Could Tuesday’s Explosion at a Chemical Research Facility be a Setback in Iran’s ICBM Program?

Could Tuesday’s Explosion at a Chemical Research Facility be a Setback in Iran’s ICBM Program? > New English Review.

Site of Raja-Shimi Military Chemical Plant Blast on 5-7-13

in Green and 11-2011 site of Bidganeh Missile test facility in Red.

Source: Goggle Earth

Israel Defense, reported on the massive explosions Tuesday at the  Raja-Shimi military chemical research facility near Tehran.  Those explosions were clearly heard across the capital of the Islamic Republic.

Ronen Solomon of Israel Defense noted in his article, “Explosion at Iranian Military Chemical Complex,”   that the explosions occurred not far from the Missile test facility that blew up under mysterious circumstances in November 2011.   See our Iconoclast post in early December 2011.

Solomon noted:

The explosions that occurred two days ago apparently destroyed a facility suspected throughout the past decade as part of an Iranian program for developing chemical weapons and producing fuel for surface-to-surface missiles.

Three explosions heard in the area of the Bidganeh area west of Tehran were reported briefly on Tuesday. While the Iranian regime is trying to hush the matter, it can be determined now that the blast occurred at 14:00 in the Raja-Shimi chemical industrial complex, which is affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Defense and deals in the production of chemical materials for military use.

Opposition officials have reported that considerable damage was caused to the facility and the authorities have instructed local teams not to discuss the number of casualties at the scene. . . The factory processes different types of chemicals that can also be used to produce fuel for surface-to-surface missiles. This morning, the Iranian Deputy Interior Minister for Security Affairs Ali Abdullahi explained that the reason for the explosions that were heard well in the area of Tehran was a controlled and planned detonation of old ammunition.

Does the Iranian version sound familiar? This was also the version that Iranian authorities stated immediately after the November 2011 blast that rocked the military complex near the village of Bidganeh.  . . .Days later it was revealed that the blast took place at the center of a missile research center which developed solid engine fuel for long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The blast, which was caused during an advanced solid engine fuel test, eradicated the center and resulted in the deaths of 17 of center’s people, including General Hassan Tehrani, the head of Iran’s missile program.

The facility presently being reported is located, at a distance of two kilometers from the former missile research center .
. ..  Iran’s Minister of Defense, General Ahmad Vahidi, and his deputy, General Majid Bokaei, have discussed Iran’s breakthrough in the development of the Sejil ballistic missile, which can reach any target in Israel as well as portions of the European continent. The Sejil is a two-stage ballistic missile propelled by solid fuel, and Iran is striving to extend its range.

In our December 2011 Iconoclast article we drew attention to a possible source of the explosions:

Israeli missile expert Uzi Rubin in our NER article on The Iranian Missile Threat noted that the alumina powder used for mix of solid fuel propellant was delivered by the Chinese, who, along with the Russians on the UN Security Council objected to revelations about technology transfer. Along with Gen. Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam the head of Iran’s missile test program and 17 other Iranians killed in the ‘accident’ there have been reports that a number of North Koreans present at the test facility were killed as well. That is analogous to the IAF 2007 raid on the Syrian nuclear bomb factory when there was documented evidence of North Korean technicians present at the destroyed site.

We contrasted New York Times with our own speculations about what could have triggered the 2011 and perhaps these 2013 explosions at the military chemical research facility:

As to the New York Times authors’ speculation that the missile test site could have been possibly taken out by a weapon launched from a UAV drone with long endurance loitering capabilities.  It might also be evidence that the threat of the Iranian solid propellant ICBM program had crossed red lines to those involved in that “attack.” Perhaps, the new variant of Stuxnet, Duqu, might have been able to destabilize the production programs for the solid propellant triggering the “accident.”  If the latter is the case, then that would be a remarkable achievement.

This does put a crimp in Iran’s delivery means. The liquid fuel Shahab III missiles require too much set up time, detectable by over the horizon radar, while the solid fuel missiles can be launched from underground silos without much warning time. The explosions at the Iranian missile test site also call into question the May NIE 2009 assessment that Iran wouldn’t have ICBMs until mid-decade. This is akin to the 2007 NIE assessment about Iran’s stop and re-start of their nuclear program.

Taking out the solid fuel propellant used for the Shejil-2 BM-25 solid fuel missiles would put a real crimp in their missile development program. That could delay the deployment of the land-based ICBMs in protected silos around Tabriz  capable of delivering both conventional and nuclear warheads.

Note the assertions of the Iranian Deputy Minister of Defense  at a memorial for those killed in the 2011 blast reported by Israel Defense:

This week, Deputy Minister Bokaei discussed the advanced development of solid fuel (a development that was halted in the wake of the 2011 explosion) and promised to reveal the accomplishment soon. Bokaei spoke during a memorial ceremony for one of the operatives who died in the November 2011 explosion at the missile base.

Two explosions two years apart within  a few kiloomters of one another is not a coincidence.  It  may perhaps have been a covert attack.  That attack  could disable the Islamic Republic’s  development of their own version of the North Korean BM-25’s. Missles capable of hitting targets throughout Europe and Israel. At issue is whether Israel had the means of accomplishing that remotely, whether via a kamikaze drone attack or a Stuxnet malworm triggering the devastating explosions that occurred on Tuesday.

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One Comment on “Could Tuesday’s Explosion at a Chemical Research Facility be a Setback in Iran’s ICBM Program?”

  1. incaunipocrit's avatar incaunipocrit Says:

    Reblogged this on The Blogspaper.


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