Off Topic: Britain refused Israel military equipment for fear it would add to ‘internal repression’
( What’s there to say? Beyond FUCK the UK… – JW )
From January 2008 to December 2012, Britain rejected 52 Israeli requests to buy military equipment, citing concerns it could contribute to Arab-Israeli conflict, damage regional stability.
3Britain refused to provide Israel with certain types of military equipment in recent years out of fears there was a “risk of their use for internal repression” and a “risk of contributing to internal tensions or conflict in the recipient country.” The equipment, Britain worried, might also damage “regional stability” or be transferred from Israel due to the “risk of diversion or re-export to undesirable end-users.”
From January 2008 to December 2012, Britain rejected 52 Israeli requests to buy military or dual-use equipment (which can be used for both civilian and military purposes), according to a new report by the the British government’s Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. The department oversees security exports and publishes regular reports on permits granted or denied to purchase arms, military equipment or civilian items that are monitored because they can be put to security uses.
The British rejected requests for, among other things, the purchase of engines and other items for patrol boats; components for artillery shells; military communications equipment; airplane engines; parts for combat helicopters, military aircraft navigation systems and electronic warfare; components for explosives; protective suits and demolition equipment; detonators and other equipment for explosives; software for protecting planes against missiles; cryptography equipment; parts for airborne radars; chemicals and specialty metals.
Britain is not the only country that has refused to supply Israel with military equipment out of fears it will be used for repression or aggravate the regional conflict. The Dutch government, which sells only a small amount of military equipment to Israel, rejected a request to purchase night vision systems for the Israel Prisons Service and the police’s rescue unit in 2010. In 2009 the Dutch refused to sell thermal imaging components for a missile launching system to Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, and night vision components to Elbit.
The Netherlands also refused to supply Israel Military Industries with aluminum parts for a missile launching system that was intended for export to Rwanda and Azerbaijan. Elbit asked to purchase camouflage paint in Holland for unmanned aerial vehicles, but was refused.
Haaretz reported Tuesday that according to the British report on the supervision of security exports, Israel sought to export items to Muslim countries with which it does not have diplomatic ties.
According to the report, in 2011 Israel sought to purchase British components to export radar systems to Pakistan, as well as electronic warfare systems, Head-up Cockpit Displays (HUDs), parts for fighter jets and aircraft engines, optic target acquisition systems, components of training aircraft, and military electronic systems. In 2010, Israel applied for permits to export electronic warfare systems and HUDs with components from Britain to Pakistan.
Also in 2010, Israel sought permits to supply Egypt and Morocco with Israeli electronic warfare systems and HUD systems that use British parts.
Pakistan denied Tuesday that its military had purchased equipment from Israel. A spokesman from the media wing of the Pakistani military said the report was baseless. The British report states that Israel requested the equipment purchases intended for Pakistan in August 2011.
Explore posts in the same categories: Uncategorized
WarSclerotic 
June 12, 2013 at 8:36 PM
Yep, you gotta admit. Dem Joos really know how to repress people. Yea…right. Ask the the English Defense League about repression in light of their protests against the muslims in Britain.
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/mosques-attacked-london-250-angry-members-english-defence-league-threw-rocks-fought-police-area-woolwich-arsenal-scene-beheading-attack-article-1.1352575
June 12, 2013 at 9:26 PM
Leave the brits alone…….they are going down the drain anyway and Israel will make this equipment themselves and Israel will make it better than the brits did. Afterwards Israel will be able to sell this
stuff too and the brits – they will say oi wei……….
Blessed is he who blesses Israel – cursed is he who curses Israel !
Thats how it was, how it is and how it will be for ever and ever !
June 12, 2013 at 9:38 PM
The Great Britain is not so great anymore. Yes, back in the days of the Golden Age, the victory against the spanish Armada, the stand against Hitler…yes, a glorious past. But, the british had behave in a very bad manner regarding the jews, from the beginning. And the same nasty people of Avraham, our father, caused them to abandon the ”Palestine” and ”let those arabs and jews kill one each other”. That was a defeat, a bitter one. That, the brits, will never forget.
June 12, 2013 at 10:05 PM
They went farther then that, in 1948 they gave Jordan the green light to annex the westbank.
June 13, 2013 at 2:17 PM
Don’t steal our tech you got caught to many time reverse engineering it that’s the reason and that only,your lucky to get f35s and dont forget the UK can stop that sale whenever it wants it tales just one email,Britain isent great anymore well just to let you know were a major military power that’s 50 years ahead of Israel and writhing stuff like this only convinces Cameron to pull back more,he may even start taking the other EU states line,posting this stuff about your allies makes the politicians say i told you so,we have to distance ourselves more,and your in real shit at the moment on the verge of being wiped out i would stick to calling your enemy’s and not your allies as one morning if you keep this up you may well find yourselves alone and without any arms supporters
June 13, 2013 at 6:22 PM
With the use of PRISM it’s not entirely impossible that Cameron is pissed off by comments on Warsclerotic.
I’ll test this hypothesis. F*** you Mr. Cameron.
June 12, 2013 at 9:55 PM
While antisemitism may be a part of their motivation I think their main motivation is cowardice.
The British goverment fears not so much “internal tensions” in the Middle East but they fear “internal tensions” in Britain.
They are increasingly afraid of the jihadists in their midst and do everything to appease them.
June 13, 2013 at 7:24 PM
prism does not copy text only interactions its and as i said it for one reason and one only israel caught backward engineering British tech Cameron has no say in it,its as simple as that stealing your allies tech is unacceptable,and your leader has done untold damage to israel which is something ours has not araxes,anti antisemitism what bollocks
June 13, 2013 at 8:17 PM
I don’t consider reverse engineering stealing.
If you buy something and open it to see how it works, is that stealing?
You mean to tell me that other countries don’t try to find out how the things that they buy work?
So you think, antisemitism does not exist in Britaiin? Bollocks?
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/1493/is-britain-anti-semitic
The disgusting reaction of Cameron and the British state to the murder of the soldier by the two jihadis proves my point.
June 13, 2013 at 9:41 PM
well taxes i am arguing with a friend so i wont be horrid,but i have to say that your country is totally antisemitic and you have proved its yourself over the last year by the myriad of articles you have posted about the Obama administrations antisemitism,and the fact that 60% of Americans voted for Obama,shows that’s 60% of Americans are antisemitic,i don’t need to spend all afternoon scraping the bottom of the barrel looking for something about American antisemitism,because you have spent the last year posting it here for me,,,lol
June 13, 2013 at 10:02 PM
Utter nonsense….
I voted for Obama when he first ran. Am I antisemitic?
I understand your love of your country and your desire to defend it. Furthermore, I don’t believe that antisemitism is endemic in the UK public. At issue are the actions of the government.
The UK gov makes the Obama administration look like AIPAC.
It has no more to do with you than with me. Amorality is the special province of international relations.
Justice… We have to call a spade a spade. Even when it’s destroying our own back yard.
June 13, 2013 at 11:31 PM
Thanks for keeping it this way.
Even if you were right and the majority of my comments did accuse obavez of being an antisemite this would not prove that the Americans are antisemites.
Even by your logic you are wrong because you should know that obavez was only voted by the majority of the voters and not by the majority of Americans.
Moreover a goverment does not necesserily reflect the views and wishes of the people that elected it.
Polls show consistently that a there are more Americans who identify themselves as conservative than those who identify themselves as liberal.
And so if I critcize a goverment I don’t criticize a people as a whole.
This is something that you seem to misunderstand.
If you cannot admit, that you are ruled by a worthless and spineless political class that has chosen to appease Islam and throw the British culture into the toilet you can never change this.
The fact that I say this does not mean that I hate the British people and I know for a fact that many Brits are disgusted by their own goverment and political elite.
By the way, I’m not an American and my name is Artaxes and not Taxes. Let’s keep it civilized and respectful.
Ok Justice. Have a nice evening.
June 13, 2013 at 11:36 PM
what i told you is the reason that only you got caught,Cameron is a Islamo butt kisser,but generally people here are very pro Israel,Cameron has really no say in it,its Whitehall who run the country not the government,in that respect,they have categorical proof,Britain created Israel in no world would we ever wish to destroy it,half the aristocracy are partly jewish.Half of Churchill’s family are Jewish,the antisemities are foreigners not English and a very small minority of left and right wing nutters
June 13, 2013 at 11:46 PM
Anyway JW your an anti Semite by your own admission for voting for Obama,lol here is his latest revelation just read it it will make you wonder why you did it as i would never vote for the piece of crap we call a leader
http://nation.foxnews.com/2013/06/13/obamas-snooping-excludes-mosques
June 13, 2013 at 11:56 PM
And I thought I’d puked my last over voting for Obama. Wow…. UGH!!!!!
June 12, 2013 at 10:03 PM
Man that sounds very 1948 like.
October 1, 2013 at 10:50 AM
The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran include the IRIA and the IRGC and the Law Enforcement Force
These forces total about 945,000 active personnel (not including the Law Enforcement Force. All branches of armed forces fall under the command of General Headquarters of Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics is responsible for planning logistics and funding of the armed forces and is not involved with in-the-field military operational command.
Iran’s military was called the Middle East’s most powerful by General John Abizaid, Commander, United States Central Command . However, General Abizaid said he did not include the Israel Defense Forces as they did not fall into his area of operations.
Revolutionary Iran was taken by surprise, by the Iraqi invasion that began the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988. During this conflict, there were several confrontations with the United States. From 1987, the United States Central Command sought to stop Iranian mine-laying vessels from blocking the international sea lanes through the Persian Gulf in Operation Prime Chance. The operation lasted until 1989. On April 18, 1988, the U.S. retaliated for the Iranian mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)in Operation Praying Mantis. Simultaneously, the Iranian armed forces had to learn to maintain and keep operational, their large stocks of U.S.-built equipment and weaponry without outside help, due to American sanctions. Reaching back on equipment purchased from the U.S.A. in the 1970s, the Iranians began establishing their own armaments industry; their efforts in this remained largely unrecognised internationally, until recently. However, Iran was able to obtain limited amounts of American-made armaments, when it was able to buy American spare parts and weaponry for its armed forces, during the Iran-Contra affair. At first, deliveries came via Israel and later, from the USA.
The Iranian government established a five-year rearmament program in 1989 to replace worn-out weaponry from the Iran-Iraq war. Iran spent $19 billion between 1989 and 1992 on arms. Iran ordered weapons designed to prevent other naval vessels from accessing the sea, including submarines and long-range Soviet planes capable of attacking aircraft carriers.
A former military-associated police force, the Iranian Gendarmerie, was disbanded in 1990.
In 1991, the Iranian armed forces received a number of Iraqi aircraft fleeing from the Persian Gulf war of that year; most of which were incorporated into the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force.
From 2003, there have been repeated U.S. and British allegations that Iranian forces have been covertly involved in the Iraq War. In 2007, Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces also took prisoner Royal Navy personnel when a boarding party from HMS Cornwall (F99)was seized in the waters between Iran and Iraq, in the Persian Gulf.
According to Juan Cole, Iran has never launched an “aggressive war” in modern history, and its leadership adheres to a doctrine of “no first strike”.The country’s military budget is the lowest per capita in the Persian Gulf region besides the UAE.
Since 1979, there are no foreign military bases present in Iran. According to Article 146 of the Iranian Constitution, the establishment of any foreign military base in the country is forbidden, even for peaceful purposes.
Iranian military doctrine constitutes a unique hybrid of western (especially U.S.) military concepts coupled with ideological tenets, including martyrdom and revolutionary zeal. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian military doctrine has continued to evolve and adapt with the regime’s shifting threat perceptions and regional political developments.
Iran’s armed forces have tailored their war-fighting strategies to counter technologically superior adversaries, such as the United States. Tacitly acknowledging it has little chance of winning a conventional force-on-force conflict, Iran has opted for deterrence-based model of attrition warfare that raises an opponent’s risks and costs, rather than reducing its own. The goal is to inflict a psychological defeat that inhibits an enemy’s willingness to fight.
Asymmetric warfare plays a central role in Iranian military theory. Iran’s armed forces appear to be focusing on the development of niche capabilities that play to Iranian strengths—manpower, strategic depth and a willingness to accept casualties—while exploiting the weaknesses of Iran’s adversaries, who are regarded as risk averse, casualty sensitive and heavily dependent on technology and regional basing facilities for access.
Doctrine evolution
The basis of Iranian military doctrine was developed during Iran’s long and traumatic war with Iraq (1980-1988). Most senior officers are veterans of the “imposed war,” which has had a major influence on Iranian strategic thinking. Concepts such as self-reliance, “holy defense,” and export of the revolution first entered the military lexicon during the Iran-Iraq War and were codified as doctrine in the early 1990s. These ideas mingled with concepts from pre-revolutionary doctrine, which was heavily influenced by the United States, to form a unique hybrid that distinguished modern Iranian military doctrine from its largely Soviet-inspired counterparts in the Arab world.
After the war, Tehran gradually scaled back its efforts to export its revolution. As its foreign policy goals shifted, Iran’s national security strategy also became more defensive. Iranian military strategists began to pay more attention to the principles of modern maneuver warfare, such as combined and joint operations. In the mid-1990s, there was even talk about merging the IRGC with the regular military, the Artesh, to alleviate the command and control-related problems of having two parallel military services operating in tandem. Iran’s military capabilities still lagged behind its doctrine, but by the end of the decade, its forces were gradually evolving into professional, Western-style militaries.
The 9/11 attacks and U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan led Tehran to reconsider the trajectory of its armed forces. The regional security environment had changed drastically. Ba’athist Iraq and Taliban Afghanistan—two of Iran’s main rivals—were no longer a threat. But the United States suddenly had troops positioned along both its western and eastern flanks. This confluence of events, coupled with rumblings in Washington about opportunities for regime change, led Tehran to reassess its national security strategy. Iran’s armed forces began to tailor their strategies specifically to counter the perceived U.S. threat.
Land warfare doctrine
In 2005, the IRGC announced that it was incorporating a flexible, layered defense —referred to as a mosaic defense—into its doctrine. The lead author of this plan was General Mohammad Jafari, then director of the IRGC’s Center for Strategy, who was later appointed commander of the IRGC.
As part of the mosaic defense, the IRGC has restructured its command and control architecture into a system of 31 separate commands—one for the city of Tehran and 30 for each of Iran’s provinces. The primary goal of restructuring has been to strengthen unit cohesion at the local level and give commanders more latitude to respond to potential threats—both foreign and domestic. But the new structure would also make it difficult for hostile forces to degrade Iranian command and control, a lesson the Iranian military has learned by analyzing U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans.
The mosaic defense plan allows Iran to take advantage of its strategic depth and formidable geography to mount an insurgency against invading forces. Most of Iran’s population centers and major lines of communication are spread out within the interior of the country. Iran’s borders are ringed by rugged mountain ranges that serve as natural barriers to invasion. As enemy supply lines stretched into Iran’s interior, they would be vulnerable to interdiction by special stay-behind cells, which the IRGC has formed to harass enemy rear operations.
The Artesh, a mix of armored, infantry and mechanized units, would constitute Iran’s initial line of defense against invading forces. IRGC troops would support this effort, but they would also form the core of popular resistance, the bulk of which would be supplied by the Basij, the IRGC’s paramilitary volunteer force. The IRGC has developed a wartime mobilization plan for the Basij, called the Mo’in Plan, according to which Basij personnel would augment regular IRGC units in an invasion scenario.
IRGC and Basij exercises have featured simulated ambushes on enemy armored columns and helicopters. Much of this training has been conducted in an urban environment, suggesting that Iran intends to lure enemy forces into cities where they would be deprived of mobility and close air support. Iran has emphasized passive defense measures—techniques used to enhance the battlefield survivability —including camouflage, concealment and deception.
Naval doctrine
Tehran views maritime combat operations much the same way as it views land-based operations. Iranian naval doctrine is geared toward confronting a technologically superior adversary—often assumed to be the U.S. Navy—with a form of guerrilla warfare at sea. The bases of this doctrine were developed during the Tanker War (1984-1988), during which Iran used aircraft, speedboats, sea mines and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles to attack civilian tanker shipping in the Persian Gulf. After a U.S. frigate, the Samuel B. Roberts, was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, the U.S. Navy retaliated with Operation Praying Mantis (1988), destroying two Iranian oil platforms and sinking several Iranian surface vessels, including a corvette, a guided missile patrol craft and smaller gunboats.
After Operation Praying Mantis, Iran apparently determined that its maritime forces would not be as effective in a conventional force-on-force naval conflict with adversaries such as the United States. Incorporating lessons learned from the Tanker War, the IRGC Navy (IRGCN) and, to a lesser degree, the regular Navy (IRIN) developed an asymmetric strategy based on avoiding direct or sustained confrontations at sea. It instead relies on surprise attacks, ambushes and hit-and-run operations. Rather than inflict a decisive defeat, Iran’s maritime forces would seek to inflict enough causalities to raise the cost of victory to an unpalatable level.
Iran’s naval doctrine relies on a layered defense and massing of firepower, integrating multiple sea, land and air-based weapons simultaneously to overwhelm and confuse adversaries. As Iran’s naval doctrine has matured, the Iranians have acquired a large inventory of naval materiel suitable for asymmetric warfare. This includes naval mines, which can be covertly deployed using small boats or commercial vessels; land and sea-based anti-ship cruise missiles; small fast-attack craft, which can engage in swarming operations or suicide attacks; and submarines, including three Russian-supplied KILO-class diesel-electric submarines and numerous North Korean and domestically produced midget submarines, which can be used in the Gulf’s shallow areas.
Geography is a key element in Iranian naval planning. The Gulf’s confined space, which is less than 100 nautical miles wide in many places, limits the maneuverability of large surface assets, such as aircraft carriers. But it plays to the strengths of Iran’s naval forces, especially the IRGCN. The Gulf’s northern coast is dotted with rocky coves ideally suited for terrain masking and small boat operations. The Iranians have also fortified numerous islands in the Gulf that sit astride major shipping lanes.
Iran has developed a strategy to deny hostile navies access to the Persian Gulf that focuses on the strategically sensitive Strait of Hormuz. This strategic maritime chokepoint is only 29 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point. Iranian officials have hinted that they might close the strait during a conflict, thereby temporarily cutting off as much as 30 percent of the world’s oil supply. But closing the strait would also cause tremendous economic damage for the Iranians, so they are not likely to undertake such a measure lightly. Given the strait’s importance, however, disrupting maritime traffic in it or even threatening to do so would be an effective tool for Iran to pressure neighbors and intimidate foes.
Air and air defense doctrine
Iranian air and air defense doctrine is focused on defending Iranian airspace and deterring aggression, although certain Iranian aircraft, such as the Su-24 fighter-bomber, can be used in an offensive capacity. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and interceptor aircraft—most of which belong to the regular Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF)—both play an important role in this effort. Iran’s pilots are among the best trained in the region. They continue to use U.S. training manuals and employ U.S. tactics—a legacy of U.S.-Iranian military exchanges during the shah’s rule.
The IRIAF and the Air Defense Force, a separate command within the Artesh, face numerous challenges in defending Iranian air space. In this case, geography is a limiting factor, given the size of Iran and its mountainous terrain, which tend to produce gaps in radar coverage. For the IRIAF, aging and outdated equipment remains another problem. Many aircraft in the IRIAF’s inventory, including mainstays such as the F-14A and the F-4D, were supplied by the United States before the 1979 revolution. Some of these platforms have been kept running, either by cannibalizing parts from other aircraft or procuring spare parts on the black market, but IRIAF readiness levels are assumed to be low due to maintenance issues.
Iran has managed to acquire several batteries of the advanced Tor-M1 medium altitude SAM system from the Russians, but its air defense capabilities remain limited. As of mid-2010, efforts to buy the advanced long-range SA-300 SAM from the Russians had failed. Iran also lacks an integrated air defense network or the ability to engage air-to-air targets beyond visual range.
As a result of these challenges, Iran’s military has opted to use its limited air and air defense assets to protect high-value point targets, including Tehran and the country’s nuclear facilities. Iranian pilots have been trained to compensate for the limitations of their aircraft, avionics and weapons systems by using advanced tactics, such as terrain masking, to ambush enemy aircraft without being detected. Iran’s air and air defense forces have also attempted to augment the survivability of their units with passive defense measures, including asset dispersion and the use of forward operating bases, hardened shelters and hidden installations.
Ballistic missile doctrine
Iran’s ballistic missile program dates back to the middle of the 1980s, during the Iran-Iraq War. For Tehran, Iraq’s use of ballistic missiles against Iranian strategic targets highlighted a critical vulnerability in Iran’s defenses; it also demoralized Iran’s civilian population. To deter Iraq from attacking its population centers and strategic industries, Iran initiated its own ballistic missile program, beginning with the initial shipment of a limited number of SCUD-B missiles from Libya. By the end of the war, Iran had launched over 100 ballistic missiles at Iraqi targets in what would become known as the “War of the Cities.”
Iran’s strategic missile forces are now key to its deterrence strategy, in part because they are implicitly linked to Iran’s weapons of mass destruction programs. In 2010, Iran had the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East. The IRGC, which has operational control over Iran’s missile forces, continues to extend the range and improve the performance of its ballistic missiles, several classes of which can range Israel and the Gulf countries. Their limited accuracy suggests they would not be useful in a conventional counter-force role. Instead, they are probably intended for strategic targets such as cities, oil production and export facilities, ports and water desalinization plants.
The future
Iranian military doctrine is primarily defensive in nature and based on deterring perceived adversaries. Iran is therefore unlikely to seek a direct, force-on-force confrontation with the United States.
However, there is ample room for miscommunication between Iranian and U.S. forces at the tactical and operational levels. The recent push to decentralize command and control within the IRGC could have unintended consequences in terms of escalation, especially in the Persian Gulf.
For the foreseeable future, lack of coordination between the IRGC and the Artesh is likely to remain a key weak point in terms of Iranian military planning, due to underlying structural issues and institutional rivalries.