conduct within an entirely different cultural context crashed and burned, particularly in light of China’s rebellious “fight or die” attitude. The 1949 civil war ended with a victory by the communists, and the dreams of forming a vast coalition that would encompass all of the mainstream political streams turned out to be fantasy.

Nonetheless, Uncle Sam adhered to his exporting his values to the world and inculcating the outlines of his political system. He ignored the resounding failure in China, which was supposed to serve as a cautionary tale for an American leadership that ignored the danger of ethnocentric thinking. He also continued to stick to the belief that the American brand of democracy had the potential to serve as a light unto the nations.

Ever since the U.S. emerged as a superpower, it has never completely abandoned its hope to shape the world in the image of the fundamental principles that underlie the liberal democratic world. These principles could be characterized by a cockeyed optimism, an “every-problem-has-a-solution” approach that allows people to resolve moral disputes rationally and intelligently.

Just as the American administration naively believed that it was possible to slice the pie equitably in 1940s China, it is repeating this pattern in Afghanistan, where Washington believes the Taliban could be included in a government of national reconciliation. This scenario touted by “all the president’s men” is supposed to usher in a new era of stability in Afghanistan, despite the radical and fundamentalist nature of the Taliban regime which ruled the country from 1996 to 2001.

If we train our focus onto Egypt, we will once again see evidence of U.S. diplomacy’s farfetched goal of installing an effective carbon copy of Western-style democracy in Cairo.

The most glaring example of just how wrongheaded this approach turned out to be from a diplomatic and ideological standpoint is then-President John F. Kennedy’s policy toward Egyptian ruler Gamal Abdel Nasser in the early 1960s. The driving force behind that policy was the belief that a package of economic incentives would lay the foundations for the establishment of a pluralistic, democratic society in Egypt.

Not only did Kennedy believe that this carrot would serve as a confidence-building measure in his relationship with Nasser, but that it would also encourage the Egyptian leader to concentrate on domestic development, growth, and modernization. As a result, Kennedy was certain that this would dissuade Nasser from continuing to arm anti-Western movements in Aden, Oman, and Libya. Egypt wanted to assert its dominance in these areas at the expense of Western influence. Kennedy also thought this was the best way to veer Nasser onto a course of greater accommodation and moderation in his dealings with Israel.

Less than two years after this policy was formulated, the grand hopes harbored by the Americans died a grueling death in the dunes of the Middle Eastern desert. Egypt sent tens of thousands of soldiers to Yemen (where the monarchical government was overthrown in 1962) to take part in the civil war there alongside the military regime.

At the end of that year, Nasser escalated his moves on this front. He began bombardment of targets friendly to the Saudi monarchy. In the spring of 1963, reliable reports began to emerge regarding Egypt’s use of chemical weapons.

Flying in the face of Kennedy’s unbridled optimism and certainty that Nasser could be swayed by economic levers, Cairo intensified its military intervention in Yemen.

Nearly two decades after the Kennedy administration’s grand designs for Egypt collapsed and relations between Washington and Cairo reached a nadir during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, the song remained the same. This time it was President Jimmy Carter who scored a resounding failure on the Iranian front.

Despite the fact that the Carter administration refrained from sanctions against the Shah’s regime, it was Washington’s fierce, continued criticism of the Tehran government’s human rights violations and oppressive domestic policies that contributed mightily to the destabilization of the shah’s government and its eventual downfall in 1979.

We all know how this turned out. The shah’s place was taken by the hostile, radical, and anti-Western revolutionary regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini, and all the rest (including the severe damage to American and Western interests in the entire Middle East, which continues to accumulate to this very day) is history.

Despite the fact that these history lessons are in plain view for another liberal president to see — a “poor man’s Kennedy” who goes by the name Obama — the American march of folly continued onward, this time to Cairo.

Upon assuming the presidency in January 2009, Obama was determined to open a new, more conciliatory chapter with the Muslim world. He sought to offer an array of confidence-building gestures that would eventually lead the world to a utopia of moderation and pragmatic deal-making. Yet even before it was possible to gauge the practicality of this dramatic initiative (which was introduced to the world in the form of the Cairo speech delivered by the president on June 4, 2009), the Arab Spring burst onto the scene with a violent bang and completely reshuffled the deck.

Since the emergence of the Arab Spring, one would be hard-pressed to pinpoint one realistic, sober-minded move by the Obama administration in the region, particularly over Egypt. In light of the endless stream of mistakes and mishaps, one can only be sorry that famed historian Barbra Tuchman, who penned such classics as the unforgettable “The March of Folly,” is no longer with us. Otherwise, she would have been able to add an entire chapter about one of many follies that have been committed in Washington’s dealings with Cairo.

The explosion of the Arab Spring in the town squares of the Egyptian capital in the winter of 2011 and the slogans of democracy that were bandied about at the time fell on attentive ears in Washington. Like Kennedy, Obama quickly became convinced that a window of opportunity had presented itself, one which would allow him to advance the process of Western-style democratization in Egypt. He believed this despite the fact that Egyptian society and its institutions had not undergone the requisite moral metamorphosis necessary for a democracy to take root.

The administration was completely blinded by its own lofty rhetoric, which supporters of the revolution used in their struggle to bring down Hosni Mubarak’s regime. That was when the U.S. decided to abandon its longtime, reliable ally. As it did with Iran during the waning days of the Shah’s government, the U.S. repeated its stance 30 years later in the Egyptian context. There is no doubt that Mubarak acted with aggression against his political rivals, and that his regime bore none of the hallmarks of democratic governance.

From a geostrategic standpoint, on the other hand, the tremendous, years-long contribution that Mubarak, as a pivotal member of the moderate Sunni camp, made to Western security cannot be disputed. Nonetheless, despite his status as a valued asset, the Egyptian president was left to his own devices.

This American tragedy continued after the Egyptian elections, when Obama gave his stamp of approval to the man who ascended to the top office, Mohammed Morsi.

The fact that the new president did not even bother to internalize the essence and the spirit of democratic governance and instead worked tirelessly to tighten his grip on power while at the same time cutting the opposition down to size did not prompt the White House to reassess its support of the Muslim Brotherhood-led government.

Since Morsi’s government was removed from power six weeks ago by the military (which espouses an avowedly pro-Western orientation), it appears the White House has yet to recover from the shock of what is perceived as Egypt’s regression to the pre-democratic era. The administration’s attitude to the new strongman in Cairo, General Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi, is chilly, even bordering on hostile.

Not a day goes by without Washington complaining to the new regime about its behavior. The most recent dustup came as a result of the decision to arrest Muslim Brotherhood chief Mohammed Badie.

Big Brother is angry

Yes, Sissi’s regime employs violence against its opposition. The images from Cairo, particularly from last weekend, jolted American public opinion, particularly among members of Congress from both parties. Nonetheless, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that not only is the administration held hostage to its uncompromising commitment to democratic procedure (through which Morsi came to power), as if that was the be all and end all, but it is also showing signs of fatigue.

The astonishing statements of Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, who admitted that the administration’s levers of influence in Egypt are limited, reflect more than anything else this level of attrition as well as a sense of helplessness in light of the unfolding events. Obama’s America, which is exhausted from its experiences on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, is desperate to return home and close itself off to the rest of the world to the greatest extent possible, even if the price to be paid is abandoning its position in the Middle East.

One cannot ignore the rising tide of criticism coming from Capitol Hill which is closely observing the events in Egypt. Still, it is hard to foresee a scenario in which American lawmakers try to usurp the responsibility of shaping U.S. foreign policy from the Obama administration, particularly in light of the fact that Egypt is hardly a central issue on the Congressional agenda.

George Kennan, the legendary diplomat who first articulated the Cold War doctrine of containment, was highly critical of Kennedy during the his stint as ambassador to Yugoslavia in the 1960s. Kennan was angry over the administration’s decision to impose sanctions on the regime of Josip Tito following a number of anti-Western statements uttered by the Yugoslav leader.

Kennan simply could not fathom how Kennedy capitulated to congressional pressure, resulting in the abandonment of vital, strategic American interests. In his view, these interests, chief among them were strengthening Tito’s relatively independent position within the Eastern bloc, were needlessly sacrificed on the altar of a philosophical and ideological argument that was largely devoid of significant content. One could assume that if Kennan were alive today, he, like Tuchman, would express frustration at the lack of realism in the Obama administration’s thought process.

The White House hastened to deny statements made by the liberal senator from Vermont, Patrick Leahy, who revealed that the administration decided to suspend the remainder of military aid it was to deliver to Egypt this year. The very fact that this issue was raised highlights the depths of the absurdity we are witnessing. That is because the most worthwhile step was to grant legitimacy to the new regime by way of increasing aid from its current levels.

Indeed, as the new government in Cairo tries to solidify its domestic standing while struggling to fight off the fundamentalist, radical forces aligned against it, it is at the same time forced to cope with an angry, confrontational America that continues to ignore the enormously important strategic windfall it inherited and which will benefit the entire region. This windfall is the result of Egypt’s reassuming its position as head of the moderate Sunni camp.

Drifting toward chaos

Not only does Obama’s chilly attitude toward Sissi encourage the radical jihadi camp in the entire region, but the freezing of aid (even if temporarily) could have a direct impact on Israel. That is because the aid package to Egypt was a central component in the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, and it has always been viewed as an expression of Washington’s obligation to that agreement.

Any harm done to this aspect could be the clearest indication yet of Obama’s America’s wish to disengage from the region and disavow the main cornerstone of American policy in this part of the world. At this stage, one can only wait and see whether the American hegemon will finally adopt an approach that is less naive and more sober-minded over what is happening in Egypt, and whether it will change its priorities and areas of focus.

This question becomes more relevant in light of the endless bloodletting in Syria, with the latest reports indicating that massive use of chemical weapons caused the deaths of over 1,000 people this week. The events there should highlight to Obama the importance of Egypt as an avowedly pro-Western player in a region that is replete with threats and dangers posed by radicalism and chaos.

After all, Egypt is a major player that is supposed to first and foremost advance the political, economic and security interests of the U.S. It is not Egypt’s role to serve as a preacher to advocate moral norms that are mostly in the realm of a utopia that is hopelessly disjointed from reality.